[net.columbia] Range safety system

thoth@tellab3.UUCP (Marcus Hall) (01/29/86)

First, a few lines of silence in memory of Challenger and her crew.















A while ago, there was discussion on net.columbia about testing the
range safety system during the countdown, using the actual flight codes.
It was proposed that one should be able to receive this transmission
and then transmit it to the shuttle during flight.  The result of this
discussion (to the best of my knowledge) was that it must not be that
simple, but I never saw anything that refuted it.

After I heard of Challenger's explosion, and after I started believing it,
this discussion came immediately to mind.  Does anyone know where the
ordinances are placed and what the possibility is that this is what destroyed
Challenger?  With Khadaffi threatening terrorism in America, it just makes
me afraid that the shuttle would be a prime target for an attack.  I hate
to consider this as a real possibility, however, so someone in the know,
please prove this wrong!

marcus hall
..!ihnp4!tellab1!tellab2!thoth

wmartin@brl-smoke.ARPA (Will Martin ) (02/01/86)

Newsgroup "mod.risks" (the ARPA "RISKS Digest") has detailed info in
the latest two issues on the range safety system.

sewilco@mecc.UUCP (Scot E. Wilcoxon) (02/02/86)

In article <313@tellab3.UUCP> thoth@tellab3.UUCP (Marcus Hall) writes:
>...
>this discussion came immediately to mind.  Does anyone know where the
>ordinances are placed and what the possibility is that this is what destroyed
>Challenger?  With Khadaffi threatening terrorism in America, it just makes

In the interest of squelching a couple of silly rumors:
1) Destruct codes are changed for each flight and are categorically and
physically very well protected.  Including duplicated and remote equipment.
Activation of destruct involves many hardware and software confirmation
sequences.  Marcus' message referred to broadcasting own signals, but
a very strong signal would be needed and (here's my only assumption
so far) would also be detected by destruct transmitters' monitors.
I'm sure if that had happened, the Range Safety Officers, NASA, press,
and FBI would have heard about it within minutes.  [Some people like
conspiracies, so certainly some almost-clever people will nevertheless
come up with an even more outlandish idea]

2) Soviet press has reported a deadly "green canister" might be in
the shuttle debris.  I don't care what color it is, I also can make
a list of deadly things: explosive bolts, fuel for maneuvering jets,
the destruct devices, fuel for the satellite in the cargo bay, hydraulic
devices (jammed, with pressure sealed inside), twisted coil of
springy metal, batteries, sharp edges, 4 foot bar of metal (might
poke your throat with it).  Sillier lists are left as an exercise for
other parents of toddlers and souvenir hunters.

[Disclaimer: My source makes sense to me, maybe not to you.  I have no
connection with anybody, but I am a parent of an exploratory toddler]
-- 

Scot E. Wilcoxon  Minn. Ed. Comp. Corp.            quest!mecc!sewilco
45 03 N / 93 15 W   (612)481-3507 {ihnp4,mgnetp}!dicomed!mecc!sewilco

larry@kitty.UUCP (Larry Lippman) (02/03/86)

> ...  With Khadaffi threatening terrorism in America, it just makes
> me afraid that the shuttle would be a prime target for an attack.  I hate
> to consider this as a real possibility, however, so someone in the know,
> please prove this wrong!

	In view of the present "situation" between the U.S. and Libya,
sabotage was the very first thought which crossed my mind upon learning of
the shuttle disaster.  Within the first 60 seconds of launch, the shuttle
not only provides an immense infrared signature which even the most
unsophisticated heat-seeking surface-to-air missle could not miss, but
is within range of several varieties of such a man-packed missile.
	In light of all the data disclosed by NASA, this seems now to be
improbable as the actual cause of the disaster.  I would assume that NASA
and the U.S. military was aware of this possibility prior to launch, and
maintained some type of surveillance of the land and water area surrounding
the launch site; I don't suspect that NASA or the military will comment on
their precautions for security reasons.  However, a well-concealed person
with a man-packed SAM within range, but off the NASA base would be difficult
to detect...

==>  Larry Lippman @ Recognition Research Corp., Clarence, New York        <==
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henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (02/09/86)

> ...  Within the first 60 seconds of launch, the shuttle
> not only provides an immense infrared signature which even the most
> unsophisticated heat-seeking surface-to-air missle could not miss, but
> is within range of several varieties of such a man-packed missile.

Don't forget that the missile not only has to see the shuttle, it has
to *catch* it -- from a standing start, heading almost straight up to
catch a rapidly-accelerating target.  These are very unfavorable
conditions for a man-packed missile, which will typically have a modest
maximum speed (under Mach 2) and a low maximum altitude and range (a
few kilometers at most).
-- 
				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry