al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (12/20/85)
The latest Aviation Week had some interesting stuff about star wars (a.k.a. SDI). First, Britain joined up. Interestingly, the memorandum of understanding stated that SDI is meant to suppliment deterrance (sp?), not replace it. I.e., was still get mutual assured destruction (MAD), just at a much higher price. Second, there was an extremely interesting chart that looked like is was developed for some high level briefings. It list four kinds of targets that must be protected. Strategic Offensive Forces were at the top of the list and cities at the bottom. In addition, there was a region on the graph labeled 'Completely Effective Defense' corresponding to 0-5% 'leakage' in SDI systems. Since there were 3,500 target in the four categories, I figure 1,000-2,000 of those must be cities. 5% leakage corresponds to 50-100 nuclear explosions in U.S. cities. Assuming 200,000 casualties per explosion (fairly conservative I'd say) that gives us 10-20 million dead Americans in the first few hours of a nuclear exchange - after we built a 'Completely Effective Defense' at great expense. Gives you a nice warm feeling, doesn't it?
karn@petrus.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) (12/21/85)
> First, Britain joined up. Interestingly, the memorandum of understanding > stated that SDI is meant to suppliment deterrance (sp?), not replace it. Indeed. Given that SDI is being sold to the American public as a way to "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete", I think we're seeing the biggest hand-waving con game of all time. UCS points out that there are really TWO very different forms of ballistic missile defense, which they call "Type One Star Wars" and "Type Two Star Wars". The first is an inpenetrable shield that protects cities and makes offensive weapons obsolete. The second is a "hard point" defense that protects only our retaliatory capability. The only people who still profess to believe in Type 1 Star Wars are Ronald Reagan and Caspar Weinberger. In comparison, Type 2 Star Wars is more feasible, but still extremely unwise strategically. If we hadn't led the way in developing and deploying MIRVs as the answer to a Soviet ABM system that never materialized, we woudn't now "need" a defense to protect our deterrent. > ..that gives us 10-20 million dead Americans > in the first few hours of a nuclear exchange - after we built a > 'Completely Effective Defense' at great expense. "Ten million! Twenty million, tops!" --General Buck Turgidson (George C. Scott). Phil
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (12/22/85)
> > First, Britain joined up. Interestingly, the memorandum of understanding > > stated that SDI is meant to suppliment deterrance (sp?), not replace it. > > Indeed. Given that SDI is being sold to the American public as a way to > "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete", I think we're seeing the > biggest hand-waving con game of all time... Given that the current British government is firmly committed to really enormous expenditures (by their standards) in the near future for upgrading their SLBM forces to Trident, it would be political suicide for them to openly commit to making deterrence obsolete. Somebody is conning somebody, definitely, but the memorandum in question is heavily political and should not be interpreted as a case of "the truth comes out". -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
medin@lll-crg.ARpA (Milo Medin) (12/23/85)
First off, if you speak with people who work in the SDIO, they
make no claims other than that this system is being built to
protect our military assets primarily, and damage limitation
to the population on a secondary basis. The hype that some people
(not the SDIO) are using to sell the system as a total inpenetrable
defense is misleading.
With regards to having 10-20 million dead, contrast that to 150
million dead. That is a big difference. At a recent SDI
debate at Stanford, a story was told about a recent picnic between
US and Soviet arms negotiators in which the weather got
worse all of a sudden, and people started to take cover under some
nearby trees. The rain started getting harder, and leaking through
the trees. At this point one of the Soviet negotiators said,
"You see, just like your SDI, it leaks!". At which point one
of the US state dept. people pointed outside at the torrential
rains and retorted, "Ah, but would you rather be out there?"
To me, that exemplifies the case for damage limitation.
I agree the emphasis should be placed on not waging a war in
the first place, but what happens if deterrance fails?
I also brought up a point about building and deploying a conventially
built ABM system immediately to defend ICBM sites. Such a system
that would get 80% of the incoming warheads would not have to
be space based and would not necessarily have to be all that
expensive. The guy from the SDIO didn't like that idea
because it wouldn't be able to counter Soviet countermeasures
that could be used in the next 10 yrs. The other guy (Dick Garwin)
said it'd be easy to build a system like that one, but there
isn't any need for it because our ICBM's aren't vulnerable.
So I guess my position falls in the middle for a change. I think
the reply about countermeasures is extremely shortsighted
since a system like that wouldn't have to be space based and
could be quite robust. Even a 50% kill rate would greatly
complicate the Soviet's targeting plans, and such a system
could still be built without violating the ABM treaty. And
it certainly wouldn't be destabilizing, since a retaliatory
strike by the Soviets wouldn't be directed at empty ICBM silos
which cant be reloaded, but at cities typically far away from
the ICBM silos.
Phil, as for the case about MIRV's, I'm not terribly happy about having
MIRV's around either, but they are here and no amount of wishing
can wish them away.
It's been awhile since I contributed to this net, but I thought
I'd jump now that I had a little spare time.
Milo Medin
medin@ames.ARPA
...{lll-crg,seismo,riacs}!nike!medinlkk@teddy.UUCP (12/28/85)
In article <1149@lll-crg.ARpA> medin@lll-crg.ARpA (Milo Medin) writes: >First off, if you speak with people who work in the SDIO, they >make no claims other than that this system is being built to >protect our military assets primarily, and damage limitation >to the population on a secondary basis. The hype that some people >(not the SDIO) are using to sell the system as a total inpenetrable >defense is misleading. That "hype" is being spread by none other than the President of the United States, Mr. R. Reagan. He has stated on a number of occaisons his vision of SDI eliminating the need for strategic nuclear weapons. It was this view of Reagan's which was the reason for SDI being started in the first place, and it is this vision which fuels political support for it. Sounds to me the the various scientifically minded people who do have a vested interested in the continuance of SDI have invented a new purpose for it so that they can defend it to the scientific community, even though THAT purpose is indefensable strategically or politically. > medin@ames.ARPA ^^^^ Not surprising. -- Sport Death, (USENET) ...{decvax | ihnp4!mit-eddie}!genrad!panda!lkk Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa -------- Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing. - Helen Keller
bob@pedsgd.UUCP (Robert A. Weiler) (12/30/85)
Organization : CONCURRENT Computer Corp, Tinton Falls NJ Keywords: In article <1149@lll-crg.ARpA> medin@lll-crg.ARpA (Milo Medin) writes: >First off, if you speak with people who work in the SDIO, they >make no claims other than that this system is being built to >protect our military assets primarily, and damage limitation >to the population on a secondary basis. The hype that some people >(not the SDIO) are using to sell the system as a total inpenetrable >defense is misleading. > >With regards to having 10-20 million dead, contrast that to 150 >million dead. That is a big difference. At a recent SDI It is the difference between believing a nuclear war is acceptable and the absolute conviction that it is not. You sound an awful lot like General Buck Turgidson here. Also I would point out that 10-20 million is the most optimistic estimate based on no real life experience. We in the software business know 2 things about such estimates - everybody likes to believe them, and they are rarely (never?) achieved.
eugene@ames.UUCP (Eugene Miya) (12/31/85)
> In article <1149@lll-crg.ARpA> medin@lll-crg.ARpA (Milo Medin) writes: > >The hype that some people ... > > Sounds to me the various scientifically minded . . . > vested interested > > > medin@ames.ARPA > ^^^^ > Not surprising. > > Sport Death, (USENET) ...{decvax | ihnp4!mit-eddie}!genrad!panda!lkk > Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa This is neither science, nor hype. 1) the host ames.ARPA and the host I post from (ames.UUCP) are not one and the same machine. 2) Mr. Medin does not speak for the Space Agency as he is a contractor. NASA has not endorsed the SDI which is a military project. NASA is the CIVILIAN space and aeronautics agency. If you believe in <paranoid, pardon my french> conspiracy theories, then there is nothing I can do to convince you otherwise, because your mind is already made up. Certainly people from both Agencies have crossed in different directions: most noteably former Lt. Gen. Abrahamson, former Shuttle Project head. We certainly have joint projects with some military cooperation, but these are highly limited: just as MIT has joint projects with the military. SDI will not be a NASA related project. We may have contractors bidding on SDI, but the Agency is specifically staying out of the SDI ball game. If you are concern about secondary and teritary effects, then you should not be reading this as computers are very much a military spinoff. 3) Many people within the Agency do not agree with Mr. Medin's viewpoint. The discussion up to this point has been a political and not a "scientific" discussion. The proper host where Mr. Medin should post his note is either lll or lanl. 4) Check the affiliations of O.B. Toon, J.B. Pollock, and T. Ackerman from the original Nuclear Winter study (coauthored with C. Sagan and R. Turco). Consider the possible military uses of pictures of Uranus and Neptune: better understanding of the weather for fallout purposes, any other? 5) Lastly, the Agency apologizes for other information which Mr. Medin posted which violated the trust we had with another contractor about internal projects. --eugene miya NASA Ames Research Center {hplabs,ihnp4,dual,hao,decwrl,allegra}!ames!aurora!eugene emiya@ames-vmsb.ARPA It has to go without saying: The views expressed above, with the exception of 5), are not entirely the opinions of NASA or its contractors. We must do not endorse any any products or services.
medin@nike.UUCP (Milo S. Medin) (12/31/85)
Calling an ABM system indefensible is ridiculous. Both the Soviets
and the US primarily target counterforce style. There are options
for countervalue in both countries SIOP's, but if war breaks out,
counterforce targeting will probably be used. It does the US little
good to incinerate a few million civilians when its the military
forces that you really want to take out. I'm not going to argue
the counterforce vs. countervalue argument here. If you are
a hardcore MAD person who thinks people still use that doctrine
operationally, I'd recommend you take a look at some of the
policy and doctrinal statements issued by both nations.
I have never been sold on a population defense system. If its possible,
and it may be (I'm not prepared to rule out things before detailed
research has been performed), then maybe its a good thing. If its
not, protecting out land based ICBM's is a very good thing for
us to do, because it increases stability. And that is the name
of the game for keeping peace in a deterrent role.
If you don't think that our ICBM's are vulnerable, then I suggest
you look up Soviet ICBM's CEP and megatonnage, and run through
the survival calculations yourself. I won't even talk about
vulnerability of our C^3 systems.
Lastly, what is so interesting about me working at Ames? I
work on networking here, which is my field of interest, and
NASA isn't working on any SDI projects.
Of course, these opinions are my own and not necessarily of
my employer, but you knew that already...
Milo
medin@ames.arpa
{seismo,riacs,sunybcs}!nike!medinlkk@teddy.UUCP (01/02/86)
In article <1299@ames.UUCP> eugene@ames.UUCP (Eugene Miya) writes: >> In article <1149@lll-crg.ARpA> medin@lll-crg.ARpA (Milo Medin) writes: >> >The hype that some people ... >> >> Sounds to me the various scientifically minded . . . >> vested interested >> >> > medin@ames.ARPA >> ^^^^ >> Not surprising. >> >> Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa > > [Long flame defending the good name of NASA.] I appologize. The implication I made was unfounded. -- Sport Death, (USENET) ...{decvax | ihnp4!mit-eddie}!genrad!panda!lkk Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa -------- Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing. - Helen Keller
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (01/03/86)
> > With regards to having 10-20 million dead, contrast that to 150 > million dead. That is a big difference. The 10-20 million dead assumes that SDI meets its program goals (personal opinion: unlikely) and that the Soviets take no counter measures (not credible). In addition, that's only the first few hours of the conflict. Finnally, since a limited SDI system may be very useful in support of a first strike, it could easily start the war we're all trying to avoid.
jens@moscom.UUCP (Jens Fiederer) (01/03/86)
Putting cities at bottom priority seems sensible from the psychological standpoint -- an enemy would prefer destroying our weapons and leaving our cities productive (for him) to destroying our cities and leaving our weapons vengeful. What these charts suggest to me is a GRADUATED approach to SDI. Assuming economically feasible SDI defenses, one begins by using them to protect our missiles (currently our main protections are SHEER NUMBER, one of the less heartwarming aspects of the arms race, and variety (ICBM, bomber, submarine), which is very vulnerable to the vagaries of progress in such fields as submarine detection). A 50% effective SDI protecting our missiles would mean that we need 50% fewer missiles for "defensive" purposes. The inspirational dream is that we can implement the lower priority SDI objectives, and obviate the need for nuclear missiles altogether. Of course, as powerful a system as SDI would have to be can hardly exist without having some OFFENSIVE capabilities as well. Azhrarn
medin@nike.UUCP (Milo S. Medin) (01/08/86)
Al, you seem to think that nuclear war is to be avoided at any cost. Clearly, if this were the case, we wouldn't be pursuing current defense goals. The fact is, we in the US would prefer to start a nuclear war than to relinquish our national sovereignty. Also, taking a position like that would erode deterrence and increase the risk of war. One element of deterrence is will. If you have capabilities, even if the other side is confident in those capabilities, if you are not willing to use them they are not an effective deterrent. Milo
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (01/10/86)
> A 50% effective SDI protecting > our missiles would mean that we need 50% fewer missiles for "defensive" > purposes. > Alternately, we could launch a first strike against the USSR, knock out 50% or more of their missles, and stop the other 50% with SDI. The Soviet's see this comming, of course. This is the legitimate part of their argument against SDI. They have no intention of allowing us to attack them, assume that we will if we can, and will take whatever steps necessary, including attacking us, to avoid such a fate. This, my friends, is how we go about destroying civilization.
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (01/11/86)
> Al, you seem to think that nuclear war is to be avoided at any cost. > Clearly, if this were the case, we wouldn't be pursuing current > defense goals. The fact is, we in the US would prefer to > start a nuclear war than to relinquish our national sovereignty. > > Milo It may well be true (though I am nowhere near so confident of it as you seem to be) that a nuclear war of the sort we could have today would not be the end of the world, merely a crippling mutilation of all parties involved, with a little collateral poisoning of non-participants. It seems to me that this is a transient state of affairs. Technology has and will continue to improve man's ability both to build and to destroy. The means of destruction are and will continue to become more varied and subtle. Countermeasures will be ever harder to put in place before they themselves are obsoleted. An incredibly well conceived and executed BMD system, deployed in secrecy that would probably require a police state, might break the deadlock for a time, but that would be a very temporary situation, hardly worth the cost unless one plans to get a quick payoff by launching a surprise first strike. A nuclear bomb is a relatively small, rugged device, and there are many, many ways of putting one in a specified place at a specified time. Any given delivery system can be countered, but there will be no *general* defense against nuclear weapons until we find a way to locally interdict the processes of particle physics. And nuclear bombs are by no means the only possible weapons of mass destruction. Just the cheapest. Mutual assured destruction is not just a policy that can be repudiated. It is a state of affairs that will become progressively less escapable. We will either learn to live with it, or not at all. The problem is that the existence of a stalemate at the upper limit of confrontation does not magically make the conflict between two opposing systems go away. The conflicts between the US and the USSR are not likely to be direct threats to one another's *sovereignty* (for the reasons above), but to one another's *interests*. To the extent that a nuclear exchange is taken seriously as a fallback position, and we fail to find means to defend our interests short of starting a nuclear war and effectively ending the game, we are inviting disaster. Baba, back but briefly from the grave
medin@nike.UUCP (Milo S. Medin) (01/13/86)
Technology advancing does not necessarily invalidate MAD, indeed, just the opposite. Technology has made counterforce possible. Over the past 10 yrs, US nuclear throweight has dropped 40%. We simply don't need that much bang anymore. Weapons are not getting larger, if anything, they're getting smaller. You are of course right, none of this addresses the root causes of the problem, conflicting national interests. But since we really can't change people, and we can easily change technology, technology will drive nature of warfare. Your point about technology not providing a permananent solution, I also agree with. This means that this course is expensive, however, it has worked. There are not always nice options that fix all the problems. Sometimes, your options are all bad, but some not as bad as others. I don't claim to provide an answer to the underlying problem, and neither should SDI expected to either. Nuclear weapons don't kill people, people kill people. There, that should generate a few flames... Milo
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (01/14/86)
> Technology advancing does not necessarily invalidate MAD, indeed, > just the opposite. Technology has made counterforce possible. > Over the past 10 yrs, US nuclear throweight has dropped 40%. > We simply don't need that much bang anymore. Weapons are not getting > larger, if anything, they're getting smaller. Some people think this has little or nothing to do with advancing technology, and a lot more to do with advancing common sense. It is worth remembering that the Oppenheimer committee, circa 1950, opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb on the grounds that there was NO VALID MILITARY REQUIREMENT for it. These were knowledgeable people who supported further development of other types of nuclear weapons. Their report stated, in so many words, that existing fission-bomb technology (20kT bombs plus a sprinkling of fractional-megaton special designs) was entirely adequate to meet all reasonable military needs, and that bigger bombs were unnecessary. They were right. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
ansok@spp3.UUCP (Gary Ansok) (01/16/86)
> > A 50% effective SDI protecting > > our missiles would mean that we need 50% fewer missiles for "defensive" > > purposes. > > Alternately, we could launch a first strike against the USSR, knock out > 50% or more of their missles, and stop the other 50% with SDI. All we have to do is figure out which 50% will get stopped by SDI, and blow up the other 50% ahead of time! :-)
al@ames.UUCP (Al Globus) (01/17/86)
> > Al, you seem to think that nuclear war is to be avoided at any cost. Absolutely, I'd like this society to survive. > The fact is, we in the US would prefer to > start a nuclear war than to relinquish our national sovereignty. I'm in the US and couldn't care less about national sovereignty. I do care about the health, wealth, and freedom of everyone - and see no reason we need to sacrifice any of the above to avoid nuclear catastrophy (sp?). > > Also, taking a position like that would erode deterrence and increase > the risk of war. One element of deterrence is will. If you have > capabilities, even if the other side is confident in those capabilities, > if you are not willing to use them they are not an effective deterrent. > Just how good do you think the Soviet's crystal ball is? How many times have you seen them risk their survival on assumtions about anybody's will, much less the US'. Join the real world Milo.
orb@whuts.UUCP (SEVENER) (01/17/86)
> > > A 50% effective SDI protecting > > > our missiles would mean that we need 50% fewer missiles for "defensive" > > > purposes. funny thing then, that the Reagan administration is planning on deploying 18,000 more offensive nuclear weapons! Indeed Reagan while smiling all the while is deploying 5 new nuclear weapons *every day*! tim sevener whuxn!orb
medin@nike.UUCP (Milo S. Medin) (01/19/86)
When did the USSR risk its survival on an analysis of anyone's will, much less the US's? How about the Cuban missile crisis? The USSR bet that Kennedy wouldn't act. He did. It's precisely this type of action that a indecisive foreign policy encourages. The USSR would not have tried it if they knew what Kennedy was going to do... That is, they were not deterred by the US's overwhelming superiority because they thought Kennedy wouldn't use it. Milo
john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) (01/20/86)
In article <493@whuts.UUCP> orb@whuts.UUCP (SEVENER) writes: >funny thing then, that the Reagan administration is planning on deploying >18,000 more offensive nuclear weapons! Indeed Reagan while smiling all >the while is deploying 5 new nuclear weapons *every day*! Where did you get this? In fact, we have far fewer (and smaller, because more accurate) ICBMs than for some time past. What weapons are you talking about? What plans to deploy them? 18000? Don't be silly. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas
carroll@uiucdcsb.CS.UIUC.EDU (01/24/86)
/* Written 12:16 pm Jan 17, 1986 by orb@whuts.UUCP in uiucdcsb:net.space */
funny thing then, that the Reagan administration is planning on deploying
18,000 more offensive nuclear weapons! Indeed Reagan while smiling all
the while is deploying 5 new nuclear weapons *every day*!
---------------------
tim sevener whuxn!orb
/* End of text from uiucdcsb:net.space */
You are confused. While it is true that about 5 nukes/day are
built, about that many are taken out of service too. Nuclear weapons wear
out over time, through (surprise!) radioactive processes and need to be
replaced. How many of these news bombs are REALLY new I don't know, but
not all of them are, in fact my guess is that most (if not all) are
replacement devices.