XBR1D65W@DDATHD21.BITNET (HAJO SCHMITT) (02/06/90)
Dear Pete, I clearly understand the philosophy of a VAP. But thats the problem: the VAP is >>>>> not <<<<<<< running on the File-Server, it is running in a bridge. In our configuration we installed it in a bridge with a single LAN A to operate as Backup-server. There is no connection between the VAP in the bridge and the file server except the IPX transport layer. And that's my problem: > Can a VAP ( a program?) bypass the security mechanism from >>> outside <<<< the file server? > Are there undocumented NCP-calls ? (If this is so, you need a LAN-Analyzer and 15 minutes to crack NetWare's security mechanism) If I get an Analyzer I will try to track down the actions of the Tapeware VAP in the bridge. I agree with you that a VAP is a process that you must trust, but if such a process anywhere, started from anyone, can bypass >MY< security system, this is not o.k. Hans-Jochen Schmitt Technical University Darmstadt West-Germany