brt@pyuxvv.UUCP (05/28/83)
Relay-Version:version B 2.10 5/3/83; site mhuxt.UUCP Message-ID:<143@pyuxvv.UUCP> Date:Sat, 28-May-83 14:29:24 EDT Earlier this year , I received a letter from Dr. Wendell Mendell , Geology Branch , Planetary and Earth Sciences Division , JSC. It is reproduced here with the permission of the author . Ben Reytblat (...!pyuxvv!brt) ___________________________________________________________________________ WHY ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT A MANNED LUNAR BASE NOW WHEN THE SHUTTLE FLEET NEEDS A FIFTH ORBITER , WHEN THE SPACE STATION PROJECT IS SPUTTERING , WHEN PLANETARY EXPLORATION HAS HAD NO NEW START SINCE 1978 , WHEN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS IN THE WORST SHAPE SINCE THE GREAT DEPRESSION , WHEN THE JAPANESE ARE PUSHING FOR WORLD LEADERSHIP IN TECHNOLOGY , WHEN THE SOVIETS AND THE EUROPEANS ARE CHALLENGING AMERICAN PREEMINENCE IN SPACE , AND WHEN VIDEO GAMES ARE CORRUPTING YOUTH? W.W. Mendell and M.B.Duke, L.B. Johnson Space Center, Houston , TX , 77058 For the past 15 months we have been speaking in various forums within NASA and in the space science research community concerning the need to begin preparation now for a decision to establish a manned research laboratory on the surface of the Moon . Before the end of the next decade , the Space Transportation System (STS) will include a space station and a reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (OTV) , the latter for the transfer of payloads between low Earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit . The energy requirements for a transfer to lunar orbit are very similar to those required for transfer to to geosynchronous orbit . The existence of that capability will force the question whether a permanent manned presence on the Moon's surface falls within the national interest . In fact , this minimal scenario is almost certainly too conservative. As space activity becomes more commonplace in world affairs , awareness of the lunar option will emerge well before the turn of the Century . We have no difficulty imagining motivations for a significant American enterprise in space stemming from international economic competition , cold war geopolitics , or national security considerations. Consider the economy of the United States , now in the throes of transition . In the important area of international trade , the country must depend on the export of technology , a word once automatically associated with the adjective "American" . Today the Japanese are making inroads on American leadership using long range planning and efficient management of goal-oriented technology development . The relationship between business and government is so different here that it is difficult to respond to the Japanese thrust in kind . The traditional American method for priming the technological pump has been government financed projects in science or engineering , designed to demonstrate the American forte - organization and management of high technology . A manned research laboratory on the Moon is a world-class project which would serve nicely to stimulate innovation in the private sector . The political impact of this project would be significant , both nationally and internationally . An analogy to 1961 could be drawn when the declaration of project Apollo a political reaction to the national preoccupation with Sputnik and the demoralizing effects of the Bay of Pigs. Today the American public largely discounts the methodical Soviet space program , which is not the unknown quantity it was 25 years ago . Nevertheless the imminent development of a very large Soviet booster probably will lead to a highly visible manned mission . A re-enactment of the fable of the Tortoise and the Hare , coupled with some domestic or international difficulty , could make a lunar initiative politically attractive . It is important to remember that today the lunar option is much more an evolutionary development of the American Space program than it was in 1961 . Ironically , we are much further away from going to the Moon today than we were in 1961 . The current space budget of the Department of Defense exceeds that of NASA , testimony to the importance of national security considerations in space policy . A major project would be reviewed for its implications in that area , and the Moon base has some positive attributes as a secure observation and communication post . Activities on Earth can be seen , and it is not generally realized that more than 95% of geosynchronous orbit can be viewed from the near side of the Moon at all times. Communication time to the Earth is seconds while travel time is days Finally , we point out that eyewitness to hostile activity adds enormous credibility to sensor measurements , however sophisticated they may be . We have discussed factors in the politico-economic equations , and have neglected the exiting and important science to be done , because we want to emphasize the probability of a decision point in the bearly 90's . NASA must prepare for the decision through maintenance of a healthy Lunar research and analysis program over the next ten years . The programmatic objectives must include preparation of a fiscally viable and technologically challenging strategy for establishment of an international research laboratory on the Moon . We believe this can be done within a modest but stable budget , designed to support a healthy continuity in research without creating a population explosion . Project Apollo returned a wealth of scientific information , and it commonly is assumed that exploration of the Moon is complete . The lunar samples are rich sources of information for the Apollo landing sites but represent the rest of the Moon only in an average sense . Orbital remote sensing data from the "J" missions allow geochemical inferences for much of the low latitudes , but mapping is nowhere near complete . Photographic coverage of the Moon lags behind that of Mars . For example , The lunar polar regions are popular candidates for lunar base but very little is actually known about them . Thus the critical element and the pacing item for the first phase of the lunar initiative is an unmanned scientific satellite collecting data in lunar polar orbit for at least six months . At JSC we have formulated two related mission concepts for Advanced Lunar Mapping Satellite , based on the well analyzed Lunar Polar Orbiter mission proposal . One mission profile is a simple Shuttle launch to lunar orbit ; the second profile adds demonstrations of certain capabilities of the STS and features a return of the entire spacecraft to Earth orbit upon completion of the lunar mission . Cost estimates for either scenario fall well below typical Mariner class planetary missions. A new start for a lunar mission can be put in the NASA budget no earlier than FY85 . The launch would occur by the end of this decade , and the first analyzed data would be available in the early 90's , when our predicted decision point occurs . If we act now , we can be ready. As our preaching has spread beyond the choir to the congregation , and even outside the church , we become ever more exposed to critical cross- examination by nonbelievers . The hardest , often raised question concerns economic return - not the long term benefits touted by advocates of space colonization but rather the near term payback for this next step in space. Unfortunately , the Moon could not be more desolate , more devoid of riches. On the other hand , we have two real advantages over our predecessors who have wrested with this problem. as a scientific and engineering community , we know more about the Moon and also we can deal more realistically with the options in the lunar transportation system . Our guesses are more educated, and our confidence level can be higher . From the economic point of view , the Moon's most significant attribute is it's "proximity" , in terms of gravitational potential to Earth orbit . Any lunar product can make an immediate impact on the economic equation if it is needed in quantity by the STS and if it requires minimal processing . So far we identify two candidates . Simple dirt can be used as radiation shielding in polar orbit space station or for any manned mission beyond low Earth orbit . Hundreds of tons of mass are required for such an application . The second , and more valuable , potential resource is lunar oxygen for fuel . Production of oxygen from rocks could double or triple payload capacity of the Shuttle fleet and make profit from the lunar operation . Other , more subtle , options surely will appear as we have the opportunity to learn more about the Moon and as we actually can pay people to think about the problem ! Why are we talking about a lunar base now ? NASA , as part of its responsibility for input to space policy must determine the scope , the advantages , and the difficulties of the lunar option in anticipation of important decision process in the early 90's . NASA can utilize a modest , long term program of lunar research and analysis to provide disparate activities in science and in enginnering and in technology development with a common vision and a new excitement . The vision is important to us all; the time for it is now. _________________________________________________________________________ P.S.There are further articles on the subject written by W.Mendell and M.Duke. If there is enough interest in this one , I will post the other ones later .