unitex@rubbs.fidonet.org (unitex) (08/12/89)
future talks on strategic stability. These talks were to start, pursuant to
the Washington accord, three years before the end of the non-withdrawal period
There was an understanding that an agreement regarding ABM defenses
should include a protocol that would envisage predictability and
confidence-building measures, he said. Despite the fundamental differences
which still existed regarding the substance of the agreement proper, there was
a certain measure of proximity in the sides' approaches to the nature of
certain measures that would be included in the protocol. Those measures were
predictability measures with respect to ABM activities of the sides (data
exchange on activities, regular meetings of experts, visits to test ranges).
Work had continued to produce agreed language for the protocol on
predictability measures. The Soviet side continued to hold that, besides
predictability measures, the protocol should also provide for measures to
verify compliance, including inspections of facilities that gave rise to
concern on either side. The protocol should, certainly, envisage
consultations to discuss situations which either side considered jeopardizing
its supreme interests.
Long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) limitations were one of
the most complicated problems, he said. Regrettably, the negotiations had not
succeeded so far in breaking the deadlock on that issue. The problem of
verifying SLCMs could be resolved through businesslike and detailed
discussion. It was the Soviet hope that the two sides would find it possible
at the next round to proceed to this problem.
On the issue of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the
Soviet representative said that as a result of the 1987 Washington Summit, the
two sides had agreed to cap heavy ICBMs at 154 and their warheads at 1,540.
The agreement had been reaffirmed at the Moscow summit meeting in 1988 and was
not subject to questioning. To meet certain United States concerns on the
subject of heavy ICBMs, a number of steps had been taken. Work had continued
on the provisions in the future treaty and the accompanying documents that
were related to verification.
RICHARD R. BURT (United States) said round XI of the strategic arms
reduction talks (START) between the United States and Soviet Union had been a
useful and constructive endeavour. The United States had sought to clarify
the policy positions of both parties and to reaffirm the central structure of
the joint draft treaty. In many areas more than that had been accomplished
including the very important area of providing for effective verification.
There had also been a good give and take at the working group level
related to the Treaty and Protocols which together comprised the START joint
draft text, he said. The two sides had held worthwhile discussions and
debates of various alternatives. Together, the two sides had improved the
text and cleared brackets and narrowed differences in small but significant
ways. The process had been businesslike, non-polemical and oriented to
substance not rhetoric. A groundwork had been laid for the START discussions
between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next month
in the United States.
In its early days, the Bush Administration had conducted a comprehensive
review of American security and arms control policies, he said. As a result
of this review, the President had concluded that the primary objective for
strategic arms control was to achieve verifiable agreements that reduced the
risk of war.
At the beginning of this round of negotiations, the United States intent
had been to proceed on the basis of the existing joint draft text, he said.
The United States had reaffirmed its continued acceptance of the structure of
limits and sublimits that had already been agreed: 1,600 strategic offensive
delivery systems; 6,000 accountable warheads; 4900 warheads on ICBMs and
SLCMs; 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ballistic missiles; and a reduction of
approximately 50 per cent in Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight. While
reaffirming its support of the basic agreed numerical limits and other United
States positions in the joint draft text, the United States had reserved the
right to suggest new ideas and other changes that it believed would contribute
to force survivability and stability.
The United States position on banning mobile ICBMs remained unchanged for
now, he said. The decision on mobile missiles depended in part, of course, on
support in the United States Congress for the President's ICBM modernization
programme. Nonetheless, the United States had indicated to the Soviet side
that it was willing to reconsider its position on seeking a ban, in light of
the 100-plus mobile ICBMs that the Soviets had deployed over the past several
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Patt Haring | UNITEX : United Nations
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