patth@ccnysci.UUCP (08/20/89)
Ported from PeaceNET:
/* Written 12:03 am Aug 17, 1989 by cries in cdp:cries.regionews */
/* ---------- "ElSal: I'view with Salvador Samayo" ---------- */
EL SALVADOR: INTERVIEW WITH SALVADOR SAMAYOA - FMLN
(cries.regionews from Managua August 14, 1989
The conflict in El Salvador was a major theme at the recent
Central American presidential summit meeting in Tela where
President Alfredo Cristiani tried to have the idea adopted
that there is "symmetry" between the questions of how to deal
with the Nicaraguan contras in Honduras and the guerrillas in
his country. His goal was to have pressure placed on the FMLN
to lay down their weapons and abandon their struggle for
power. Salvador Samayoa, a member of the Political-Diplomatic
Commission of the FMLN, offers his views on the rebels'
evaluation of the summit results. Interview taken from the
FSLN daily newspaper "Barricada" of August 9.
*******************
**Q. Paradoxically, both Cristiani and the FMLN have called
the Tela summit meeting a success. Why would both sides have
such similar evaluations?
**A. The accords are beneficial to the peace process as a
whole and to the idea of having politically negotiated
solutions to conflicts. They take us back to the original
agreement signed in Guatemala (Esquipulas II - August 7,
1987) where the ideas of democratization, internal dialogue,
national reconciliation, and political solutions to conflicts
were set down. Cristiani probably hasn't had it sink in just
how far-reaching that process is, so he thinks he can
manipulate and distort the real content and the
interpretation that all international forces give to the Tela
agreement.
**Q. Nonetheless, the agreement speaks of the "voluntary
demobilization" of the FMLN. How do you interpret the
inclusion of this phrase in the accord?
**A. What was set down in Tela is precisely that the
Nicaraguan and El Salvadoran processes are not symmetrical.
Mechanisms have now been established and a timetable has been
set for the demobilization of the contras because this is
something which depends exclusively on the Honduran
government. In the case of El Salvador, the "demobilization"
would have to be the result of a process of dialogue, of
political negotiation, of reaching a common agreement. That
has already been done in Nicaragua, but in El Salvador, it
hasn't even begun.
**Q. What does it mean for the FMLN that the idea of symmetry
wasn't applied?
**A. It's a clear recognition that the FMLN has been noted to
be a political force and of a completely different character
from what the contras were. Above all, [the difference is
that the FMLN is] a force rooted inside El Salvador's
territory, unlike the contras who have been settled in a
foreign country.
**Q. What are the perspectives for dialogue in El Salvador?
**A. Given the enormous contradictions that there are in the
power circles in El Salvador, the most likely thing is that
they have received announcement of a dialogue with mistrust.
They're going to cause some degree of conflict for Cristiani.
They're going to view him with a lot scepticism and caution,
and try at any cost to prevent a dialogue from happening. We,
for our part, are going to continue insisiting on the
neccesity of beginning that dialogue as soon as possible.
**Q. From the point of view of the US project in El Salvador,
what political significance would the occurrence of a
dialogue have?
**A. In reality, the presidential agreements mark the end of
the whole cycle of US strategy in Central America. From the
beginning, they put forward the need to defeat the
revolutionary processes in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and
now, the fact that the demand for dialogue and a political
solution to the conflict has come up is forcing a change in
US policy in El Salvador.
**Q. What could be the future of the Central American
national liberation movements in the wake of this agreement?
**A. We see a much better future than we saw before. It's
very important that now that the dismantling of the contra
structures has been agreed to and a timetable has been set,
the problem in El Salvador is less subject to pretensions of
"symmetry" and to the setting of erroneous parameters and
definitions. Now that the problem of Nicaragua is resolved,
it will be necessary to take up the problem of El Salvador
and it will have to be taken up in its totality.
Other revolutionary processes can gain as well if they get
their forces moving in order to take advantage of the demands
for real democratization that exist in this peace process. To
the extent that they do that, they can gain plenty of
political space.
**Q. Is that the logic behind the current military offensive
of the FMLN?
**A. We are staying on a military offensive because we
understand that political negotiation is always a problem of
the correlation of forces. Nicaragua has almost been able to
finish resolving its problem on the basis of a political,
military, and diplomatic defeat of the counter-revolution. In
our case - although there are differences - we think that a
change in the correlation of political and military forces
will bring a negotiated solution to the conflict closer. This
is the logic behind the continuous military offensive that
we're pushing forward with.
**Q. Will there be any formal initiative by the FMLN in order
to force a dialogue with Cristiani?
**A. Yes, for sure. Our logic is to immediately take
advantage of the spaces that are opening up both domestically
and internationally. For example, the demand by the Central
American community to form a National Reconciliation
Commission is being raised again. Possibilities are open for
the United Nations and the Organization of American States,
already playing a role in Nicaragua, to play a similar role
in El Salvador.
New initiatives can be expected very soon from the FMLN.
---
Patt Haring | UNITEX : United Nations
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