die@hydra.UUCP (Dave Emery) (09/03/85)
Yes it is possible, and not even very difficult.
Some years ago it was pointed out that 68 percent of long distance
telephone trunks went by ground based microwave. And while the
long distance carriers have been working (under some pressure from the
NSA and White House) to convert these circuits to optical fibers
or at least coaxial cable there are still many routes that
use microwave or satellite hops. I don't know an exact figure but I think
it would be reasonable to guess that at least 40-50 percent of long distance
trunks include a microwave or satellite hop. And some 75% (approx) of long
haul microwave relays use the 3.7-4.2 Ghz band which is readily
receivable by a tvro.
Most long haul microwave systems use FM modulation and frequency
division multiplexing (FDM) of single sideband supressed carrier voice
channels. Some satellite systems also use this modulation. Unfortunately
FM-FDM-SSB modulation is quite easy to receive with simple and widely
available equipment. Recovering the contents of a specific channel is
very easy, which opens up the possibility of monitoring random phone
calls to a specific group of destinations or monitoring specific
private line data or voice circuits (which are assigned to a multiplex
slot for long periods of time).
The question of whether a TVRO could be used to monitor phone
conversations has been raised on the net. The answer is that with
the addition of a stable general coverage single sideband receiver
(such as an ICOM R-71 or a Kenwood R-2000 or the receiver section
of a modern transceiver) connected to the unfiltered and unclamped video
output (provided for connecting stereo adapters and descramblers) a TVRO
can be used to listen to FM-FDM multiplexed telephone signals
from both celestial and ground based sources.
Further, with a stable down block down converter that converts
to the UHF TV band and one of the scanner type receivers designed
to cover this band one can also receive the some of the single channel per
carrier (SCPC) signals that carry telephone circuits to more remote
places (along with network radio feeds, Muzak, and various broadcast
data services such as the AP and UPI news services). (Some signals
are dithered and require some form of closed loop afc to receive them).
This vulnerability has been well known in security circles for
many years, but as the number of tvro systems has increased to over
a million, the problem assumes a somewhat different perspective. In
1976 Mitre estimated that it would cost $50,000 + to intercept
microwave telephone calls, and would require a 10 foot dish.
In that era a 10 foot dish would attract much attention. Today
one can buy a tvro system with a 75 K LNA and a 8-12 foot dish for
$1000-1500, and almost nobody will give the system a second glance
as tvro's are commonplace. A 75 K LNA beats a the 10-12 db noise figure
receiver that Mitre based it's calculations by a very substantial amount.
And the current generation of computer controllable general coverage
ssb receivers is a much cheaper demultiplexing device than the
synthezizer and selective voltmeter that seemed necessary in 1976.
The existance of all these millions of receivers that can pick
up both celestial and ground based telephone circuits means that one
should not presume that a long distance telephone call is private. And
more important (because they are much easier to find in FDM complexes)
nobody should assume that a private leased line is secure (unless the
long distance carrier has specially routed it via lightwave (much
more secure) or coaxial cable (somewhat more secure) for it's entire
path. (Obviously conventional (and highly illegal) wiretaps also
have to be considered if there is some reason to beleive that
some individual or organization has a strong enough reason to be interested
in your communications).
Background
Communications satellites carry telephone traffic in several
formats. The principle formats are:
Multi Channel systems
1. FDMA - PSK - TDM - PCM.
Used on a number of transponders on 4 and 12 Ghz
satellites. Heavily used by private business
for tie lines and other leased line services,
sometimes mixed with data. Quite secure
if encrypted. Not easily intercepted by
private individuals
2. TDMA - PSK - TDM - PCM.
Used on SBS (12 Ghz) satellites as the principle
access technique. Therefore SBS Skyline service
and some MCI service (they are now both owned
by IBM) is protected this way. Used also
on some 4 Ghz transponders. Very difficult
for private individuals to intercept even
if not encrypted. Some circuits encrypted
some not. TDMA is felt to be the heavy use satellite
access technique of the future as it offers very
efficiant use of transponder power and dynamic
allocation of system capacity to those links
which are currently active. When combined with
encryption it is quite secure.
3. FDMA - FM - FDM - SSB.
Standard modulation used on almost all terrestrial
long haul telephone microwave circuits. Used on several
4 Ghz domsat transponders and most multi channel
Intelsat links. Wideband FM-FDM signals can be readily received
by standard tvro receivers, and an individual channel
can be easily picked out of the multiplex signal with a
garden variety general coverage ssb comunications
receiver. Very easy for private individuals to intercept.
4. CDMA - TDM - PCM otherwise know as spread spectrum.
CDMA or spread spectrum techniques are widely used on
military satcom links because of their security and
resistance to jamming. As far as I know the only
commercial satcom use of such techniques is by
Equatorial Communications to broadcast data streams to
small (2-3 foot) dishes. Intercepting and decoding military
spread spectrum signals is presumably nearly imposible even
for large well equiped intelligence agencies. Intercepting
Equatorial signals is quite possible, though it is reported
that they will soon encrypt all the data they transmit.
Single channel systems
5. FDMA - FM otherwise known as SCPC - FM.
Single Channel Per Carrier is used to transmit one single nbFM
telephone channel between two points. A transponder carries
many such FM carriers at one time. Frequencies used
are often coordinated by a central station when the
call is set up, and may only used for the duration of the
call. This technique is used for communications with
remote places that rarely need more than a very few
circuits at once. Can be relatively easily intercepted
by a wide band scanner connected to a very stable block
downconverter. Easy for private individuals to intercept.
6. FDMA - PCM otherwise known as SCPC - PCM or SPADE.
This technique is the international standard Intelsat method of
establishing telephone connections between places that
don't have enough traffic to warrent permanently assigned
FDM trunks. Each direction of each telephone call is assigned
a channel by the central control station. Stations transmit
a PSK keyed carrier on that channel for the duration of the
call. Each carrier contains one 8 khz sampled PCM bitstream
along with some error correction and sychronizing bits. As
far as I know encryption is not used. The signal can
be intercepted by a sophisticated individual but intercepting
it requires a very large dish as the effective radiated power
per carrier is very much less than domsat SCPC carriers use.
A few domestic satcom SCPC users use PCM, probably with
some form of encryption. Hard for a private individual
to intercept.
7. FM - FDM - FM (Subcarriers on Video feeds)
As most TVRO owners discover, many of the video feeds contain
additional subcarriers that carry unrelated or tangentially
related material. Included amoung these are cue and
coordination channels that may occasionally carry
telephone like conversations. There are no regular
telephone circuits on video subcarriers however.
On FM-FDM-SSB
All it takes to recover FM-FDM signals is a suitable
wideband FM receiver connected to a stable general coverage ssb receiver
that tunes the frequency range used for the baseband. Tvro receivers
have the correct bandwidth for many such signals and often incorperate
provisions for IF filters that can be used to better adapt the receiver
to the narrow band signals found on some transponders. And modern
general coverage receivers and transceiver receiver sections with synthezised
tuning, digital frequency display, and narrow IF filters are well suited
to recovering the audio on a particular channel.
Listening to FM-FDM-SSB signals can be accomplished by tuning the
TVRO receiver to either a satellite transponder carrying a FM-FDM signal
(this may involve restricting the IF bandwidth with a filter as some
transponders carry more than one FDM-FM signal), or pointing the
antenna at a nearby terrestrial microwave transmitter and tuning the
receiver for maximum signal.
Once the FDM-FM signal has been tuned in, the single sideband receiver
can be used to search the baseband (typically .3Mhz to 6 or 8 Mhz)
for telephone conversations, data transmissions and other private line
circuits. Individual channels will appear as usb or lsb signals at
precise 4 khz intervals. In fact the whole baseband is organized into
12 channel groups, 60 channel supergroups, and 600 channel mastergroups
according to a standard frequency plan (the AT&T plan as usual is
different from the CCITT one used internationally)
Most channels have completely supressed carriers, although
certain channels will seem to have a carrier in them (but slightly off
frequency) which is something called a pilot tone, used to monitor circuit
continuity and control overall gain. Depending on how archiac the telephone
trunk equipment is on a particular trunk, it may have a 2600 hz sf signalling
tone in it when it is idle which is dropped when the channel is in use for
a call. Trunks which use sf signalling also often use MFKP (multi-frequency
key-pulsing - the famous blue box version of tone dialing) to pass telephone
numbers on to the destination switch. More modern trunks use CCIS
(common control interoffice signalling) which is a packet network
replacement for the earlier and less secure in band signalling that
uses separate signalling channels to carry all the signalling for
all the trunks in a trunk route.
Obviously, a single signal usually carries only half a telephone
conversation so it is necessary to use two receivers and TVRO's to
pick up both sides of the call clearly. Receiving both sides of a
terrestrial circuit requires a suitable location where both directions of
transmission can be picked up, which usually means a site in line
with the microwave path. Sometimes both directions of transmission
from a repeater site can be monitored by a very nearby (less than a mile)
receiver. Many telephone trunks have low enough echo return loss so
that both parties can be heard even on when monitoring only one
direction of transmission however, so it is quite possible to listen
to both sides of some conversations with only one receiver. Both
sides of a satellite FDM circuit can usually be found on the same bird
but are sometimes not, and sometimes not even on FDM satcom at all.
In general, particularly on terrestrial signals, all the channels
in a 12 channel group originate and terminate at the same place. The groups and
supergroups that make up a mastergroup however often originate from several
different places. Demodulation to baseband audio is generally done as few times
as possible on a trunk or private line circuit that connects two places, the 12
channels of it's group are shifted to various frequencies within the baseband
of the different satellite, microwave or coaxial cable FDM signals
that carry it to it's destination, but at least with older multiplexing
equipment the granularity of routing resolution is a usually a group
(occasionally half a group), and all 12 of the channels in a group
usually end up demodulated to audio at the same place.
Channels within a group are assigned to various purposes. Some may
carry telephone trunks, some may carry private line data, some may
carry private trunks that belong to large companies, and a certain percentage
are reserved for use as spares. It has long been telephone company practice
to route the telephone trunks between two switching centers over several
different paths to supply redunancy in the event one path fails (and also to
make it harder to intercept a particular call between the two switches).
This means that any given FDM group may contain trunks from several different
trunk groups rather than containing all the trunks from say Chicago to
West Bend.
On PSK TDM
The most secure technique in commercial service, and probably
the technique that that will predominate on satellite links in the future,
is TDM-PCM (time division multiplexed pulse code modulation) either phase shift
keying (usually QPSK) a continuous carrier on a transponder that may have
several such carriers on it (FDMA - frequency division multiple access)
or keying a single carrier that occupies the whole transponder in bursts
precisely timed so as to not overlap other carriers from other stations
that it shares a transponder with (TDMA - time division multiple access).
Telephone traffic on TDM-PCM links is sampled 8000 times a second
and converted into 8 bit binary values (in a sort of floating point format
called A-law or u-Law companding that greatly expands the dynamic range
from softest to loudest that the channel will handle). (There are
other digitizing standards used on satellite phone links but the standard
T carrier - D channel bank is widely used). Some number of these channels
(often 24) are combined into a high speed serial bit stream (often 1.554 mb/s)
by sending one sample from each channel in serial form as a string of 8 bits
followed by a sample from the next channel and so forth. Sometimes this
composite bit stream or the bit stream from individual channels is
encrypted with a DES chip. Error correction and framing bits and sometimes
special control channel bits are added. This digital bit stream is then
scrambled (so it has more predictable transition statistics and little or
no DC component) by a linear feedback shift register sequence. The
resultant bit stream is used to PSK modulate a carrier which is uplinked
to the satellite.
Receiving these FDMA-PSK-TDM-PCM digital transmissions requires complex
rf modems, a large enough dish to get an acceptable signal to noise ratio (and
BER), and often requires knowlage of the DES encryption keys used (unless you
are a major intelligence agency and can break DES). While some such
transmissions that aren't encrypted could in theory be monitored by
a very sophisticated individual, particularly one who had access to the rf
modem and multiplexing hardware used by the subscribers, the required expertise
and technology is great enough so few if any such listeners exist. Presumably
the only listeners to such transmissions are the intelligence agencies
and perhaps industrial spies who can afford to buy the necessary hardware
to listen to their competitors private circuits. And more and
more users of such links are encrypting them with DES.
TDMA-PSK-TDM-PCM signals are much more complex than most
FDMA-PSK-TDM-PCM signals. This is natural since all traffic is transmitted
by having each station on the network transmit a burst of very high speed
(tens of mb/s) data in an assigned time slot round robin fashion. Included
in the burst is all of the traffic that station has with every other station
on the network. Every other station monitors the all the bursts from stations
it is in communication with and picks out the channels that correspond
to it's incoming traffic. In many such systems burst lengths and time slots
are dynamically assigned by a master ground station computer as calls are set
up and terminated. Each station is capable of receiving and decoding
the bursts transmitted by every other station it talks to, so if the
channels are not encrypted it could monitor much of or all the traffic
going through the transponder. In practice, however, the complex firmware
and hardware make it difficult to accomplish this.
The burst formats are complex and contain error correction, status
and control channels, call setup channels and so forth. And the
bursts are scrambled just as in the continuous carrier TDM case. Intercepting
and demodulating such a signal would be a major task and is probably something
that has only been done (by intelligence agencies) by using perverted versions
of the ground station hardware and firmware used by the system. In addition
to the complexity of the task of sorting out the digital information
and finding the right time slot from the right burst to retrieve the
channel of interest, the very high speed fast lockon rf modems used to
demodulate the bursts are themselves non-trivial
devices. I suspect that even perverting the firmware in a legitimate
ground terminal is complex enough so that no private individual
or group could easily accomplish it without access to a lot of detailed
non-published information (such as source of the firmware and precise
details of the protocol and burst formats).
It has been said that SBS which uses such TDMA techniques on
it's 12 Ghz system regards the signal format as complex enough
so encryption is not necessary for at least some of the traffic
it transmits. I doubt very much if a private individual has ever
successfully monitored telephone traffic through this system (except
perhaps by fiddling with a legitimate ground station).
lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) (09/03/85)
It should be pointed out that monitoring telephone conversations from either terrestrial or satellite links would almost certainly be construed, under current law, as wiretapping. This is, I believe, a federal crime (probably a felony), and not to be taken lightly. --Lauren--
brown@nicmad.UUCP (09/04/85)
In article <777@vortex.UUCP> lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) writes: >It should be pointed out that monitoring telephone conversations >from either terrestrial or satellite links would almost certainly >be construed, under current law, as wiretapping. This is, >I believe, a federal crime (probably a felony), and not to be >taken lightly. > >--Lauren-- Fortunately it is not wiretapping. Since it is on the open airwaves, a different set of rules take over. You can receive the signal, you can listen to it, but you cannot tell anyone the contents of what you heard. It is exactly like listening to police/fire. You can, but don't tell anyone the contents of the communications. -- Mr. Video {seismo!uwvax!|!decvax|!ihnp4}!nicmad!brown
djw@lanl.ARPA (09/04/85)
The $350-$500 Stargate project hardware that Lauren Weinstein (sp?) is working on would be quite useable here; don't cha think? I believe that you overrate the expense and difficulty factors; but, I can't see any reason to do most of this listening even though it would be quite easy. BUT; with the downlink from Usenet on WTBS's subbands and free, there is a very real probability that I will obtain one of Lauren's boards to go with my tvro setup and my ( as yet imaginary ) general coverage receiver and my MacIntosh... Dave Wade WB5PFS
prg@mgweed.UUCP (Phil Gunsul) (09/04/85)
[Ring.... ring...] I don't know where you are getting your law advice from, Lauren, but it is NOT illegal to listen in to the phone calls that are transmitted over the satellite or ground microwave repeaters. It WOULD be illegal to discuss what you heard with another person, or use the information to your benefit. Phil Gunsul -- WB9AAX
ron@brl-tgr.ARPA (Ron Natalie <ron>) (09/05/85)
> In article <777@vortex.UUCP> lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) writes: > >It should be pointed out that monitoring telephone conversations > >from either terrestrial or satellite links would almost certainly > >be construed, under current law, as wiretapping. This is, > >I believe, a federal crime (probably a felony), and not to be > >taken lightly. > > > >--Lauren-- > > Fortunately it is not wiretapping. Since it is on the open airwaves, > a different set of rules take over. You can receive the signal, you can > listen to it, but you cannot tell anyone the contents of what you heard. > It is exactly like listening to police/fire. You can, but don't tell > anyone the contents of the communications. > -- Only partially right, Captain Video. Wiretapping is different from the communications laws (by the way, is the topic of discussion and your point is only one of the opinions on how that law works). By your own reasoning if I put a big coil around the the telephone line coming out of your house and inductively pick up your signal, then it isn't wire tapping either, which is not the case.
lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) (09/05/85)
As far as I know, the laws on wiretapping and wire fraud do not require that the material actually be on a wire. Intercepting of telephone conversations off of a point-to-point microwave transmission is apparently legally considered to be wiretapping. I believe that the same case law will cover telephone coversations on satellites. Over the years I've read of a number of cases of successful prosecutions of people who were monitoring microwave sidelobes for telephone conversations. Felony convictions as I recall. It's amazing how naive some people are about communications issues. The Communciations Act doesn't create the entire universe. It is subject to interpretation by the courts, interaction with other laws, and the buildup of case law over time. The intersection of all these aspects create the current legal environment. Simplistic readings of the Act will almost always be in error when it comes to real world cases. --Lauren--
lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) (09/06/85)
The Stargate hardware doesn't include a TVRO! It's decoding and buffering equipment for the particular vertical interval signals on which Stargate resides. It has nothing to do with receiving other sorts of signals. By the way, just to correct a point of fact--the service (if it ever becomes a service as opposed to an experiment) won't be "free"--there will have to be some (hopefully quite modest) monthly fee associated with the service. The data (due to the very design of the vertical interval system) will already be pretty heavily scrambled. Some sort of fee is absolutely necessary since we are NOT being given the channel bandwidth in the vertical interval for free forever! At such a time as we go into a service mode, then we're going to have to pay the uplink people for the use of that bandwidth. Luckily, since they consider Stargate to be an extremely interesting and unique "electronic publishing" non-profit-type project, we will be paying fees much, much less than what would normally be the case. --Lauren--
dsi@unccvax.UUCP (Dataspan Inc) (09/06/85)
It seems that I remember a case involving a youth who intercepted a
wireless telephone call from a neighbour. This kid evidently was able to
pick up one side of the wireless phone call because it was above the AM
band. The subject of the calls were arrangements to purchase and distribute
cocaine. This child told his mother, who called the police; which in turn
spent several more days listening. THIS WAS NOT HELD TO BE WIRETAPPING
because the radio facilities were not common carrier but part 15 devices.
They got a conviction (and one of the principal defences of the coke
trafficker was that it was an illegal wiretap).
Interception of common carrier telephone facilities, wire, coax,
microwave, satellite, whatever; I am assured by a prominent Washington
attorney, is technically wiretapping.
David Anthony
CDE
DataSpan, Inc
P.S. I didn't realize that the satellite calls were SSB/FDM. How many
percent are using FDM and how many TDM-digital?lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) (09/08/85)
That is correct. Under current law, it appears that listening to cordless phones
wjc@ll-vlsi.ARPA (Bill Chiarchiaro) (09/08/85)
It would be interesting to see citations of some of those cases. Bill N1CPK
die@hydra.UUCP (Dave Emery) (09/09/85)
> It should be pointed out that monitoring telephone conversations > from either terrestrial or satellite links would almost certainly > be construed, under current law, as wiretapping. This is, > I believe, a federal crime (probably a felony), and not to be > taken lightly. > > --Lauren-- > As far as I know (and I am an engineer not a lawyer) there is at least one other law (than 605) that concerns interception of telephone calls and that is the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. This law which is section 2115 of title 82 (?) of the US Code is the basic federal anti-bugging/anti-wiretapping statute. Among other thing it forbids interception of any common carrier communications of aural or visual material that travels by "wire, cable or other means". It also forbids interception of any aural or visual material that travels for any part of its trip on a common carrier channel even if it is not being intercepted from a common carrier channel. And unlike section 605, 2115 forbids interception alone, not just interception *and* use or disclosure. I believe the operative phrase is something like "whosoever intercepts ..." as contrasted with 605's "whoseover intercepts and discloses ..." 2115 establishes both stiff federal felony penalties (I think 5 years and $50,000 fine) and, interestingly, also civil penalties (someone whose communications have been intercepted can sue the intercepter for damages). I do not know if 2115 is considered to apply to radio communications by common carriers, as I remember it it doesn't mention radio in this context, and because 605 is specifically about radio communications it might be assumed to take precedence. If 2115 is considered to apply to radio communications it would very clearly forbid even casually listening to any common carrier transmission whether or not any use was made of it's contents and even if this act of interception was in the privacy of one's home and did not involve disclosure. And a surprisingly large fraction of radio transmissions could be considered common carrier. For example SCA subcarriers, scrambled TV stations, virtually all mobile, marine and cellular phones, almost all satellite links (the transponders are owned by a common carrier and often leased to another common carrier that actually uses them to transmit information such as cable tv feeds), MDS transmissions, and almost all commercial users of the hf spectrum are common carrier services or could claim to be. In addition many non common carrier transmissions that have simply been routed via common carrier facilities at some point in their path could claim protection under 2115 (for example one could argue that if the local police use a leased telco line to connect to their transmitter site on a nearby hill then simply passively listening to them is a violation of 2115 since the communications went by common carrier for part of the way). How does 2115 apply ? I do not know where the fine line has been drawn by the courts in interpreting 2115. (I would appreciate citations of cases if anyone reading this knows of some). It certainly is true that nobody was prosecuted (that I know of) for watching satellite cable tv feeds even though these are clearly common carrier transmissions of aural and visual material. (It is currently quasi-legal to watch unscrambled satcom cable feeds under another act of congress). Yet there have been at least attempts at prosecution of people who have received the same video and audio (mostly HBO) from 2150 mhz MDS transmissions. I find that distinction puzzling since I cannot see a significant difference between receiving HBO from a 4 GHz transmitter out in space using FM modulation and a 2 ghz transmitter on the top of some nearby tall building that uses AM. Lauren claims that there have been successful prosecutions of people who have intercepted telephone calls from terrestrial microwave links. (He doesn't say under what statute but I presume 2115). I also fail to see the difference between listening to a 4 ghz ground based transmitter (FM-FDM presumably) on a tvro and swl receiver and using a scanner to listen to the FM 150/450 mhz IMTS mobile telephone calls. Many thousands of scanner enthusiasts listen to mobile phone conversations - yet I have never heard of a prosecution for merely listening to these common carrier transmissions (I think there have been some or at least some attempts in cases where information was disclosed or put to some use), and yet the distinction between microwave and vhf listening is widely presumed to exist. So the law is murky and even murkier in the area of intercepting satellite signals. It is apparently more likely to get you prosecuted if you intercept ground based microwave links (VHF/UHF is probably OK) and more complex signals (simplex FM is very safe). This makes little sense since these are all radio signals, all carry private communications that the users presume will not be disclosed, and all can be received with standard consumer equipment widely available to average people. Perhaps the only distinction is that millions know how to listen to calls on on their scanners, and until recently when several recently published books on tvro systems broached the subject there was a conspiracy of silence surounding simple methods of intercepting microwave multiplex FM signals. The data loophole There is one important hole in 2115 however, it carefully aviods mention of data, record (telex and the like), telegraph, teletype, facsimile and other forms of non-voice, non-video information transmission. It has been widely reported that this was at the behest of the NSA which had (at least in 1968) much more capacity to process and filter out material of interest in these forms of communications than it had to monitor telephone calls (which take (or took) human transcribers to laboriously take down the words). Apparently the courts have upheld this loophole, as there has been some recent effort to get congress to close it. Conclusion The intent of my posting on tvro interception of calls was to make a point about the vulnerability of microwave transmissions to interception by common consumer tvro and swl hardware owned by millions of people, many of whom live within easy receiving range of ground based microwave systems, and all of whom are in range of satellites carrying significant interceptable telephone traffic. Whether or not it is legal, whether or not it is covered by 2115 in addition to 605, it is clear that the proliferation of the hardware required into the hands of millions of Americans, many of whom beleive that it is their God given right to listen in to anything they can pick up, is going to make long distance telephone and data transmissions significantly less private. I am personally an advocate of what is becoming a more and more widely accepted national goal, and that is routing all long distance traffic via paths which cannot be intercepted by casual listeners with widely available equipment. At the minimum this means digital microwave transmission under DES or better encryption. Hopefully in many cases it will also mean fiber optic paths (which are at least much harder for the KGB and friends to tap than microwave or coax links). I have always felt that making an act as passive and invisible as intercepting a radio signal a serious crime was the wrong approach. Prosecution of such acts is necessarily so erratic and dependant on violations of the privacy of whoever is intercepting the signal that it seems worse than the crime in all too many cases. Perhaps more fundementally, the secret nature of listening guarentees that someone whose purpose is more sinister than casual observation of the electromagnetic fields around his back yard can almost always intercept whatever he needs to with little or no chance of getting caught. For this reason draconian laws only serve to reduce the number of harmless casual snoops, without doing much of anything about the professional information thief. Limiting efforts toward prosecution, however, will tend to force those who set up systems to consider designing in security by using encryption and transmission media that cannot be readily tapped, rather than living in the fools paradise of assuming that since it's illegal nobody will be doing it and communications are secure. And as someone on the net pointed out, the difficulty of proving interception took place will soon lead to proposals to make mere possession of equipment that could or might intercept private transmissions a crime. This of course will be rather interesting since there are so many examples of legitimate radio equipment that could be used to pick up forbidden private signals by merely pointing the antenna differently or keying in a slightly different frequency. This of course will result in licensing of such equipment only to people who have a proven need, and while once you could listen to your local fire department if you are a volunteer fire fighter or the airport control tower at your local airport if you are a private pilot you will probably have to prove need and be registered to own a receiver that covers other than the broadcast band (and let the heavens quake if you should decode an SCA subcarrier from an FM station). And think of all your neighbors accusing you of tuning your radio to a forbidden channel just because they don't like your lifestyle! I think it is too bad in this age of the digital revolution in transmission and storage of information and of readily available digital security devices to depend on oppressive legal avenues to protect communications that can be effectively secured by encryption. But that seems to be the direction in which the courts are going. David I. Emery Charles River Data Systems 617-626-1102 983 Concord St., Framingham, MA 01701. uucp: decvax!frog!die
prg@mgweed.UUCP (Phil Gunsul) (09/09/85)
> > Interception of common carrier telephone facilities, wire, coax, >microwave, satellite, whatever; I am assured by a prominent Washington >attorney, is technically wiretapping. > >David Anthony >CDE >DataSpan, Inc > > > ONLY if I use what I hear!! I can listen as much as I want, I just can't use or repeat it. Maybe you better explain that to your prominent Washington attorney. Phil Gunsul -- WB9AAX
lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) (09/09/85)
Once again, I've been merely reporting on how the courts seem to be treating these subjects--I don't necessarily agree with all of them! As I recall, one of the prosecution issues revolved around "reasonable expectation of privacy." That is, when you make a mobile telephone call you apparently have less of an "expectation of privacy" than you do when you make a non-mobile to non-mobile call. I'll try dig up some references... --Lauren--
karn@petrus.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) (09/10/85)
I pulled the following item off another system. I'm posting it here because
I thought it might be relevant to the current discussion.
Phil
C1025 CC204 Harry Goodman (Harry,409) 9/ 8/85 12:26 PM L:49
KEYS:/LEAHY'S ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT / A START/
This report from Billye Leymon of the MetaNetwork:
Thought you'd be interested in this:
Senator Leahy to propose Electronic Communications Privacy Act
This afternoon, at the first annual meeting of the Electronic
MAIL Association, Senator Patrick J. Leahy (Democrat-Vermont)
announced his intention to introduce the Electronic Communication
Privacy Act of 1985. When the Senate reconvenes, similar
legislation will be introduced in the House. In his address,
Senator Leahy focused on the complex public policy problems which
have emerged with the increase of computer-based communications.
Policy is now needed to protect the privacy and security of
communication exchanged via new technologies, so that citizens
may feel as secure using newer communications media as they do in
using the mail services or the telephone. At present, the
Federal legislation enacted in 1968 on the illegality of
wire-tapping is the only act which might apply to privacy of
communication issues. That legislation designed to protect voice
communication via common carrier is no longer adequate, as
protection is extended only to communication "capable of being
heard." According to the Senator, current federal policy needs to
protect "WHAT is being transmitted, not the WAY it is
transmitted."
The Senator, Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Policy, is committed to the protection of private communication
from any source, be it government itself or a private, undetected
perhaps, intruder in a database.
The to-be-proposed Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1985
will make five important changes to the "wire tap laws." As
outlined, these changes will:
- extend coverage from "voice" to all electronic transmission
- recognize private carriers, so that all communications
systems will be covered, not just common carriers as at
present.
- institute civil and criminal penalties for illegal access.
- institute civil penalties for _disclosure_ of private
information stored on any system.
- for law enforcement, require that a court order be obtained
before accessing information stored on private
communications systems.
-------------------------------------------------
HarryGgnu@l5.uucp (John Gilmore) (09/10/85)
The last time the wiretapping laws were hacked, the NSA suggested (and got) a small wording change that effectively makes it legal to listen in AS LONG AS YOU ONLY LISTEN TO TELCO SIGNALLING rather than user data/speech. This means that, for example, receiving microwave phone transmissions is defensible if your equipment filters out all but the "who called who" info. They wanted this because it gives them a legal reason to have tapping equipment always installed. (Who's to know if their equipment happens to switch to recording speech or data if an interesting phone number makes or receives a call?) It would be interesting to see them try you for it -- if they found you guilty, you could sue the government to stop the NSA. Please correct me if I'm wrong, Lauren.
revc@gwsd.UUCP (Bob Van Cleef) (09/10/85)
In article <127@hydra.UUCP>, die@hydra.UUCP (Dave Emery) writes: > And as someone on the net pointed out, the difficulty of > proving interception took place will soon lead to proposals to > make mere possession of equipment that could or might intercept private > transmissions a crime. This of course will be rather interesting > since there are so many examples of legitimate radio equipment > that could be used to pick up forbidden private signals by merely pointing > the antenna differently or keying in a slightly different frequency. My brother-in-law, a German airlines pilot, likes to tell the story of one airlines Captain who lost his commercial license because he was discovered listening to airplane conversations with an unlicensed receiver. In Germany the Post Office has the functions of our FCC, and you are NOT allowed to monitor anything non-commercial without a license. In the case of this pilot, the German supreme court overruled the PO, on the grounds that loss-of-livelyhood was excess punishment, but they kept his receiver system. Bob -- Bob Van Cleef {ihnp4|akgua|decvax|dcdwest|ucbvax} (619) 457-2701 ...sdcsvax!gwsd!revc Gateway Computer Systems CompuServe - [71565,533] 4980 Carroll Canyon Road San Diego, CA 92121
wmartin@Almsa-2 (Will Martin -- AMXAL-RI) (09/10/85)
Just would like to say to all the electronics, scanner, and radio enthusiasts out there: Welcome to the world of persecution and harassment by government that we firearms enthusiasts have been experiencing for the last century or so! Isn't it wonderful when your relationship with what is *supposed* to be an organization dedicated to SERVING your needs (government) is instead a continual firefight and struggle to simply be *let alone*?!?!? Plus, of course, you can NEVER win; you can only stave off further encroachment or assaults until they decide to attack you again... Will
lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) (09/11/85)
The way I heard it, what actually happened is that courts have ruled that telco can track and deliver to authorized agencies the numbers dialed on particular phones without a "wiretap" court order. This is considered to be about the same as a "mail watch" where the post office keeps track of return addresses on mail to a particular point. In both cases, I suspect that only the particular entities specifically authorized (i.e. telco and post office) have the appropriate permissions for such activities--I doubt if the permissions extend to the public at large. I'm speculating on the details of this point, so don't take this message as gospel. --Lauren--
john@anasazi.UUCP (John Moore) (09/11/85)
In article <20281@mgweed.UUCP> prg@mgweed.UUCP (Phil Gunsul) writes: >> >> Interception of common carrier telephone facilities, wire, coax, >>microwave, satellite, whatever; I am assured by a prominent Washington >>attorney, is technically wiretapping. > >ONLY if I use what I hear!! I can listen as much as I want, I just >can't use or repeat it. Maybe you better explain that to your >prominent Washington attorney. Not true! You are referring to the sectoion 605 of the Communications Act. Common carriers are protected (by different rules) from interception. Those rules have been used to prosecute (for example) MDS HBO listeners. -- John Moore (NJ7E) {decvax|ihnp4|hao}!noao!terak!anasazi!john {hao!noao|decvax|ihnp4|seismo}!terak!anasazi!john (602) 952-8205 (day or evening)
acardenas.ES@Xerox.ARPA (09/11/85)
As I understand it... The new (now old) push is for DEregulation. It appears that attempts to limit *monitoring* is not in step with FCC and Feds efforts to that end. Amatures have seen an almost 'washing-of-the-hands' as far as FCC rules and regs violations go. That is to say, amatures do the foot work, then document-document-document and then with enough complaints, the FCC MAY take action against the violator. Bearcat 250; one of the most popular scanners on the market... WHO made the original demands to limit the tunning range(s), FBI, CIA, FCC, USA? I would sure like to see the letters, memos or read the notes from the meetings! What kind of 'pressure' was applied to Bearcat assure compliance with the feds desires? Perhaps threats of no FCC equipment certification? (Some newer scanners now offer almost full-spectrum tunning). Looking at the technical manual for the Bearcat 250, a simple vco voltage controls what frequency is monitored. It is apparent that if one simply injected a adjustable control voltage, FULL-spectrum tunning is possible within all three of the bands! I expect that one could tune even higher and lower of specified limits with some loss of sensitivity at the band edges. Bypass the memory/processor and it's done. I add that there ARE program 'tricks' that fool the processor, however, there is a loss of receiver sensitivity. There are limits to the 'tricks' too, only a few more MHz are added with this method. The next logical question is: Who will monitor the monitors? Uncle T. Tony Cardenas Q.A. Auditor, 6085 Project WA6IGJ
weltyrp@rpics.UUCP (Richard Welty) (09/12/85)
> The last time the wiretapping laws were hacked, the NSA suggested (and > got) a small wording change that effectively makes it legal to listen > in AS LONG AS YOU ONLY LISTEN TO TELCO SIGNALLING rather than user > data/speech. This means that, for example, receiving microwave phone > transmissions is defensible if your equipment filters out all but the > "who called who" info. They wanted this because it gives them a legal > reason to have tapping equipment always installed. (Who's to know if > their equipment happens to switch to recording speech or data if an > interesting phone number makes or receives a call?) Actually, traffic analysis (knowledge of the sources and destinations of a large group of messages) is an extremely useful form of intellegence collection -- knowledge of where and in what volume is remarkably useful. Thus, even if NSA equipment only checked destination and source for a message, they would certainly have a use for the information. I don't want them to listen to me, but I also don't want them to know my correspondents, either ... -- Rich Welty (I am both a part-time grad student at RPI and a full-time employee of a local CAE firm, and opinions expressed herein have nothing to do with anything at all) CSNet: weltyrp@rpi ArpaNet: weltyrp.rpi@csnet-relay UUCP: seismo!rpics!weltyrp
mojo@kepler.UUCP (Morris Jones) (09/12/85)
In article <1415@brl-tgr.ARPA> wmartin@Almsa-2 (Will Martin -- AMXAL-RI) writes: >Plus, of course, you can NEVER win; you can only stave off further >encroachment or assaults until they decide to attack you again... You can't win because people like you and I, Will, favor privacy as one of our basic freedoms. Especially privacy from the government. But that has to extend to privacy from other individuals. I also happen to believe in property rights and free enterprise, and feel that there *are* property rights involved in the use of the radio spectrum. Thieves and eavesdroppers get no respect from me. -- Mojo ... Morris Jones, MicroPro Product Development {dual,ptsfa,hplabs}!well!micropro!kepler!mojo
coffin@mot.UUCP (Chris Coffin) (09/12/85)
My (and I suspect most other peoples) opinion about receiving ANYTHING from the airwaves is: If you don't want me listening (watching etc) to it, then KEEP YOUR PHOTONS OFF OF MY PROPERTY! Chris Coffin ihnp4!mot!coffin [If you can't fix the warp drive, you're fired.]
karn@petrus.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) (09/14/85)
There's an interesting circular argument forming here. It is said that listening in on cordless phones isn't illegal (and police don't need a warrant to do it) because it's so easy; i.e., there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy". But if listening in on a common carrier's trunks is almost as easy, then why should their customers have any greater "expectation of privacy"? Phil
lauren@vortex.UUCP (Lauren Weinstein) (09/15/85)
I suspect that the key is that when you use a cordless phone, you're not a common carrier and thusly don't have the "expectation of privacy." It gets tricky, but note that the designation of "common carrier" exists (in part) specifically to categorize some of these issues. --Lauren--
larry@kitty.UUCP (Larry Lippman) (09/17/85)
> The last time the wiretapping laws were hacked, the NSA suggested (and ^^^ > got) a small wording change that effectively makes it legal to listen > in AS LONG AS YOU ONLY LISTEN TO TELCO SIGNALLING rather than user > data/speech. This means that, for example, receiving microwave phone > transmissions is defensible if your equipment filters out all but the > "who called who" info. They wanted this because it gives them a legal > reason to have tapping equipment always installed. (Who's to know if > their equipment happens to switch to recording speech or data if an > interesting phone number makes or receives a call?) > > It would be interesting to see them try you for it -- if they found > you guilty, you could sue the government to stop the NSA. > > Please correct me if I'm wrong, Lauren. You are partially wrong. NSA does not NEED an excuse to monitor telecomunications traffic - the 'interest of national security' says it all. The real agencies who benefit from this decision are law enforcement agencies like the FBI, DEA, local police, etc. Telephone toll statements (and therefore signalling information) has ALWAYS been freely available to law enforcement agencies - in many cases without even requiring a subpoena. This has been considered to be no more than accounting information, and does not come under the pervue of eavesdropping statutes. Local dialed numbers have historically been available at the request of law enforcement agencies; if central office equipment did not automatically record this information, the telephone company would install a dialed number recorder ('pen register'). There has never been any restriction on obtaining this information by bona fide law enforcement agencies. In general, up until about ten years ago only the telephone company could install a dialed number recorder. As a result of some court decisions (including People vs Stewart 1973 in NY State), law enforcement agencies were permitted ON THEIR OWN and WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE of the telephone company, to attach dialed number recorders to a subject's telephone line. ONLY a bona fide law enforcement agency has this right. My personal opinion is that the telephone companies should be more cooperative with law enforcement agencies insofar as furnishing dialed number information; such cooperation would eliminate any claims that law enforcement agencies might be listening in. However, most telephone companies tend NOT to cooperate with law enforcement agencies due to a fear of 'bad press'; as a result of this NON-cooperation in the past, law enforcement agencies have been permitted to take this matter into their own hands. I am certain that a number of people will be upset that their dialed number information COULD be obtained by a law enforcement agency without the benefit of any judicial proceeding authorizing same. However, if you are not doing anything illegal which would MOTIVATE a law enforcement agency to take this rather EXTREME step, then you really shouldn't lose any sleep over the possibility... +++ Larry Lippman @ Recognition Research Corp., Clarence, New York +++ +++ UUCP {decvax,dual,rocksanne,rocksvax,watmath}!sunybcs!kitty!larry +++ +++ VOICE 716/741-9185 {rice,shell}!baylor!/ +++ +++ FAX 716/741-9635 {AT&T 3510D} syr!buf!/ +++ +++ TELEX 69-71461 ansbak: ELGECOMCLR {via WUI} ihnp4!/ +++ +++ +++ +++ "Have you hugged your cat today?" +++
FTD%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA (David D. Story) (09/17/85)
Because the F.C.C. says so as well as a great many states but public and restricted bands do not except for xmit. No constitution issues here...so sorry charlie ! Dave
hes@ecsvax.UUCP (Henry Schaffer) (09/20/85)
> ... However, if you are not > doing anything illegal which would MOTIVATE a law enforcement agency to take > this rather EXTREME step, then you really shouldn't lose any sleep over the > possibility... > > +++ Larry Lippman @ Recognition Research Corp., Clarence, New York +++ <mild flame on> - with respect to these quoted lines only A citizen should have stronger protections against abuse than this. One can come up with many examples of mistaken identity, personal grudges, etc. where a citizen was abused without having done anything illegal. If it is legal for police agencies to get this (e.g., dialed number) info, then let's be up front about it. There shouldn't be an "expectation of privacy" if it is not private info. I have no objection to using a party line - but I should be told it is a party line. <off> --henry schaffer
jbuck@epicen.UUCP (Joe Buck) (09/23/85)
> From: larry@kitty.UUCP (Larry Lippman) > Date: 16 Sep 85 22:53:39 GMT > > I am certain that a number of people will be upset that their dialed > number information COULD be obtained by a law enforcement agency without the > benefit of any judicial proceeding authorizing same. However, if you are not > doing anything illegal which would MOTIVATE a law enforcement agency to take > this rather EXTREME step, then you really shouldn't lose any sleep over the > possibility... By this argument, there should be no 4th amendment. After all, if you're not doing anything wrong, why should you fear a search of your house, or a tap on your phone? Federal angencies have often been used in the recent past to investigate legitimate political activity, rather than criminal activity. For example, if the phone #'s of known radicals (I'm talking about people that SAY radical things, not mad bombers) appear on my phone bill, what right does the FBI have to know that? If they had to go to a judge and present some evidence that I might be involved in criminal activity, and the judge issues a warrant, then and only then should they be allowed to obtain "billing information" or tap my phone. -- Joe Buck | Entropic Processing, Inc. UUCP: {ucbvax,ihnp4}!dual!epicen!jbuck | 10011 N. Foothill Blvd. ARPA: dual!epicen!jbuck@BERKELEY.ARPA | Cupertino, CA 95014
elric@proper.UUCP (elric) (09/27/85)
<><><> Some posted a LONG message under this subject all about HOW to tap a phone transmission. I saved a copy of that message, but somehow lost it. It is no longer on the net at our site, could someone please repost it. Thanx Elric