eros@chovax.DEC (02/23/86)
Over the last few days, engineers at Morton-Thiokol have been falling
all over one another to express how sure they were that the O-rings
on the SRBs would fail during launch and how schedule-minded and
inflexible NASA management was about delaying the mission.
This brings up an interesting question - if these folks were
so sure of the danger to the SRBs (in fact, one senior engineer said
that he and other engineers expressed surprise at launch time that
Challenger cleared the tower without incident) why didn't they go
to the media with their concerns? I'm sure that the networks,
NPR and the papers would have been more than happy to spash their
objections far and wide; in fact you probably would have seen a two
inch high headline in the NY Daily News reading something like this:
'RUBBER RINGS RICKETY', REVEAL RED-FACED ROCKETEERS
Faced with this kind of prelaunch publicity, NASA would have been
forced to scrub.
This of course presupposes that the engineers are accurately
depicting the intensity of their opposition to the launch.
I'm beginning to believe more and more that this is just a massive
CYA movement on the part of the Morton-Thiokol engineering staff.
How is it that NASA, who has scrubbed launches for all kinds of
seemingly arcane reasons in the past (everything from failure of
Nth redundant systems to cloudy days) would suddenly perform a
180-degree turn and force a launch when engineers are insisting
the vehicle will blow up?
In my view, if the situation developed the way the engineers
are claiming it did, then they are equally (if not more) culpible
than the company executives who signed off on the launch OK and
the NASA management who insisted on it, since they KNEW that
seven people (more, if an explosion on the pad occurred) and
25% of the shuttle fleet were in extreme danger of destruction
and they chose not to put their reputations on the line by
publicly speaking out against the launch.
In the end, it seems they are salving their collective consciences
with the old 'I was just obeying orders' bit.
Tony Eros
!decwrl!chovax!eros
'My opinions are my own; who else would want them?'bzs@bu-cs.UUCP (Barry Shein) (02/24/86)
Re: Why didn't MT go to the media with their concerns about the O-Rings?
Good question. It is an unfortunate property of our institutions that
everyone has the right to lie ('everything is fine') and no one seems
to have the right to tell the truth ('something is terribly wrong').
I quite frankly believe that if it turns out to become generally accepted
that MT really knew there were dangers (not just a worst case study that
the media is hyping up) then NASA had better review the ability of their
organization to allow dissident views, even if they are not popular, to
be heard. I hope this isn't what happened. Everything I have heard about
NASA in the past seems to deny this, that worst case studies are taken
very seriously.
I mean, look at all the delays in the shuttle flights. It doesn't appear
that NASA hesitates to hear that there is a problem, perhaps the final
outcome will be that this one time some anxiousness to launch over-rode
a warning and that should be fixed by a management correction. One should
not be totally non-cynical about MT quite possibly, at this late date,
trying to save face, or to turn it around, yes, if they knew before hand
and were so sure, who did they tell? How hard did they push? Or are we
hearing their hindsight and a press very hungry for news.
-Barry Shein, Boston Universitytim@ism780c.UUCP (Tim Smith) (02/25/86)
In article <1301@decwrl.DEC.COM> eros@chovax.DEC writes: > > In my view, if the situation developed the way the engineers > are claiming it did, then they are equally (if not more) culpible > than the company executives who signed off on the launch OK and > the NASA management who insisted on it, since they KNEW that > seven people (more, if an explosion on the pad occurred) and > 25% of the shuttle fleet were in extreme danger of destruction > and they chose not to put their reputations on the line by > publicly speaking out against the launch. This seems unfair to the MT engineers. Isn't the final decision to launch made close enough to launch time that it wouldn't do any good to go to the press? If it didn't explode, they would probably lose their jobs. Also, perhaps they thought they _could_ stop the launch. I heard on the news ( CNN, I think ), that the MT engineer in Florida who has to sign the form that says MT approves of the launch refused to sign. If the MT engineers in Utah knew that the guy in Florida was on their side, they might have felt that even if they couldn't convince NASA and MT management to postpone the launch, that the fact that they guy in Florida wouldn't sign would stop it anyway. Management was able to send a signature over the phone to allow the launch to go on as scheduled. By this time, the MT engineers probably only had time to sit back and watch, and hope that nothing happened. If all this turns out to be true, some management heads in NASA and MT will probably be rolling soon ... -- Tim Smith sdcrdcf!ism780c!tim || ima!ism780!tim || ihnp4!cithep!tim
mrgofor@mmm.UUCP (MKR) (02/26/86)
In article <1301@decwrl.DEC.COM> eros@chovax.DEC writes: > > Over the last few days, engineers at Morton-Thiokol have been falling > all over one another to express how sure they were that the O-rings > on the SRBs would fail during launch and how schedule-minded and > inflexible NASA management was about delaying the mission. > > This brings up an interesting question - if these folks were > so sure of the danger to the SRBs (in fact, one senior engineer said > that he and other engineers expressed surprise at launch time that > Challenger cleared the tower without incident) why didn't they go > to the media with their concerns? > > Tony Eros > !decwrl!chovax!eros If the MT engineers were 75% sure that the shuttle would not make it, would that justify "going to the media" (aka "going over their bosses' heads")? What, then, if the 25% chance happened and all went well? They'd be in the bread lines, that's what. The bosses made the decisions, and at some point, you have to acknowledge the authority of those "in power". You really don't want that sort of anarchy going on in a company that handles such sensitive ventures as this. You want to invest the authority in the right people and in the right decision-making systems, and follow those rules. It seems to me that the problem came in that the decision-making power was in the wrong hands. It should have been more responsive to the engineers, who are closer to the real-life physical laws at work, rather than resting ultimately with paper-pushing private-sector politicians whose main concern is appearances rather than substance. To blame the engineers for not risking their (and their families') future and security is dependent upon what they saw as the likelyhood of a mishap. If it was 90% or more, perhaps I would agree with you. If it was 50% or below, you're asking those engineers to toss a coin over their own asses. After all, they *did* make their objections known to the right people. -- --MKR There is none so blind as he who cannot see.
gwe@cbdkc1.UUCP ( George Erhart x4021 CB 3D288 RNB ) (02/26/86)
In article <209@bu-cs.UUCP> bzs@bu-cs.UUCP (Barry Shein) writes: >Re: Why didn't MT go to the media with their concerns about the O-Rings? MT was involved in some important (i.e. $400 million) contract talks with NASA at the time of the accident. It is easy to speculate that the MT upper management would downplay the engineers concerns in order to keep up a good front with NASA. It is amazing to see the kind of pressure that comes with contract negotiations for that kind of money. -- George Erhart at AT&T Bell Laboratories Columbus, Ohio 614-860-4021 {ihnp4,cbosgd}!cbdkc1!gwe
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (02/27/86)
> This seems unfair to the MT engineers... > If it didn't explode, they would probably lose their jobs. The way they've been presenting it so far, they said "don't launch", argued with management, management said "launch", at which point the engineers quietly gave in. They decided that it was not worth risking their jobs in an attempt to avert [what they now claim was obviously] a major risk of loss of a shuttle. If any of them are licensed Professional Engineers, I trust their state licensing boards will take notice of this gross dereliction of duty. "A commander in chief cannot take as an excuse for his mistakes in warfare an order given by his minister or his sovereign, when the person giving the order is absent from the field of operations and is imperfectly aware or wholly unaware of the latest state of affairs. It follows that any commander in chief who undertakes to carry out a plan which he considers defective is at fault; he must put forward his reasons, insist on the plan being changed, and finally TENDER HIS RESIGNATION rather than be the instrument of his army's downfall." - Napoleon [emphasis added] -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
pritch@osu-eddie.UUCP (Norman Pritchett) (02/28/86)
In article <564@mmm.UUCP> mrgofor@mmm.UUCP (MKR) writes: >In article <1301@decwrl.DEC.COM> eros@chovax.DEC writes: >> >> Over the last few days, engineers at Morton-Thiokol have been falling >> all over one another to express how sure they were that the O-rings >> on the SRBs would fail during launch and how schedule-minded and >> inflexible NASA management was about delaying the mission. >> >> This brings up an interesting question - if these folks were >> so sure of the danger to the SRBs (in fact, one senior engineer said >> that he and other engineers expressed surprise at launch time that >> Challenger cleared the tower without incident) why didn't they go >> to the media with their concerns? >> >> Tony Eros >> !decwrl!chovax!eros > > If the MT engineers were 75% sure that the shuttle would not make >it, would that justify "going to the media" (aka "going over their bosses' >heads")? What, then, if the 25% chance happened and all went well? They'd >be in the bread lines, that's what. The bosses made the decisions, and at >some point, you have to acknowledge the authority of those "in power". You >really don't want that sort of anarchy going on in a company that handles >such sensitive ventures as this. You want to invest the authority in the >right people and in the right decision-making systems, and follow those >rules. > Even after the accident, they couldn't voice their concerns until after the cuase was determined. There is the likelyhood that some other failure may have been the cause and the M-T engineerings coming out immediately would have prevented an objective anylsis of the evidence. -- Norm Pritchett, The Ohio State University BITNET: TS1703 at OHSTVMA Bellnet: (614) 422-0885 UUCP: cbosgd!osu-eddie!pritch CSNET: pritch@ohio-state ARPANET: NPRITCHETT%osu-20@ohio-state (or) pritch@ohio-state
abc@brl-smoke.ARPA (Brint Cooper ) (03/03/86)
In article <6442@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > >If any of them are licensed Professional Engineers, I trust their state >licensing boards will take notice of this gross dereliction of duty. Then he adds some irrelevant blather about military affairs. First, in most states, licensing boards have no authority over engineers working on government (defense, space) contracts. Second, it's a noble sentiment to berate the engineers for not running to the media with their complaints. It's not so easy if you're the engineer and you know that your press conference will cost you not only your job but very likely your chances for another job. Neither the bank who holds your house mortgage and the university that bills you $10K every year for your kid's tuition (yes, tuition) are interested in your nobility. It seems agreed by all that the engineers protested and were overruled by "management." Assumption of responsibility is the commodity purchased by those big salaries paid to industrial managers in this country. If the story turns out to be as it has been told, it's the managers' heads that should roll. -- Brint Cooper ARPA: abc@brl.arpa UUCP: ...{seismo,decvax,cbosgd}!brl!abc
kdj@teddy.UUCP (03/03/86)
I feel strongly that a system to report concerns/problems from engineers to management must be maintained. If management decides not to listen to engineerings concerns on such a critical matter, then the management is at fault, not the engineers. It was managements responsibility to reliably represent the engineers concerns to the officials at NASA. And, I believe we will find this to be the problem.
paul@axiom.UUCP (Paul O`Shaughnessy) (03/04/86)
>TENDER THEIR RESIGNATIONS...
Strong stuff, and engineers as well as society might be better off
if they stuck to their guns more often and did not give in. Unfortunately,
the reward structure in the military and aerospace industry of the USA
is slightly f**ked up. Engineers (or accountants, or anybody) who make
too much fuss over fraud, be it financial or technical, are labelled as
troublemakers and blacklisted. The long arm of government is employed to
destroy these people's careers in detail. It is an atmosphere in which
even the courageous must pause and consider if THIS is the issue upon
which they will ruin their livelihood. Contrary to rumor, engineers
ain't rich. They also must consider whether their calculations and
intuition are correct, AND they must consider the effect of their action
(resignation, for example). If one or a couple of engineers had resigned
in protest, and even gone to the press with stories of sloppy decisions
in the program, I doubt that the politicians would have respected their
actions any more than they presently respect those who, at some risk,
criticize useless or dangerous weapons systems. The shuttle would have
flown anyway.
I strongly agree with Mr. Spencer's sentiments, but doubt that much will
change while engineers can gaze at the ruined careers of those who did
speak up.laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) (03/05/86)
There is a lot to be said about being able to wake up in the morning and look in the mirror, though.
tim@ism780c.UUCP (Tim Smith) (03/06/86)
In article <6442@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > >If any of them are licensed Professional Engineers, I trust their state >licensing boards will take notice of this gross dereliction of duty. There is a story in the March 5, 1986 L.A. Times about engineers who find safety problems in big expensive projects, and what happens to them after they go public. The story contains many interesting examples of engineers who voiced concerns over safety and were fired. I recommend going to your local library and reading it. It is very interesting. They say that the MT engineer in Florida who refused to authorize the launch _was_ still trying to get it stopped, even after management went over his head. How certain should an engineer be that something will fail before he blows his career trying to stop it? If he does go public to stop something from happening, and is proven correct in his fears, he will still be considered a trouble maker, and his career will be shot. -- Tim Smith sdcrdcf!ism780c!tim || ima!ism780!tim || ihnp4!cithep!tim
joels@tekred.UUCP (Joel Swank) (03/06/86)
> If the MT engineers were 75% sure that the shuttle would not make > it, would that justify "going to the media" (aka "going over their bosses' > heads")? What, then, if the 25% chance happened and all went well? They'd > be in the bread lines, that's what. The bosses made the decisions, and at > some point, you have to acknowledge the authority of those "in power". You > really don't want that sort of anarchy going on in a company that handles > such sensitive ventures as this. You want to invest the authority in the > right people and in the right decision-making systems, and follow those > rules. > The engineers weren't at all sure the SRBs would fail. The main point made by Allen McDonald was that they DIDN'T KNOW what effects the weather would have on the seals. This lack of data should be enough to scrub launch. Instead, NASA used it as a point in FAVOR of launching. This seems contrary to their policy in the past, when the engineers had to PROVE beyond a reasonable doubt that their systems would work. Joel Swank Tektronix, Redmond, Oregon
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (03/07/86)
> It seems agreed by all that the engineers protested and were overruled > by "management." Assumption of responsibility is the commodity > purchased by those big salaries paid to industrial managers... As the Napoleon quote pointed out (in military terms because that was Napoleon's profession), "I was just following orders" is not an ethical excuse for acquiescing to a decision you know is wrong. > ...It's not so easy if you're the > engineer and you know that your press conference will cost you not only > your job but very likely your chances for another job... The lack of that press conference cost the Challenger crew their lives. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
barb@oliven.UUCP (Barbara Jernigan) (03/07/86)
> I strongly agree with Mr. Spencer's sentiments, but doubt that much will > change while engineers can gaze at the ruined careers of those who did > speak up. More evidence of the double standard we (Americans) are cudgeled with from birth. Our integrity says we should tell the truth. Our integrity says we should not fink on our buddies. It's not right or wrong, it *is*. In hindsight it's easy to say "I told you so!" -- and to remember you were at least that exuberant in telling your manager he/she shouldn't go ahead. But were you? Really? Memory's a quirky thing -- as much fiction as fact (perhaps more of the former) and subject to revision. I'm not saying the M.T. engineers weren't as persuasive/insistent and they remember being -- but that's all under the bridge now. Challenger was launched -- and died. Let's move on. If heads deserve to roll, believe me, they'll roll (I only pray they're the right ones and not scapegoats) (see, I'm skeptical, too). Barb
ray@utcsri.UUCP (Raymond Allen) (03/07/86)
In article <6474@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >> ...It's not so easy if you're the >> engineer and you know that your press conference will cost you not only >> your job but very likely your chances for another job... > >The lack of that press conference cost the Challenger crew their lives. I agree, Henry, your point is valid but consider what the probable outcome of the press conference might have been. Management would have issued a statement to the effect that the opinions of the engineers were not the *official* view of the company and, as such, are invalid (from the point of view of the management). Now obviously anyone who was intelligent enough to understand that the engineers are the best individuals to judge whether or not the O-rings might fail would certainly favor aborting the launch, BUT, the presumption if intelligence is a tenuous one. After all, even their own managers (with the exception of one, I gather) did not respect (or, perhaps *wish* to respect) the opinions of the engineers. Who would win the forum if the engineers and management decided to slug it out in public? I suspect that the engineers would lose the argument and their careers. (Of course the *next* time something like this happens, the engineers might get a better hearing.) The real problem is that "Whistle-Blowing" legislation that would ensure an employee job security (for whatever its worth) if he/she decided to go public with regards to a situation such as we have been discussing should exist everywhere. Such legislation *does* exist in the state of Michigan. Its appearance was motivated, at least in part, by the discovery that many Ford engineers knew in advance that the Pinto's gasoline tank was a potential fire hazard in the case of a rear-end collision. Unfortunately these engineers also chose job security over a public statement. As we all are aware, *that* engineering blunder killed a lot more than seven people. -- Ray Allen | "A thing is not necessarily true because a man dies for it." utcsri!ray | - Oscar Wilde as quoted in "Parachutes & Kisses" by Erica Jong
jer@peora.UUCP (J. Eric Roskos) (03/07/86)
> If any of them are licensed Professional Engineers, I trust their state > licensing boards will take notice of this gross dereliction of duty. Well, I would hope their licensing boards include a number of engineers working in the real world, and not a lot of armchair speculators on what they would have done in that situation... unfortunately the process of engineering in the real world involves many cases in which you firmly believe something is wrong, but are overruled by your superiors. There are not many alternative jobs for people whose specialty is making rocket engines; you can't resign your job everytime you disagree over a decision and are overruled, let alone the case in which your job was so difficult to come by in the first place... "A commander in chief cannot take as an excuse for his mistakes in warfare an order given by his minister or his sovereign, when the person giving the order is absent from the field of operations and is imperfectly aware or wholly unaware of the latest state of affairs...." But this wasn't a war, and the engineers had told their superiors, so they were neither absent nor imperfectly aware... -- UUCP: Ofc: jer@peora.UUCP Home: jer@jerpc.CCUR.UUCP CCUR DNS: peora, pesnta US Mail: MS 795; CONCURRENT Computer Corp. SDC; (A Perkin-Elmer Company) 2486 Sand Lake Road, Orlando, FL 32809-7642 LOTD(6)=B ---------------------- Amusing error message explaining reason for some returned mail recently: > 554 xxxxxx.xxxxxx.ATT.UUCP!xxx... Unknown domain address: Not a typewriter (The above message is true... only the names have been changed...)
wagner@utcs.uucp (Michael Wagner) (03/07/86)
There is something that is being missed in this discussion, however. It's been pointed out that engineers have other responsibilities (careers, family) that would cloud/slow down the decision-making process (and it seems like there really wasn't all that much time, perhaps a few hours, when they knew the temperatures that were going to be 'on' at launch). But what hasn't been dealt with at all is the personalities of said engineers. Most people (UN*X hacks apparently excepted) are seldom 100% convinced of anything. And it seems to me that much of this sort of engineering is new and different, so there are few 'rules of thumb' to back one up. Now consider someone who has been brought up not to make a fuss, even when they know they are right (pretty common in our (general) society, if not on this network). Add the fact that they aren't all that sure that they are right. Add to that the fact that they only had a few hours when they were in possession of all the facts. Add the fact that they had already been overridden by two management groups (their own, and NASA's). Perhaps I'm stupid, but I think people have been coming down a little hard on these people. I certainly don't know what I would do in that case. I would like to think that I would come forward, but I'd have to be d**m sure of my facts (and I, unlike most of my friends, am probably almost as self-assertive as others here (claim they?) are.) It's also a lot easier to be a monday-morning quarterback (which is what we've been doing here). I'd be interested in hearing opinions from engineers/etc who have really been in similar situations. Not the time that you went three rounds with your boss over the naming convention of tty ports on your system, but the times when you chose (not) to speak up in situations of life-threatening design/execution problems. Seems to me that the people who have *really* been there are the best qualified to speak on this matter. Anyone willing to start? In order to keep it focused, and not just become a mod.risks discussion, it would be wise to try to relate the experience to the Morton-Thiokol situation. Michael Wagner (wagner@utcs)
brad@looking.UUCP (Brad Templeton) (03/08/86)
> > The lack of that press conference cost the Challenger crew their lives. > -- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry *** LACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR RHETORIC *** I would buy yelling at those engineers if I had some evidence that a management overturned engineering advisory was a rare event. The fact is that little discussions and negotiations between engineers and managers go on every day. The manager's *job* is to know what to say yes and no to. Was the O-ring problem something that stuck out like a sore thumb beforehand, as a source of major disagreement? I suspect instead that it was just one of hundreds of possible problems brought up and deemed not serious enough. In this case, they were wrong, and everybody pays. To suggest that every engineer overruled by his or her boss go to the press is ludicrous. This should only be done if the engineer knows the manager's decision is based on something illegal, like fraud. -- Brad Templeton, Looking Glass Software Ltd. - Waterloo, Ontario 519/884-7473
herbie@polaris.UUCP (Herb Chong) (03/09/86)
In article <1439@brl-smoke.ARPA> abc@brl-smoke.UUCP (Brint Cooper (SECAD/CSMB) <abc>) writes: >In article <6442@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >> >>If any of them are licensed Professional Engineers, I trust their state >>licensing boards will take notice of this gross dereliction of duty. > >First, in most states, licensing boards have no authority over engineers >working on government (defense, space) contracts. does this mean that engineers who work for the government are exempt from the social responsibility clauses in most of the state licensing boards' charters? Herb Chong... I'm still user-friendly -- I don't byte, I nybble.... VNET,BITNET,NETNORTH,EARN: HERBIE AT YKTVMH UUCP: {allegra|cbosgd|cmcl2|decvax|ihnp4|seismo}!philabs!polaris!herbie CSNET: herbie.yktvmh@ibm-sj.csnet ARPA: herbie.yktvmh.ibm-sj.csnet@csnet-relay.arpa, herbie%yktvmh.bitnet@wiscvm ======================================================================== DISCLAIMER: what you just read was produced by pouring lukewarm tea for 42 seconds onto 9 people chained to 6 Ouiji boards.
mc68020@gilbbs.UUCP (Tom Keller) (03/09/86)
In article <6474@utzoo.UUCP>, henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > > It seems agreed by all that the engineers protested and were overruled > > by "management." Assumption of responsibility is the commodity > > purchased by those big salaries paid to industrial managers... > > As the Napoleon quote pointed out (in military terms because that was > Napoleon's profession), "I was just following orders" is not an ethical > excuse for acquiescing to a decision you know is wrong. Oh, come now. In the first place, no one claimed they were "just following orders". Secondly, in the case of the Challenger flight, the dissenting engineers had no authority or clear means of preventing the launch, regardless of their degree of conviction about the dangers. > > > ...It's not so easy if you're the > > engineer and you know that your press conference will cost you not only > > your job but very likely your chances for another job... > > The lack of that press conference cost the Challenger crew their lives. > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry Oh really? What conclusive evidence can you present to us that would support this seemingly idiotic comment? There is no gaurantee that such a press conference would in any way have delayed that launch. Moreover, based on past history, there does seem to be considerable evidence that the engineers in question would have been immediately fired, and labelled as "malcontents" or some such silly label. The engineers, *IF* they in fact made their fears and reasoning known to their superiors, and attempted to stop the launch as claimed, did everything within their power (short of sabotaging the launch support equipment). It seems to me that an awful lot of the comments around here aimed at these engineers here are coming from people with a pretty clear case of Ivory Tower Syndrome. For the sake of argument, let us assume that calling such a press conference *WOULD* have halted the launch (assuming that the engineers weren't arrested before they could make their statements!). What I seem to be hearing here is that even though the higher-ups chose to ignore their technical experts, and go ahead with a launch that was likely to be unsafe, we should hold the engineers responsible. It's okay for the fucking bureaucrats to wantonly ingore facts in favor of politics, but it is criminal for the engineers not to have taken steps that would have halted the launch, but permanently ruined their careers. Amazing. Using this logic, it is obvious that since the engineers failed to sabotage the launch support systems, and thereby stop the launch at *ANY COST*, they are criminally liable, and ought to be incarcerated immediately! (to borrow a phrase from Joan Rivers: grow up!) -- ==================================== Disclaimer: I hereby disclaim any and all responsibility for disclaimers. tom keller {ihnp4, dual}!ptsfa!gilbbs!mc68020 (* we may not be big, but we're small! *)
sdo@celerity.UUCP (Steve Oualline) (03/09/86)
When critising the Morton-Thiokol engineers for not going public you should consider what would happen if the shuttle did not explode. Here are the events that I would expect to happen. 1. Morton-Thiokol engineers decide that the engines have a 30% chance of blowing up. 2. They go to management with their findings. 3. Management overrules them. 4. Engineers go to the press and cause a nasty stink. 5. Shuttle goes up and does not explode. 6. Engineers are labeled crack-pots and trouble makers. They are fired. 7. Since they are known trouble makers, no one else will hire them. I want to point out that as an engineer the most you can do when management overrules you is to document your findings. This gives you protection if something goes wrong and places the blame on the managers who overruled you. You can not go to the press unless the manager's judgement is so bad that you are sure disaster will occur. (Not probably occur, WILL occur).
mrgofor@mmm.UUCP (MKR) (03/10/86)
In article <6442@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >> This seems unfair to the MT engineers... >> If it didn't explode, they would probably lose their jobs. > >The way they've been presenting it so far, they said "don't launch", argued >with management, management said "launch", at which point the engineers >quietly gave in. They decided that it was not worth risking their jobs in >an attempt to avert [what they now claim was obviously] a major risk of >loss of a shuttle. > >If any of them are licensed Professional Engineers, I trust their state >licensing boards will take notice of this gross dereliction of duty. > As Sally Ride pointed out, the engineers *did* hang tough, and fought the launch as far as they could within the framework of the organization. The original poster suggested that they should have gone directly to the media and voiced their opinions publicly, and I still believe that is an unfair risk to ask the engineers to take. Remember, these guys are *rocket* engineers. If they got their butts fired for insubordination and every other charge that their management would certainly come up with, where are they going to go to find work in their field? There aren't a whole lot of jobs out there, especially for hot-headed troublemakers who can't work within the system. Imagine the best-case scenario: they went to the media, and such an outcry was raised that the launch was postponed for a couple days and finally launched without problems. What do you think those management types (who are *still* arguing that the decision to launch was sound - even though it quite obviously was not) would do to the renegade engineers? That's right - their careers would be over. It's not just losing a job - it's losing their entire careers so they would have to start over in another field. I think that's too much to expect of the engineers. I think they behaved honorably - it was those handful of management types who blew it, and it's *their* asses that should get toasted, the engineers were the *good* guys. >"A commander in chief cannot take as an excuse for his mistakes in warfare >an order given by his minister or his sovereign, when the person giving >the order is absent from the field of operations and is imperfectly aware >or wholly unaware of the latest state of affairs. It follows that any >commander in chief who undertakes to carry out a plan which he considers >defective is at fault; he must put forward his reasons, insist on the plan >being changed, and finally TENDER HIS RESIGNATION rather than be the >instrument of his army's downfall." - Napoleon [emphasis added] >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry Napolean is not a particularly good role model in moral affairs. Besides, note the words "commander in chief" in your quote. I'll agree with the concept as stated. In this case, however, it was the commanders-in-chief who undertook to carry out a plan which they did not consider effective. The engineers were not commanders - they were soldiers. I doubt that Napolean would consider soldiers to have the same obligations to weigh the soundness of the campaign - that's the generals' job, and that's why they get paid the big bucks. It's also why they get their butts kicked when the other army wins. -- --MKR If Man were meant to use the metric system, Jesus would have had 10 disciples.
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (03/11/86)
> You can not go to the press unless the manager's judgement is so bad > that you are sure disaster will occur. (Not probably occur, WILL occur). The M-T engineers are certainly doing a good imitation of being sure, in retrospect. The reports I've seen make them out that way, anyway. In practice they probably weren't sure, but then they should stop claiming so. Either they weren't sure, in which case some of the more hysterical finger- pointing at management is out of order, or they were, in which case they take a large share of the blame. They can't have it neither way. Incidentally, it is possible to resign without holding a press conference. If management overrules you on something important, and you know damn well that you know the score and they don't, how can you ethically stay with that management? Why were there no quiet resignations at M-T? -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
rjnoe@riccb.UUCP (Roger J. Noe) (03/12/86)
> I want to point out that as an engineer the most you can do when > management overrules you is to document your findings. This gives > you protection if something goes wrong and places the blame > on the managers who overruled you. > > You can not go to the press unless the manager's judgement is so bad > that you are sure disaster will occur. (Not probably occur, WILL occur). As a professional engineer, I think this is rather irresponsible and unethical. If a professional has grave misgivings about a company project that could significantly endanger the public safety or welfare, then the professional is morally obligated to go outside the company if she has exhausted all internal means of having herself heard. This includes (but is not limited to) contacting the press and law enforcement agencies. Note that the engineer does not need to be publicly identified; newspapers and television stations will happily accept any information of this type "without attribution". Moreover, such organizations will zealously try to prevent release of such information under First Amendment principles. -- Roger Noe ihnp4!riccb!rjnoe
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (03/12/86)
> ...In the first place, no one claimed they were "just following orders". "We told them it was dangerous, our management said it wasn't, so we shut up and went back to work." Sure sounds like "just following orders" to me. > Secondly, in the case of the Challenger flight, the dissenting engineers > had no authority or clear means of preventing the launch, regardless > of their degree of conviction about the dangers. Their protestations of innocence would ring a lot truer if they had *tried*, once they realized that they were being overruled for "political" reasons with lives at stake. Or at least resigned, to dissociate themselves from the possible results. > > The lack of that press conference cost the Challenger crew their lives. > > Oh really? What conclusive evidence can you present to us that would > support this seemingly idiotic comment? There is no gaurantee that such a > press conference would in any way have delayed that launch... But it might have. However slender the chances of getting the desired result with a press conference, *without* the press conference there was *no* chance. > Moreover, > based on past history, there does seem to be considerable evidence that the > engineers in question would have been immediately fired, and labelled as > "malcontents" or some such silly label. I'm sure the crew of Challenger would appreciate how painful this would be for the engineers. Too bad we can't ask them. > The engineers, *IF* they in fact made their fears and reasoning known to > their superiors, and attempted to stop the launch as claimed, did everything > within their power (short of sabotaging the launch support equipment)... The Morton-Thiokol engineers who will participate in redesign of the SRB seals should be told that one of them will be randomly selected to be a passenger on the first test flight. THEN we'd see what's within their powers; I suspect it would be considerably more than you suggest. > For the sake of argument, let us assume that calling such a press conference > *WOULD* have halted the launch (assuming that the engineers weren't arrested > before they could make their statements!)... Arrested? On what charge? Actually, getting themselves arrested (in public) might be the most effective thing to do under such conditions, if it could be done. Then there *would* be a press conference. > ... It's okay for the fucking bureaucrats to wantonly ingore facts in > favor of politics... Please point out to me where I said that. I didn't. The bureaucrats bear a large share of the blame; my point is that the engineers can't duck their share by claiming that they were "just following orders". > ...but it is criminal for the engineers not > to have taken steps that would have halted the launch, but permanently ruined > their careers. Amazing. You don't consider the Challenger crew's careers permanently ruined? Amazing. > Using this logic, it is obvious that since the engineers failed to sabotage > the launch support systems, and thereby stop the launch at *ANY COST*, they > are criminally liable, and ought to be incarcerated immediately! I'm not sure I would go as far as advocating sabotage, but *they* didn't need to go that far either! As for criminal liability, if it truly turns out that they did *nothing* after their management told them to shut up, a charge of "accessory before the fact to negligent homicide" would not be totally unjustified. Excessive, perhaps, but not ridiculous. Has even one of those engineers even resigned? I'm not asking about press conferences, just about whether they are willing to stay with a company which has innocent blood on its hands. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
rupp@noscvax.UUCP (William L. Rupp) (03/13/86)
In article <6486@utzoo.UUCP>, henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: > > You can not go to the press unless the manager's judgement is so bad > > that you are sure disaster will occur. (Not probably occur, WILL occur). > > Either they weren't sure, in which case some of the more hysterical finger- > pointing at management is out of order, or they were, in which case they > take a large share of the blame. They can't have it neither way. > > Incidentally, it is possible to resign without holding a press conference. > If management overrules you on something important, and you know damn well > that you know the score and they don't, how can you ethically stay with > that management? Why were there no quiet resignations at M-T? > -- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology I tend to agree with those who feel that the engineers did about all they could to protest the dangerous decision of management, considering their status in the organization. It is certainly easy to say after the fact that they should have done thus and so. Regarding Mr. Spencer's idea that they should have resigned quietly, is that realistic considering the time frame involved? Was there really time to resign, quietly or otherwise? I do believe that in a situation drawn out over many days or weeks, the quiet resignation option could be appropriate.
ronc@fai.UUCP (Ronald O. Christian) (03/14/86)
>Imagine the best-case scenario: they went to the media, and such an outcry >was raised that the launch was postponed for a couple days and finally launched >without problems. What do you think those management types (who are *still* >arguing that the decision to launch was sound - even though it quite obviously >was not) would do to the renegade engineers? That's right - their careers would >be over. **** You are describing a well known management ploy: Insist loudly and frequently that you are right in the face of all evidence and laws of physics to the contrary. I think someone once called this 'the big lie'. The point is that the individuals who made the mistake can keep their jobs if they bull it through. By the way, what happened to the rumor about telephone records showing someone from the white house staff telling nasa to 'get that damn thing up' so it could be in orbit when the president gave his state of the union address? If this is true, seems to me there's more to share the blame than the management at Morton-Thiokol. Ron -- -- Ronald O. Christian (Fujitsu America Inc., San Jose, Calif.) ihnp4!pesnta!fai!ronc Oliver's law of assumed responsibility: "If you are seen fixing it, you will be blamed for breaking it."
henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) (03/14/86)
> ... In this case, however, it was the commanders-in-chief > who undertook to carry out a plan which they did not consider effective. The > engineers were not commanders - they were soldiers... Note that the quote makes it clear that the "commander-in-chief" that Napoleon is referring to has at least two levels of superiors above him who might be actively (if unwisely) involved in the decision. I think the analogy holds. And as for soldiers' obligation to weigh the soundness of the campaign, Nuremberg and later such courts established very clearly that it *is* the soldiers' obligation to weigh the *legality* of their orders. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry
doug@terak.UUCP (Doug Pardee) (03/14/86)
> Note that the engineer does not need to be publicly identified; newspapers > and television stations will happily accept any information of this type > "without attribution". Moreover, such organizations will zealously try to > prevent release of such information under First Amendment principles. Hmmmm. Here in the Phoenix area, 30 managers working at the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant are being forced by their employer to take polygraph tests to determine which one gave an anonymous tip to the local newsrag. The paper isn't revealing its sources, but the tipster is gonna get axed anyway (anyone who refuses the test is automatically fired). And maybe some innocent folks as well. The Arizona Corporation Commission (which regulates our utilities) has indicated that the information which was leaked should have been public knowledge, should definitely have been provided to the ACC, and was instead covered up. The ACC is grateful to the "squealer", but its hands are tied when it comes to protecting the guy's job. -- Doug Pardee -- CalComp -- {elrond,savax,seismo,decvax,ihnp4}!terak!doug
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (03/14/86)
In article <504@looking.UUCP> brad@looking.UUCP (Brad Templeton) writes: > >Was the O-ring problem something that stuck out like a sore thumb >beforehand, as a source of major disagreement? I suspect instead that >it was just one of hundreds of possible problems brought up and deemed >not serious enough. In this case, they were wrong, and everybody pays. > I think this is a very important point. In *hind-sight* it seems obvious that the problem was significant. BUT, how do you tell *ahead* of time which of the hundreds of niggling little doubts and concerns are *really* important and which are not? It is impossible to make sure *everything* is *exactly* right before launching, if we did that we would *never* launch. In fact if we used that criterion we would never do anything significant. Unfortunately the media must have a scandal to sell newpapers and catch viewers, so *someone* must be at fault. I have *never* seen a news story which concluded that everything was normal and that there was no cause for concern. They *thrive* on problems. Unfortunately, in this case they may get innocent people ruined in the search for scapegoats. -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa
doug@terak.UUCP (Doug Pardee) (03/18/86)
> Nuremberg and later such courts established very clearly that it *is* > the soldiers' obligation to weigh the *legality* of their orders. My feeble memory suggests that the soldiers' orders were "legal". Not moral, but still in full accordance with the laws of their land. This is something that I've found interesting, since "pop" psychology suggests that the majority of adults have "fifth-level" ethics, and so differentiate right vs. wrong by reference to "the law". The war crimes trials punished people for not having at least "sixth-level" ethics in which right vs. wrong is arbitrated by a self-determined sense of what is in the best interest of society as a whole. -- Doug Pardee -- CalComp -- {elrond,savax,seismo,decvax,ihnp4}!terak!doug
mrgofor@mmm.UUCP (MKR) (03/19/86)
In article <6512@utzoo.UUCP> henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) writes: >> ... In this case, however, it was the commanders-in-chief >> who undertook to carry out a plan which they did not consider effective. The >> engineers were not commanders - they were soldiers... > >Note that the quote makes it clear that the "commander-in-chief" that >Napoleon is referring to has at least two levels of superiors above him >who might be actively (if unwisely) involved in the decision. I think >the analogy holds. > >And as for soldiers' obligation to weigh the soundness of the campaign, >Nuremberg and later such courts established very clearly that it *is* >the soldiers' obligation to weigh the *legality* of their orders. >-- > Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology > {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry Are you suggesting that the engineers' actions were in some way illegal? -- --MKR "The majority of the stupid is invincible and guaranteed for all time. The terror of their tyranny, however, is alleviated by their lack of consistency." - Albert Einstein
arnold@ucsfcgl.UUCP (Ken Arnold%CGL) (03/20/86)
In article <270@noscvax.UUCP> rupp@noscvax.UUCP (William L. Rupp) writes: >I like to think I would have protested more, and maybe I would have >... In any case, I doubt I would have gone public. And what if the >engineers had done so? You ask on what grounds the government could >have stopped them. That's easy. The shuttle program has very >important national security aspects. I would not want a situation >where two or three engineers could ground the shuttle at any time. >Such as during an international crisis when the shuttle might be >needed to launch recon satellites to replace those knocked out by a >hostile nation. If the Feds wanted to keep those engineers from >making a statment on TV, they could find many nice, legal ways to do >it. There are no nice, legal ways to stop a person from calling a reporter, nor are there any nice, legal ways to stop publication of material prior to publication (although there are some messy legal ways to accomplish that). The only way to stop someone from talking to the press is to hold them incommunicado, which is highly illegal unless there is real reason to suspect that a crime has already been committed. Note that even if it was illegal to talk to the press, you could only stop them *once the crime was committed*. We have not yet degenerated to the point where you can arrest someone *before* they commit a crime. (We have some "conspiracy" laws which look a bit like that, but are quite different.) Two or three engineers could never ground the shuttle over the objection of the President, so let's be a little real here. In the case of a crisis where the shuttle was vital, the President would do so. Of course, in any such case the Shuttle is probably a sitting duck for any surface-to-air or air-to-air missle, since it can hardly take evasive action, but that is neither here nor there. Any further discussion of the legal ability of the gov't to prevent people from talking to the press, or to get prior restraint on publication of material, should be taken up in net.legal, where I have forwarded followup discussion. Ken Arnold P.S. By the way, just to prevent somebody from misinterpreting what I say, when I use the term "stop" above, as in "legal ways to stop", I mean "prevent by legal action". It is usually legal to convince someone not to publish something of their own free will.