sdd@pyuxh.UUCP (S Daniels) (03/01/86)
This might be the wrong place for this, but I couldn't think of anywhere else. Having followed the news from the public sessions of the Commission studying the Challenger disaster, it seems that both NASA and Morton-Thiokol engineers knew beforehand that launching in extremely cold weather was a tremendous risk with potentially tragic consequences. NASA and Morton-Thiokol management knew it, and they decided to discard their best technical advice and launch anyway. My rhetorical question: How often have we seen the correct technical or operational decision overturned by "higher management" because of the politics of the situation? Fortunately, most of us don't work in places where the cost of doing that is measured in lives, billions of dollars, and national prestige. Makes you sick, doesn't it. Think about it the next time someone says, "It's a great idea, but politically......." (These are definitely mine and no one else's) -- Steve Daniels (!pyuxh!sdd) "I'm counting the smiles on the road to Utopia."
ark@alice.UucP (Andrew Koenig) (03/01/86)
> My rhetorical question: How often have we seen the correct technical or > operational decision overturned by "higher management" because of the politics > of the situation? Fortunately, most of us don't work in places where the cost > of doing that is measured in lives, billions of dollars, and national prestige. Rhetorical question #2: what fraction of the past (successful) launches have gone on despite objections by at least one of the myriad engineers in the various companies that make the various parts of the shuttle?
caf@omen.UUCP (Chuck Forsberg WA7KGX) (03/03/86)
In article <260@pyuxh.UUCP> sdd@pyuxh.UUCP (S Daniels) writes: > >My rhetorical question: How often have we seen the correct technical or >operational decision overturned by "higher management" because of the politics >of the situation? Fortunately, most of us don't work in places where the cost >of doing that is measured in lives, billions of dollars, and national prestige. > Some years ago a DC-8 ran out of fuel and crashed somewhat short of the runway, killing about a dozen. The transcript showd the flight engineer reminding the captain about the fuel situation, but the captain (preoccupied with a landing gear problem) paid insufficient attention to those warnings. As a result of that crash, the airline instituted a program of assertivness training for the cockpit crew. According to scuttlebutt I have heard, there is a feeling among some NASA trrops that the higher-ups that "forced" the launch should be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter. I have also heard concerns that had Challenger blown up on or near the launch pad, many spectators would have been killed or wounded by the blast. Question: what degree of danger are the launch visitors in?
polish@garfield.columbia.edu (Nathaniel Polish) (03/03/86)
As to danger to spectators at KSC: I've been to 7 or 8 launches at the Cape as press since Apollo 17. The press site is adjacent to the launch control facility and the VAB. All are about 3.5 miles from either pad. There are swamps (and bugs, snake and 'gators) all over. When they built the place NASA put the VAB in that location because they felt that it was safe. I for one would find it hard to believe that any explosion (non nuke) could do more that knock you down at that range. I do recall at the first launch many of us were quite concerned that an SRB could take off and travel the 3 miles to us and blow up. This is a danger with SRBs. And this is just what the range safty system is for. Watching launches is very safe.
ronc@fai.UUCP (Ronald O. Christian) (03/04/86)
>My rhetorical question: How often have we seen the correct technical or >operational decision overturned by "higher management" because of the politics >of the situation? Fortunately, most of us don't work in places where the cost >of doing that is measured in lives, billions of dollars, and national prestige. >Steve Daniels (!pyuxh!sdd) "I'm counting the smiles on the road to Utopia." *** Many of us who have done military work feel this way. In many cases the decisions made by upper management haven't resulted in loss of life or money measured in powers of 9 simply because a third major war has yet to occur. These kinds of dangerous decisions are not always the work of higher management, either. Sometimes personality conflicts or rivalry between peers can twist a product into uselessness. Often at the negotiation table vendor and customer representitives get so wrapped up with trading functionality for delivery schedules, or spec exceptions for money, that both sides lose sight of the product's original intended function. Given all this, and that the shuttle went through the same process, it was inevitable that the shuttle would prang. But Jesus God, why did it have to fail in such a fashion? I can't imagine a worse time for the shuttle to blow, except perhaps when the senator was aboard. Now it is politically necessary to hang the responsibility on someone, just as it *may* have been politically necessary to launch in less than ideal conditions. Speaking of which, if someone cognizant of the risks made the decision to launch because of the political effect of having the shuttle in orbit at the time of the president's speech, I want his eyeballs. I will remove them myself. Ron -- -- Ronald O. Christian (Fujitsu America Inc., San Jose, Calif.) ihnp4!pesnta!fai!ronc Oliver's law of assumed responsibility: "If you are seen fixing it, you will be blamed for breaking it."
rt@cpsc53.UUCP (Ron Thompson) (03/06/86)
> My rhetorical question: How often have we seen the correct technical or > operational decision overturned by "higher management" because of the politics > of the situation? Fortunately, most of us don't work in places where the cost > of doing that is measured in lives, billions of dollars, and national prestige. A good question. Tonight's newspaper pointed out two rather well known instances where this occured. (1) The Ford Pinto problems involving the faulty fuel tank design which led to untold numbers of fiery deaths due to rear end collisions. (2) The problem with the baggage door design on the DC-10 which resulted in the crash of the Turkish airliner near Paris and the loss of over 360 people's lives. It has been established in both of these cases that engineers had made formal written identification of these problems before any were experienced. Sadly, as in the case of our Challenger, good technical judgement based on many dollars of training and years of experience was electively ignored by people with 'higher goals' than the safety of human life. -- Ron Thompson AT&T Information Systems Customer Programming (404) 982-4217 Atlanta, Georgia Services Center ..{ihnp4,akgua}!cpsc53!rt (Opinions expressed are mine alone.)