[misc.headlines.unitex] Nica: I/view EPS Colonel Lacayo

cries@mtxinu.COM (09/14/89)

/* Written  5:37 pm  Sep 12, 1989 by cries in ni:cries.regionews */
/* ---------- "Nica: I/view EPS Colonel Lacayo" ---------- */
              "WE WON'T SUPPORT THE REACTION"
           INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL OSWALDO LACAYO
(cries.regionews from Managua           September 12, 1989
                                   115 lines   5372 bytes)

Colonel Oswaldo Lacayo Gabuardi is the second-in-command of
the Chiefs of Staff of the Sandinista People's Army (EPS).
The role of Nicaragua's Armed Forces has been sharply
criticized by many in the opposition as being one of
defending the power of a party, the FSLN, and not of
defending the nation. As in any Latin American republic,
what the officer corps thinks is of concern to many in the
country. The following are extracts from an interview which
appeared in the weekly newspaper La Cronica of September 1-
7, 1989.

           If the opposition wins the elections...

We're speaking of a hypothetical situation, so I'll get into
that hypothesis and say sincerely that restorationist
positions -or in other words, the pretensions to rub out the
revolution- aren't going to win. I'm absolutely convinced of
that.

I have to say in all sincerity that within the Sandinista
Army, beyond a shadow of doubt, there is an overwhelming
majority of people with Sandinista thinking and that will be
hard, speaking within this hypothetical situation, [for the
opposition] to handle. There's not one army company that's
going to evict campesinos from their lands. No one is going
to be able to get the soldiers in the army to move in that
direction.

Certainly, that's a problem. But the army is of popular
extraction; there's no elite here. We're maee up of people
from the grassroots. In our ranks there aren't any bordello
owners like in the past. Here, we bring people together who
are truly revolutionary, simple people who love Nicaragua
and want to have it move forward.

In this hypothetical situation of the parties with a program
meaning confrontation with the people winning, it will be
very difficult to have the army support this. An anti-people
policy could only be carried out by the EEBI [elite troops
of Somoza's National Guard] which as part of its program of
mental preparation of the troops recognized the people as
their enemies. The soldiers were taught to be bloodthirsty,
and so they ask themselves, who's blood? The blood of the
people. So, Rambo-style criminal machines were created.

In the case of the EPS, it won't be possible to separate us
from the people. Knowing as I do the mentality of the
officer corps of the army, I think it would be impossible to
support a restorationist program. It would go against the
grain of the popular character of the army. Don't get me
wrong. It won't be because of orders from the FSLN, nor
because someone orders the soldiers to disobey, but because
of the popular character of the army.

The soldiers in the army are of the people. They come from
the barrios, the streets, and the bunkhouses of the
plantations. You can't ask them to support an anti-people
program. We'd have problems. For the army, it would be a
point of conflict. We've always believed in the framework of
a mixed economy, political pluralism, and non-alignment.

I've read articles which talk of abolishing the EPS and
creating a new army. That is a failure to recognize reality
and ignores the degree of professionalism development that
we have attained. These things are almost always
underestimated.

              About being a Party-Army...

If one accepts the fact that there was a revolution here, a
dramatic incident in history -not a mere reform, but a
destruction of the basis of the former situation- and if one
recognizes that the FSLN was the vanguard of the armed
struggle, then it's easier to understand the link that
exists between the FSLN and the EPS. But this isn't the same
as having a whole mess up front about Party-Army relations,
disconnected from the historical process. To look at it that
way is incorrect analysis.

The officer corps were brought up inside of Sandinismo
-that's true- but nonetheless, for us, once the historical
link is acknowledged, we can improve, we can perfect our way
of thinking in the future, modernizing ourselves as they
say.

In the army, we don't close ourselves off. We're not a
caste. If that were the case, if we feared the people, we
would have closed ourselves inside of ourselves and created
a totally professional army without conscripting anyone or
anything like that.

I say that we have to debate this matter. There's a
magnificent opportunity for a debate. I think that to the
degree that the revolutionary project is strengthened with
the participation of all the patriotic sectors, with a real
national project, the army will have to continue evolving
through the new generations in an improved, more favorable
situation, with the truly progressive political currents.

Despite what many believe, there is no systematic
indoctrination in the army. What we do offer is a basic
process of information, of revolutionary patriotic
conscientization linked to Sandinismo, with a nationalist
mental framework.

(We encourage feedback. Send comments, suggestions, etc. to
 us via e-mail. Address cdp!ni!cries)


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