eugene@ames-lm.UUCP (Eugene Miya) (06/05/84)
<Flame on>
Thing 1: I guess that many people don't call "Deterrance(sic)" a form
of defense. Funny that as time goes on, we see that the umbrella has
holes in it. You cannot say that we don't have 'defense.' I don't want
to defend the DOD, but there is a problem of scale in your argument.
Phil Karn points out that this is not a technological problem (I agree).
Libya isn't going to lob an ICBM at us. Analysis shows they could do
more harm by sneaking it in (more accurate, less technology [ICBM]). So it
become more a matter of combat against a large foe like the USSR. Here the
problem is one of easily overwhelming a defensive system [very easily done].
On the other hand, we have never really had a good defensive system.
[Pardons to those Bell Labs/Sandia people who worked on Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD)].
The Nike program of air defense and the Safeguard/Sentinel systems
always had holes. The question evolves, how much defense are you to pay
for, and how much are you willing to absorb? Everybody in this country
in this country [like Ronald R.] say "The Soviets believe they can
win a nuclear war..." As scientists, we have to learn to ask the right
questions. I think the right question is " not whether the Soviets
believe they could win (or survive), DO WE BELIEVE WE CAN WIN OR SURVIVE?"
I understand the psychology of war fighting, troop moral, and so on.
Nuclear war (even so called limited nuclear war) is beyond a scale
of imagination that strategic planners and generals cannot conceive, but
believe they can conceive: it's very fast and very destructive.
[Remember: Herman Kahn had an opinion, not facts. Jacob Bonowski contrasted
"knowledge" and "certainty."]
You cannot fight a nuclear war with a WWII or earlier mentality.
The Generals in the past said that they fight today's war with yesterday's
weapons [due to budgetary considerations]. This is only partly true:
many Generals also plan by yesterday's methods (tried and ture). You obviously
could argue that High Frontier is a 'tomorrow' method. But it won't
work. It's too easily overwhelmed and complex.
If we could only spend as much on arm control as we do on arm development,
perhaps we could come up with better solutions [over-naive sounding].
Again, I believe this discussion belongs in net.politcs and not net.space.
<Flame off>
Thing 2 on planetary science: I worked with Apollo 17 SAR data. It is
called "regolith." I confirm with others have said. I think I could shed
some light at the its relation to mantle rock. When the Apollo astronauts
{Armstrong and Aldrin} came to California before the moon landing,
they met with a number of Caltech and other Planetary scientists in the
mountains above LA. There is a significant batholith (large rock body)
of a mineral called anorthosite (sp?) in the Angeles mountains about LA
and it turns out that it was theorized that the moon was largely composed
of this igneous rock. The astronauts were given a geology lesson based
on this material was (like granite) was slowly cooled mantle material.
This body is also significant because it's sister body sits on the opposite
side of the San Andreas fault 200 or so miles away and if you date the rocks,
you can determine the rate the fault has moved! I know the Caltech planetary
science department is not on the net [They have a Prime without UNIX.],
but the USGS (!menlo70 or !seismo) might know more. Final aside: a friend
who was Neil Armstrong's geology teacher said that he thought Neil was
the craziest person he ever knew (shortly after Neil ejected from the
LEM training craft).
--eugene miya
NASA Ames Res. Ctr.
{hplabs,hao,menlo70,dual,research}!ames-lm!statvax!eugene