craig@think.ARPA (Craig Stanfill) (01/30/86)
References:
In the aftermath of Challenger's loss, we have to examine
the shuttle program, and answer the question ``where do we
go from here?'' First, I am (like most Americans) committed
to the manned space program. I think we have a future in
space, and the sooner we learn the technology needed to
conquer space the better. Some important issues.
1. As transportation from earth to orbit for payloads, is
the STS economically justified? I include in this
dollar cost, cost due to delay when the STS cannot get
off the ground, and cost due to payload loss when the
launch vehicle fails (a significant problem with
ARIENNE, and now alas with STS).
2. Can the shuttle be fixed? Perhaps NASA will figure out
what went wrong, and correct the problem. But more
distressing, the shuttle is very complex. Will there be
more losses as new problems crop up? STS was built as
well as we know how, but it still suffers from many
failures. Most of these failures have resulted in
nothing more than delayed flights; some have come close
to causing disaster; now we have a catastrophic failure.
But then, who knows how many Saturns we would have lost
if we had flown 25 missions with them.
3. Do we have a choice? How long can we afford to be
without the Shuttle? The military and civilian space
programs are utterly dependent on the Shuttle. The
delays in Apollo (after the fire in I and the explosion
in XIII) delayed only Apollo, but a delay in the Shuttle
delays everything we are doing in space.
4. Are we willing to risk more orbiters and more crews?
I welcome other opinions. Here are my own.
First, the value of the Shuttle is as a means of perfecting
space technology. The fact that payload fees pay for part
of its cost is icing on the cake. I don't care much if it
loses money in the short run; in the long run what we learn
by flying the Shuttle is more than worth the cost.
Second, I think the Shuttle can be fixed, and that it will
ultimately be reliable. In any system as complex as the
Shuttle, it is impossible to get everything perfect on the
drawing board, so you have to keep trying the system out and
fixing bugs as they appear. Whatever killed Challenger was
probably a small mistake. Commercial airlines have much
larger safety factors in their design, but noone would
certify an airliner on the basis of 24 flights. Airliners
continue to crash, in any event; new bugs are always being
found.
Third, there is little alternative to the current STS.
Designing a new one is out of the question at this point;
if we did, there is no guarantee that it would be more
reliable. It would certainly have to be at least as
complex. Expendable boosters are an alternative, but
satellites would have to be redesigned, and this takes time.
ARIENNE is booked up, and there is a very small supply of
other boosters. Perhaps some aging TITAN II's being wasted
sitting in silos...
Fourth, it is unthinkable to needlessly risk orbiters and
crews. NASA's credibility is on the line: their first
priority has always been flight safety, as it should be.
It should not fly until everything possible has been done to
fix the STS.
I think, then, that the following is in order. First, find
the specific cause of this failure, and fix it. Second,
evaluate the design of the STS, from top to bottom, and try
to find residual problems before we find one the hard way.
This might ground us for a year. Third, build three more
orbiters. We'll need them. Slocum@HI-MULTICS.ARPA (02/05/86)
Here are some random thoughts, rumors, comments, etc. about
what the Shuttle and the recent disaster:
I recall that the Pentagon got a bit of flak last year for getting
funding to build some Titan rockets as backup launch vehicles for
large satellites. I also heard on the news during the coverage
last week that some Titans were being taken out of silos and
refurbished as a part of this project. (Certainly to be replaced.
Wouldn't want to be vulnerable to instant attack :-)
I also heard a rumor that there are enough spare parts to build a
complete shuttle, and there is always the Enterprise to use for
parts. I should think that putting together a spare part version
would take about 6 months to a year.
Ariane is booked solid for two years, so there is not going to be much
off-loading of launch capability. I did hear a most annoying
idea that the US should consider sending their launch capabilites
overseas, as if they were talking about computers or cars.
I think that the US should correct the problem in the Shuttle, and
design a new shuttle. The next design has the successes and mistakes
of the first to build upon. After all, the Wright brothers second plane
was much improved over the first.
If the space program got as much support as SDI does, we would be
living in space by now, practically. I hear that Reagan wants to
double the SDI budget in '87 and again in '88. And similar growth
thereafter. In '87, the SDI budget will equal the NASA budget, if he
gets his way and also if the NASA budget doesn't get cut.
And this is in three years from the start of the program.
Just think where we could be if NASA's budget had seen that kind of
growth.
Brett Slocum
(Slocum\@HI-MULTICS.ARPA)C449499@UMCVMB.BITNET (Randy Davis) (02/06/86)
nike!topaz!harvard!think!craig@ucbvax.berkeley.edu wrote: > I think we have a future in space, and the sooner we learn > the technology needed to conquer space the better. I agree. I believe that space represents the "last frontier", and that one way to make sure that we don't kill off the entire human race in some political/military misunderstanding is to learn to live in space and colonize it. In history the pioneers have always been the risk takers, but the better prepared they were the more often they survived. >3. Do we have a choice? How long can we afford to be > without the Shuttle? The military and civilian space > programs are utterly dependent on the Shuttle. I seem to recall that the Air Force is reconditioning some of titans to lift military payload. However, I don't believe that they were close to being ready when the shuttle accident occured. I think that NASA is going to have to diversify their launch program to use more than just the shuttle. >First, the value of the Shuttle is as a means of perfecting >space technology. The fact that payload fees pay for part >of its cost is icing on the cake. I don't care much if it >loses money in the short run; in the long run what we learn >by flying the Shuttle is more than worth the cost. But being a natural cynic, I can see NASA's budget being cut even more if they can't get the shuttle to pay more for itself. Congress isn't known for taking a long-range view. >Third, there is little alternative to the current STS. >Designing a new one is out of the question at this point; But NASA could be planning for the future. I recall that there were plans for a 'space tug' that would be able to get into medium high orbits where a possible space station could be. >I think, then, that the following is in order. First, find >the specific cause of this failure, and fix it. Second, >evaluate the design of the STS, from top to bottom, and try >to find residual problems before we find one the hard way. >This might ground us for a year. Third, build three more >orbiters. We'll need them. How hard is it to evaluate the design? It may be the long road, but in the long run it is the safest bet to make sure that make sure that another accident of this sort doesn't happen again. Will Congress allocate the funds to build three more? One can only hope (and write to them). And if they do supply the funds, do we go with the design we have now, or do we move on to the next phase? Randy C. Davis