[comp.sys.ibm.pc.misc] Dial-in security

srm@dimacs.rutgers.edu (Scott R. Myers) (07/16/90)

I have an interesting problem I am hoping someone can offer a solution to.
I have a client that wishes to have remote dial-in to his system with PC's.
He is security conscience and wants to set up a dial in disk with the phone
number and password information setup in a script.  Now here comes the
challenge.  He doesn't want anyone to read the information on the disk.  The
only way I could imagine doing this is to copy protect the disk after its
created.  This brings up a couple of questions for me.

1) Can you copy protect a bootable diskette.
2) Will this method provide a suitable deterent for the average user.
3) What products are available to do this with.

Another possibility would be a communications package that would allow
encryption of the script in execution so no one but the person with the
password can examine/modify the script only use it.

Any help you can give me concerning this issue would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you.  Scott R. Myers
-- 

				Scott R. Myers

Snail:	1418 Kerbaugh St			Phone: (215)225-1622(HOME)
	Philadelphia, PA 19140

Arpa:	srm@topaz.rutgers.edu			Uucp: ..!topaz!srm

		"... No matter where you go, there you are ..."

			   "... Ha! I kill me ..."

				 >>>2 Hype<<<

swh@hpcupt1.HP.COM (Steve Harrold) (07/17/90)

The poster asks about securing phone numbers and passwords on a distribution
(bootable) diskette.

It seems to me that this is ultimately a hopeless task.  Whether or not
the data is encrypted, it will eventually appear as clear text at the
COM1 port, and thus can be eavesdropped by a capable "cracker".

A better solution would be the use of a call-back system, whereby the user
dials the target computer, enters a password, and then hangs up.
If the caller is successfully authenticated, the computer will
dial the caller back at a pre-arranged phone number.  Even if the 
dial-in phone number and/or password is breached, the "cracker" would still
have to be physically located at the pre-arranged call-back phone.

This obviously costs more than a mere dial-in facility, but the poster
did say that his client was "security conscious".  

cjp@beartrk.beartrack.com (CJ Pilzer) (07/25/90)

While call back systems are better than open modems, they do have a failing 
in that there are ways to intercept the call back to an unauthorized line.
For obvious reasons, I do not think that it would be desirable to discuss
the technique.  But it has been disclosed in a publication with wide spread
distribution lately.

-- cj