unitex@rubbs.fidonet.org (unitex) (08/12/89)
years, if the sides could agree upon a regime that would allow the effective
verification of numerical limits on mobile ICBM systems. Though much remained
to be done, round XI had produced significant clarifications of the
requirements and restraints to be placed on both road and rail mobile systems.
The United States, he continued, had proposed that the two sides make a
special effort to agree on, and begin implementing as soon as possible,
certain verification and stability measures drawn from proposals previously
advanced by both sides.
HENRY F. COOPER (United States) said innovative non-nuclear defensive
concepts were emerging from laboratories and would undergo testing. If hopes
were realized, the nuclear- or chemically-armed ballistic missile, by far the
most dangerous instrument of war to use the medium of space, would no longer
be an "absolute weapon".
The United States and the Soviets both understood that there were no
limitations on ABM research and experimental work to determine if effective
defenses were feasible, he said. The Soviets were already doing far more than
the United States on strategic defenses. The magnitude of their civil and air
defenses was unequaled anywhere else in the world. They also had the world's
only deployed ABM system, which they were modernizing -- as was their right
under the ABM Treaty. Certain of their activities clearly went beyond the
limits of the ABM Treaty, however. Soviet actions made clear they did not
oppose all defences, only United States defences.
The United States understood the Soviet interest in assuring
predictability as both sides' research and experimental work proceeded and as
reductions in strategic offensive arms took place, he said. It, too, wished
to assure predictability -- not only now, and in the near future, but also
into the more distant future when advancing technologies may enable effective
defences to play an increased role in the strategic forces of both sides.
Therein lay a basis for agreement on a defence and space treaty. Although key
differences remained, and the pace had been slower than desired, there had
been some progress toward such an agreement.
In early 1988, the United States had formally proposed a predictability
measures protocol to a defense and space treaty. While there was not yet
agreement on the specific purpose for the protocol, both sides were
constructively drafting a joint draft text. Notably, both sides agreed that,
under this protocol, they would use the nuclear risk reduction centers to
exchange data each year on their activities regarding the development,
testing, deployment, modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic
missile defences. The United States also wished to exchange data on research
activities conducted prior to the commencement of the formal development stage
The significant progress on this protocol had not received much public
attention, he said. Rather, the emphasis had been on Soviet threats that
there could be no START Treaty without an agreement not to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.
Since 1986, the United States had made clear that it would agree to
conclude a separate treaty of unlimited duration, including such a
nonwithdrawal period -- but not as payment for a START Treaty that should be
concluded on its own merits. Rather, the United States was prepared to meet
the Soviet demand for a nonwithdrawal period provided the Soviet Union met
three conditions: First, after the nonwithdrawal period, the United States
would be free to deploy defences without further reference to the ABM Treaty,
after giving six months' notice. Second, withdrawal and termination rights
under international law, other than those associated with deployment per se,
would be retained. And third, there must be no disputes during the
nonwithdrawal period about research, development, and testing -- including in
space. The United States was conducting, and would continue conducting, the
strategic defence initiative (SDI) programme in compliance with all
international agreements, including the ABM Treaty.
AHMAD KAMAL (Pakistan), speaking on behalf of the Group of 21 (neutral
and non-aligned countries), said the Conference on Disarmament had the
potential to make a significant contribution in promoting international
security and in arresting and reversing the arms race leading towards the goal
of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
That potential had not been exploited to the fullest; hence, there was a need
to make the Conference on Disarmament more responsive to present requirements.
The Group of 21 proposed re-establishing a body charged anew with the
task of identifying and suggesting measures relating to the improved and
effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, he said.
* Origin: UNITEX --> Toward a United Species (1:107/501)
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Patt Haring | UNITEX : United Nations
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