cries@mtxinu.COM (09/16/89)
/* Written 5:40 pm Sep 12, 1989 by cries in ni:cries.regionews */
/* ---------- "Guat: I/view Gaspar Ilom - URNG" ---------- */
"Counterinsurgency failed in Guatemala..."
(cries.regionews from Managua September 12, 1989)
250 lines 11356 bytes)
Gaspar Ilom is a member of the General Command of the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), the
political-military group which is leading the 30 year old
armed struggle in that country. He speaks here about the
military activity of the rebels and its spread to the cities
and about the URNG's position regarding a negotiated
solution to the armed conflict.
Interview from El Nuevo Diario, September 5, 1989.
*******************
**Q. Why does the URNG say that Guatemala is experiencing
the highest level of war in its history ?
**A. The answer is clear and based on concrete events,
specific data, and a global appreciation of the situation.
>From a quantitative point of view, a greater number of
operations are being carried out over specific periods at
the moment than at any other time in the development of
armed conflict in Guatemala.
If we look at the last three years, we see that in 1986, 570
operations were carried out, an average of 1.5 operations
per day, and the army suffered 633 casualties, an average of
1.8 casualties per day. In the first seven months of 1989,
we've carried out 1000 operations and caused more than 1400
losses to the army. That's a level of 4.8 operations daily
and an average of 6.6 casualties to the army each day. But
this is only one indicator.
Another indicator is the kind and quality of operations that
have been carried out in the last three years, particularly
in 1989. This year, there have been 60 operations against
fortified army positions, causing a high number of
casualties.
To any objective observer, these facts indicate an
unconcealable increase in the level of the war and
irrefutably shows its development.
Added to this is the fact that the zones of operation have
expanded this year. The south of the department of El
Quiche, the north of Chimaltenango, the whole of
Huehuetenango, the south of El Peten, and the north of Alta
Verapaz are now war zones. The same must be said of
Chimaltenango and parts of Sacatepequez and Esquintla, which
this year also indicate the development ofURNG military
operations.
For a these reasons, we can state that the country is
experiencing a higher level of war than ever before.
**Q. Why does the URNG say the strategy of low-intensity war
is not a viable solution in Guatemala?
**A. Low-intensity war is generally understood to be a
combination of military, psychological, and political
operations, with the objective of disorienting and
misinforming the people, promoting demagogy, and attempting
to wipe out the revolutionary forces. In this sense, we
consider that low intensity war isn't the solution for
Guatemala.
In actual fact, no counterinsurgency project will resolve
Guatemala's problems. Neither the "total war" strategy nor
that of low intensity will bring about a solution because
they don't deal with the causes of domestic armed conflict.
Instead, these forms of counterinsurgency are expressions of
an unpopular conception. As long as the conflicts aren't
solved and the reasons for the revolutionary uprising
persist, there is no way to solve the national situation or
to end the armed conflict.
>From a political standpoint, low-intensity conflict doesn't
solve the problems; they continue to prevail. Militarily
speaking, it has also been proved that low intensity tactics
don't achieve the objective of defeating a revolutionary
movement such as Guatemala's, characterized by having a lot
of accumulated experience and by having gotten stronger over
the course of time, and which is capable of defeating all
the different tactical models that low-intensity conflict
has to offer.
The strategy of total war runs into the same problems and
situations. The problem isn't that the tactics aren't good
or adequate, it's how the revolutionary movement confronts
them right now. The revolutionary movement is capable of
developing enough of its own combat tactics and techniques
to defeat anything that a counterinsurgency plan may
contain.
In Guatemala, it's not a case of the failure of low-
intensity strategy or total war; it's the failure of
counterinsurgency in all forms: political, military, and
social.
**Q. If the armed struggle is going in favor of the URNG,
then why call for talks?
**A. Ever since the theme of dialogue was brought up, the
URNG has made it clear that we advocate a political solution
to the armed conflict. This is because of our humanitarian
principles. We want to avoid more blood letting and higher
social cost to our people. We made this clear in October
1987 in Madrid, at the first and only meeting to take place
between the URNG and the government. Our view of dialogue
isn't tied to a situation of political and/or military
defeat. We're not looking for negotiations because we're
losing the war or because we're in a disadvantageous
military position. Instead, we are proving by this that the
URNG is very mature when it comes to dealing with the
country's problems.
These three and a half years have shown that the army isn't
capable of imposing a military solution or of obtaining a
victory over the URNG. On the contrary, it's evident that
the URNG is in a position to continue advancing and
developing militarily.
**Q. How do you feel about the National Dialogue presently
being promoted by the National Reconciliation Commission
(CNR)?
**A. We think, and have expressed several times, that the
National Dialogue promoted by the CNR is an effort that
deserves to be recognized by all. We feel that it is
valuable and important to our nation, although we have also
reiterated our concern that, because of the limitations
imposed on it from the start, it would have very little
effect and that could affect its validity. It didn't allow
for the direct and official participation of the URNG -
recognized by the majority of the country's political and
social forces- in the national discussion and in the solving
of Guatemala's main problem, armed conflict. In this way,
the dialogue is limited in its projections and
possibilities.
Nevertheless, the effort made and the fact that they have
broached areas of exchange, is positive. The results of what
takes place in the general assemblies of the National
Dialogue remain to be seen. In any case, the URNG looks
favorably on all possibilities for dialogue. This one is
promoted by the CNR is happening, and it could open the door
to talks on more specific issues as well as on general ones.
We have a lot of interest and expectations for what might
emerge from the National Dialogue.
**Q. How representative is the dialogue now?
**A. As I said before, the National Dialogue does not
include all the players that should be participating. The
forces that participate are representative, but sadly, not
all are looked at equally. But it is very useful that the
forum is open to the participation of different forces and
opinions.
If all the players in the nation had been allowed to take
part, the dialogue as a whole would be more representative
and the effects of its agreements would all the greater. But
undoubtedly, it will be an important step if once the
dialogue comes to an end, it can set down broad and clear
conclusions about the country's problems.
**Q. What could presently block the dialogue?
**A. We think that in recent months some obstacles have been
put in the way of the dialogue due to events which in
appearance should have nothing to do with it.
The main obstacle in the way now is the national situation.
Political spaces which existed when the negotiations began
have been closed. This is a result of the attempted coups
and the concessions that the government has made to those
responsible, narrowing the political spaces and unleashing a
campaign of covert repression and threats against the forces
participating in the dialogue, against other personalities
not participating in it directly, or in general, against the
popular sectors.
**Q. Why is the war coming to the cities?
**A. The answer to this important question is very simple.
The war and its guerrilla fronts move closer to the cities
as a natural result of the development of the revolutionary
movement, expanding the field of operations. Of course, the
fronts that are operating near the capital, in the
departments of Chimaltenango and Sacatepequez, take on
special importance since they are evidence of the existence
and strength of the revolutionary movement near the capital.
The revolutionary movement historically has been present in
most of the country, but the military High Command has been
able to manipulate information in order to hide that
presence and the development of the guerrilla forces in some
remote zones. This is more difficult now since we've
extended our operations recently, to areas such as the
municipalities of Patzicia, Patzun, Zaragoza, and San Miguel
Duenas, which are close to the capital and main transport
routes, and are more densely populated.
It must be emphasized that we aren't talking about isolated,
desperate, or improvised actions. Nor are they publicity
stunts, and much less are they the results of supposedly
dispersed groups with no connection to the URNG General
Command. All our forces are under one unified command. There
is complete unity of criteria for the conceptions and plans
developed. Ruptures and confrontations do not exist.
This increase of guerrilla activity in zones surrounding the
capital has made the High Command initiate an intense
campaign of psychological warfare in order to present our
operations as acts of pillage or repression against the
population. This, of course, is absolutely false. We have
always respected the population. People's fears are due
precisely to the actions of the army, which since the
beginning of the 1980s have heavily repressed the
population, and which today continues to accuse the
guerrillas of actions that they themselves commit.
It must also be said that the war doesn't only advance via
guerrilla fronts towards the city. We have carried out
military actions inside the capital, although the army has
tried to cover this up.
The presence of the URNG isn't limited to military actions.
The bulk of our forces, which is much bigger than the
regular military forces, works in underground organizations.
**Q. What is your opinion of the current level of
organization in the popular movement?
**A. The popular movement organizes itself in line with the
concrete and daily necessities that it faces. The level of
organization and the importance of the popular mobilizations
are such because of the magnitude of the problems that the
population suffers from. The popular movement has increased
its actions and demands in the last years, and particularly
in the last months, while the conditions of poverty have
worsened as a result of the deepening of the country's
economic, political, and social crisis.
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