unitex@rubbs.fidonet.org (unitex) (08/29/89)
There is one final argument for the B-2: strategic stability. Bombers
are simply too slow to be used as first strike weapons, but they would be
extremely effective in rendering the other side's first strike suicidal. Tha
is why both sides have tentatively agreed in START to use counting rules that
would increase the importance of bombers, and decre_
Under this counting rule, a missile carrying say ten warheads would count
a full ten against any agreed upon limit. But each B-2, would count as only
one against that limit In short, the B-2 is an integral part of our arms
reduction strategy -- a strategy that was ignored by the House.
Under START, fully one-fifth of all of our nuclear warheads are to be
carried by the B-2. So by gutting the B-2 program, the House is also gutting
our arms reduction strategy. More importantly, a world without the B-2 would
be less safe -- with or without a START agreement.
The concern about safety brings me around to my last subject. I want to
talk for a few minutes about SDI. An effective strategic defense could be the
single most important military bequest this generation could make to the futur
There has been a lot of nonsense spoken about SDI. Some people seem to
think that if you cannot assure a defensive system that would protect against
all incoming missiles, there might as well not be a defensive system at all.
That odd form of reverse utopianism fails to understand how even a moderately
effective defense could help make a first strike unthinkable.
Put yourself in the shoes of a Soviet military planner. Suppose you knew
that a significant percentage of your missiles would be knocked out by space-
based kinetic energy interceptors shortly after liftoff. Kinetic energy inter
ceptors would destroy their targets by colliding with them at great speed.
Suppose you also knew that many of the missiles that got past the space-based
interceptors would be destroyed by a second layer of groundbased lnterceptors.
You would have no way or knowing in advance which of your warheads would get
through. In that situation, how could you even begin to plan a preemptiwe
first strike?
Enhancing deterrence by confounding first strike planning is exactly the
objective of the first phase of SDI. Later phases would involve directed
energy, or lasers, as well as kinetic energy interceptors. These would be
expected to hit an even higher percentage of missiles and reentry vehicles.
When SDI was proposed by President Reagan, some critics thought it was
hopelessly idealistic. Now we have a great deal of serious research behind
us, with sucoessful tests, miniaturization of component technologies and vastl
reduced unit costs. We have good reason to believe we are talking about some-
thing that is not only realistic, but that is operationally feasible within th
relatively foreseeable future.
I cannot yet assure you that a Phase I system with both space and ground
based sensors and interceptors will definitely work. But I can say to you
that our research and development work is very promising. Our budget request,
which the Senate came close to following, would allow the President to make a
deployment decision within four years, without destroying the research into
even more advanced technology that has already begun. In contrast, the House
budget figures would gut the program.
The point of this program, however, is not just to preserve an option
for the President. The President and I want to pursue SDI research not becaus
we are starry eyed, and not because we are 1ooking for bargaining chips. We
want to pursue SDI because we think a successful SDI program would be immensel
valuable. It no longer is visionary to think that a successful strategic
defense could render our fears about a preemptive first strike obsolete. That
is why President Bush committed himself to deploying SDI when it proves feasib
We are serious about pursuing weapons and technologies that can enhance
deterrence, increase stability and assure the security of the United States an
its allies. That is why we are serious about SDI, the B-2 and mobile missiles
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union goes about building weapons that would appear to b
useful only in a preemptive first strike. We cannot let the Soviet modernizat
program go unanswered. And yet, we feel morally impelled to seek responses
that do not put the world on a hair trigger.
The House of Representatives put short-term concerns ahead of these stra-
tegic and moral imperatives. I urge the House-Senate conferees to follow the
Senate and restore the President's priorities. We must not sit passively by,
knowing that our children will have to live with the consequences.
* Origin: UNITEX --> Toward a United Species (1:107/501)
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Patt Haring | UNITEX : United Nations
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