cries@mtxinu.COM (09/28/89)
/* Written 4:37 pm Sep 27, 1989 by cries in ni:cries.regionews */
/* ---------- "Pana: Permanent destabilization" ---------- */
PANAMA: PERMANENT DESTABILIZATION
(cries.regionews from Managua September 27, 1989
In Panama, the maxim that "the United States doesn't have
friends, it has interests" is being followed to the letter.
The canal country, victim of various modalities of the low
intensity warfare strategy, is being destabilized by means
of economic pressures, psychological warfare, and diplomatic
pressure on its allies.
The main aim of the United States has not been to see a
simple change in who is at the helm of the Panamanian ship
of state or to bring in a government more to its liking.
Rather, it wants to totally roll back the process of
Panamanian independence.
This is seen, for example, in the results - surprising to
many - of the economic pressure which primarily affected US
allies in Panama and contributed to the destabilization of
financial institutions in the United States.
Phases of Aggression
Low intensity warfare is characterized by the use of methods
and techniques which are psychological, military,
diplomatic, and disinformative in nature. All these are
aimed at producing frustration and discouragement among
peoples struggling for national liberation. It is a
simultaneous assault on all fronts with different emphases
in each phase of the attack.
The beginning of an overall, holistic aggression marked the
first phase. In June 1987, what became known as the
"Philippinization of Panama" started. Detonating it were the
accusations made by retired Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera
against General Noriega.
At this time, a pro-US alliance was formed. It was led by
the Christian Democrats, business sectors, and other
rightist groups. The movement coalesced in the National
Civic Crusade (CCN) which later became the rightist
electoral alliance known as ADOC (Democratic Alliance of
Civic Opposition). It called for the resignations of Noriega
and the government cabinet.
The US aim was stated by General John Galvin: move up the
date for handing over the administration of the canal to
Panama in exchange for the continued presence of US military
forces.
With the CCN, a campaign began which was aimed at all
sectors of society, in its majority unhappy with the Arturo
Del Valle administration because of the retreat from the
ideals of "torrijismo" and a failure to resolve the basic
problems of the population.
The CCN developed a strategy of strikes and protests in
order to place pressure on the government. In the second
half of 1987, the United States added the imposition of a
trade embargo and cut back its military and economic aid. In
the prevailing climate of political instability, a rapid
deterioration of the economy was provoked, one expression of
which was a massive flight of capital.
The United States named Arthur Davis as ambassador, and he
brought together a team which had had success with
destabilization tactics in the Philippines. After his
arrival, actions were no longer planned and carried out
covertly, but openly. It marked a stage of open intervention
into Panama's domestic affairs.
Washington began looking for a way to create a crisis of
legitimacy in political power. As a result, an economy which
had been growing in the first months of 1987 became bogged
down in the second half of the year, thereby showing the
impact of political factors on economic stability.
The second phase of the development of US strategy was
marked by an acceleration of aggression. In 1988, an attempt
was made to get inside the Panamanian Defense Forces (FDP)
and coopt members of the officer corps in strategic command
positions. At the same time, the "Panama problem" was
brought home to the US with accusations of drug links
against Noriega in order to obtain domestic consensus which
would legitimize future intervention.
The first result of this strategy happened on March 16 with
an unsuccessful attempt to divide the FDP and promote a coup
led by police chief Colonel Leonidas Macias and other
officers. The US wanted to infiltrate the armed forces,
undermine them from within, and turn them into an instrument
that would serve US interests.
The second result of this strategy was the laying of charges
by a US grand jury against Noriega for drug trafficking. The
third result occurred after the failed attempt by former
president Arturo Del Valle to get rid of Noriega. A
"government in exile" was formed and used to legally justify
the economic assault on Panama. Measures taken included
retention of Panamanian state funds (canal income), non-
payment of taxes by US businesses operating in Panama,
blocking bank transactions, and reducing the sugar import
quota.
In one month the United States concentrated all its efforts
on wearing the country down: closing the banks, threatening
a coup, laying charges against Noriega, and going to the
extreme of invoking the law of emergency economic powers.
This latter measure had only been invoked before against
Vietnam, Libya, Nicaragua, and Iran.
Current Situation
The third phase, begun after the US failure in the second
phase (although some $500 million was drained from the
Panamanian economy), placed emphasis on political-diplomatic
pressure and disinformation. The goal was to reduce
international support for the government, especially in
Latin America and Western Europe, and to isolate it
diplomatically.
During the last third of 1988, efforts centered on
delegitimizing the May 1989 elections, alleging that they
would be fraudulent. A climate of uncertainty was created
and a lack of confidence in elections as being a way to
democracy was generated.
A communications infrastructure that the US had in the canal
zone was used in that effort. It was connected to a
repeating station of Radio Impacto on the Costa Rican border
and to the high-power equipment of the Voice of America.
Disinformation and psychological pressure reached their high
point during the period from January to April 1989.
The United States managed to get the domestic opposition
forces to agree among themselves, but at the same time,
maintained its campaign against the legitimacy of the
elections and pumped $11 million into the country for that
purpose. The US was playing both sides of the field in a
game in which the opposition didn't really count for much,
but instead was just one more component of the strategy. The
elections went down in history as one of the most disrupted
and intervened in electoral events.
After the elections were annulled, the United States made
its moves on the diplomatic level and held bilateral
consultations with Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico, trying to
put pressure on those countries to blockade Panama
economically. Venezuela, at the urging of the United States,
called for an emergency meeting of the Organization of
American States (OAS) in order to get Latin America involved
in Panama's internal affairs. US diplomatic pressures
intensified, and on a number of occasions, President George
Bush even called personally on the presidents of Venezuela,
Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, urging them to adopt
the US position.
These diplomatic tactics didn't produce the desired results
because of the attitude taken by the OAS mediation
commission that visited Panama and held talks with the
different sides in order to find a way out of the impasse.
Washington then resorted to military provocations. Although
these began in March, they intensified in June and July and
reached a peak in August. The United States was seeking to
create a situation which would justify strong actions and
possibly provide the spark for a coup.
Return to Colony
The US policy of aggression against Panama is highly
complex; it is a holistic, integral aggression, which spells
double jeopardy for Panamanian domestic tranquility and
regional peace. The US goal is not to facilitate opposition
access to the government. The real aim is to subvert
Panama's attempts at achieving its national liberation and
to make it into a colony.
For that reason, Washington is not interested in seeing the
establishment of a stable government. Instead, it wants a
climate of permanent destabilization. A clear
differentiation should be made between the wholesome pretext
that the US puts forward of being sentinels of democracy and
its underlying geopolitical interests.
The Panamanian experience could be considered unique because
of the domestic variables at play, but that does not mean
that it cannot be recyled for use in other countries.
From "Pensamiento Propio" #63, September 1989
By Jose Rodolfo Castro
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