Tom@sri-unix (07/13/82)
The July 14 issue of ELECTRONICS magazine has a Washington Commentary (pg. 70) on the Reagan space policy and Project High Frontier.
alex@sdcsvax.UUCP (Alex Pournelle) (06/01/84)
Why are those people opposed to High Frontier so adamantly against any form of space defense? Don't know about you, but I'd rather be able to defend against some nut like the one that runs Libya than not defend at all. The American people might well agree with me, if they knew we had no defense at all. Most still think that SPRINT and SPARTAN still are up & running. How does it feel to live in a country that, with six months' notice, still couldn't shoot down an incoming warhead? Alex
karn@mouton.UUCP (06/03/84)
The point is, even if we had a reliable missile defense system (an idea which is far from practical) it would still not make us immune to nuclear threats. It would be very easy for a terrorist group or even a government to smuggle a nuclear device into a country and detonate it on the ground. In fact, this is much more likely given the technical level of the countries that are directly involved in international terrorism. I used to be accused of succumbing to the engineer's mentality of thinking that all world problems can be solved with technology. However, I've always believed that the nuclear arms race has no technological solution, only a political one. Reagan is only trying to cover his complete failure on this point with a technological red herring. Phil
al@ames-lm.UUCP (Al Globus) (06/05/84)
I have no objection to point defense against ballistic missles. I have a major objection against weapons in space. One day either I or my decendents will live in space. I'd would be awful nice if there were no really effective weapons that could harm us there, which, basically, is the present situation. Let's keep it that way (Yes I know the USSR has a space weapon, but it's not very good and if testing is banned they'll lose operational capability anyway).
alex@sdcsvax.UUCP (Alex Pournelle) (06/06/84)
Well, the following is a reply to a message by dmw@cmu-cs-vlsi, but it applies to the latter half of the latest message, too: (His:) The arguments on both sides of this issue have been described in many other places. I will confine myself to the main points. 1) Directed energy weapons are a long time and a lot of dollars away. There are a number of cheap straightforward countermeasures that makes their task much harder, such as finishing boost phase in the atmosphere. (my replies follow his arguments:) I never mentioned DE weapons. "Shotguns in space" are fine for me. 2) Homing warheads still don't work very well and are subject to the usual countermeasures. EH? Hmm, I guess SAMs, HAWKs, AMRAAMs, and Sparrows should all be scrapped as useless. After all, they are nothing but homing warheads. It's a shame that the Air Force has never hit Kwajalein with any of their RVs, either. 3) Space defenses must be in space, where they are vulnerable. even if you coat them with lots of rock, their sensors are still vulnerable. Not true. Pop-ups can be built if space starts getting vulnerable. Besides, any attack on one of our sats is an act of war; hence, more warning. 4) More missiles is probably cheaper than more defense satellites, if that's the way the Russians choose to respond. Richard DeLauer, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering has stated that arms control must be combined with space defenses if they are to work. 5) Bombers and cruise missiles will still exist, and most big US cities are on the coast. Tactical weapons will also still exist. So? Wouldn't you rather shoot down some missiles than none at all? Bombers/cruise are recallable until no-return point. The Russians use turboprop aircraft which we can see coming from a looooong distance. If they switch, we've time to think about appropriate responses. Only missiles are game as soon as they are launched; only they have flight times of minutes, too. His is a non-argument--HF isn't going to make war impossible, merely less likely. It will raise the level above which we MUST launch, for fear of an incoming attack. As far as tac nukes go, we can detect them if we know they're there. There are more profitable ways for a terrorist organization to kill millions. Russia isn't going to blow up US cities one at a time. (his summary:) In summary, it is not at all clear that a space defense system will work very well. Even if it does work, it might not measurably increase US security, and may just wind up being a big money sink. The goal of a perfect defense seems very far away. It more likely would just add an element of uncertainty for any attacker, and there are far cheaper ways to do this, such as point defense of ICBM silos. Treaties reducing the ratio of warheads to launch vehicles would accomplish the same goal at a much lower price. (my reply:) I wish I had his hope for treaties. Shame the Russians haven't kept one they've signed, including SALT II. I never claimed for this straw man, "the perfect defense". That's an argument that McNamara advanced, and it's patently foolish. Are tanks a "perfect defense" against artillery? Are Nylon vests "perfect" against bullets? No, but they're a damn sight better than the alternatives. Same for High Frontier. I don't see how his arguments, even if true, lead inescapably to space defense "/not working very well/". My reasons: HF need NOT, repeat *NOT* be perfect to offer a serious countermeasure. It need only boggle up the Russian's targeting plans to the point that they are NOT sure they will blow up all our silos. The arithmetic is simple: they may know that only 25% of their attack isn't going to make it, but they will have no way of knowing _which_ 25%. If they don't know for certain whether they will destroy all our missiles & bombers, their plans are cast with doubt. _This_ _is_ _all_ _a_ _defense_ _need_ _do_ _to_ _have_ _an_ _effect_. It must merely have a good chance of succeeding. Not even the Russians are crazy enough to test against such a system by experiment. Let's not forget that HF's first step is neither space-based nor very expensive. Simple point-defense of our current missile silos would be a defense bargain, pure and simple. Does anyone seriously object to defending our silos? Alex P.S. Please, if you're going to offer anti-defense arguments, answer the implicit questions above. Ask yourself if this level of uncertainty in targeting calculations are worth the money. If not, why not? I weary of getting the same old arguments already answered by HF literature.
eugene@ames-lm.UUCP (Eugene Miya) (06/06/84)
When you hold a hammer in your hand, everything in the world has a tendency to look like a nail. Prevention is far better than a 20% loss. Who is to say, who is to die. I know San Diego well and it stands a good chance of being a prime target. In the age of 9 minute warning, do you think the President has time to tell his people we will be coming under attack? More likely, we will be walking around, then in a flash, cease to exist (I am assuming big cities.). I pity those of you not near us big targets. The terrorist argument: third world nations are more likely to use biological and chemical for economic reasons (cheaper) than nuclear, however, nuclear gives the glow of high tech and thus the appeal for certain nations. You need to divide a first strike into two parts (for simplicity): the beginning and the engagement (oversimplified). There are numerous texts: popular such as Fail Safe, The Bedford Incident, ad nauseum and more serious: Rand and Hudson Center reports, Herman Kahn's text, USAF and DOD open literature texts. The scenarios are numerous: accidental, limited war, "full scale" conflict, mad men and so on. Each is an opinion. I think the LLNL Janus simulations are probably the most enlightening, I hope friends at LLNL eventually let me in to try [I doubt I will get a chance.]. You can debate (Accidental war is improbable, limited war is not possible.....) till you are blue in the face. The engagement is another matter. CBS Reports on the Defense of the US (seven day series which a friend also taped) give an interesting feeling of this. Limited (and escalating) scenarios of Europe are the most publicized. It is my understanding that there are strategic plans which can allow targeting of Western European cities in event of capture, but I cannot confirm this (obviously). A first strike in many ways does not differ a retaliation: hit certain command and communication centers. Avoid wasting warheads on empty silos and bases. The terms "counter force" and "counter value" can be extended to this concept. Note: in a limited engagement, you might not chop of the head of the ememy: Moscow might be "spared" in order to have leaders communicate and prevent further escalation. Submarines and ASW pose a special dangerous problem because of the short flight time and communications problems. Next, what cities and facilities do you target: enumerate: Kiev, Moscow, launch sites.....? what order? depends on your response. Technically, my ancestors launched a very successful attack, few losses to their side, great damage to the enemy (although a couple of blunders were made, we have learned our lessons: some say my ancestors lost the war, but won a greater victory). I think your English ancestors had a similar good battle early in their history: sneak attack on Christmas eve crossing some river. Perhaps we can pool our talents! If we hit the Russians hard and fast, maybe we could get by with less than 20% casualties! We have to knock out their subs first, and synchronize that by blinding their missile and air defense, cut off their lines of communiation. We will have them hit so hard and so fast, they won't know what hit them! Civil Defense: they won't have time to use it. We can discuss this using mail rather than the net. This is my absolute last posting on this subject. It should move to net.politics or as Robert said: arms-discussion. My parents, by the way, are both US born and raised: my father landed on Utah Beach on D-Day with 3 other uncles in the 442 regiment. My mother was interned at Santa Anita Race Track where she lived in a horse stable for two years (including getting a HS degree). She was later a Red Cross volunteer who was trapped in Tokyo at the end of the war and survived the fire bombing of Curtis LeMay (she does not regret this). I went to school with a kid whose mother was in Himoshima the day the bomb was dropped. How much longer does this have to go on? --eugene miya (some short satire intended in the next to last paragraph)
piner@pur-phy.UUCP (Richard Piner) (06/12/84)
Well, time to enter the debate. First let me summarize the debate.
It seems to go back and forth something like this;
Pro: "Look at this neat defense system. Let's build it."
Con: "It won't work. Forget it."
Pro: "Well, it will be expensive, and it has some bugs.
But we can make it work."
Con: "Well, you're right, it can be made to work in theory.
But there are too many counter measures".
Pro: "Ok, so it isn't perfect, but isn't it better to take out
some of the warheads than to let them all land."
Con: "It is an escalation of the arms race. It will cost a lot
of money and will just make things worse."
Pro: "But I would rather have a defensive arms race than an
offensive arms race."
Con: "It's worse"
Pro: "Better!"
Con: "WORSE!"
.
.
.
The argument then gets even more heated. I have been thinking about
this debate. I must admit that I like the idea of defensive weapons
rather than offensive weapons myself. But I had to scan my memory
to find if history could shed any light on this debate. Indeed it can.
In the 60's this debate was about the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile)
system. The arguments above are just about the same arguments that
were put forward when the ABM system was debated. The proponents won.
It was decided to build an ABM system. The Russians decided to build
one too, of course. It was seen that these system were going to be
very expensive, imperfect and perhaps destabilizing. So the Soviet
Union and the United States agreed to build only four such systems.
Each side would build two. The plan was to build one system to
defend a missile base in the west, and one system to defend the
capital. The Soviets decided on a similar plan.
The US started work on the first system in the west. The second
one the protect the capital was to be built after the bugs were
worked out on the first one. The Soviets started work around Moscow.
After the US system was partly built, it was decided that the system
would never be worth the money, and it might not ever be made to
work. In short, those folks who had argued against it's technical
feasibility had been right. The Soviets did complete the system
protecting Moscow, I don't think they ever built the second.
The system around Moscow is not expected to work by US experts.
So what's so bad about this. We gave a good idea a good shot.
So a few billion dollars were spent to find out it was a mistake.
That's not so bad to defend our country, is it? Well, there was
a side effect to the ABM plan. When it was decided to build these
systems, weapons designers started work on counter measures.
The idea they hit upon was decoy war heads. Put several decoys
on each missile, then the Soviets would have to shoot more
targets to get your warhead. Then someone got the bright idea,
"Why use dummy warheads? why not use real ones?" And so MIRVs
were born.
Now we have MIRVs, but no defense, even against the old
style single warhead missiles. Is this history lesson germane
to the current debate. I believe it is. Even if we can build
a space based system which is 100% effective against ICBMs,
there are still submarine based missiles. I suspect that
any attempt to build a space based defense will result in
a shift to weapons which can be launched from the sea. These
weapons are harder to stop, and give much less warning. In
the case of ballistic missiles, flight times are around 10
minutes, instead of 30 minutes for ICBMs. The cruise missiles
don't even show up on radar. They can be shot down if you can
find them soon enough., But finding them, intercepting them,
and shooting them is a real trick. But I digress.
My point is, there is an easy counter measure to any
space based defense we could build. Building such a system,
or even trying to build it, will only shift the arms race
into another direction. Indeed, current trends in the arms
race are away from ICBMs anyway. Building a defense against
them will only hasten this trend. Any defense plan must
be complete to be effective. As long as there is anyway around
it, it is a waste. I think the ABM lesson shows us this.
So, I am afraid any space based defense will be just another
Maginot Line.
Rich Piner
Purdue Physics Dept.
P.S.
To make a long article longer, we should define a couple
of terms in this debate.
"High Frontier" refers to system of around 400 platforms in
orbit, each with 100 interceptor missiles to take out
one warhead each. These are backed up by ground based
"Gatling guns". The chief proponent of this system is
Gen. Daniel Graham (Ret.) It is not a beam weapon, and
the warheads on the missile, use conventional explosives
and flack.
"Star Wars" is the other term. It refers to directed energy
beam weapons. This includes particle beams, and laser beams.al@ames-lm.UUCP (Al Globus) (06/12/84)
I received a query as to what papers have been pulled from conferences by DOD recently. The information comes from Aviation Week within the last few months. Unfortunately I don't have time to go dig the details out, but I believe they were mostly information technology papers. Note that cryptologists submit their papers to pre-censorship even when they are not DOD funded. This is suposedly voluntary. I have an excercise for those who think Star Wars can protect us. 1. Estimate the number of atomic explosions the U.S. can absorb. 2. Divide by 8,000 (approximate number of Soviet warheads that can reach the U.S.) to get the percentage success required. 3. Realize that ICBM's take about a half hour and submarine missles as little as 10 seconds to reach U.S. cities. 4. Figure out how to test star wars sufficiently to have confidence in success. If, after going through the above, you still believe that star wars can protect the U.S. population against a determined attack by the Soviet Union I have several bridges near here I'd like to sell you. A good deal, only $1 trillion in OEM quantities.
goun@elmer.DEC (Roger H. Goun) (06/13/84)
Why are those people opposed to High Frontier so adamantly against
any form of space defense?....How does it feel to live in a country
that, with six months' notice, still couldn't shoot down an incoming
warhead?
I personally am opposed to a space defense because I feel that such a system
will only increase the number of warheads in the world. My premise is that
it is impossible (with current technology) to build a perfect defense.
If we can build a defense against (say) 50% of incoming warheads, or (say)
75% of missiles in their boost phase, then I'm certain that the Soviets will
simply build enough new missiles that they can feel assured of delivering
the same megatonnage to the same targets as they can now, despite the
defense we're erected. If we improve our defense, but it is still not
"perfect," they will simply build still more missiles. More missiles in the
world make the world less stable, for reasons which should be obvious.
I'm donning my asbestos suit. Flame away.
(The preceding is the opinion of the author and should not be construed as
the opinion of his friends, employer, or anyone else.)
-- Roger Goun
ARPA: goun%elmer.DEC@decwrl.ARPA
UUCP: {allegra, decvax, ucbvax}!decwrl!rhea!elmer!goun
USPS: Digital Equipment Corp., HLO2-2/H13
77 Reed Road; Hudson, MA 01749
MCIMail: RGoun
Tel: (617) 568-6311cozadde@trsvax.UUCP (06/15/84)
#R:ames-lm:-32800:trsvax:56000016:000:6887 trsvax!cozadde Jun 15 12:49:00 1984 I would like to turn your numbers around. 1. How many hand grenades are there in the world, outside of the U.S.? 2. How many people can a hand grenade kill under optimum conditions? 3. Is the resultant numbers sufficient to kill every person in the U.S. if applied under optimum conditions? 4. How much would it cost for the U.S. to protect every person residing in the U.S. from being killed by a determined enemy (one who is willing to die while carrying out the attack) wielding hand grenades? 5. What is the difference between a person being killed by a hand grenade attack and a nuclear attack? The above questions are basicly illogical, if not silly. But they reflect the level of logic applied to the High Frontier debate. WARNING: THIS IS LONG AND POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS TO LIBERAL IDEAS OF HISTORY AND OF THE MILITARY. PROCEED AT YOUR OWN DISCRETION!!!! I would like to insert a little personnal information that I have picked up over the years. 1. The ABM system (Safeguard) of the early 70's failed to live up to its promises for a number of reasons. a. The system was initially designed to deal with incoming warheads sequencially. The system was also designed to have independent, but mutually supporting complexes consisting of radars, computers, and missiles (all ground based). b. The system was initially designed to attack incoming warheads at the midcourse point (half way to the target ) with small nuclear weapons carried by ground launched. missiles. c. After some testing, it was found that (then) current technology could not produce the following items to ful fill its missions. d. Radars: Did not have the range or precision to detect and track warheads prior to midcourse point to allow early launch of ABM missiles. e. Computers: Did not have the speed and power to han- dle the flow of data required to project the course of incoming warheads and compute the trajectory of the in- terceptor missiles to allow sufficient time to launch, intercept and destroy the incoming warheads without destroying or damaging the target with our own weapons. f. Missiles: Did not the acceleration necessary to reach the interception points that were plotted for them. Attempted fixes: a. Faster missiles,ie the Nike X, were tried. It got to the interception point, but there was a high (~20%) percentage point of failure to destroy the incoming warhead. b. Better radars and faster computers were looked for but none were satifactory. So more complexes were asked for and the price tag started to skyrocket. More testing revealed: a. That if incoming missiles were launched in waves, the system would be unable to destroy incoming warheads fast enough to protect the target. And if the target was the ABM system itself, poof goes the whole ball of wax. (Even more complexes were asked for after this one was brought to light.) b. That if decoys were deployed along with the warheads the system would have to shoot at more targets and de- plete the system's supply of missiles. This caused a complete rethinking of strategy. Since decoys had a smaller mass than warheads, they had a different tra- jectory when they hit the upper parts of the atmosphere and then the real warheads could be detected with pre- cision. But, this meant the warheads would be almost on top of the target before the warheads could be tracked and plotted for interception. This meant even faster missiles, ie the Sprint. At this point, the ABM system was a multi-layered system with detection, plotting, and interception to be attempted at mid- course point, upper atmosphere, and right above the target. Now two things happened, one the military brought the ABM sys- tem to Congress for funding and the Soviet Communist Party started to request negotiations for a ban on ABM systems. At first, the U.S. decided to build several complexes and not to negotiate a ban on our advantage. But two more things came to light, one: the civilian leaders started to understand what the ABM system would probably flatten their cities while protecting them from ICBM attack and the cost of the system. Two: the military, after some more test, found that two more factors affected the success of the ABM system. A. EMP (ElectroMagne- tic Pulse) from our Sprint missiles and certain preprogrammed incoming missiles would force our radars and possibly our com- puters to shut down during flash (when the EMP passes through the point of concern) or risk the almost certain chance of burned out electronics. This would mean our radars would be blind for a few seconds after each detonation if not destroyed. B. Because of the research done to develop the small but very efficient warheads for the Sprint and Nike X missiles, the military had the ability to have more warheads per ICBM (this is not MIRV, more like a shotgun) and this meant more targets that had to be shot at (decoys could be ignored once they hit the atmosphere). More targets meant more Sprint missiles and the Soviets had the ability of loading up their missiles the same way within a short period of time, once they got the idea. These two pieces of news caused two changes in plans. 1. No one wanted an ABM system protecting their city. And 2. the military no longer supported a total protection system. How- ever they did want something to protect certain military installations for nuclear war fighting capabilities. There- fore the U.S. quickly sat down with the Soviets and negotiated the ABM treaty. (And where did MIRV come from? It was a result of the "shotgun" system and the requirement of mutually supporting targeting system and why waste a big bomb on a little target when a little one will do fine.) What is the whole point of this? Any connection between the concept of the High Frontier and efforts for an ABM system back in the early 70's is comparable to the connection between a '1984 Corvette' and a 'horse and buggy'. A parting comment: What the military wants, what Reagon wants and what Reagon tells the media and the civilians what he wants are three different things. The military wants something that will allow them to fulfill their mission of protecting the nation. Reagon wants something to beat the Soviets back so they can not blackmail him or the rest of the world into submission. And there is the media hype of "We dream of wiping out the need of nuclear weapons by building a 'Star Wars' defense that will stop anything the Soviets can throw at us or our friends." lt. of marines ...microsoft!trsvax!cozadde ...laidbak!trsvax!cozadde ...ctvax!trsvax!cozadde