alex@sdcsvax.UUCP (06/04/84)
Even if HF is only 80% effective against a massive attack, I would much
rather have it than not. Come on: wouldn't you rather (in the even of a
nuke attack of 1000 warheads) have 20% land than 100%? The attitude of
the UCS, Carl Sagan, et al, seems to be that one bomb will kill us all
(Hiroshima/Nagasaki notwithstanding). {This discussion presupposes that
I don't want ANY bombs landing, in case you were wondering.}
In re "hostage cities" (smuggled bombs): this is an ooooold argument.
Assuming that some terrorist group (say, Libya) really wanted to take
out a city, they'd likely do it in a cost-effective manner. Dams are
much easier to blow than bombs are to buy. LP gas tanks are even
easier, and as kill-effective.
OK, let's assume they have a bomb anyway. The US gov. has ways to
detect bombs, once it knows they're around--even from space.
Back to HF. Having some form of defence moves the U.S. away from a
strict launch-on-anything policy, which is almost necessary with 9
minute flight times. It makes our forces more likely to survive, gives
the president more breathing room, and gives us a defence against small
numbers of incoming RVs.
Sure, the arms race may go into space; why not? Better there than on
Earth. Any country that starts using nukes in space is going to (a)
show the whole world he means war and (b) take out all of his own sats.
This means a higher "tripwire" level--and more warning.
And let's remember that all of HF's plans are non-nuclear. No nukes in
space, no new nukes (three times fast, now) other than MX. And much
cheaper than "mobile missiles" a la Midgetman.
Those who think HF is destabilizing are invited to tell me why. Please
address the question of how the U.S. is likely to run a first strike.
Alex
P.S. The original nickname of MX (Peacekeeper) was Hallmark. Anyone
know why?ech@spuxll.UUCP (Ned Horvath) (06/06/84)
HF anti-ICBM defenses are destabilizing only if they are effective! How's that again? Take an extreme example. Stipulate that The Bad Guys have developed an anti-missile defense that is 100% effective. They are now in the process of deploying, and will have sufficient capacity to take out The Good Guys entire missile force in, say, two years. Meantime, the Good Guys have the technology too...but the deployment is a year behind the Bad Guys (it took a little while to steal it). OK, Mr. Chief Good Guy. In two years the Bad Guys are going to have, for one glorious year, a first strike. The best you can hope for is that they will offer you generous terms of surrender. The Cold War is over, and the only choice you have is to surrender later or push the big red one while you still can. And the longer you wait the worse the imbalance... The above is, of course, a fantasy. By contrast, any anti-ICBM of high effectiveness BUT LOW CAPACITY is a highly stabilizing device: an accidental launch, or the isolated act of a madman, can be dealt with without "city swapping" and similar lesser-of-the-two-insanities methods. A true defender-of-man would give the damn thing, and a $10 Billion a year budget, to the Swiss to build as many as they want, with the proviso that they only use 'em on the guy who shoots first. (I mention the Swiss because they only make money when EVERYBODY survives, and they know it. Give me enlightened greed any day, it is something I trust.) Giving an anti-ICBM to a true neutral is a nice idea, since you can build down offensive weapons unilaterally as the umbrella opens. Hah, another fantasy. The bottom line on all this is that the worst thing you can do is overplay your hand; if the other side THINKS you are about to have a first strike, they may just take you with them. In the meantime, an attempt to build the needed technology is good news for we who make our living building neat widgets, and the end result is likely to be more stabilizing than not (enough senior scientists have pronounced the project infeasible to suggest, as a fine-tuning on Clarke's dictum, that it is at least going to be HARD, which falls under scenario 2, not 1). =Ned=