art@ACC.ARPA (12/02/85)
One concern I have about SDI is the situation France was in at the start of WWII. The French had built an "impregnable" defensive system along the German border called the Maginot Line. But the German Panzer Army was a development in warfare technology that the Maginot Line was not prepared for and the German Armies ran right through it. If we put up SDI and our adversaries have converted to cruise missiles and low level supersonic bombers, will we be protected? It seems that SDI may just result in a change of tactics and an ongoing vicious cycle of weapons development. We had better try to learn from history, lest we repeat it. Let us hope that our respective leaders can find some way to at least reduce the number of existing weapons. ------
space@ucbvax.UUCP (12/02/85)
Your point is well taken, except for the fact that the Germans didn't crash *through* the Maginot Line, they went around it by invading neutral Belgium and out-flanking the defenses the French had built. Apparently the designers hadn't considered that the Germans would violate the neutrality of other nations. jim
blb@cbdkc1.UUCP ( Ben Branch 3E293 CB x4790 WSB ) (12/02/85)
I believe the Germans ran around the Maginot Line, which did not extend along the Belgian border because the terrain was 'too rough' for the Germans to attack there. But the point about non-ICBM is well taken. Especially if you make a cruise missile look like a private plane, as far as your space defenses can tell.
space@ucbvax.UUCP (12/03/85)
The initial SDI plans are concerned with ICBM's using a layered defense. The lowest layer (a kinetic kill weapon located near a potential target) could destroy bombers, cruise missiles or warheads. The higher layers (in orbit) are aimed at the ICBM's themselves and the warheads. Later additions to SDI could include more advanced sensors and weapons to track and kill cruise missiles & bombers at long range. This could also include a pop-up weapon (launched during an attack) that uses x-ray lasers against sub-launched missiles, which are otherwise very difficuly to catch since their flight time is so short.
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (12/03/85)
> ... The French had built an "impregnable" defensive system > along the German border called the Maginot Line. But the German Panzer > Army was a development in warfare technology that the Maginot Line was > not prepared for and the German Armies ran right through it... Not true, they went around it rather than through it. And they were able to do that because it had been cut down from M. Maginot's original proposal, which did not envisage such a gaping hole in the defences opposite the Ardennes. (It is worth noting that it was also undermanned and not well maintained -- issues that will be worth remembering if SDI is deployed.) And this discussion has drifted away from specifically space-related issues to the point where it probably should not continue in net.space. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
space@ucbvax.UUCP (12/04/85)
> start of WWII. The French had built an "impregnable" defensive system > along the German border called the Maginot Line. But the German Panzer > Army was a development in warfare technology that the Maginot Line was > not prepared for and the German Armies ran right through it. If we The Germans went AROUND the Maginot Line not through it! > We had better try to learn from history. Maybe some of us better learn our history first. :-) (?) -taw
space@ucbvax.UUCP (12/05/85)
The historical aspects of your analogy aren't correct: the
Germans went around the Maginot Line just as hostiles would do to SDI
as the remainder of your analogy suggests. The Maginot Line forced
the Germans to rethink their tactics, not develop new technology.
Joe Barone, {allegra, decvax!brunix, linus, ccice5}!rayssd!m1b
Raytheon Co, Submarine Signal Div., Box 330, Portsmouth, RI 02871karn@petrus.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) (12/05/85)
The US government seems to have a hard time intercepting more than a few percent of the illegal drugs smugged into this country. This is despite the fact that the smugglers put relatively "low tech" delivery devices (boats, Cessnas, parachutes) up against satellite reconnaissance, F-15's and lots of armed agents. Does anyone seriously think that just throwing money at the problem will help? It hasn't done much for the drug trade; an AP wire story says that cocaine is as cheap as it's ever been. And we're supposed to build a complete and impenetrable barrier to nuclear weapons entering the country. If Reagan weren't so powerful, I'd be laughing too hard to type. Phil
jlg@lanl.ARPA (12/06/85)
> The US government seems to have a hard time intercepting more than a few > percent of the illegal drugs smugged into this country. This is despite the > fact that the smugglers put relatively "low tech" delivery devices (boats, > Cessnas, parachutes) up against satellite reconnaissance, F-15's and lots > of armed agents. Does anyone seriously think that just throwing money > at the problem will help? It hasn't done much for the drug trade; an > AP wire story says that cocaine is as cheap as it's ever been. Of course, if the objective was simply to destroy all vehicles of the type used by smugglers, the problem would be comparatively simple. But in order to catch drug smugglers in their "low tech" operations, we have to resort to such "low tech" approaches as direct person-to-person contact, read their rights, search their vehicle with dogs, etc.. The DEA, Coast Guard, and other agencies don't have the luxury of saying "this is war, any vehicle moving through the Caribbean shall be destroyed." If they did, smuggling would soon cease. So would all other commerce and recreation. The military technology of WW2 would be sufficient to blockade the Caribbean these days (over the horizon radar controlled guns for example). The SDI on the other hand has exactly this luxury. It will probably be implemented in such a way that any space-going vehicle that is not part of SDI would be a target for destruction if a war starts. This would be kind of rough on any civilian spacecraft (if SDI works). The feasibility of SDI is still seriously in question, but the failure to stop drug smuggling in not a counter-example. These are two different tasks with two completely different objectives. J. Giles Los Alamos P.S. I don't think this is the right newsgroup for this discussion. Net.politics or ar.arms-d would be better.
space@ucbvax.UUCP (12/06/85)
The Germans did run right through the Maginot Line. They went around it. The French did learn from WWI that the Germans might not respect the rights of the Benelux Region. They did not have the line wide enough to cover the rest of their borders. Bernie Gunther
ln63fkn@sdcc7.UUCP (Paul van de Graaf) (12/08/85)
In article <34395@lanl.ARPA> jlg@a.UUCP (Jim Giles) writes: >The feasibility of SDI is still seriously in question, but the failure >to stop drug smuggling in not a counter-example. These are two different >tasks with two completely different objectives. I recall that the war-head in a cruise missile weighs about 350 pounds. Considering that TONS of marajuana are smuggled into the U. S. every day... What's to stop Joe terrorist, or for that matter the Soviets, from smuggling hundreds of war-heads into the U. S. and setting them off in choice locations. Spy Satellites might help you in this area, but SDI certainly won't. Paul van de Graaf sdcsvax!sdcc7!ln63fkn U. C. San Diego
jlg@lanl.ARPA (12/10/85)
> I recall that the war-head in a cruise missile weighs about 350 pounds. > Considering that TONS of marajuana are smuggled into the U. S. every day... > What's to stop Joe terrorist, or for that matter the Soviets, from smuggling > hundreds of war-heads into the U. S. and setting them off in choice locations. > Spy Satellites might help you in this area, but SDI certainly won't. When the Soviets start to use this as a delivery method, I think I'll start to worry. I'll worry harder than you think - to smuggle warheads into this country is an overt act of war. The soviets won't try this sort of intrigue because of the probably that we would launch an immediate attack if such activities were detected. We wouldn't have to catch every warhead, if we detect just one the war will have been declared. SDI doesn't help against this form of attack because it is not the sort of attack the Soviets would use. Drug smuggling is still not a counter-example against SDI. SDI is a specific defense against a specific form of attack - ie. that form of attack that our potential enemy currently places emphasis upon. J. Giles Los Alamos
karn@petrus.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) (12/10/85)
> ...The > DEA, Coast Guard, and other agencies don't have the luxury of saying > "this is war, any vehicle moving through the Caribbean shall be > destroyed." If they did, smuggling would soon cease. So would all other > commerce and recreation. > . . . > The SDI on the other hand has exactly this luxury. It will probably be > implemented in such a way that any space-going vehicle that is not part > of SDI would be a target for destruction if a war starts. This would be > kind of rough on any civilian spacecraft (if SDI works). Yeah, like Ariane launchers carrying communication satellites insured for $350 million by Western insurance carriers, or manned Soviet missions, or any other form of space commerce and recreation. And if you modify your system to spare what appears to be a manned Soviet launch, the Soviets will simply make all their ICBMs indistinguishable from manned launchers. Then when we shoot down one of their cosmonauts by mistake they'll have the perfect pretext for blowing up all the space mines parked next to our SDI components... > The feasibility of SDI is still seriously in question, but the failure > to stop drug smuggling in not a counter-example. These are two different > tasks with two completely different objectives. The comparison is perfectly appropriate. Someone else already answered this point, so I won't bother to repeat their comments. Phil
karn@petrus.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) (12/10/85)
> When the Soviets start to use this as a delivery method, I think I'll start > to worry. Start worrying. Ever heard of cruise missiles? They are simply automated smuggling devices with warheads in place of drugs. > Drug smuggling is still not a counter-example against SDI. SDI is a > specific defense against a specific form of attack - ie. that form of > attack that our potential enemy currently places emphasis upon. The parallels to the Maginot Line are even closer than I thought. In both cases, the advocates of the defense wave(d) their hands and claim(ed) that the enemy would never dream of exploiting the Achilles Heel of the system. The Soviets may currently place their emphasis on long-range land-based ICBMs, but deploying SDI would simply guarantee that they shift their emphasis to cruise missiles, short-range sub-missiles and perhaps even diplomatic pouch smuggling (the Soviets regularly label entire tractor- trailers as "diplomatic pouches"). Phil
c8p-bd@ucbholden.BERKELEY.EDU (Adam J. Richter) (12/11/85)
> = Phil R. Karn (karn@petrus.UUCP) >> = Someone else, paraphrased. >> [Summary: SDI/drug-smuggling comparison is invalid b/c DEA isn't >> allowed to just shoot down everything, while SDI, if used, can.] > [Summary: Yeah, like {list of innocent civilian targets}. This would > give the USSR the perfect excuse to blow up SDI.] >Phil Yes, in the event of nuke-war. Those poor cosmonauts and ESA satalites might be destroyed. At such a time, do you seriously think that an excuse will be needed to knock out SDI? Have a really really nice day... + + + + + + Adam + + + + + + +
ems@amdahl.UUCP (ems) (12/12/85)
> In article <34395@lanl.ARPA> jlg@a.UUCP (Jim Giles) writes: > >The feasibility of SDI is still seriously in question, but the failure > >to stop drug smuggling in not a counter-example. These are two different > >tasks with two completely different objectives. > > I recall that the war-head in a cruise missile weighs about 350 pounds. I talked with a friend in the warhead business (about 7 *YEARS* ago). At that time they were working on a cannon shell nuclear warhead. About 8 *INCHES* in diameter and not very long. I am sure the state of the art has impoved since then. He thought 4 inch shells were possible. I wonder how much of that 350 pounds is not involved in the act of explosion? It would be relatively easy to *MAIL* packages to various cities all timed to go off at the same time. So a few of them are sitting in customs at the time, and some are still in the air over the city, and others are on trucks in downtown traffic. The effect would be spectacular. (Will we start xraying every incoming package? What about those containing Lead Crystal? Lead weights? Refrigerators? ...) -- E. Michael Smith ...!{hplabs,ihnp4,amd,nsc}!amdahl!ems This is the obligatory disclaimer of everything.
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (12/12/85)
> > [SDI has a clear field, uncluttered with legitimate traffic] > > > Yeah, like Ariane launchers carrying communication satellites insured > for $350 million by Western insurance carriers, or manned Soviet missions, > or any other form of space commerce and recreation. This brings up an interesting side issue, a reason why it is *important* for the US to have operational antisatellite capability (!). The main problem with SDI is simply that it has to be able to cope with thousands of targets simultaneously, spread over a wide area. Opinions differ (to put it mildly!) on whether it is possible to build a system capable of stopping a mass ICBM launch completely, but everyone agrees that it's hard. The problem gets a lot simpler if the things come at you one at a time. It would, at the very least, take a lot of hardware to shield against ICBMs. It would be much, much easier to blockade a nation's spaceports. So... "The gangsters who rule America are bent on threatening the rest of the Earth with their [insert dirty words as desired] 'Star Wars'. Accordingly, the peace-loving peoples of the Soviet Union have acted to prevent this abomination. The fiendish schemes of the imperialists rely heavily on placing gigantic weapons in space. To prevent this intolerable militarization of the very heavens, the Soviet Union has constructed a network of 'PeaceShield' satellites to police American space launches. Henceforth no launch will be permitted unless its payload has been inspected by Soviet experts. Treacherous attempts at secret launches will be destroyed. "No bar will be placed on peaceful launches which advance the interests of all mankind. The saber-rattling, death-dealing US Air Force will of course be forbidden to launch any military payload. The spy satellites used by the CIA to eavesdrop on the world will not be allowed. Fatuous claims that certain payloads must not be inspected because of 'proprietary processes' will be recognized as the imperialist lies that they are; inspection will be thorough and complete. In doubtful cases, a Soviet observer will ride aboard the Shuttle to ensure the world's safety. "The American 'Space Station', obviously intended for servicing space weapons, will of course be discontinued as an unnecessary drain on the world's resources. Capitalist industrial activity in space will subject to strict supervision to ensure that it complies with the 'Moon Treaty', guaranteeing that the resources of space will not be monopolized by the fortunate few for their private profit. "To ensure that the Americans do not simply continue their warmongering ways through their lackeys elsewhere, these rules will be extended to cover European and Japanese space launches as soon as the necessary equipment can be installed." I'm not saying this is likely to happen, but it is just plausible enough to be a little disturbing. > And if you modify > your system to spare what appears to be a manned Soviet launch, the > Soviets will simply make all their ICBMs indistinguishable from manned > launchers.... Uh, do let us know when the Soviets start launching manned missions several hundred at a time...
werner@aecom.UUCP (Craig Werner) (12/14/85)
> > One concern I have about SDI is the situation France was in at the > start of WWII. The French had built an "impregnable" defensive system > along the German border called the Maginot Line. But the German Panzer > Army was a development in warfare technology that the Maginot Line was > not prepared for and the German Armies ran right through it. If we Actually, the German armies went through Belgium and hence around, not through the Maginot line. They came up to the line eventually from behind, and the fixed fortifications, being pointed towards Germany, were useless. The lesson, however, is the same. Personally, I think the best way to find and win a war was described in some detail by Asimov in Foundation (1950). -- Craig Werner !philabs!aecom!werner "It doesn't even have to be a Pelvis."
karn@petrus.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) (12/15/85)
> This brings up an interesting side issue, a reason why it is *important* for > the US to have operational antisatellite capability (!). I've got a better solution. Let's establish a treaty that bans all further tests of anti-satellite weapons by either side. That'll effectively keep the Soviets from developing the "space blockade" capability of which you speak. Phil
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (12/15/85)
> > I recall that the war-head in a cruise missile weighs about 350 pounds. > > I talked with a friend in the warhead business (about 7 *YEARS* ago). > At that time they were working on a cannon shell nuclear warhead. > About 8 *INCHES* in diameter and not very long. I am sure the state of > the art has impoved since then. He thought 4 inch shells were possible. > I wonder how much of that 350 pounds is not involved in the act of > explosion? You should have asked your friend how *heavy* those warheads were. 6-inch nuclear shells do exist; I don't think anyone has done a 4-inch one, but it could probably be built if one tried hard enough. But nuclear warheads are very dense. Still, man-portable ones do exist -- the cruise-missile warhead is not particularly small or light as nuclear explosives go. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
space@ucbvax.UUCP (12/16/85)
While I can't say I disagree with your assessment of the possible failings of SDI as a defensive system, it isn't really true that the Germans went "right through the Maginot line;" as a matter of fact, they went around it, through the Ardennes forest of Luxembourg and Belgium, which wasn't supposed to be "tank country." So much for the accuracy of military experts in forecasting the course of the "next war." Some of us, in fact, think that, had the Maginot line been extended all the way to the Channel, the Panzers never would have gotten through. But that's not space....
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (12/16/85)
> I've got a better solution. Let's establish a treaty that bans all further > tests of anti-satellite weapons by either side. That'll effectively keep > the Soviets from developing the "space blockade" capability of which you > speak. Only if it also bans development of boost-phase missile interception, which is much closer to the problem at hand. And only if it is completely verifiable, which I fear I have no confidence in. Bear in mind that such a treaty will *most* *assuredly* remove the West's ability to *break* such a blockade, which means we would be relying 100% on the treaty with no backup. When I hear someone say "of course it will work 100%", I want to see the backup system that will handle the remaining "0%". I'd want to be very sure that the treaty was airtight and that development of a blockade system would detectably and unambiguously violate it with plenty of lead time. Consider the debates now current about things like the size of Soviet underground tests and the alleged SALT II violations. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a blockade system could be operational before Congress could be fully convinced it was under development! Improbable, maybe; impossible, no. Bear in mind that the Soviets seem to be copying a good many US attitudes to weapons procurement; can the "of course it will work, no need to test it thoroughly" attitude be far behind? Note that a blockade system does not need to be highly reliable -- the ability to shoot down 1 out of every 5 unauthorized launches is probably sufficient. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
ccs025@ucdavis.UUCP (Martin Van Ryswyk) (12/17/85)
> > This brings up an interesting side issue, a reason why it is *important* for > > the US to have operational antisatellite capability (!). > > I've got a better solution. Let's establish a treaty that bans all further > tests of anti-satellite weapons by either side. That'll effectively keep > the Soviets from developing the "space blockade" capability of which you > speak. > > Phil Sure it will, just like the ABM Treaty of 1972 kept the Soviets from implementing ABM devices. They have violated it several times. Perhaps I am overly pesimistic of my fellow human beings, but I do not trust the Soviets. They are our undeclared enemy at this point in a very cold 'Cold War'. While the recent talks in Geneva have promised a change, however so slight, in attitudes...we still have ICBM's aimed at all their big cities. Why should they adhere to a treaty with us if it is not beneficial to them? I do not think that treaties of any kind with the Soviet Union can be a cure. We will end up without and they will end up with. I see it as the gun control laws on a large scale. If you outlaw guns, only the criminals will have them. I realize there are to ways of looking at this, I just happen to advocate one. Please correct my logic if you see a flaw. One last note, I do not think verification clauses are worth didly. We have undeniably verified a phased array radar in Siberia that is contrary to the '72 Treaty, yet nothing has been done. -Searching for an answer- -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- Martin Van Ryswyk ..!{dual,lll-crg,ucbvax}!ucdavis!deneb!ccs025 "The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few." -Spock --------------------------------------------------------------------
space@ucbvax.UUCP (12/17/85)
To: philabs!cmcl2!seismo!lll-crg!ucdavis!ucbvax!space
References: <8512020718.AA15110@s1-b.arpa>
The Germans did not go through the Maginot line. They went through
Belgium, and came onto the line from behind. And of course, all of the guns
were pointed towards Germany.
Craig Werner
!philabs!aecom!werner
"It doesn't even have to be a Pelvis."mdm@ecn-pc.UUCP (Mike D McEvoy) (12/19/85)
>You should have asked your friend how *heavy* those warheads were.(350lb) >Still, man-portable ones do exist -- the cruise-missile >warhead is not particularly small or light as nuclear explosives go. > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology Now we know why the Soviet Union has made such an investment in their wieght lifting program, so they can backpack in their 500 lb warheads over the pole to our silos. Now that is what I call a delivery system. (Everyone knows that a Russian warhead would weigh 50% more than one of ours.) Merry XMAS netlanders..................................
Bakin@HI-MULTICS.ARPA (Jerry Bakin) (12/22/85)
From: ulysses!burl!clyde!watmath!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu (Henry Spencer) Subject: Re: A High Tech Maginot Line Sender: usenet@ucbvax.berkeley.edu To: space-incoming@s1-b.arpa (In which I open my mouth, a decision I think I already regret). > I've got a better solution. Let's establish a treaty that bans all further > tests of anti-satellite weapons by either side. That'll effectively keep > the Soviets from developing the "space blockade" capability of which you > speak. >> Only if it also bans development of boost-phase missile interception, >> which is much closer to the problem at hand. And only if it is >> completely verifiable, which I fear I have no confidence in. Henry, I think you've missed the point; however, most people do. There are two points to make: A 100% test ban is much more verifiable than any sort of limited treaty of any kind (either limiting test or capabilities). There is always a possibility that any side will violate any treaty, the question becomes how often can they expect to be able to violate it, and get away with it because they weren't caught. This turns into a question about the sensors we might deploy. What kind of accuracy can we expect from our sensors? Are you willing to agree that our sensors would have a 50% chance of catching one test? That means that if any country were to have even two tests of any system, we would have a 75% chance of finding out that they have had even one test. And we would protest, because with a 100% test ban, even one test is a violation. A country that has to use a system that has only been tested once may think twice about it. Are our sensors only thirty percent effective? Than after two tests, we still have a 51% chance of figuring out they have tested a weapon. After three such tests, our chance becomes 65%. One out of three tests are caught. A country might be able to test their system twice (if they are lucky). How accurate are our sensors? I dunno, the air force museum will show you a camera (and an old one at that) that can take pictures of golf balls on greens. I think we can develop sensors which are at least thirty percent effective. Oh you don't think so? Well look at limited bans then, if a sensor which has only to distinguish between existence or not (a 100% ban) is only thirty percent effective, how effective can sensors be which have to discriminate between shades of treaty compliance? A limited treaty is one that relies on faith. Sensors which can verify a limited treaty can of course verify a 100% test ban. A slogan: a 100% test ban is needed because we don't trust the Soviets, not because we do. Should development of boost-phase missile interception be banned? Of course. There is a fundamental difference however, between ASATs and boost-phase missile interceptions: boost-phase missile interceptions (almost by definition) involve firing weapons into the territorial land of the country! From previous discussions in space-digest, the legal issuses of whom owns space seem fuzzy. Shooting a satellite is something that ``could'' be gotten away with. Developing and testing an ASAT system is something which might even be acceptable to another side (although it is foolish of course by any side -- especially ours -- the value of satellites is information -- who will lose most if recon satellites are killed?). Any sort of boost phase interception development program is clearly an offensive weapon. SDI aside, any system which seeks to shoot elementary particles, rocks, VW sized shells, or even propaganda into another country is clearly an offensive weapon. Shore batteries shooting into the ocean are defensive, ASATs might be, the New Jersey is an offensive weapon, boost-phase missile interception (and those aspects of SDI) are too. With that in mind, of course we should ban development of boost-phase missile interception capabilities as well as ASAT capabilities. And since the former is obviously an offensive weapon while the latter is only most assuredly an offensive weapon, we should probably ban the former first. Except that, contrary to your message, ASATS are much closer than boost-phase missile interception weapons. But come on, do you think SDI has been pushed this far only to allow treaties on boost-phase missile interception weapons to be negotiated? Jerry Bakin Replies to this digest only please. Disclaimer: nah, I've spoken to Ed Spencer, Thomas Watson, Alexander Graham Bell, Ken Olsen, R.J. Reynolds, J. Beggs, and H. Packard :). They all agree.
space@ucbvax.UUCP (12/23/85)
I have a camera that can take pictures of golf balls on greens, too. :-)
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (01/03/86)
> > Sure it will, just like the ABM Treaty of 1972 kept the Soviets > from implementing ABM devices. The ABM treaty allowed both sides two ABM systems, one around a missle base and another around the capital. I think the Soviets built the one around their capital. We abandoned ours for some reason. > They have violated it several times. The only violation that I am aware of that has not been resolved by the board specifically set up to resolve such issues is the phased array radar being constructed. Although this may be a violation, it should be noted that Reagan has NOT submitted the issue to the board. Perhaps he's more interested in propoganda than resolution? > Perhaps I am overly pesimistic of my fellow human beings, but I do not > trust the Soviets. They are our undeclared enemy at this point in a > very cold 'Cold War'. Although the Soviets are considered our enemy, it should be noted that the armed forces of the Soviet Union have never attacked the United States, Russia and America have never fought a war (except a small invasion of Russia by US troops during the Russian Civil War), and in the two major conflicts of this century Russia was our ally. > Why should they adhere to a treaty with us if > it is not beneficial to them? They shouldn't and won't. However there are several issues, such as ASAT's and nuclear testing where the Soviet's feel a treaty is in their best interest, and I feel are in our best interest. It should be noted that the Soviets have implemented UNILATERAL bans on nuclear and ASAT tesing. Also, the Soviets have a new leader from a different generation. They have also made indications that they might accept on site verification and even withdraw from Afganistan. Hmmmmm. > I do not think that treaties of any kind > with the Soviet Union can be a cure. No. But they could help. And they are cheap financially. > I see it as the gun control laws on a large scale. > If you outlaw guns, only the criminals will have them. During one portion of it's history, Japan SUCCESSFULLY banned guns completely. > One last note, I do not think verification clauses are worth didly. > We have undeniably verified a phased array radar in Siberia that is > contrary to the '72 Treaty, yet nothing has been done. Perhaps if we submitted the issue to the board that has resolved these things in the past something would get done.
broehl@watdcsu.UUCP (Bernie Roehl) (01/03/86)
In article <2138@aecom.UUCP> werner@aecom.UUCP (Craig Werner) writes: > > Personally, I think the best way to find and win a war was described ^^^^ >in some detail by Asimov in Foundation (1950). > *finding* a war is usually not the problem; all too often, the war finds you.
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (01/03/86)
In article <851221223119.997886@HI-MULTICS.ARPA> Bakin@HI-MULTICS.ARPA (Jerry Bakin) writes: > >Henry, I think you've missed the point; however, most people do. > >There are two points to make: > >A 100% test ban is much more verifiable than any sort of limited treaty >of any kind (either limiting test or capabilities). > >There is always a possibility that any side will violate any treaty, the >question becomes how often can they expect to be able to violate it, and >get away with it because they weren't caught. > Actually, there is an even *more* important question. What do we(or they) do if a violation is detected? We cannot really threaten to go to war over a violation, that would be over-reacting. Could we make any violation void the whole treaty and make it cause for the other side to resume nuclear developement? I am not sure that is practical. And why should we expect the US government to take any strong positive action obout such a violation, given that we have been simply ignoring numerous violations of existing treaties(that is except for meaningless diplomatic hand-slapping)? In other words the question is how is the treaty to be *enforced*? -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (01/03/86)
In article <1309@ames.UUCP> al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) writes: > >The only violation that I am aware of that has not been resolved by the >board specifically set up to resolve such issues is the phased array >radar being constructed. Although this may be a violation, it should >be noted that Reagan has NOT submitted the issue to the board. Perhaps >he's more interested in propoganda than resolution? But why did they submit to the arbitration? Did they do it because the treaty is *currently* in thier best interests? Or does the board have some sort of powers beyond saying "naughty, naughty, you shouldn't do that"? What will happen if we ever get into a real conflict with them, or they get into a real conflict with Red China? Will the board be able to achieve compliance when they feel they need these weapon systems? If so how? > >They shouldn't and won't. However there are several issues, such as ASAT's and >nuclear testing where the Soviet's feel a treaty is in their best interest, >and I feel are in our best interest. It should be noted that the Soviets >have implemented UNILATERAL bans on nuclear and ASAT tesing. Also, the >Soviets have a new leader from a different generation. They have also made >indications that they might accept on site verification and even withdraw >from Afganistan. Hmmmmm. Alright, but what happens when keeping the treaty is no longer in thier best interests? Or alternatively, how do we ensure that keeping the treaty is *always* in thier best interests? Certainly, on-site verification and withdrawal from Afghanistan are worthy goals, and we should certainly be engaged in dialog with them, but I do feel we must be *very* careful no to sell ourselves down the river. (Actually, I suspect the withdrawal from Afghanistan is a political ploy - they want out, but they do not want to look like they have been defeated by the Afghans, thus making it a treaty concession gives them a good excuse for getting out). > >> I do not think that treaties of any kind >> with the Soviet Union can be a cure. > >No. But they could help. And they are cheap financially. > As long as we have some sort of "back-up" capability in case they decide to violate the treaty and ignore our diplomatic scolding. >During one portion of it's history, Japan SUCCESSFULLY banned guns completely. Yeah, because they could really get tough with the violators, a government is *far* more powerful than a individual. US and Russia are very close in power, there is little we can do to Russia to enforce compliance if they don't want to.(That is short of declaring war, and that would have to be very *early* in the game or they would simply nuke us to oblivion). > >Perhaps if we submitted the issue to the board that has resolved these >things in the past something would get done. Again, what enforcement powers does this board have? -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa
brent@poseidon.UUCP (Brent P. Callaghan) (01/06/86)
> Actually, there is an even *more* important question. What do >we(or they) do if a violation is detected? We cannot really threaten >to go to war over a violation, that would be over-reacting. Could we >make any violation void the whole treaty and make it cause for the >other side to resume nuclear developement? I am not sure that is >practical. And why should we expect the US government to take any >strong positive action obout such a violation, given that we have been >simply ignoring numerous violations of existing treaties(that is >except for meaningless diplomatic hand-slapping)? In other words the >question is how is the treaty to be *enforced*? At the next summit, the leader of the violating country gets cream pied by the other leader. With the world press invited of course. :-) -- Made in New Zealand --> Brent Callaghan AT&T Information Systems, Lincroft, NJ {ihnp4|mtuxo|pegasus}!poseidon!brent (201) 576-3475
karn@petrus.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) (01/07/86)
Everyone opposed to treaties with the Russkies seems to think that we're forever locked into them, no matter what the other side does. All of the arms treaties I've seen, however, contain clauses stating that either side can, if its "supreme interests" are jepardized by "extraordinary" circumstances related to the subject of the treaty, give notice and formally withdraw from the treaty. Neither side ever has, though. Has net.sdi been created yet? Phil
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (01/10/86)
> > But why did they (USSR) submit to the arbitration (about treaty > violations)? Did they do it > because the treaty is *currently* in thier best interests? Or does the > board have some sort of powers beyond saying "naughty, naughty, you > shouldn't do that"? I don't know the details of the board's powers. I have heard from several sources that the board has been effective, and that's what counts. > What will happen if we ever get into a real conflict with them? We'll all die. > (Actually, I suspect the withdrawal from > Afghanistan is a political ploy - they want out, but they do not want > to look like they have been defeated by the Afghans, thus making it a > treaty concession gives them a good excuse for getting out). So what? Why not make them look as good as possible, so long as they get out and stay out?
don@umd5.UUCP (01/13/86)
> > Has net.sdi been created yet? > > Phil No, but net.politics will welcome your political arguments with open arms. For discussion of SALTs 1 and 2, you would be welcome in net.legal. Folks, this has gone on for quite a while in net.space -- The postings no longer involve "space", as in "extraterrestrial space". Please move to an appropriate news.group .... Thank you. -- --==---==---==-- "What happened ?" "It seems the occipital area of my head impacted with the arm of the chair." "No, I mean, what happened to us ?" "That has yet to be surmised." ARPA: umd5!don@maryland.ARPA, don%umd5@umd2.ARPA BITNET: don%umd5@umd2 UUCP: ..!{ seismo!umcp-cs, ihnp4!rlgvax }!cvl!umd5!don