unitex@rubbs.fidonet.org (unitex) (08/29/89)
out all three legs of this retaliatory Triad at once.
The idea behind the Triad remains sound. However, the weapons that could
do the job 20 years ago are not adequate to prowide anything like the same,
comfortable level of deterrence today. Old Minuteman missiles in fixed silos
and an aging bomber fleet do not inspire the same confidence they once did.
The Soviets are moving forward. It would be irresponsib1e ror the United
States to try to get by with aging systems.
Although the case for mobile ICBMs should be self-evident, the House of
Representatives voted against both road-mobile and rail-mobile ICB
convinced that most members understand the importance of missile mobility.
They were probably rebelling against two different mobile systems. For those
people, I want to emphasize how crucial it is for us to stop arguing about
which is the best system. If we keep arguing, nothing will ever get done.
The Peacekeeper has already been built and deployed. It can be made
mobile quickly. We should do it now to remove the specter of vulnerability
from the land-based missile leg of the Triad.
The road-mobile, small ICBM has real advantages, but it cannot be ready
for years. So we recommend putting the 50 already built Peacekeepers on rail,
and then spending more on the small ICBM as the Peaoekeeper spending winds dow
Let me turn now to the B-2 and SDl. I am convinced the American people
should support these two programs. Unfortunately, our case has not yet taken
hold. What we have said about the B-2 has been distorted and misunderstood.
What we have said about SDI has not been heard. We need to correct both of
those problems. This is a good place to start.
The first thing you hear about the B-2 is its oost. I am not denying tha
the B-2 will be expenslve, but the cry of "sticker shock" is a phony argument.
The opponents of the B-2 do not plan to return the unspent money to the tax-
payers. They plan to spend it on other projects. So the real issue is not
cost, but whether the B-2 1s worth more than pork barrel.
The B-2 decision is really a decision about the future of the penetrating
manned bomber. Our B-52 bombers are older than the pilots who fly them. By
the turn of the century the youngest B-52 will be 40 years old
some 250 penetrating bombers, but without the B-2, that number will dwindle to
under 200 by the mid 1990s, and to just 97 B-1 bombers at the end of the centu
So the question is a simple one: do we need a penetrating bomber? To
answer that question, you should think about how bombers operate. A significa
portion of our strategic air force is kept on alert at all times. These plane
can be airborne in minutes.
That means they would have to be attacked by missiles with very short
flight times -- submarine missiles, not ICBMs. Because the
for taking out bombers and ICBMs are so different, it would be virtually impos
ible for a Soviet first strike to destroy both systems at the same time.
Whichever were hit first, there would be time for the other to take off.
In other words, airplanes -- like submarines -- help make the Triad invul
nerable. In addition to invulnerability, however, the bombers add safety. An
airplane can take off to make sure it would survive a first strike.
However -- unlike a missile -- an airplane can be recalled after takeoff.
Because human beings are in control, no other system provides so many safeguar
against human error.
That element of safety can be crucial to a President in the midst of a
crisis. Imagine a situation in which the radar screen suddenly lights up,
during peacetime. It looks as if the United States may be under attack, but w
are not fully certain. By putting bombers in the air, a President can afford
to wait until he is certain before making what could be the most important
most lethal decision any leader in history has ever been forced to confront.
That brings me to the remarkably misleading congressional debates over th
B-2's mission or targets. The main strategic, deterrent value of bombers is
not that they would go after different targets than missiles
after different targets, of course, and they would. Bombers are by far the
most flexible systems in the strategic arsenal.
But the major deterrent value of bombers is that they can also go after
the most important and most difficult strateg1c targets -- some of the same
targets that might redundantly be given to a Peacekeeper. That redundancy
assures the prime targets would be at risk no matter what happens to our land-
based and sea-launched missiles. It is why bombers would give the United
States safer options to consider in a moment of crisis.
* Origin: UNITEX --> Toward a United Species (1:107/501)
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Patt Haring | UNITEX : United Nations
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