cries@mtxinu.COM (09/02/89)
/* Written 5:56 pm Aug 30, 1989 by cries in ni:cries.regionews */
/* ---------- "CentAm: Tela like it is" ---------- */
CENTRAL AMERICA: TELA: LIKE IT IS
(cries.regionews from Managua August 30, 1989
120 lines 5689 bytes)
The summit accord signed in Tela, Honduras on August 8 - the
second anniversary of the Esquipulas II Accords - was a
masterpiece of regional negotiation. Nicaragua achieved it's
main goal, proposed in 1987: the dismantling of the
counterrevolutionary army.
The result of the three day round table was a concrete,
detailed plan with mechanisms, procedures, and most
importantly, a time-table for the steps to take and
provisions for international verification. It's a tight
plan; its importance can not be underestimated. Getting it
meant getting around the US's repeated attempts to foul the
regional peace process.
Before Tela, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega skillfully
made a series of concessions to the domestic opposition,
conceding to demands around the electoral process in
exchange for support to disband the contras. That, in fact,
amounted to the same thing for the other presidents. When
Nicaragua arrived at Tela, it had already complied with the
main demand which could have been placed on it in exchange
for cooperation in breaking up the contras. For the first
time, the summiteers didn't debate Nicaragua's
democratization process.
Costa Rican President Oscar Arias is still riding the crest
of his fame as a mediator between adversaries, but at home
he's worried about allegations of drug connections. For him,
the mere continuation of the peace process gives breathing
room to his party's electoral campaign. Since Nicaragua's
opposition parties were supporting Ortega's stance at Tela,
Arias couldn't do anything except back it, too.
The summit's success is rooted in the spirit of the first
regional agreement which Nicaragua adeptly nurtured over the
years. That began a process of taking distance from the US
policy of regional militarization and increased the space in
which each country could exercise its national interests.
Honduras Has Interests, Too
Honduran leaders, long tired of being discredited at home
and abroad because of the contras, want a clean record in
the World Court and want Nicaragua to drop its suit against
them. Aware of the Hague's track record, including Honduras'
victory over Nicaragua in the early 1960's for the Mosquitia
territory, the Honduran military calculated that they would
lose the pending court case.
They would end up owing Nicaragua for damages, AND they'd be
in a disadvantageous position in their dispute with El
Salvador over their common border and, even more important
strategically, over the question of control of the Gulf of
Fonseca in the Pacific. Disputes between Honduras and El
Salvador - which led to the 100 Hour War of 1969 - still
simmer under the surface of the temporary, US-imposed
entanglement with Nicaragua. With a resolution to the
regional "military problem" of Nicaragua in sight, Honduras'
concern about El Salvador's military is revived.
Guatemala also has something to gain in the medium term with
the process going forward. Cerezo has to bolster his image
by acting as a regional leader - his political isolation
from the military is now legend - and his proposal to create
a Central American Parliament was what kicked off the first
Esquipulas summit. Guatemala sees the creation of such a
body as key to facilitating the economic relations with the
rest of the world, in particular with Western Europe.
Although El Salvador's nine year war on its southern border
isn't particularly convenient for the Guatemalan military
and promoting FMLN demobilization could help add to the cone
of silence placed over the increasing terror in the country,
forcefully trying to couple contra demobilization to that of
the FMLN would mean that the regional peace train would
stop. Cerezo has to deal with things one at a time, and keep
things rolling.
Getting Smart About Symmetry
No one was anxious to see the new face at the summit ruin
the party. Cristiani's proposal to treat the FMLN the same
as the contras ran afoul of the other four heads of state,
all well versed in the regional affair of give and take.
Symmetry might work as propaganda but not as a framework for
negotiations, especially when serious negotiations are on
the agenda and there's nothing symmetrical about the
proposal. Logic swept it under the summit rug.
In El Salvador, the order of factors is key. FMLN
demobilizaton is contingent on dialogue. There will be more
pressure on the FMLN to negotiate, but the rebels put that
forward in earnest a long time ago. What's new is that Tela
puts pressure on Cristiani to talk. El Salvador is becoming
the focal point of the regional conflict.
The summit's spirit will be interpreted according to the
relationship of forces between the contenders, both of which
are inside the country. Cristiani is trying to follow what
he sees as the letter, and not the spirit, emphasizing
what's convenient for him - FMLN demobilization.
The Duarte regime tactically danced around the negotiation
table for years without results, but now Cristiani faces a
shift from a battle of peace proposals to one of serious
dialogue. Domestic, regional, and international pressure
will be key. For now, the red herring of symmetry has taken
a dive, but when it surfaces again, El Salvador, and not
Nicaragua, will be the one accused of knocking the wind out
of the peace process.
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Subject: Pana: Scoreless Tie At Zero Hour
Status: OR
/* Written 6:10 pm Aug 30, 1989 by cries in ni:cries.regionews */
/* ---------- "Pana: Scoreless Tie At Zero Hour" ---------- */
PANAMA: SCORELESS TIE AT ZERO HOUR
(cries.regionews from Managua August 30, 1989
148 lines 7004 bytes)
Time is running out, and anything could happen. The
Panamanian constitution states that President Manuel Solis
Palma's term ends on September 1, but still no agreement has
been reached on who is to take control of the executive
office. And according to Panama's representative to the
Organization of American States (OAS), Jorge Ritter, the
"real danger" of armed US intervention "from within" will
intensify within the next few days. "In practice, they've
already invaded us," he said on August 27.
The score of the negotiations is "zero to zero", according
to Ricardo Arias Calderon, the opposition's vice-
presidential candidate in the muddled elections of last May
7. Although four visits by a special OAS commission were
successful in promoting talks between pro-government and
opposition forces, both sides refuse to back down in their
demands on each other.
The Democratic Alliance of Civic Opposition (ADOC) still
demands recognition of the May election results, which it
claims to have won hands down. It has suggested that a
plebiscite be held to acknowledge this electoral victory as
well as to determine the future of Panamanian Defense Forces
(FDP) chief, General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Pro-government
forces maintain that the solution is to share executive
power until new presidential elections can be celebrated.
They have offered ADOC 50% control over the interim
executive branch.
Such a provisional government will most likely take control
on September 1, whether the opposition takes part or not.
Its purpose, as declared by the OAS after its last plenary
session on July 20, will be to call for elections in the
shortest time possible. General Noriega will remain in
charge of the Defense Forces.
Threats From Above
On the OAS floor in Washington on August 24, the commission
returned for the fourth plenary session dedicated to
resolving the Panamanian crisis but listened instead to a
diplomatic duel between US and Panamanian delegates. During
the lengthy debates, US Under-secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger reiterated Washington's demand that any solution
must include Noriega's ouster. If a transfer of power isn't
carried out in Panama by September 1, Eagleburger
threatened, "The Noriega regime will have to be declared
illegal by civilized nations, and we must treat it
accordingly."
What's more, at an August 15 White House press conference,
George Bush did not rule out a possible military operation
to capture the Panamanian "strong-man" and bring him to the
US to face 1988 drug-trafficking charges. "I have the
obligation to try to bring to justice people" accused in the
US, Bush claimed. The idea of kidnapping the Panamanian
military leader originated in a memo from then-National
Security Council agent, Oliver North. Whereas the Reagan
administration discarded the idea as extreme, Bush
resuscitated it as yet another means to pressure the canal
country.
Threats From Within
12 tanks left US Southern Command bases on August 13,
treading the main streets of Panama City on their way to
Omar Torrijos International Airport. En route, they passed
by FDP installations and a Panamanian military headquarters.
The reason: US army mail was allegedly being held at the
airport. A US major explained: "We don't have to ask them
for permission" to cross into their territory.
Two days later, right in the center of the capital, 22 US
soldiers rappelled from helicopters and took combat
positions inside the grounds of the US embassy. In a
residential area less than a mile away, a marine unit
stormed the residence of the US ambassador. Meanwhile, a
small fleet of Black Hawk helicopters circled low overhead
the commercial center of Panama City while hundreds of
anxious citizens looked on.
The Southern Command gave Panamanian officials just 30
minutes notice of this military excercise, appropriately
named "Cold Duck". According to Southern Command spokesman
Terrence Kneenobe, US Armed Forces have no obligation to
warn Panama, but gave them half an hour "out of courtesy."
On August 17, US infantry troops burst into a Panamanian
correctional facility and detained municipal judges at the
site for three hours. UH-60 helicopters hovered over Fort
Amador, an area at the Pacific entrance of the canal to be
shared by US and Panamanian military forces according to the
1977 Torrijos-Carter treaties. The Fort Amador area, where
many of Noriega's FDP offices are found, was then surrounded
by armored vehicles. At the same time, armored vehicles took
to the Panamerican Highway in the direction of Arraijan,
some 15 miles from the capital, and A-37 fighter planes flew
over the district of Chorrera.
US troops stationed in Panama "will continue to carry out
the maneuvers necessary to insure their preparedness, as
well as to protect and defend the lives of US citizens
wherever they may be threatened," said Kneenobe. Quoting
Bush, he added that during the past few years in Panama,
"There has been a constant degradation of US rights through
treaty violations by the Noriega regime."
It is the Southern Command, however, that has carried out
some 30 such military operations since May 7, and Panama
that has asked the United Nations to send their Nobel Peace
Prize winning "Blue Helmet" military observers to prevent US
marines from provoking a confrontation as a possible pretext
for armed intervention. Tanks have sealed off entire zones,
helicopters have buzzed neighborhoods, and Panamanian
citizens, soldiers, and officials have been detained. The
maneuvers, most of which have taken place near main FDP
offices, were criticized by the OAS commission for their
"negative effect" on the search for a peaceful and
Panamanian solution.
History Repeats?
August 15 marked the 75th anniversary of the opening of the
Panama Canal, and to many, "a long period of pain,
humiliation, and indignity" for the country that holds, but
does not own it. To celebrate the occasion, the pro-
government Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) issued a
declaration stating that Panama now faces "one of the most
difficult dilemmas in its history due to the new threat of
aggression coming from the US army."
Since the canal's debut, Panama has seen seven full military
interventions. The last occurred in 1964, when US marines
killed 21 Panamanians and wounded 500 who were demanding an
end to a US controlled and occupied canal zone. The PRD
declaration lamented the fact that Panama's geographic
position has been exploited "by virtue of the power,
selfishness, and arrogant and insatiable desire for
political and military hegemony of the United States."
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