mughal@iago.caltech.edu (Mughal, Asim) (11/22/90)
I met with Dr. Mahmoud Azhaar, a Muslim scholar from Ghaza strip last Friday. In reply to the question mentioning the Muslim killing near Al-quds, he said something as following: The extremist Jews of Yaroshalam, saw the current Gulf crisis, [with all the Shaikhdoms worrying about their own seats] to lay the foundation stone of the Third Temple of King David. 20,000 to 30,000 Jews went to the location to lay the foundation stone. The Muslims there tried to deter them from Al-Aqsa, by throwing stones. In return 21 Muslims were murdered, unarmed. The administration in Israel knows about the incident and wants to cover it up. They, as we all know, not only refused to let UN investigate it, but did not let it be investigated by a neutral entity, such as an Israeli Judge. It was investigated by a special committee formed by the Shamir, who belongs to the extreme right wing party. __Asim Mughal_______________________________________________________________ I only represent myself, not my university and/or my employer. Flames & unsolicited e-mail sent directly will not be read.It will be DEL __ MUGHAL @ Caltech.bitnet ___________________________ MUGHAL @ Caltech.Edu__ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
heru@byron.u.washington.edu (heru-ra-ha) (11/27/90)
And in fact an Israeli friend of mine lays the blame squarely where Dr Azhaar lays it, with scathing comments concerning the incompetence of the Police in resorting to deadly force (and allowing the incident to get far enough that a riot started). Joshua Geller heru@byron.u.washington.edu
isaac@goanna.cs.rmit.OZ.AU (Isaac Balbin) (11/29/90)
[Moderator's note: please keep all replies relevant to Islam. replies of a political nature will be forwarded to talk.politics.mideast. - shari] mughal@iago.caltech.edu (Mughal, Asim) writes: >I met with Dr. Mahmoud Azhaar, a Muslim scholar from Ghaza >strip last Friday. In reply to the question mentioning >the Muslim killing near Al-quds, he said something as >following: [etc] I am shocked that such a political topic made it into this newsgroup. If the moderators feel compelled to include it, then they should be equally compelled to include the following: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Spelling and grammar errors from the original text are marked with [sic]; any errors not so marked may have been inserted by me during transcription.) JERUSALEM, 26 OCTOBER 1990 SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT OCTOBER 8, 1990 - THIS SUMMARY WAS PREPARED AND TRANSLATED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. THE ONLY OFFICIAL AND BINDING VERSION IS THE FULL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. THIS SUMMARY IS AN AIDE. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1. THE COMMISSION EXPRESSES ITS DEEP SORROW OVER THE LOSS OF LIFE ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, AND CONVEYS ITS SORROW TO THE FAMILIES THAT LOST LOVED ONES. THE COMMISSION ALSO EXPRESSES ITS SORROW OVER THE INJURIES CAUSED TO CIVILIANS AND POLICE AT THE WESTERN WALL PLAZA AND ITS VICINITY AND WISHES A FULL RECOVERY TO THE INJURED. 2. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT ITS CONCLUSIONS BE REVEALED IN THEIR ENTIRETY TO THE PUBLIC AND, THEREFORE, HAS OMITTED FROM THE REPORT THE EVIDENCE AND THE SOURCES OF ITS DECISIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. 3. DESPITE ITS BEING A "COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION" AND NOT A "COMMISSION OF INQUIRY," THE COMMISSION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE TO "RECEIVE STATEMENTS IN WRITING AND TO WARN THE WITNESSES TO TELL THE TRUTH..." THE COMMISSION ALSO OPERATED ACCORDING TO SECTION 14 OF THE INQUIRY COMMISSION LAW OF 5729 (1968) AND HAS DECIDED THAT ALL TESTIMONY AND MATERIAL RECEIVED WILL NOT SERVE AS EVIDENCE IN A LEGAL PROCEEDING, EXCEPT FOR A CRIMINAL TRIAL. 4. THE COMMISSION HEARD 124 WITNESSES, AMONG THEM: THE MINISTER OF POLICE, THE MAYOR OF JERUSALEM, THE POLICE COMMISSIONER, THE HEAD OF THE GSS, POLICE AND BORDER PATROL COMMANDERS, AND ALSO POLICE OFFICERS AND BORDER PATROL POLICE. THE COMMISSION ALSO HEARD A NUMBER OF DETAINIES [sic], AMONG THEM FAISAL HUSSEINI AND SHIEKH MOHAMMAD SAID AL-JAMAL AL-RIFA'I. 5. THE COMMISSION VISITED MUKASED HOSPITAL AND HEARD REPORTS FROM DOCTORS AND THE WOUNDED, AND ALSO VISITED THE TEMPLE MOUNT AND ITS VICINITY A NUMBER OF TIMES. 6. THE COMMISSION WAS NOT REQUESTED TO DRAW PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS IN THE REALM OF CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR DISCIPLINARY RESPONSIBILITY OF ANY OF THOSE INVOLVED IN THE EVENTS -- AND IT IS THE OPINION OF THE COMMISSION THAT IT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMMISSION WAS TO EXAMINE THAT WHICH WAS DEMANDED OF IT IN ITS LETTER OF APPOINTMENT -- IT IS NOT THE PURVIEW OF THE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION TO DEAL WITH OR TO RECOMMEND THE DRAWING OF PERSONAL CONCLUSIONS BY ANY ONE OF THOSE INVOLVED IN THE EVENTS. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION DO NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO THE ACTIONS OR THE MALFEASANCE OF A GIVEN INDIVIDUAL. ALL RESULTANT DECISIONS AND INFERENCES -- IF ANY ARE MADE AT ALL -- TO THE COMMISSION'S CONLUSIONS [sic] WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THE TEMPLE MOUNT EVENTS OF THE OCTOBER 8, 1990 [sic], WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES. 7. THE COMMISSION RECEIVED WRITTEN MATERIAL FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES INCLUDING "BETZELEM," BUT THE WITNESSES WHOSE STATEMENTS WERE ATTACHED TO THE "BETZELEM" REPORT REFUSED TO APPEAR FOR QUESTIONING BEFORE THE COMMISSION. APPEALS BY THE COMMISSION TO THE HIGH MUSLIM COUNCIL AND THE WAQF ADMINISTRATION TO MEET WITH THE COMMISSION WERE REFUSED. 8. THE OPINION OF A MEDICAL EXPERT, SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION, REGARDING SEVEN OF THE WOUNDED ADMITTED TO MUKASED HOSPITAL IN JERUSALEM, DETERMINED THAT NOT A SINGLE ONE OF THEM WAS STRUCK FROM BEHIND. 9. THE COMMISSION CALLS ON THE NATIONAL INSURANCE INSTITUTE TO CLARIFY, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHO AMONG THE WOUNDED -- WHO DID NOT TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN THE DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT -- IS ELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS UNDER THE VICTIMS OF HOSTILE ACTION (PENSIONS) LAW -- 5730 (1970). CHAPTER 2: CONCLUSION AND INFERENCES 1. THE STATUS OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT IT IS THE OPINION OF THE COMMISSION THAT S SPECIAL MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR TEMPLE MOUNT AFFAIRS BE ESTABLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH THE MAYOR OF JERUSALEM. THIS COMMITTEE SHOULD DESIGN POLICY, DIRECT PREPARATIONS FOR VARIOUS SITUATIONS, DECIDE AND SUPERVISE THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE SECURITY (OR PROTECTION) OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT AND THE WESTERN WALL. THIS COMMITTEE WILL CONSULT RELIGIOUS LEADERS AS IS REQUIRED BY LAW. 2. CAUSES OF THE INCIDENT A. THE MUSLIM GATHERING ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT EXCEEDED THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE SITE AND THE NORMS WHICH A HOLY SITE OBLIGE. THE MEMBERS OF THE WAQF KNEW THAT THE HIGH COURT REFUSED THE "TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL" PETITION TO LAY THE CORNERSTONE OF THE THIRD TEMPLE, AND DID NOT RESPOND TO REQUESTS BY ISRAEL POLICE OFFICERS ON THE MORNING OF THE INCIDENT TO CALM THE CROWD. THIS, EVEN AFTER THE FACT THAT THE POLICE INFORMED THE WAQF THAT THEY WOULD ALSO PREVENT THE "TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL," AND ANYONE ELSE, FROM VISITING THE AREA, THOUGH SUCH VISITS ARE ALLOWED BY LAW. B. THE INCIDENT ITSELF BEGAN WHEN, SUDDENLY, VIOLENT AND THREATENING CALLS WERE SOUNDED ON THE SPEAKERS ("ALLAH AKBAR," "JIHAD," "ITBAKH AL-YAHUD" (SLAUGHTER THE JEWS)). IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, ENORMOUS AMOUNTS OF ROCKS, CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS AND METAL OBJECTS WERE THROWN AT ISRAELI POLICEMEN WHO WERE PRESENT AT THE SITE. MANY IN THE INCITED, RIOTING MOB THREW STONES AND METAL OBJECTS FROM A VERY SHORT RANGE, AND SOME EVEN WIELDED KNIVES IN THEIR HANDS. THE ACTIONS OF THE RIOTERS, AND CERTAINLY THE INCITORS, CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO THE LIVES OF THE POLICE, THE THOUSANDS OF WORSHIPERS AT THE WESTERN WALL AND TO THEMSELVES. THIS WAS A SERIOUS CRIMINAL OFFENSE COMMITTED BY MASSES WHO WERE INCITED BY PREACHERS ON LOUDSPEAKERS, AND THIS IS WHAT LED TO THE TRAGIC CHAIN OF EVENTS. C. IT IS THE OPINION OF THE COMMISSION THAT ANY CRIMINAL ACTS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT DURING THE COURSE OF THE EVENTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE INVESTIGATED. IT IS THE OPINION OF THE COMMISSION THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR SUSPICION THAT A CONSIDERABLE PERCENTAGE OF THE PEOPLE GATHERED AT THE TEMPLE MOUNT AND THEIR LEADERS APPARENTLY WERE INVOLVED IN THE OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ORDER, CAUSING HARM TO POLICE AND WORSHIPERS AND ENDANGERING THEIR LIVES. 3. USE OF FORCE BY THE POLICE A. THE COMMISSION HAS REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT THE LIVES OF THE POLICE ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT WERE ENDANGERED, AND THAT THEY FEARED FOR THEIR LIVES, AND FOR THE LIVES OF THOUSANDS OF WORSHIPERS WHO WERE AT THE WESTERN WALL. THE FIRING OF TEAR GAS AND RUBBER BULLETS BY THE POLICE, WHICH CAME FOLLOWING THE MASSIVE BARRAGE OF STONES AND OTHER OBJECTS, WAS INTENDED TO DETER THE RIOTERS AND TO REPEL THEM FROM THE VICINITY OF THE WESTERN WALL. IN LIGHT OF THE INJURY OF MANY OF THEM, THE POLICE WERE FORCED TO RETREAT FROM THE TEMPLE MOUNT THROUGH MUGHRABI GATE, AND THE BARRAGE CONTINUED OVER THE WESTERN WALL, THE MUGHRABI GATE AND THE OPHEL ROAD. B. THE BREAKING INTO THE TEMPLE MOUNT CAME AS A RESULT OF THE CONTINUATION OF THE RIOTING AND THE BARRAGE OF STONES, AND OF THE FEAR FOR THE LIVES OF TWO POLICE OFFICERS WHO REMAINED CAUGHT IN THE TEMPLE MOUNT POLICE STATION. THERE WAS ALSO A CONCERN THAT THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION IN THE STATION WOULD FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE RIOTERS. DUE TO A LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE POLICE COMMANDERS DID NOT KNOW THAT THE POLICEMEN TRAPPED IN THE STATION SUCCEEDED TO ESCAPE ON THEIR OWN. C. THE BREAKING (INTO THE TEMPLE MOUNT) WAS DONE WHILE USING TEAR GAS GRENADES AND LIVE AMMUNITION AS THE MASSES RAINED ROCKS AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE POLICE, WHICH ENDANGERED THEIR LIVES. THE CONTINUATION OF THE STORMING OF THE POLICE, WHICH ALSO DONE BY MASKED ASSAILANTS [sic], REQUIRED THE POLICE TO ATTACK WITH LIVE AMMUNITION. WHEN THE MASSES ENTERED THE MOSQUES, THE ORDER WAS GIVEN TO "CEASE FIRE." D. REGARDING THE ABOVE, THE COMMISSION IS OF THE OPINION THAT FOLLOWING THE BREAKING INTO THE MUGHRABI GATE, WHICH WAS NECESSARY TO SAVE THE LIVES OF THE TRAPPED OFFICERS AND TO PREVENT THE FALLING OF THE AMMUNITION INTO THE HAND OF THE RIOTERS [sic], THE STORMING MASSES CONTINUED TO ATTACK THE POLICE WITH ROCKS AND OTHER DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTS. THE POLICE USED GAS AND RUBBER BULLETS AND, IN LIFE-THREATENING INSTANCES, ALSO USED LIVE AMMUNITION AT THEIR ATTACKERS. E. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT A SEPARATE, DETAILED INVESTIGATION BY AN INDEPENDENT POLICE OFFICER APPOINTED BY THE COMMANDER OF THE BORDER POLICE BE CONDUCTED INTO THE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY ONE OF THE BORDER POLICE PLATOON COMMANDERS AT THE LIONS' GATE, WITHOUT RECEIVING A SPECIFIC ORDER. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE MINISTER OF POLICE AND THE POLICE COMMISSIONER. F. AN AMBULANCE WAS HIT BY GUNFIRE IN ITS WINDSHIELD AND SIDE, WITH A NURSE AND THE DRIVER SUSTAINING INJURIES. IT WAS CLARIFIED TO THE COMMISSION THAT THE POLICE DID NOT SEE THE AMBULANCE WHICH STOOD BETWEEN THE PILLARS OF THE ENTRANCE TO THE AL-AQSA MOSQUE. THE RECOMMENDATION TO THE NATIONAL INSURANCE INSTITUTE GIVEN IN CHAPTER 1 REFERS TO THESE INJURIES. G. THERE WERE NO GAS GRENADES OR ANY OTHER ITEMS THROWN FROM THE HELICOPTER THAT FLEW OVER THE TEMPLE MOUNT, NOR WERE ANY SHOTS FIRED FROM IT AT THE CROWD. 4. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SENIOR COMMAND LEVEL OF THE ISRAEL POLICE THE COMMISSION CRITICIZES THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SENIOR COMMAND LEVEL OF THE POLICE: A. THE POLICE HAD ADVANCE INFORMATION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF RIOTING. THE METHOD OF THINKING AND ATTITUDES OF THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT AND OF THE COMMANDER OF THE JERUSALEM REGION WERE ROUTINE AND EVEN MISTAKEN. THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION OF THE SPECIAL SENSITIVITY OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT AND THERE WAS NO ADVANCE PREPARATION FOR A WIDE VARIETY OF POSSIBLE SITUATION. THE SUPERVISION CONCERNED ITSELF WITH ONE ELEMENT ONLY, "THE LAYING OF A CORNERSTONE FOR THE THIRD TEMPLE," AND, WHEN THAT WAS CANCELLED, THEY TOOK ROUTINE MEASURES. B. DISTRICT AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ACCUMULATED INFLUENCE OF THE INTIFADA, THE ENVIRONMENT CREATED BY TERRORIST ELEMENTS AND THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GULF CRISIS, AND CALLS FOR INCITEMENT BY THE MUAZIN AND THE PREACHERS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT ON THE FRIDAY BEFORE THE EVENTS. THESE PHENOMENA REQUIRED THE PRESENCE OF INITIATIVE AND SUSPICION THAT DID NOT EXIST IN THIS CASE. THE POLICE, FURTHER, DID NOT HAVE FILES ON PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES AND, THEREFORE, THEY WERE NOT TESTED. C. IN THE OPINION OF THE COMMISSION, THE SITUATION THAT WAS CREATED ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT REQUIRED THE PRESENCE OF COMMANDERS, OF THE MOST SENIOR LEVELS, ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE SITUATION ALSO REQUIRED THE PRESENCE OF DISTRICT AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS AND, AS THE SITUATION INTENSIFIED, THERE WAS ROOM FOR THE SUMMONING OF THE COMMISSIONER. THE ACTIVATING OF AN EMERGENCY SITUATION FOR THE SECURITY OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT, THE SETTING UP OF A FORWARD COMMAND POST, THE CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POSITIONS, COULD HAVE DETERRED THE FRENZIED MASSES FROM RIOTING. FOLLOWING OTHER EVENTS, THE COMMAND POSTS WERE NOT STAFFED BY SENIOR COMMANDERS, THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT POINTS ON THE MOUNT DID NOT FUNCTION PROPERLY AND NEITHER THE COMMISSIONER NOR THE MINISTER OF POLICE WERE BRIEFED EARLY ON REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION. D. THERE ARE NO SHARP OR UNIFORM DEFINITIONS REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMMAND ON THE MOUNT. THE COMMISSION IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE UNIFORMITY OF COMMAND MUST BE KEPT AND THAT ALL THE FORCES WORKING IN THE OLD CITY MUST REPORT TO THE OLD CITY COMMAND. E. THE COMMANDER OF THE BORDER POLICE COMPANY THAT WORKED INDEPENDENTLY IN THE AREA FELT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SPREAD OUT THE BORDER POLICE FORCE ABOVE THE WESTERN WALL -- THIS STEP WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORDERS THAT HE RECEIVED. F. IN THE OPINION OF THE COMMISSION: 1) AN ELITE FORCE MUST BE PERMENANTLY [sic] ALLOTED [sic] TO THE TEMPLE MOUNT AND ITS VICINITY TO WORK UNDER UNIFORM SUPERVISION WITH DEFINED JURIDICTIONS [sic] AND RESPONSIBILITIES. 2) A HEADQUARTERS FOR INCIDENTS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED THAT WILL REPORT ON EVENTS ON THE MOUNT AND WILL BE PRESENT AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT. 3) CONTINGENCY PLANS MUST BE PREPARED THAT WILL DEAL WITH POSSIBLE SITUATIONS AND WILL FORMULATE OPERATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR DEALING WITH ANY SITUATION. 4) REINFORCEMENTS SHOULD BE PLACED IN CLOSE AND IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY AND WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO BOLSTER THE FORCE DURING INCIDENTS. 5) THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE OLD CITY POLICE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PREPARATION OF FORCES AND THEIR TESTING, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE PREPARED FOR ACTION. G. CRITICISM OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE REGION FUNCTIONED DOES NOT DIMINISH THE COURAGE OF THE REGIONAL COMMANDS, HIS OFFICERS AND POLICEMEN IN THE COURSE OF SUBDUING THE RIOTERS. 5. INTELLIGENCE A. DIFFICULTIES EXIST IN THE GATHERING OF INFORMATION, ITS ANALYSIS, IN ISSUING WARNING AND IN ASSISTING IN PREVENTING DISRUPTIONS OF PUBLIC ORDER. THE COMMISSION IS OF THE OPINION THAT A DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN THE GSS AND THE POLICE IS BASICALLY CORRECT AND SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED. B. THE GSS HAS ASSUMED UPON ITSELF THE GATHERING OF INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF DISRUPTIONS OF ORDER AND THE POLICE HAS TAKEN UPON ITSELF THE GATHERING OF INFORMATION IN THE STREET, IN CONNECTION TO DEVELOPMENTS THAT ARE CHARACTERIZED AS SPONTANEOUS. C. IN THE INCIDENT ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, THERE WAS NO LACK OF ADVANCE INFORMATION: GENERAL WARNINGS BY THE GSS, AND, ABOVE ALL, THERE WAS CLEAR INFORMATION -- THE CALLS OF THE PREACHERS, LEAFLETS AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF GROUPS OF MASKED ASSAILANTS THAT CALLED FOR GATHERING ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT. D. THE MISTAKE OF THE COMMISSIONER, THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT AND THE COMMANDER OF THE JERUSALEM R4REGION WAS IN THE EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION AND IN FOCUSSING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT, IF THE "LAYING OF THE CORNERSTONE" COULD BE PREVENTED, EVERYTHING WOULD SETTLE DOWN PEACEFULLY -- AS IN THE PAST. A CORRECT READING OF THE SITUATION, GIVEN THE CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS, WOULD HAVE RENDERED POSSIBLE THE PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT AND PREVENTATIVE ACTION THAT WERE DEMANDED AND NECESSARY. GIVEN THIS MISTAKE, THE POLICE DID NOT DEPLOY ITS FORCES ALONG THE LINES OF PAST FORMATS; A FORWARD COMMAND POST WAS NOT SET UP AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AND A DETERRENT FORCE WAS NOT CONCENTRATED TO INTERVENE AS IS ACCEPTABLE. THIS BASIC EVALUATION DID NOT CHANGE, EVEN WHEN THERE WAS PRECISE INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT. E. THE GSS PREPARATION WERE DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OF THE POLICE. THE GSS MADE IT CLEAR THAT AN UNEXPECTED ACCELARATING [sic] FACTOR WOULD BE LIABLE TO CAUSE AN EXPLOSION DURING A GATHERING UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXISTED ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE COMMISSION DID NOT FIND BASIS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF WRITTEN WARNING BY THE GSS TO THE POLICE WITH THE SAME CLARITY AS WAS PRESENTED BY THE GSS BEFORE THE COMMISSION. F. 1. THE DIVISION OF LABOR MUST BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS AND ANY INTELLIGENCE REGARDING THE TEMPLE MOUNT MUST BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE POLICE MINISTER AND THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WHICH WILL BE ESTABLISHED. THIS COMMITTEE WILL DISCUSS INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION IF ANY EXIST. 2. THE POLICE MUST BE ALLOCATED THE TOOLS AND MEANS TO ESTABLISH A "STREET INTELLIGENCE" GATHERING NETWORK AND TO ESTABLISH UNITS WHICH WILL OPERATE WITHIN POLICE FRAMEWORK AND AS PART OF DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. 6. AUTHORITY WHICH WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED AND DETERRENT ACTIONS NOT TAKEN A. THE 10.10.90 WAS LOADED WITH EVENTS AND THE POLICE ALLOCATED FORCES AND COMMANDERS TO ALL. THE COMMISSION PROPOSES THAT EVENTS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT BE VIEWED OVER A NUMBER OF DAYS. B. "THE TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL" -- THE ACTIONS OF THIS SMALL GROUP DEVIATED FROM THE ACCEPTED ACCORDING TO LAW BUT THE MATTER CANNOT BE SOLELY DEALT WITH FROM A LEGAL AND FORMAL ASPECT. MOSLEMS VIEW THIS GROUP AS A PROVOCATIVE AND THREATENING ELEMENTS WHICH INTENDS TO DRIVE THEM OUT OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE MOSLEM LEADERSHIP TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF THIS GROUP IN ORDER TO INCITE THOSE GATHERED ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE POLICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALERT TO THIS AND SHOULD HAVE APPROVED ESCORT FOR THE GROUP ON ANOTHER DAY. THE POLICE SAW ITSELF BOUND BY THE HIGH COURT DECISION. NEVERTHLESS [sic], VERIFICATION CARRIED OUT BY THE COMMISSION REVEALS THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH OBLIGATION AND IT WAS POSSIBLE TO TRANSFER THE EVENT TO ANOTHER DAY. IN THE COMMISSION'S OPINION THE POLICE SHOULD CONSIDER LIMITING EVENTS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, THE WESTERN WALL AND IN THE OLD CITY PLAZA WHICH HAVE A HIGH PROBABILITU [sic] OF RESULTING IN SEVERE DISTURBANCES. C. THE PREVENTION OF GATHERINGS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT WHICH ARE LIABLE TO RESULT IN DISTURBANCES -- THOSE WHO GATHERED ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT OFFENDED THE SANCTITY OF THE SITE AND THEY APPARENTY [sic] VIOLATED THE LAW. FROM THE START, THEY WERE CALLED TO A PROTEST PROHIBITED ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, THE SECURITY OF WHICH LIES WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL. IN THE COMMISSION'S OPINION THE POLICE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO CLOSE THE TEMPLE MOUNT GATES AND TO PREVENT ENTRY AND GATHERING WHOSE INTENT WAS UNREST. THE POLICE ALSO COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ENTRY OF SUSPICIOUS ELEMENTS -- A STEP WHICH HAS PROVED ITSELF IN THE PAST. DURING THE EVENTS THE POLICE COULD ALSO HAVE TAKEN MEASURES WHICH COULD HAVE PREVENTED A DETERIORATION -- SUCH AS DISCONNECTING THE LOUDSPEAKER SYSTEM WHICH INCITED THE MOB. THESE STEPS WERE NOT TAKEN MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT ORDER WOULD RETURN IF THE "TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL" WERE NOT ALLOWED TO ENTER THE MOUNT. THE POLICE TIRED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO SHOOT DOWN DOWN [sic] THE LOUDSPEAKER. IN THE COMMISSION'S OPINION THIS TECHNICAL PROBLEM COULD HAVE BEEN SOLVED IN THE PAST AND ALL MUST BE DONE PREVENT [sic] FUTURE USE OF THE LOUDSPEAKER FOR INCITEMENT. HAD THE POLICE ACTED IN SUCH A MANNER, CRITICISM WOULD LIKELY HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO THE MOSLEM PUBLIC AND OTHER HOSTILE ELEMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS PREFERABLE TO CONTEND WITH SUCH CRITICSM [sic] THAN TO REACH THE SAD RESULTS OF EVENTS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, DEPITE [sic] THE FACT THAT THE BLAME AND RESPONSIBILITY LIES WITH THE THOUSANDS OF RIOTERS WHO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE SITE IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT DISTURBANCES. D. BAN ON DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE AREA OF THE OLD CITY THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE SPECIAL SITUATION IN THE OLD CITY REQUIRE RE-EVALUATION OF WHAT CAN OR CANNOT BE PERMITTED IN RESPECT TO GATHERINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH MAY LEAD TO DISTURBANCES. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS PREVENTING GATHERINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, THE WESTERN WALL, AND THROUGHOUT THE OLD CITY. THE FREEDOM OF WORSHIP OF ALL RELIGIONS AND THEIR HOLY PLACES SHOULD BE PRESERVED. ONLY OFFICIAL STATE EVENTS MAY BE PERMITTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE WESTERN WALL. E. USE OF TECHNOLOGICAL MEANS THE USE OF LIVE AMMUNITION ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT UNDER THE PREVAILING CONDITIONS WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE COMMISSION. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT IT IS THE POLICY OF THE POLICE TO USE LIVE AMMUNITION ONLY AS A LAST RESORT, AND ONLY IF LIVES ARE ENDANGERED. IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP TECHNOLOGICAL MEANS WHOSE EFFICIENCY WOULD BE GREATER THAN THAT OF THE USE OF GAS AND RUBBER BULLETS. THE COMMISSION EMPHASIZES THE IMMEDIATE NEED TO DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF LIVE AMMUNITION. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDS THE IMMEDIATE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TECHNO-DEFENSE CREW THAT WILL EVALUATE POSSIBILITIES FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTING THE TEMPLE MOUNT AND THE WESTERN WALL. THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WILL SUMMARIZE AND DECIDE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. F. DIRECTION, FOLLOW UP AND SUPERVISION BY THE MINISTER OF POLICE THE MINISTER OF POLICE CARRIES MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE POLICE. THE COMMISSION IS AWARE OF THE EXISTING LAW, AND OF THE SPECIAL POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER. IT IS ACCEPTED THAT THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE INTERFERENCE OF THE MINISTER OF POLICE IN THE PROCESS OF A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, BUT IN THE TOPIC OF KEEPING ORDER THE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF THE MINISTER IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN HIS MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY. THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE POLICE MINISTRY LACKS THE MEANS TO DO SO. THEREFORE IT IS URGENTLY REQUIRED TO DEVELOP THESE MEANS. IT IS THE OPINION OF THE COMMISSION THAT THERE IS A NEED TO DEVELOP SPECIAL STAFF OPERATIONS WHICH WILL SERVE THE MINISTER, ENABLING HIM TO FORMULATE POLICY, EXAMINE ALTERNATIVES AND MAINTAIN SUPERVISION. THE MINISTER OF POLICE MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE MATTER OF MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER, WHILE PAYING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE OLD CITY AND THE HOLY SITES. THE ZAMIR REPORT SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 8, 1990 INCIDENT ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, AT THE BEHEST OF PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR, APPOINTED AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CHAIN OF EVENTS, THEIR CAUSES AND THE ACTIONS OF THE SECURITY FORCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE LOSS OF LIFE AND THE MANY INJURIES THAT WERE INCURRED, ARAB AND JEWISH. THE COMMISSION WAS MADE UP OF THREE PROMINENT AND INDEPENDENT FIGURES. THEY ARE: MAJ. GEN. TZVI ZAMIR, A FORMER HEAD OF THE MOSSAD, ISRAEL'S SECRET SERVICE PROF. YA'AKOV NE'EMAN, A PROMINENT MEMBER OF ISRAEL'S LEGAL COMMUNITY AND CHAIM KOBERSKI, AN EXPERT IN PUBLIC COMMISSIONS AND EX-DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF ISRAEL'S INTERIOR MINISTRY. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS: 1) THE COMMISSION EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE LOSS OF LIFE ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, AND DECLARED THAT IT SHARES IN THE SORROW OF THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO WERE KILLED. THE COMMISSION ALSO EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY CIVILIANS AND THE POLICE DURING THE COURSE OF THE VIOLENCE. 2) IN INITIATING ITS INVESTIGATION, THE COMMISSION HEARD TESTIMONY FROM 124 WITNESSES. AMONG THEM WERE THE MINISTER OF POLICE, THE MAYOR OF JERUSALEM, THE POLICE COMMISSIONER, THE HEAD OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICES, AND OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE POLICE. THE COMMISSION ALSO HEARD TESTIMONY FROM SEVERAL OF THOSE ARRESTED FOLLOWING THE VIOLENCE INCLUDING FEISAL AL-HUSSEINI AND SHEIK MAHMAD AL JAMAL AL RIFAI. THE COMMISSION REQUESTED MEETINGS WITH THE HIGH ISLAMIC COUNCIL AND WITH THE WAQF, THE ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TEMPLE MOUNT, BUT THOSE REQUESTS WERE ANSWERED NEGATIVELY. THE COMMISSION VISITED MUKASSED HOSPITAL AND RECEIVED THE ACCOUNTS OF DOCTORS AND CASUALTIES OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT VIOLENCE. 3) IT WAS DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSION THAT THE ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE THAT THE TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL, A SMALL FRINGE GROUP, HAD BEEN BANNED FROM ENTERING THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS AUTHORITIES WERE ALSO INFORMED THAT ANY ATTEMPTS BY THE TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL TO ENTER THE TEMPLE MOUNT WOULD BE HALTED. 4) THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT THE VIOLENCE ITSELF WAS PLANNED, AND BEGAN WHEN CALLS FOR VIOLENCE CAME THROUGH THE MINARET ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT AND INFLAMED THE CROWD. THE CALLS INCLUDED 'ALLAH AKBAR', 'JIHAD', AND 'ITBAH AL YEHUD' (SLAUGHTER THE JEWS). 5) THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT RIOTING ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT THREATENED THE SAFETY OF THE POLICE AND OTHER SECURITY FORCES. FIRST TEAR GAS AND RUBBER BULLETS WERE USED TO DISPERSE THE CROWD. FEARING FOR THE SAFETY OF THE TWO POLICEMEN AND OF THE AMMUNITION PRESENT ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, THE SECURITY FORCES RESORTED ALSO TO LIVE AMMUNITION, ONLY WHEN THEIR LIVES WERE IN DANGER. WHEN RIOTERS RETREATED TO THE MOSQUES ON THE TEMPLE MOUNT, ORDERS WERE GIVEN TO HALT THE FIRING OF WEAPONS. 6) THE COMMISSION EXPRESSED CRITICISM AT THE UNPREPAREDNESS OF THE POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY IN THE AREA OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS PRIOR INFORMATION WHICH SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY THAT A VIOLENT RIOT WOULD OCCUR. THE RESPONSIBLE POLICE COMMANDERS ADOPTED AN ATTITUDE WHICH TREATED THE REPORTS AS ROUTINE AND FAILED TO RELATE TO THE SPECIAL SENSITIVITY OF THE TEMPLE MOUNT. THE COMMANDERS WERE FAULTED FOR NOT HAVING BEEN PRESENT AT THE TEMPLE MOUNT AND FOR NOT INFORMING THE POLICE COMMISSIONER OR THE MINISTER OF POLICE WHEN THE SITUATION BEGAN TO DETERIORATE. 7) THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT THE POLICE COMMISSIONER AND THE COMMANDERS OF THE SOUTHERN AND JERUSALEM DISTRICTS ERRED IN THEIR EVALUATION OF THE PRIOR INFORMATION, MISTAKENLY ASSUMING THAT BY PREVENTING ACTION BY THE TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL, VIOLENCE WOULD BE AVOIDED. -- ``A College degree is a right; not a privilege"
gordon@cs.tamu.edu (Dan Gordon) (11/29/90)
In article <1990Nov22.011550.24697@wpi.WPI.EDU> mughal@iago.caltech.edu writes: > >I met with Dr. Mahmoud Azhaar, a Muslim scholar from Ghaza >strip last Friday. In reply to the question mentioning >the Muslim killing near Al-quds, he said something as >following: > >The extremist Jews of Yaroshalam, saw the current Gulf >crisis, [with all the Shaikhdoms worrying about their >own seats] to lay the foundation stone of the Third >Temple of King David. 20,000 to 30,000 Jews went to the >location to lay the foundation stone. The Muslims there >tried to deter them from Al-Aqsa, by throwing stones. >In return 21 Muslims were murdered, unarmed. Some corrections are in order: 1. The 20,000-30,000 Jews were celebrating the feast of Tabernacles (an ancient holiday, commanded in the Torah). These celebrations are held everywhere, and not just in Jerusalem. Furthermore, they are held every year (and have been so for thousands of years) and have nothing to do with the Gulf crisis. 2. Most of the Jews celebrating are extremely orthodox, and these are NOT ALLOWED to go up to the Temple Mount for *religious* reasons. 3. The group that wanted to place the foundation stone consists of some 100 people, who are regarded by all Israelis, religious and non-religious, as slightly loony. They are not sanctioned by any religious establishment, because, as I wrote, the religious viewpoint is that Jews should not go up to the Temple Mount. This group is called the "Temple Mount Faithful" and they are led by one Gershon Solomon. 4. The "Faithful" have been attempting to do the same thing for several years. Every year, they are forbidden to go up, they appeal to the Israeli supreme court, and they lose. The police then inform them and everybody concerned - in particular, the Muslim custodians of the El Aqsa Mosque - that the court ruling will be upheld. This year, it was no different, and it had nothing to do with the Gulf crisis. 5. As can be seen from the above, there is no connection between the tens of thousands of worshippers and the "Faithful." Nobody has to take my word on any of the above. You can read all this background material in any of the serious newspapers that covered the incident. What I find particularly disturbing is that a Muslim scholar from Gaza, who obviously knows the above facts (since he is close to the area) should try to present such a distorted version. Most readers of this newsgroup can independently verify these facts, but what about hundreds of thousands of Muslims who have no access to alternate independent sources of information? Is this distortion meant to incite them? The Koran calls on its followers to speak the truth, and that God will judge all men. Perhaps I should end on this note.