[sci.psychology.digest] PSYCOLOQUY V1 #13

harnad@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Stevan Harnad) (09/16/90)

PSYCOLOQUY                  Sat, 15 Sep 90       Volume 1 : Issue  13
      Electronic journals. (line 12)
      Comment on Emotion and Performance Symposium (line 153)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Dr J A Pickering <psrev@cu.warwick.ac.uk>
Subject: Electronic journals.

Some thoughts on electronic journals.

Quite a bit, perhaps the majority, of the recent literature on
electronic journals has concerned things like access, security and
organisation/distribution.  These issues are important, but just as
important are the more usual editorial problems such as how to get
refereeing done in time and how to ensure it is good enough to
make a journal one in which it is worth publishing.

There is perhaps a tendency for academics to be functionally fixed
on what constitutes a journal and to see electronic communication
primarily as a way of doing more rapidly what they used to do on
paper rather than exploring the properties of the medium in
innovative ways.  Consider, for example, that electronic journals
may provide a unique teaching as well as research resource.
Making journals more accessible is certainly one way to encourage
students to read them, but as those who teach know, the problem is
not only how to provide access to journals but also how to get
people to read them.  A good way would be  to make them more
enjoyable to read.  Accessibility is related to the questions "who gets
to read it?" and "how can they get hold of it?"   Enjoyability is
perhaps more related to questions like "who gets to write and edit
the articles?" and "how carefully are the articles inspected and
selected?"

All these questions are important and one of the exciting things
about electronic journals is that they might offer new answers.
Answers, moreover, which may promote new forms of
communication within the academic community.  For example, a
novel aspect of electronic journals is the speedy interconnectivity
they support between editors, referees, authors and readers, as
pointed out in a previous paper (Harnad, Psycoloquy, March 21st.,
1990).

This not only has implications for access, though it is clear that
electronic distribution is faster and more flexible than paper
journals, but also, or at least  potentially, for the speed of peer
review.  The slowness of paper journals is more a function of the
necessarily slow process of refereeing as it is of the laborious
processes of  typeseting, copy editing, proof reading, printing and
mailing.

Not that this slowness is a bad thing.  It encourages the considered
presentation of carefully prepared texts which is an important and
unique form of academic communication.  It is not, however, the
only one.  Others, such as debate, discussion and dialogue generally
are just as vital a part of academic life but they occur on a shorter
time scales than those involved in conventional paper journal
publication and response.  As Harnad points out, an intriguing aspect
of electronic journals is that their comparatively greater speed may
permit new forms of rapid editorial and peer response which may in
turn permit the contents of electronic journals to be more like the
record of a dialogue in progress rather than the interchange of
relatively finalised positions.

As an example, consider the following proposal for an electronic
journal promoting new ways to share ideas.  It is fairly similar to
Psycoloquy as it now stands, but perhaps with the editorial and
refereeing proceedures made more explicit.  This might be a
necessary step if contributions to an electronic journal are to
become as significant as those to paper journals.

The journal would be mainly, or even entirely, for abstracts.
Numbers of the journal would appear regularly and thus would be
more identifiable when reference is made to papers in them.  The
journal could also appear relatively frequently, say monthly,
carrying a small number of items, say four.  Abstracts must observe
a firm length constraint set at, say, no more than two thousand
words or, the more draconian limit proposed by Harnad of one
screenfull.  Authors submit abstracts to a single editor whose email
address is a gate from which abstracts are copied in parallel to a
relatively large board of referees.  For each number of the journal,
every referee sees the same cohort of abstracts and, if they wish to
obtain them from the authors, the articles behind them.   Prior to
the deadline for a particular number, referees return to the editor a
list of what they consider to be the best abstracts in the cohort.  The
list could have some agreed length limits, say, no more than eight
and no less than one.  Returning no list could be a sign that a referee
wishes to resign.  Referees might also be required to rank their lists,
and perhaps to add terse comments on the abstracts in it, though
that increases their workload.  The returned lists are accumulated in
a central register.

To be considered for publication an abstract must have been
selected by more than some agreed proportion of the board of
referees.  Once that condition is met, an abstract is given a score
based on how many editors selected it or on their rankings, if
rankings were given.  This score is used to give an overall ranking to
all abstracts in the central register.  Assuming that more than four
abstracts make it from the cohort into the central register, the top
four are published.     The rest are returned to authors along with
their scores and any comments they received.  Authors of the 'near
miss' abstracts  might be invited to resubmit abstracts for inclusion
in the next edition's cohort.  Anonymity of refrereeing is no
problem, since authors just get a score and comments without any
information about which referee selected or did not select their
abstract.  Anonymity of submission perhaps is a little more difficult
although it would be relatively easy for the editor to replace author
and referee details with aliases.  Refereees and authors could then
use these aliases and the editors email gate as the channel of
communication.

So what do participants in this form of interchange get that they
don't already get with paper journals?   Well, referees get to do a
fair deal of reading but little writing.  Readers get to see a select
sample of abstracts of hitherto unpublished work.  Authors get two
relatively novel forms of peer review.  The first is the score their
abstract achieves.   This will be more rapidly received and will be
based on the judgement of a greater number of refereees than is
usually the case in paper journals.  Assuming their abstract gets
published, the second form of peer review is the number of requests
authors get for the full paper: this is a  barometer of interest in the
ideas laid out in their abstract.  Requests for the full article could
either be answered electronically, which would presumably be
faster than using something like the Psychological Abstracts system,
or by paper mail if better graphics and layout than electronic
trasmission permits were required.

Some obvious questions would need attention.  For example:  can an
abstract be too short? what if authors submit an abstract but don't
actually have a significantly longer paper to back it up?  does there
have to be a longer paper anyway?  what if editors don't look at
their incoming cohort of abstracts? what if there aren't enough
submitted abstracts? what if there are too many?  ...   and so on.

However, these problems all look soluble.  In any case, this
particular scheme is clearly not the only way to run an electronic
journal.  It is offered merely to extend the point made by Harnad
and others that electronic journals are a means to create new forms
of academic communication rather than just ways to make old forms
go faster.

Reference:

Harnad, S. (1990) Message 10/29, Psycoloquy, March 21st.,1990.

------------------------------

From: Jonathan Grudin <jgrudin%daimi.aau.dk@pucc>
Subject: Comment on Emotion and Performance Symposium

The following paragraph appeared in Psycoloquy, Vol. 1 Issue 10:
"In contrast, occupations in which negative, esteem-degrading emotions are
used as tools of social influence have been studied much less frequently.
Hochschild (1983) reports results from a modest number of interviews with
bill collectors.  She concludes that collectors are generally rewarded for
the expression of nasty feelings towards debtors and that such
esteem-degrading emotions are generally effective means for making people
their bills.  But her findings are preliminary, she provides little
discussion of the conceptual mechanisms that explain these findings, and she
does not consider the potential dysfunctions of expressed negative emotion
for organizational or individual performance."

Note that the subject of the first sentence can be seen as characterizing
the final sentence. The final sentence could as easily and perhaps more
effectively been written "In this paper, we extend her preliminary findings,
discuss the underlying conceptual mechanisms, and consider the potential
dysfunctions of expressed negative emotion for organizational or individual
performance." A minor point, perhaps, but reading interesting work such as the
paper this was taken from would be even more enjoyable if we were just a shade
more generous with one another.
-- Jonathan Grudin

------------------------------

                             PSYCOLOQUY
                           is sponsored by
                     the Science Directorate of
                the American Psychological Association
                           (202) 955-7653

                              Co-Editors:

(scientific discussion)         (professional/clinical discussion)

    Stevan Harnad          Perry London, Dean,     Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.)
Psychology Department  Graduate School of Applied   Graduate School of Applied
Princeton University   and Professional Psychology  and Professional Psychology
                            Rutgers University           Rutgers University

                           Assistant Editors:

     Malcolm Bauer                               John Pizutelli
  Psychology Department                      Psychology Department
  Princeton University                         Rutgers University
End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest
******************************

harnad@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Stevan Harnad) (09/16/90)

PSYCOLOQUY                  Sat, 15 Sep 90       Volume 1 : Issue  13
      Post-Docs and RAs needed, University of Pennsylvania (line 14)
      Position in Neuroscience, University of Quebec (line 48)
      Post-Doc in neuroscience, University of London (line 76)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: diamond@cattell.psych.upenn.edu (Adele Diamond)
Subject: Post-Docs and RAs needed, University of Pennsylvania

      Postdoctoral Fellowships & Research Assistant Positions
      in Developmental Cognitive Psychology & Neuropsychology
   The University of Pennsylvania, Laboratory of Early Development

Applications are invited for 4 fellowships and research positions
in the development & neural bases of memory, attention, perception, &
action.  Work with normal children, clinical populations, & possibly
laboratory animals, computational models, or robotics.  Training is
available in the diverse disciplines of neuroscience, cognitive
science, & developmental psychology.  Interdisciplinary work is
encouraged, as is the development of independent research.  Special
areas of interest include (a) whether memory for time &/or space is
fundamentally different from memory of other information & (b)
intersensory integration in the guidance of movement.
      Positions begin May-Sept., 1991, last for 1-4 years, & start at
$18,500-$25,000.  Applicants for RA need not hold a Ph.D, although
that is preferred.  Applicants for Postdoctoral positions have more
opportunity for independent research & study.
      To apply, send a copy of your CV, a *brief* statement of your
research interests & qualifications, 2 of your papers, & 3 letters of
reference to:

Dr. Adele Diamond
University of Pennsylvania,
Department of Psychology,
3815 Walnut Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6196

(diamond@cattell.psych.upenn.edu)

------------------------------

From: R12040@UQAM (Harry Whitaker)
Subject: Position in Neuroscience, University of Quebec

Position Available
Tenure-track position in Cognitive Neuroscience, Associate or Full
Professor level, to start in summer of 1991. We expect the candidate
to have a successful research program with clear directions for the
future. Research specializations in physiological, or computational or
pharmacological neuroscience would be of particular interest. Candidate
will be involved in both undergraduate and graduate teaching. Please
direct inquiries to Prof. Harry A. Whitaker, Laboratoire de Neuroscience
de la Cognition, Departement de Psychologie, Universite du Quebec a
Montreal, Case postale 8888, Succursale A, Montreal, Quebec, Canada,
H3C 3P8. Phone (514) 987-7002. FAX (514) 987-7953. E-mail (preferred)
R12040@UQAM.BITNET.

Position Available
Junior, invited-professor positions available for recent PhD's in any
area of Cognitive Neuroscience, psychophysiology and neuropsychology.
Appointments are for one to three years, with the possibility of being
transformed into a tenure-track position. The positions involve full-
time research. Please send a letter of interest, reprints, an a
current C.V. to:  Prof. Francois Richer, Cognitive Neuroscience Lab.,
University of Quebec at Montreal, Box 8888, Station A, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada H3C 3P8.

------------------------------

From: "Tom Salt, Inst Ophthalmology, LONDON" <smgxt01@mvs.ulcc.ac.uk>
Subject: Post-Doc in neuroscience, University of London

                  DEPARTMENT OF VISUAL SCIENCE
       INSTITUTE OF OPHTHALMOLOGY (University of London)
                  Judd Street, LONDON WC1H 9QS

                Post-Doctoral Research Assistant

The Department of Visual Science has recently expanded and is
oriented towards Neuroscience research allied to vision.
Applications are invited for the post of Post-Doctoral Research
Assistant (Grade 1A) to work on a three year project, funded by the
Medical Research Council, entitled "Transmitters of Visual and
Somatosensory Afferents to the Mammalian Superior Colliculus".  The
project will focus on the role of excitatory amino acid
transmitters and their receptors in sensory processing in the
superior colliculus under physiological conditions.  This will
involve the use of electrophysiological and iontophoretic
techniques.  Experience of neuro-physiological and/or neuro-
pharmacological techniques (especially in relation to amino acid
transmitters or sensory systems) would be an advantage, although
not necessarily essential.

Starting salary  in the range 15,262-16,511 Pounds Sterling.
Applications, including C.V. and the names of two referees should
be sent to: Dr T E Salt, at the above address.

Informal enquiries by E-Mail or telephone are welcome:
Tel (071) 387 9621 ext 231.
E-Mail: smgxt01@mvs.ulcc.ac.uk

End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest
******************************

harnad@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Stevan Harnad) (09/16/90)

PSYCOLOQUY                  Sat, 15 Sep 90       Volume 1 : Issue  13
      B.F. Skinner Obituary - Kurt Salzinger (line 12)
      B.F. Skinner Article for Discussion - Lewis Lipsitt, APA (line 146)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Kurt Salzinger KSALZING@POLYVM@.bitnet
Subject: Skinner Obituary

The following obituary was written by Kurt Salzinger, Professor of Psychology at
the Polytechnic University and Principal Research Scientist at the New York Stat
Psychiatric Institute.  He is a past President of the New York Academy of Scienc
and of Division 25 of the APA, the Division for the Experimental Analsysis of
Behavior.

                           B. F. Skinner

                          Kurt Salzinger
     Polytechnic University and New York State Psychiatric Institute

    Controversy enveloped Skinner, but it failed to shackle him.  For years,
attracting the largest audiences of any psychologist, he was, nevertheless,
treated to the repeated seemingly obligatory pronouncement by cognitive
psychologists that behaviorism is dead.
    When, in his last address to his fellow psychologists -- a mere matter of
days before his death -- Skinner likened cognitive psychologists to
creationists, he did not choose a vague calumny, nor even merely a term that
means nonscientist to most of us; he carefully selected a term that described
the critics of Charles Darwin.  Darwin also formulated a theory that troubled
people.  According to him, as everyone now knows, the ancestry of human beings
makes them less than unique.  Skinner, with his theory, added to this injury
the insult of the elimination of an inner agent -- an inner homunculus -- and
replaced it with the assertion that the environment selects our behavior.  The
latter provides still another similarity of Skinner to Darwin; both speak of
selection -- Darwin of species, Skinner of responses.  Finally, both men were
similar in being misunderstood and misinterpreted.  When asked recently by
Hans Eysenck how he could bear the strain of being so misunderstood, Skinner
was said to have replied that he needed to be understood but three to four
times a year.
    I believe, however, that we should try to produce a better record of
understanding by reviewing what he said and what he discovered over a period
of some 60 years.  That, I believe, would be a greater tribute to B. F.
Skinner than a listing of the manifold honors bestowed on him over his
lifetime.*
    First we should say outright that he was neither Watson nor Pavlov, though
influenced by both.  He was like Watson in believing that we must study
behavior for its own sake, but he rejected no inner stimuli, just inner mental
mechanisms.  Although emulating Pavlov in the precision of control of
experimental procedure, he eschewed physiological theorizing, believing firmly
that behavior must be explained on its own level.  Skinner did not oppose
relating physiology to behavior; indeed, he believed that as behavior analysts
we should define the physiologist's task.  Finally, while Pavlov studied
classical conditioning, Skinner concentrated on the operant kind.
    Skinner discovered intermittent reinforcement, thereby doing much to bring
the psychology of learning in touch with the real world.  He then studied
extinction more thoroughly than had been done before him.
    He found it useful to advocate the concept of probability of response,
while abandoning the concept of the reflex.  It is important to note that when
he abandoned that concept, he ceased being a stimulus-response psychologist.
The same is true of the area of behavior analysis which bears his stamp.  Put
another way, Skinner's behaviorism did not view organisms, including human
beings, as robots desperately waiting for the environment to elicit behavior
from them.  According to Skinner, organisms emit behavior and the environment
selects some of it through its consequences.
    Skinner never rejected thinking or what is sometimes called higher mental
processes.  Indeed, he has written much on this topic.  What he did reject was
the mentalistic explanations that buried thinking inside an unexplained
concept of mind.
   Skinner never rejected individual differences.  On the contrary,
individual differences have always been the hallmark of his approach as is
evident from inspection of his long-term operant conditioning studies of
single animals.
    He never denied feelings, just the idea that they are the causes of
behavior; he preferred to think of feelings and other states of mind as
collateral effects of the real causes; according to him, it is not the feeling
of pain that causes one to pull one's hand from a hot stove; the hot stove
causes both the behavior and the feeling.
    When he gave up S-R psychology, he substituted therefore the concept of
the reinforcement contingency in which behavior emitted in the presence of a
discriminative stimulus is reinforced.  This is a three-term contingency.
    Because he dealt with behavior without an eliciting stimulus, he developed
and refined the concept of shaping, the reinforcement of ever closer
approximations to a desired new response.  New (creative) behavior is selected
by the environment because behavior is variable and creative behavior
sometimes survives.
    Although some of Skinner's students use contrived reinforcers, Skinner's
first foray into human behavior, albeit through his novel, Walden Two, made
use of natural and social reinforcement contingencies.  The caricature of the
machine-like behaviorist reinforcing people never applied to Skinner, or even
to a significant number of psychologists who understand behavior analysis.
    Skinner believed his book, Verbal Behavior, to be his most important
contribution to psychology.  In recent years, that book has had something of a
revival in inspiring research.  Those that know of Verbal Behavior only
through Chomsky's book review are in for a surprise when they finally read the
book.
    Skinner was a radical, not a methodological, behaviorist and, therefore,
he was able to deal with private events, a concept not well known even though
he first enunciated it in 1945.  For a methodological behaviorist only those
events that are currently observable can be considered.  For the radical
behaviorist a potentially measurable stimulus is not left out of consideration
and, therefore, Skinner's behaviorism was more all encompassing than the
others'.  Recently, it has become possible to study private events
experimentally through the use of drugs allowing the experimenter to specify
the stimulus potentially controlling the organism.
    Psychopharmacology is greatly indebted to Skinner, not only because he
first studied the effect of drugs on conditioned behavior, but also because of
his emphasis on the maintenance of behavior, a stable baseline can be used to
gauge drug effects.
    Skinner respected species-specific behavior and he inspired the study of
imprinting through the concept of reinforcement, thus shedding light on a
class of behavior ethologists said he rejected.
    Skinner was not an effective public relations person, as witness his book
title, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, but he never opposed either.  He was in
favor of freeing people from aversive control.  When he said, "beyond freedom
and dignity,"  he meant that people are not in a scientific sense free or
possessed of dignity, but he favored promoting the conditions in which people
felt that way.  More important, Skinner believed in improving the world, in
part by substituting positive reinforcement for the aversive control usually
practiced.
    Although the accusation of narrowness is often directed at his radical
behaviorism, a more justified accusation might address his refusal to limit
its applicability.  He applied behavior analysis to:  the scientific study of
conditioning, improvement of education (the teaching machine and programmed
instruction), the betterment of behavior (behavior modification applied to
both complex and simple behaviors, raising of children, management of
companies, all kinds of abnormalities), language, perception, thinking,
psychopharmacology, culture, government, and finally, when he got there, old
age.
    It is customary on occasions such as these to say that the deceased now
belongs to history.  This pre-eminent psychologist surely does, but I believe
that we will most honor him by aiding history to examine what he accomplished
and by building upon that for a better science and practice of psychology.


*  Among other awards, he received the National Medal of Science (1968), and,
shortly before his death he accepted the APS William James Fellow Award, and
received APA's Presidential Citation for Lifetime Contributions to Psychology.

------------------------------

From: Lewis Lipsitt, APA Science Directorate <APASDCF%GWUVM@pucc>
Subject: Skinner Article for Discussion

B.F. Skinner's death, just eight days after receiving a succession of
standing ovations in an overflow ballroom at the APA convention in Boston,
has prompted vigorous discussion about his life, his accomplishments, his
friends and enemies, and his lasting influences on the field he loved so
much.  On receiving the award from his APA peers for life-long contributions
to psychology, he said that this was probably the greatest honor of his
life.

In due time, everyone who wants it will have his or her say on B.F. Skinner.
I'll take my pleasure now.

Skinner's many and diverse influences on the field of psychology caused some
psychologists, not to mention many non-psychologists, rather considerable
consternation.  He had to fight misperceptions and ugly rumors most of his
life, so intent were others on creating the impression that Skinner was a
cold manipulator of human beings, a "narrow behaviorist," and even (even!) a
child abuser because he dared to design a better environment in which to
rear children.  His innovative thinking -- and acting -- and his expressed
disenchantments with certain historical trends in the field he loved always
put him at the forefront of people's thinking about human and professional
affairs.  He was surely the best known psychologist in the United States,
possibly in the world, at the time of his death.

There will be much written and spoken.  There will be memorial symposia and
there will be volumes.  There will be those who will criticize Skinner in
death as they did during his life.  That is the nature of dialogue, and this
is how the roots of any scientific field are cultivated, particularly one
that has  such vast implications for human development in the largest sense,
including public policy, politics and warfare, as well as for prosocial
features of human relationships.

Fred Skinner was particularly concerned about, and voiced his annoyance
with, the apparent defection of cognitive psychologists from "mainstream
psychology."  He saw advances in cognitive psychology as stemming directly
from their historical precedents in the field, and denied that there was a
discontinuity or a need to conceptualize a paradigmatic shift to understand
thought and memory processes.

I believe that Skinner was more worried about the cognitive separatists than
about any family quarrels among clinicians and researchers.  He saw the
founding of new departments of cognition as divisive and misguided.  On the
other hand, he was always ready to debate clinical psychologists regarding
their conceptualizations, their way of looking at people's problems -- in
which he had a great interest.  He attempted often to reframe these problems
in behavioral and specifically (of course) operant terms.
Psychologists are a complicated and, in our way, an ecumenical lot.  What an
evening that was on the 10th of August!  There was experimental psychologist
B.F. Skinner on the stage to be cited for his life-long work in advancing
psychology as a science -- the citation to be read by the clinical
psychologist President of APA, and calling attention to Skinner's feats of
behavioral engineering, his educational innovations, his literary talent
and, in the end, his service to humanity.  And there was George Miller, too,
to receive a citation of his own -- as founder with Jerome Bruner of perhaps
the first cognitive science center in the United States, at Harvard -- and
against the advice and with the dissent of Fred Skinner!  When Miller got
his award, he said something like:  "I like reinforcement, too."

Fred Skinner approached the lectern looking frail, fragile and humble.  He
stood at the microphone with neither manuscript nor notes, looking directly
at the audience, and told of his perception of his own contributions to the
field.  He took the opportunity to speak against those whom he thought were
trying to split the field, conceptually and politically.  He had had little
patience for a long time with psychologists who would resort to what he
calls mentalistic conceptions, and less with those who believe that
cognitive psychology is a field apart from, and with little continuity
deriving from, classical experimental psychology.

Many think that Skinner denied thought processes.  He did not.  Skinner was
too much in touch with reality to suppose that people could get along
without thinking, or mental attributes.  He simply spoke of and
characterized these processes differently.  He knew that people have self-
concepts.  He believed that self-conceptualizations are responses that
people make -- often to themselves only -- about themselves.  Covert
behavior was not beyond his understanding.  But he insisted on antecedents.
He argued forcefully that the major task of scientific psychology is to
understand the full breadth of behavior, wherever it occurs, and from
whatever it springs.  Behavior has causes or historical origins.  Most
importantly in his view, the consequences of previous behavior are among
those causes and promote the recurrence of behavior patterns, some of which
we eventually characterize as stemming from the individual's "personality."

In his final statement at the APA convention, as well as in other public
statements of the past year -- including a marvelous interview by Michelle
Trudeau on National Public Radio -- Skinner made plain that he considered
his major contribution to be not the skillful training of pigeons to play
ping-pong, but his insistence on, and systematic study of, the proposition
that all behavior is caused and that the natural selection of behavior by
consequences is a rudimentary law of nature and evolution.

Lewis P. Lipsitt
Executive Director for Science
American Psychological Association

------------------------------

                             PSYCOLOQUY
                           is sponsored by
                     the Science Directorate of
                the American Psychological Association
                           (202) 955-7653

                              Co-Editors:

(scientific discussion)         (professional/clinical discussion)

    Stevan Harnad          Perry London, Dean,     Cary Cherniss (Assoc Ed.)
Psychology Department  Graduate School of Applied   Graduate School of Applied
Princeton University   and Professional Psychology  and Professional Psychology
                            Rutgers University           Rutgers University

                           Assistant Editors:

     Malcolm Bauer                               John Pizutelli
  Psychology Department                      Psychology Department
  Princeton University                         Rutgers University
End of PSYCOLOQUY Digest
******************************