pocha@denelcor.UUCP (09/08/83)
The following is from US News and World Report. 09/12/83
Airborne Aggression: A Soviet Trademark.
The downing of the South Korean airliner was only the latest and
most extreme episode in a series of attacks by Soviet gunners on military
and commercial planes over the last three decades.
Other incidents:-
1950, April 8. American bomber with 20 on board disappears over Baltic.
U.S. says plane was brought down by Soviets.
1951, Nov. 6. U.S. Navy plane lost over international waters off Siberia
after Soviet planes fire on it. Crew of 10 missing.
1952, April 29. Soviets attack French airliner. Two of the passengers
on the commercial flight injured.
1952, June 13. U.S. reconnaissance plane missing after interception by
Soviet planes over Japan.
1952, July 16. Russian jets down unarmed Swedish military plane over
international waters in the Baltic. Seven crewmen rescued.
1952, Oct. 7. U.S. bomber with crew of eight disappears over northern
Japan after taking Soviet fire.
1953, March 10. U.S. Air Force jet fighter shot down by two Russian MiG's
in Germany. No casualties.
1953, March 12. Soviet MiG's down British bomber over Elbe River Valley at
the East-West frontier of Germany. Five crewmen die.
1953, March 15. U.S. reconnaissance plane attacked by MiG about 25 miles
from Soviet border. Shots exchanged, but neither is hit.
1953, July 29. U.S. bomber shot down by MiG's over Sea of Japan. Sixteen
crewmen killed.
1954, Jan. 22. U.S. reconnaissance plane over Yellow Sea attacked by
eight MiG's. No casualties.
1954, March 12. Two U.S. military planes flying near Czechoslovak border
on training flight attacked by MiG. Both land safely.
1954, June 3rd. Belgian transport carrying livestock fired upon over
Yugoslavia by MiG fighter. One crew member killed, two injured.
1954, Sept. 4. U.S. Navy plane shot down by Soviet jets 30 miles off
Siberian coast. One dead.
1954, Nov. 7. American reconnaissance plane shot down over northern
Hokkaido, Japan. One American killed.
1955, May 10. Eight American fighter planes on patrol over international
waters near North Korea attacked by MiG's. No casualties.
1955, May 22. U.S. Navy patrol bomber attacked by Soviet aircraft near
St. Lawrence Island in Bering Sea. Seven in crew injured.
1958, June 27. Unarmed American military transport, diverted from its course
by storm, shot down over Soviet Armenia. No deaths.
1958, Sept. 2. Seventeen Americans lose lives when C-130 transport aircraft
is shot down in Soviet Armenia near Turkish border.
1958, Nov. 7. Soviet MiG's fire on U.S. Air Force reconnaissance jets over
Baltic and Sea of Japan.
1959, June 16. U.S. Navy patrol plane attacked by Soviet-made MiG over
Sea of Japan. One crewman wounded.
1960, May 1st. Russians down U.S. spy plane piloted by Francis Gary
Powers. U-2 pilot captured, jailed.
1960, July 1st. American RB-47 shot down in Barents Sea near Kola Peninsula.
Four of six on board die.
1963, Nov. 20th. Soviets down Iranian plane after it strays over Russian
border and flies back into Iran.
1964, Jan. 28th. U.S. Air Force jet trainer shot down over East Germany.
Three American deaths.
1964, March 10th. American bomber downed by Soviets after it strayed across
East German frontier. No one was killed.
1978, April 20th. South Korean airliner flying from Paris to Seoul fired at
when it crosses Soviet territory. Two passengers killed, 13 hurt.
1981, July Argentine cargo plane crashes after colliding with pursuing
Soviet plane in Armenia.
1983, Sept. 1st. KAL flight 007 attacked disappears 3:38 a.m. Tokyo time.
269 people presumed dead.
John Pochamason@utcsrgv.UUCP (Dave Mason) (09/10/83)
The most interesting thing about this article is that virtually all
(>80% by estimate) of the incidents of Russians shooting down planes
were in the '50s and ALL of the ones since were planes shot down in
Soviet Air Space (Many of them MILITARY). I disagree with thier methods
but I see no reason why they should be expected to put up with frequent
air-space violations. I don't know what the US does in these circumstances.
Maybe there aren't as many strayings the other way so the Russians (reasonably)
consider any border crossings as spying missions of some sort.
-- Gandalf's flunky Hobbit -- Dave Mason, U. Toronto CSRG,
{cornell,watmath,ihnp4,floyd,allegra,utzoo,uw-beaver}!utcsrgv!mason
or {decvax,linus,lsuc,research}!utzoo!utcsrgv!mason (UUCP)nishri@utcsstat.UUCP (%) (09/11/83)
September 10, 1983 NEW YORK (CP) - Was the Korean Air Lines jumbo jet spying on Soviet military installations when it was shot down last week, as the Kremlin claims? It is an unpopular question to be asking in the United States, and those beginning to pose it - a few intelligence experts, aviation specialists and diplomats - are careful to preface it by saying the fact certainly wouldn't justify shooting the plane down. But unexplained details of the incident have raised suspicions that the South Korean national airline - like those of the Soviet Union and some of its allies - might be allowing its commercial flights to conduct intelligence- gathering missions. In the words of one authority, the Sept 1 tragedy with its loss of 269 lives was "almost inevitable." U.S. intelligence experts were quoted this weeks as saying KAL pilots have been "almost cavalier" in their disregard for Soviet airspace, particularly by considering the area has been the scene of intensive intelligence efforts in the past 30 years. "KAL is notoriously sloopy when it comes to flying off course," says defense writer Ernest Volkman. "Their record is unequalled, except perhaps for Aeroflot (the Soviet airline) or Cubana (the Cuban airline)." Soviet, Cuban and East European airlines have been known on several occasions to have strayed off their Atlantic coast routes between Cuba and Canada to fly over cruise missile testing grounds and military installations in the United States. The last reported violation of Soviet airspace by the South Koreans was in 1978, when a KAL Boeing 707 flying a polar route between Seoul and Paris found itself over Soviet testing ranges on the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya, and was forced down. In that incident, the airline also insisted the aircraft had not been warned by Soviet fighter pilots before they opened fire. But the passengers later contradicted the KAL statement; one even produced a snapshot of a Soviet fighter taken from a cabin window. The pilot of the 707, Kim Chang Kyu - who now flies Boeing 747s on the Anchorage-to-Seoul run - was quoted yesterday as saying he found it "very hard to imagine" how the crew of ill-fated Flight 007 was unable to realize it was over the Soviet territory. Weather radar aboard a 747 would almost certainly register images of the Kamchatka peninsula and Kuril Islands, he said. Aviation experts, such as Frank Brady of the Institute of Navigation, have also pointed out how difficult it would be for the sophisticated 747 navigation system to lead Flight 007 as far off course as it apparently was. And why did the jumbo jet, after two hours of overflying Kamchatka and Sakhalin Island, continue on a heading that would have taken it directly over the Soviet city of Vladivostok - despite the apparent presence of the Soviet fighters? Defence writer Volkman, former national security writer for Defence Science magazine and now a freelancer, goes so far as to say KAL airlines "routinely spy over Soviet territory, using civilians for cover." "Nobody with access to intelligence will dispute that the Koreans use commercial for reconnaissance purposes," he said. "The only question is whether this particular flight was on such a mission." Aviation officials, while not so bold, concede a standard 747 flying over Soviet territory is capable of gathering valuable electronic intelligence - ELINT in the U.S. defence jargon - by simply tuning the UHF radio equipment it uses for communication with airline offices to military frequencies. The cockpit voice recorder would register background noise from the radio which would include Soviet transmissions. The tapes theoretically could reveal useful information once they were deciphered in a computer back on the ground. A typical recorder retains only the last 30 minutes of cockpit sounds, one aviation authority said. "And nobody, not even Boeing, knows what the Koreans have added to their planes," he said. There is plenty of room for ELINT equipment in the cargo hold of a 747, and it wouldn't take the six tons of instruments aboard a standard RC-135 reconnaissance plane to make it a useful "spy platform," Volkman said. "A 747 flies at an ideal speed and height to monitor microwave transmissions and test radar defences," Volkman said. "And that would explain why the Soviets are searching so carefully for something that doesn't belong there." He said the use of commercial aircraft for spying is "getting out of hand," and warned that more tragedies will occur unless the practice is stopped.
mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor) (09/11/83)
The Toronto Globe and Mail last Wednesday (7 Sept) carried an interview with "the national security editor of Defence Science Magazine" with some interesting comments not yet presented in this discussion. "South Korea has regularly put passengers at risk by using airliners as flying spy stations." "Korean Air Lines planes overfly Soviet territory whenever they can manage it. An airliner is the most perfect intelligence platform you can think of. It is large, stable and slow-moving so that it can take accurate readings of activity on the ground and the air around it." "A `black box' recorder in the cargo hold of a jetliner can record frequencies of radio and radar signals in areas it is passing over. The digital recording is fed into a computer that sorts through the readings and picks out information of military value. Frequencies are changed regularly and the information must be updated every few weeks. An amazing amount of information can be picked up from one of these flights. From the intelligence point of view this is a top priority, for instance for jamming radars." "The Soviet decision to shoot down the airliner was the culmination of a series of overflight incidents and warnings." The article also points out that Soviet and Cuban airliners regularly use the same spying tactics, points out that KAL has the very best of navigational equipment, and even so overflew the main Soviet submarine base on Kamchatka and at least three other military installations. "The plane's mission was just too obvious to the Russians. What happened to Flight 007 was inevitable." I still think it is inexcusable to shoot down an airliner for spying in peacetime, but the Russian moral system is different from ours, and it seems there was lots of warning that such an incident would happen if KAL continued its practices. From their point of view, their stance of moral indignation and surprise at the US reaction is quite reasonable. Martin Taylor
karn@eagle.UUCP (Phil Karn) (09/13/83)
I am VERY surprised that so many people seem to be seriously considering the Soviet's assertion that the 747 was spying. One of the characteristics of human nature is that people tend to ascribe their own characteristics to others. Because the Soviets know that they regularly use Aeroflot flights for spying, they believe that we must do the same thing. To believe otherwise would be to admit to themselves that only THEY do nasty things to other people, and the rationalization for their behavior would be harder to maintain. Even though the USSR is a totalitarian state, they still seem to have a strong fetish for "justifying" their actions to the world and particularly to their people. I think it VERY unlikely that the flight was really spying. First of all, it should be apparent that optical spying would not be very productive, given that it was night and the reports of low cloud cover. For UHF or microwave spying, I'd think that there would be little need to fly inside Soviet airspace; as I previously calculated, the horizon distance at an altitude of 10 km would be on the order of 350 km; you could get a good look at the island from the international air routes. For either microwave or optical spying, modifications to the plane (such as cutting windows in the bottom of the fuselage) would almost certainly be necessary. This would be very hard to do on a commercial airliner without being noticed by SOMEBODY on the ground. Consider all the people who come near commercial airliners: passengers (some of which must eventually be Aviation Week reporters), fueling and maintenance personnel, baggage handlers, etc. Keeping this kind of thing secret in such an open environment would be impossible. I'm sure that if there had been something "funny" going on, by now we'd have all kinds of stories and rumors in the paper to this effect. No, it's completely obvious to me that even the Politburo realizes that they made a big, big mistake, but that their options are so limited that they have no alternative but to defend their action to the hilt. The worst possible sin of a Soviet leader is to admit a mistake. A careful comparison of just the TASS statements shows all kinds of internal inconsistencies, certainly far more than in the US statements so far. Which brings us to the question of why the plane was off course. There are several possibilities: 1. Intentional. One of the first things I noticed about the flight path is that it very closely matched the great circle route from Anchorage to Seoul. It is possible that the pilot and/or airline took a bad gamble in order to save on fuel and/or flying time. 2. Combined equipment malfunction/pilot error. One idea that struck me the other day was a burned out segment on one of the INS displays; I could visualize a situation in which the pilot entered the wrong data or changed correct data based on an erroneous readout. A clue here is his last position report relative to Hokkaido: he had the distance right but the direction wrong. 3. Pure pilot error. Entering the wrong coordinates, setting the time reference in the INS incorrectly, all kinds of possibilities. 4. Pure equipment error. I think this one unlikely because of the redundancy involved. Very few of the off-course incidents that have been reported were due solely to equipment error. As to the Soviet claims that they didn't know they were shooting at a civilian airlier, I suggest that you try the following experiment. A 747 is 70.51 meters long. At a distance of 2km this subtends an angle of about 2 degrees. This is about four times the diameter of the moon or sun. Take a look at the moon and compare its size to the width of your thumb at arms-length. Then, if you live near a major airport (as I do), go out and watch a few planes fly by and also compare their apparent sizes to your thumb to get an idea of how large the 747 appeared to the Soviet pilot. My eyesight isn't fantastic, but I'm convinced that I would have been able to recognize a 747 under such conditions (remember the pilot flew all around the plane first.) At 10 km altitude, the air is much clearer than down on the ground in NE New Jersey. Maybe we should all send complimentary copies of Jane's Commercial Aircraft (along with bottles of Windex) to Moscow. Phil
rjnoe@ihlts.UUCP (09/14/83)
I like the idea of sending them Jane's and Windex. It's appropriate. But what about their latest lie? You know, when the alleged pilot who allegedly was the one who slaughtered 269 innocent civilians (not to mention a nice aircraft) went on Soviet TV and claimed that the "target" performed evasive maneuvers before he mercilessly unleashed his two Anabs? Right. I can just see the pilot of a wide-body commercial aircraft filled with passengers attempting to evade a Flagon. I wasn't aware that Boeing designed 747's to reach mach 1.5 or perform combat maneuvers. I've been in rather severe turbulence myself but I'll bet it wouldn't come close to being in a jumbo jet trying to do even a 3-g climb. Better get out the industrial- strength Windex. Or maybe a "dunce" sign to hang on their Pinocchio-noses. Roger Noe ...ihnp4!ihlts!rjnoe -- Roger Noe ...ihnp4!ihlts!rjnoe
dee@cca.UUCP (Donald Eastlake) (09/20/83)
I am beginning to think that the three inertial navagation systems
inputs were ganged, they wer used to calculate the distance to Seoul,
and the enter button was pushed rather than clear when Seoul's
coordiantes were being displayed, thus the airliner made a bee line to
Seoul. This assumes that the crew were ignoring almost all the standard
double check procedures but people sometimes do that sort of thing.
+ Donald E. Eastlake, III
ARPA: dee@CCA-UNIX usenet: {decvax,linus}!cca!deepocha@denelcor.UUCP (09/21/83)
This message is empty.
julian@osu-dbs.UUCP (Julian Gomez) (10/05/83)
The inertial nav systems are not ganged; they have to be programmed independently. Procedure calls for different crew members to do each one, to minimize possibility of a repeated error; this procedure is sometimes (often?) bypassed. Should this discussion be in net.aviation? It seems to be political rather than contributing to aviation.