unitex@rubbs.fidonet.org (unitex) (08/29/89)
It is also spending huge sums of money to modernize stationary missiles that
they have no intention of ever making mobile. To be specific, the Soviet Unio
has been converting silos to accommodate the fifth modification of the huge
SS-18 missile. These missiles can carry at least ten warheads each, and the
Soviets have more than 300 of them of varying vintages in fixed silos.
In other words, the Soviets are continuing to build and modernize very
powerful multi-warhead missiles that they plan to leave in vulnerable fixed
silos. This decision has crucial implications. It means that the widely
publicized Soviet shift to a defensive doctrine seems to have no serious appli
cation to the strategic world. However friendly Mr. Gorbachev may sou
however friendly he may in some respects wish to be, he cannot explain d
ment of the beefed up SS-18 as a friendly act. This is a highly capable missi
that would seem by its basic design to be a use-it-or-lose-it weapon -- one
that would make sense only for a preemptive first strike. It would be irres-
ponsible not to modernize our own systems to defend against it.
All of this adds up. The Soviet buildup shows that we must continue to
take it very seriously as a potential adversary. We need to modernize
strategic forces because Soviet strategic capabilities are becoming mor_
ous under Mr. Gorbachev, despite the popular impression to the contrary.
Despite some cuts, they may well be producing a leaner and meaner military
force and not just a smaller one.
This was the kind of information that led President Bush to recommend a
budget that placed a high priority on strategic modernization. The President
took the position that nothing is as important as assuring our continued survi
against the one adversary that can seriously threaten us. The Senate agreed
with this thinking. But the House decided it was more important to use the
defense budget as a local job protection program.
Declining defense budgets mean that we've made hard choices between compe
ing weapons systems and programs. Indeed, for years the Congress told the
Administration that it wanted to see budgets that made tough choices and actua
eliminated weapons systems.
Of course, that's exactly what our budget does. But the response is
curious indeed. The House simply restored the programs we wanted to cut, and
paid for them by gutting the rest of the defense plan. The House's decision
derived not from any defense requirements -- or budget requirements for that
matter -- but from consideration of the political impact on jobs back home.
But they simply cannot have it both ways. They want to reap the politica
benefits of calls for defense cuts without suffering the political costs of
what that reduced spending might mean to their district.
A good example is our attempt to eliminate the Navy's new F-14D productio
program. Everyone agrees it's a terrific aircraft. Everyone agrees it should
be modernized. Well, there are two ways to do that -- you can build new ones,
or you can refurbish the older ones. Building new ones gives you F-14s with a
flyaway cost of over 5O million dollars per airplane, while refurbishing costs
half as muoh.
We want to cancel the production program and modernize the older aircraft
The political problems comes from the fact the Grumman Corporation that makes
the F-14 is in Long Island. What the House did was keep open the new producti
lines in Long Island at the taxpayers expense and the military capability of
the fleet. By postponing the start up of the remanufacturing process, and
keeping open new production lines, the House would add considerably to the cos
of the program or get us fewer aircraft or both. This is a perfect example of
using the defense budget as a jobs program.
Of course, I cannot ask you or any other American taxpayer to give us a
blank check. We must explain not just our reasons for modernization in
but our reasons for specific systems and programs -- especially the mobile
ICBMs, the B-2 Stealth bomber, and the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI.
All of these systems and programs point to a similar objective. We have
managed to preserve the peace successfully, for decades, because the Soviet
Union has understood that the United States could retaliate credibly, flexibly
and with determined certainty against a strategic attack, no matter how large
the attack, and no matter how much of a surprise it might be. That is the
underlying idea behind the strategic Triad -- the three-legged deterrent con-
sisting of land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missile
and manned bombers. No matter what the Soviets might do, they could not
* Origin: UNITEX --> Toward a United Species (1:107/501)
---
Patt Haring | UNITEX : United Nations
patth@sci.ccny.cuny.edu | Information
patth@ccnysci.BITNET | Transfer Exchange
-=- Every child smiles in the same language. -=-