criesdif@mtxinu.COM (09/25/89)
/* Written 3:47 pm Sep 23, 1989 by criesdif in ni:ni.centam-elect */
/* ---------- "Nica: Hemisphere Initiatives Rpt." ---------- */
The following is the executive summary and contents page of
a 30-page report published by Hemisphere Initiatives in
August 1989. Hemisphere Initiatives describes itself as:
"...a non-profit organization created to promote:
* genuine democracy in the countries of Central America
* an end to conflicts in the region; and
* sound and equitable investment and development."
Copies of the report can be obtained by contacting:
Hemisphere Initiatives
Post Office Box 179
Boston, MA 02118-0179
telephone: (617)437-6220
FAX: (617)437-6268
**********************
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Establishing the Ground Rules
A Report on the Nicaraguan Electoral Process
The first report prepared by Hemisphere Initiatives
(HI) offers a comprehensive overview of the players, key
procedural issues and preliminary prospects for free and
fair elections in Nicaragua to be held on February 25, 1990.
Publication of the report was facilitated by support from
the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee. The report is
based primarily upon information gathered by two HI
delegations to Nicaragua in June and July of 1989. The
following points summarize the report's major conclusions.
Overview
* With the changes brought by the electoral reform
process culminating in the August 1989 Political Agreement
between the Nicaraguan government and opposition parties,
the laws and procedures have been improved. They compare
favorably with those of other Latin American nations and
with prior Nicaraguan laws and procedures and clearly
provide the legal and institutional framework for a fair
election.
* The Nicaraguan government demonstrated flexibility in
responding to opposition demands and the suggestions of
international organizations for improving the electoral
process. This response provides an initial level of
confidence that the government will fulfill its promise to
hold fair elections.
* The five-member CSE (Supreme Electoral Council) has
the primary responsibility and authority to regulate the
electoral process. The composition of the CSE, with two FSLN
members, two opposition members and one independent,
provides the distinct possibility for impartial
implementation of the laws, procedures and agreements
regulating the electoral process. Such impartial
implementation is key to a free and fair election. The CSE
must assure that there is a reasonably level playing field;
that complaints are promptly investigated; that access to
the media, the right to assemble, and freedom of political
parties and candidates to bring their campaigns to all
Nicaraguans are assured; that the registration process is
honest; the vote secret, with pollwatchers not only from the
FSLN, but also opposition parties or alliances; and that the
vote count is above reproach.
* There have been some instances of official harassment
of the National Opposition Union (UNO), an alliance of 12
opposition parties [and two unregistered parties]. While
organizing activities by the UNO are technically illegal
under Nicaraguan law since the alliance is not legally
registered [UNO registered itself in early September] and
wle the parties themselves appear to be organizing without
restraint or harassment, interference with the organizing
efforts of UNO is regrettable. With the signing of the
August Political Agreement and the commitment of the UNO
parties to participate in the elections, it is hoped that
this type of harassment will cease.
* The U.S., particularly in light of the Political
Agreement and the extraordinary monitoring role of the UN
and OAS, should reconsider its position regarding the
Nicaraguan elections. The U.S. should cease its attempts to
discredit the process. There will be time enough for this
type of response if the implementation of the laws and
framework prove unfair. In addition, the U.S. should heed
the call of the August Political Agreement and discontinue
all covert aid to the opposition.
The Players
* Despite the advantages of incumbency, the political
problems of the Sandinistas have mounted. The economy is
worse, and among supporters and within the FSLN itself,
criticism is widespread. Even with these problems, whether
the result of the Contra war, Hurricane Joan, the U.S.
embargo or Sandinista mismanagement, the FSLN remains the
largest and best organized political party in Nicaragua, and
there is credible evidence that it retains considerable
popular support.
* As of August, there are 20 legal opposition parties
in Nicaragua. The UNO is a tenuous alliance of parties
ranging from the far right to the far left. Given their
history of fragmentation as well as their limited
organizational base, the degree of unity and the numbers of
candidates will be a key factor in determining the strength
of the opposition.
* With the signing of the Tela Agreement calling for
the demobilization and voluntary reintegration or relocation
of the contras, the role of the contras in the election is
unclear. The contras are viewed negatively by the vast
majority of the Nicaraguan population. In any event, as long
as they remain outside the country, the contras can play no
positive role in the upcoming elections.
* The Bush administration appears to be pursuing a two-
track policy of encouraging opposition unity while
simultaneously challenging the credibility of the whole
electoral process. While Congress has agreed to make $3.5
million available to support the opposition, the U.S. has
thus far offered nothing to defray the estimated $25 million
administrative costs of the election, except $1.5 million to
the monitoring activities of the Organization of American
States.
Conclusions
* Because democracy is not absolute, the report does
not fix absolute criteria for judging the fairness of the
Nicaraguan elections. No electoral system effectively
insures a totally level playing field. For example, no
election campaign provides candidates with exactly the same
funds or the same advantages of incumbency. Outside
observers need to take care not to impose criteria or
standards that existing democratic countries do not satisfy.
* Hemisphere Initiatives will continue to observe the
electoral process, including implementation of the laws and
procedures and conduct of the players. As of August, we
approach this task with optimism that the process will be
fair and serve the cause of democracy in Nicaragua, but also
with the realization that many obstacles remain to be
overcome and many pitfalls may arise as the process unfolds.
*****************
CONTENTS OF THE REPORT
Introduction
Criteria for evaluating democratization in Nicaragua
Background and context of the elections
The legitimacy of the 1984 elections
Negotiating changes in the elections
The players
The FSLN today
The opposition
The contras
The US role in the elections
Issues concerning the electoral process
The fairness of procedures for adopting reforms
Composition of the CSE and subordinate bodies
Regulating political parties
Campaign financing
Registration and eligibility
Use of State resources in political campaign
Access to poll data
Access to media
Intimidation of opponents
Outside interference in the electoral process
Preliminary prospects for fair elections in Nicaragua
Conclusions
Endnotes
Appendix A: Legal political parties in Nicaragua
Appendix B: Outline of the electoral process
Appendix C: Official electoral calendar
Members of the June 1989 and July 1989 HI delegations
**********************
---
Patt Haring | United Nations | FAX: 212-787-1726
patth@sci.ccny.cuny.edu | Information | BBS: 201-795-0733
patth@ccnysci.BITNET | Transfer Exchange | (3/12/24/9600 Baud)
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