thoth@tellab3.UUCP (Marcus Hall) (01/29/86)
First, a few lines of silence in memory of Challenger and her crew. A while ago, there was discussion on net.columbia about testing the range safety system during the countdown, using the actual flight codes. It was proposed that one should be able to receive this transmission and then transmit it to the shuttle during flight. The result of this discussion (to the best of my knowledge) was that it must not be that simple, but I never saw anything that refuted it. After I heard of Challenger's explosion, and after I started believing it, this discussion came immediately to mind. Does anyone know where the ordinances are placed and what the possibility is that this is what destroyed Challenger? With Khadaffi threatening terrorism in America, it just makes me afraid that the shuttle would be a prime target for an attack. I hate to consider this as a real possibility, however, so someone in the know, please prove this wrong! marcus hall ..!ihnp4!tellab1!tellab2!thoth
wmartin@brl-smoke.ARPA (Will Martin ) (02/01/86)
Newsgroup "mod.risks" (the ARPA "RISKS Digest") has detailed info in the latest two issues on the range safety system.
sewilco@mecc.UUCP (Scot E. Wilcoxon) (02/02/86)
In article <313@tellab3.UUCP> thoth@tellab3.UUCP (Marcus Hall) writes: >... >this discussion came immediately to mind. Does anyone know where the >ordinances are placed and what the possibility is that this is what destroyed >Challenger? With Khadaffi threatening terrorism in America, it just makes In the interest of squelching a couple of silly rumors: 1) Destruct codes are changed for each flight and are categorically and physically very well protected. Including duplicated and remote equipment. Activation of destruct involves many hardware and software confirmation sequences. Marcus' message referred to broadcasting own signals, but a very strong signal would be needed and (here's my only assumption so far) would also be detected by destruct transmitters' monitors. I'm sure if that had happened, the Range Safety Officers, NASA, press, and FBI would have heard about it within minutes. [Some people like conspiracies, so certainly some almost-clever people will nevertheless come up with an even more outlandish idea] 2) Soviet press has reported a deadly "green canister" might be in the shuttle debris. I don't care what color it is, I also can make a list of deadly things: explosive bolts, fuel for maneuvering jets, the destruct devices, fuel for the satellite in the cargo bay, hydraulic devices (jammed, with pressure sealed inside), twisted coil of springy metal, batteries, sharp edges, 4 foot bar of metal (might poke your throat with it). Sillier lists are left as an exercise for other parents of toddlers and souvenir hunters. [Disclaimer: My source makes sense to me, maybe not to you. I have no connection with anybody, but I am a parent of an exploratory toddler] -- Scot E. Wilcoxon Minn. Ed. Comp. Corp. quest!mecc!sewilco 45 03 N / 93 15 W (612)481-3507 {ihnp4,mgnetp}!dicomed!mecc!sewilco
larry@kitty.UUCP (Larry Lippman) (02/03/86)
> ... With Khadaffi threatening terrorism in America, it just makes > me afraid that the shuttle would be a prime target for an attack. I hate > to consider this as a real possibility, however, so someone in the know, > please prove this wrong! In view of the present "situation" between the U.S. and Libya, sabotage was the very first thought which crossed my mind upon learning of the shuttle disaster. Within the first 60 seconds of launch, the shuttle not only provides an immense infrared signature which even the most unsophisticated heat-seeking surface-to-air missle could not miss, but is within range of several varieties of such a man-packed missile. In light of all the data disclosed by NASA, this seems now to be improbable as the actual cause of the disaster. I would assume that NASA and the U.S. military was aware of this possibility prior to launch, and maintained some type of surveillance of the land and water area surrounding the launch site; I don't suspect that NASA or the military will comment on their precautions for security reasons. However, a well-concealed person with a man-packed SAM within range, but off the NASA base would be difficult to detect... ==> Larry Lippman @ Recognition Research Corp., Clarence, New York <== ==> UUCP {decvax|dual|rocksanne|rocksvax|watmath}!sunybcs!kitty!larry <== ==> VOICE 716/741-9185 {rice|shell}!baylor!/ <== ==> FAX 716/741-9635 {G1, G2, G3 modes} duke!ethos!/ <== ==> seismo!/ <== ==> "Have you hugged your cat today?" ihnp4!/ <==
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (02/09/86)
> ... Within the first 60 seconds of launch, the shuttle > not only provides an immense infrared signature which even the most > unsophisticated heat-seeking surface-to-air missle could not miss, but > is within range of several varieties of such a man-packed missile. Don't forget that the missile not only has to see the shuttle, it has to *catch* it -- from a standing start, heading almost straight up to catch a rapidly-accelerating target. These are very unfavorable conditions for a man-packed missile, which will typically have a modest maximum speed (under Mach 2) and a low maximum altitude and range (a few kilometers at most). -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry