AC%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA (04/10/84)
From: Anthony J. Courtemanche <AC%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA> But the way it is now, we may run out of fuel and have to end the mission as an 80% failure, it's gonna be close as I type this on Monday evening. Somehow I disagree that the failure percentage would be that high. I consider it a great success that the astronaut who was flying the MMU (I forget his name now) was able to successfully approach the rotating satellite. The failure was (as I understand it) only with the device that was to attach with the pin on the Solar Max. To me that indicates only that a small piece of machinery isn't up to par. Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't it the case that during the Gemini project, docking procedures were practiced and it was found to be extremely difficult. Now we can stap a man with a backpack and he is able successfully approach and get in contact with a rotating object in space. I consider this a success in it's own right. Optimistically Yours Anthony J. Courtemanche AC@MIT-OZ -------
kcarroll@utzoo.UUCP (Kieran A. Carroll) (04/16/84)
*
I disagree with the optimistic opinion expressed a while ago, that
the recent shuttle mission would have been a great success even if the
solar maximum satellite hadn't been able to be captured or repaired.
While it is true that many interesting things were demonstrated during this
mission (high apogee orbits, release of the heavy LDEF), the
repair of the solar max. satellite was the first attempt NASA has made
to back up one of the claims which were used to justify the expense
of the shuttle: that it would make launching satellites less espensive
in the long run, by providing the ability to retreive damaged
ones, and either repair them or return them to earth. Thus,
satellites could be designed with less redundant systems,
dropping their cost and weight; also, insurance premiums on launches
could drop, as a satellite which failed on orbit could be returned
to earth for repair at a fraction of its original cost, and hence
insurance companies would spend less on such satellites, and hence could
charge less in the way of premiums.
The current shuttle mission cost in the range of $20M to $30M,
I beleive. That'd be a small price to pay for the repair of the
solar max. satellite (the actual cost was higher, as $50M or so of hardware
had to be provided for the mission). If the attempt failed, though,
NASA'd have (a) a still-broken solar observatory, and (b) an extra
$80M missing from it's 1984 operating budget: nothing for something!
They'd then have to consider sending up yet >another< repair mission,
for another $20-30M, which woud have a similar chance of failure to
that of the first mission. They'd likely not chance it, for fear of the
bad press if the >second< mission failed as well (the press can be
awfully fickle). The scenario in which the repairs failed utterly
would be a very bad one: the shuttle would have been proven
>un<-reliable in its satellite-repair role., and a lot of the economic
justification for the shuttle would evaporate.
Of course, this is all academic now, as the repairs to
the errant satellite were carried out in fine fashion, hurrah!
Now rescue missions for the palapa and westar satellites are being
considered; perhaps insurance rates >will< go down for launches in the near
future, rather than up. We should realize that the success of the
recent shuttle mission was rather a momentous thing,
and be glad (especially seeing how close it come to failure).
-Kieran A. Carroll
...decvax!utzoo!kcarrolljdd@allegra.UUCP (John DeTreville) (04/17/84)
From: AC%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA
Newsgroups: net.space
Subject: Solar Max Mission Failure/Success
Date: Tue, 10-Apr-84 08:52:33 EST
From: Anthony J. Courtemanche <AC%MIT-OZ@MIT-MC.ARPA>
But the way it is now, we may run out of fuel and have to end the
mission as an 80% failure, it's gonna be close as I type this on
Monday evening.
...The failure was (as I understand it) only with the device
that was to attach with the pin on the Solar Max. To me that
indicates only that a small piece of machinery isn't up to par.
Yes, well, but the fact that they'd found only one "small" problem \so far/
doesn't mean they mightn't have found fifty or sixty more later. Being able
to get close to a satellite may still a long ways from being able to repair
one.
Cheers,
John ("Space Cadet") DeTreville
Bell Labs, Murray Hillal@ames-lm.UUCP (Al Globus) (04/20/84)
True shuttle launch costs are about $200 million according to high mucky-mucks giving talks here, not the $20-30M suggested. The lower figure may be the bargain basement rate NASA charges current users. Rates for future launches have already gone up and will continue to do so until NASA recovers full costs (except development) around about the late 1980's.
elt@astrovax.UUCP (Ed Turner) (04/20/84)
With an operation as large the Shuttle program and with the complexity and arbitrary nature of modern accounting systems, it is almost impossible to say what the "true" cost of a Shuttle mission is in any meaningful sense. You can bet it is a hell of a lot more than they claim when they're trying to make it sound like a good deal though. They even admit that they are not amortizing the development costs which could well far exceed the other expenses at this point. From a scientific point of view, the Shuttle could probably repair every scientific satellite in the sky for free, and it would not make up for the damage its cost over runs did to scientific programs during the 70's. Ed astrovax!elt
ks@astrovax.UUCP (Karl Stapelfeldt) (04/21/84)
Ed, I am not an accountant. I too am mystified (and a little skeptical)
about the oft-quoted $240 million replacement cost for Solar Max. However,
NASA administrator Beggs testified before the Senate in the FY '84 budget
hearings that for a worst-case mission model (234 flights for the shuttle
over 14 years) the individual costs per flight would be 120 million 1983
dollars. This flight also launched the LDEF, and thus its cost is not
assessable to the Solar Max repair mission alone.
Including costs of equipment and crew training, it is quite conceivable
that the flight would be economically advantageous. More frequent use of
the shuttle (as initially predicted by NASA and now forecast by
the AIAA) would lower this cost per launch.
As for the shuttle development costs, it is clearly unfair to expect
these to be included in shuttle user charges while not correspondingly
including development costs in expendable launch vehicle user charges.
No one is asking Delta customers to pay for all of the development work
that was required to perfect ELV technology; shuttle users should not have
to either. NASA *is* including procurement costs for production orbiters
in its user fees for the first three years of operational missions.
A report to Congress for FY 1981 budget hearings cited the shuttle's
development costs as going 20% over budget. However, if the contingency
fund originally granted by the Nixon administration for shuttle development
is *restored*, then the same report would say that the entire development
program went only $30 million over budget (out of $5.15 Billion). Both
figures are listed as 1971 dollars.
The delays in the shuttle program hurt all potential users, and certainly
NASA itself. However, the shuttle should not be the scapegoat for the
failure of past administrations to adequately support space science programs.
Where is it written that the administration & Congress may ititiate space
programs, but then when NASA needs supplemental funding for them it must
take those dollars from other programs instead of being allocated more?
It would certainly help your case (and I would be interested to know
more) if you could be more specific about which scientific programs you
refer to as being damaged by the shuttle overruns. The Grand Tour was
cancelled over NASA's objections by the OMB in 1972; the U.S. half of
the Solar Polar Mission was cancelled by the Reagan administration (recently
"born again" to space advocacy) in 1981. NASA twice presented Halley probe
proposals to Congress in the late 1970's, and was twice refused. What do
any of these actions necessarily have to do with space shuttle overruns?
The heart of the problem is that NASA's budget in real terms
is about half of its budget during the 1960's (and about a third of that
during the peak year, 1966). Until this changes (probably not until the
federal deficit problem is solved), there will be only slow progress
toward the exploration *and* development of space.
Karl S.
Princeton Students for the Exploration & Development of Space
(SEDS, or NASA ROTC)