LADBAC@UNMB.BITNET (Dr. Barbara A. Kohl) (10/07/89)
October 6, 1989
CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE
Copyright 1989
(Latin America Data Base, Latin American Institute, University
of New Mexico. Project Director: Dr. Nelson Valdes. Managing
Editor: Dr. Barbara A. Kohl)
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GENERAL
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U.S. AID FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA
On Sept. 28, the US Agency for International
Development announced that Washington plans to spend
$46.3 million over the next six years to support
environmental protection projects in Central America. These
projects include activities in natural resource policy
reform, environmental awareness education, bio-diversity
conservation, forestry management and sustainable
agriculture.
The USAID program will be administered from Guatemala,
and specialists will work in the field near project sites.
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EL SALVADOR
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EL SALVADOR: RELATIVES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS &
DISAPPEARED OCCUPY COSTA RICAN EMBASSY
On the morning of Oct. 5, a group of relatives of
political prisoners, disappeared and assassinated persons
occupied the Costa Rican Embassy and seized 19 hostages to
denounce the Salvadoran government's human rights
violations. A spokesperson for the group, comprised mainly
of women, told AP in an interview that the takeover was
undertaken so that the Costa Rican government pressures
President Alfredo Cristiani "to end the repression against
the people."
The activists who staged the occupation were members of
the Federation of Committees of Mothers and Relatives of
Political Prisoners, Disappeared and Assassinated People of
El Salvador. A spokesperson said they planned to stay at
the embassy until their demands were met. For several
years, the Federation has protested killings and kidnappings
by government security forces and rightist death squads.
Notimex cited the Federation as saying that it had
occupied the embassy to request Costa Rica and "other
friendly governments of the world" to pressure the US to
suspend military aid to El Salvador, and to denounce the
Salvadoran government's continuous human rights violations.
In addition, the Federation demanded that the government
provide information on the whereabouts of a list of
prisoners, and disappeared persons.
In contrast to reports by Notimex, Salvadoran radio and
AFP, stating that the protesters numbered about 50, AP
reported a total of 20.
Costa Rican Ambassador Jesus Manuel Fernandez, Consul
General Humberto Murillo and First Secretary Rene Aldama
were being held in the embassy. Most other hostages were
people visiting the embassy on business. Fifteen
journalists and five people from the Green Cross, a local
first aid group, were also inside the embassy offices, but
not considered hostages. Red Cross personnel delivered
sandwiches.
AP said reports conflicted on whether the activists
were armed. The AFP reported that Fernandez was permitted
to leave the embassy briefly to speak with reporters. He
told journalists that some of the assailants were armed with
pistols when they forced their way into the embassy. AP
state that reporters said they saw a handgun tucked into the
waistband of at least one young man who participated in the
occupation. The reporters also said demonstrators carried
newspaper-wrapped packets that appeared to have a fuse. The
activists' spokesperson, cited by AP, said they had no
weapons. A report by Xinhua indicated that the protesters
were not armed.
Notimex reported that the Federation activists disarmed
guards reponsible for security of the Central American
Building, before entering the embassy on the third floor of
the six-story structure. Special National Police units
surrounded the building, but no violence was reported as of
late Thursday evening.
Two hours after the occupation, an anti-riot squad
failed in an attempt to dislodge the protesters. On
Thursday afternoon, about 30 people--employees of the
Peruvian and Swiss embassies, and of the United Nations
office in El Salvador--were permitted to leave the building.
Ambassador Fernandez told AP by telephone that he
requested military officers at the scene to lift the cordon
around the building. He said his request was under
consideration.
San Salvador Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas arrived
at the embassy shortly after dusk, in an effort to mediate a
solution. His presence was requested by the Federation.
Fernandez, who has a heart condition, said his medicine
had been delivered to him, and that he had been examined by
a Red Cross doctor.
When informed of the embassy takeover, Costa Rican
President Oscar Arias said, "It is very sad that there are
people who believe that violence can be the good instrument
to get what they want." He spoke at a news conference in
San Jose, Calif., where he was visiting.
In San Jose, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Dino
Starcewic said, "Shortly after midday, a woman employee at
the embassy called us to say that a group of attackers had
seized the embassy and taken people hostage, and that they
are heavily armed, with rifles and even hand grenades."
On Thursday evening, Fernandez said the Federation
activists had decided to remain inside the embassy until the
next day, and that the Salvadoran government had not yet
established contacts or entered into negotiations with them.
Salvadoran Information Minister Mauricio Sandoval told
reporters the takeover was "an act of provocation" but was
being dealt with "calmly, so no one gets hurt." Later, in a
communique Sandoval asserted that the occupation of the
embassy was a "propagandistic act." He said the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is responsible for
the safety of the hostages, and not the government.
According to the minister, the occupation had put the Oct.
16 talks between the government and the rebels in jeopardy.
The "dialogue" is to take place in San Jose, Costa Rica.
(Basic data from several reports by AP, AFP, Notimex,
Xinhua, 10/05/89)
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NICARAGUA
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NICARAGUA: NOTES ON FIRST DAY OF VOTER REGISTRATION
About 5,000 voter registration booths were opened
throughout Nicaragua on Oct. 1. Eligible voters are
estimated at about 1.9 million.
President Daniel Ortega was the first in line at the
booth serving his neighborhood in central Managua. In
remarks to reporters, Ortega called on all Nicaraguans to
register "so there will be massive participation" in the
Feb. 25 general elections.
The AP reported irregularities at Ortega's booth. It
opened an hour late at 8 a.m., the representative of the
National Opposition Union (UNO) on the board did not show up
and his deputy arrived without any identification. The
deputy was sent home to find his ID, but hours later had not
returned.
Dozens of two-member observer teams from the United
Nations and the Organization of American States were
present at registration booths. OAS Secretary General Joao
Baena Soares led an observer team to oversee registration in
the heavily populated Pacific Coast region. After visiting
11 registration booths in Leon, Nicaragua's second largest
city, Baena told reporters, "I see that people are
motivated, and that there's a great interest in
registering."
Later, the OAS secretary general told reporters he was
satisfied with the overall outcome of the day's activities.
UN observers heard complaints from some opposition poll
workers who maintained that their credentials had been
rejected by local voting authorities. The credential
problems, according to the New York Times, appeared to be
associated largely with first-day difficulties of a
large-scale registration process.
Reps. David Drier (R-Calif.), Howard Coble, (R-NC),
Cass Balenger (R-NC), and Porter Goss (R-Fla.), were among
those visiting registration booths.
Jaime Bonilla, an UNO leader, said 30% of UNO officials
scheduled to work at registration booths had not received
their credentials.
Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo complained that
the estimated 500,000 Nicaraguans living outside the country
were prevented from taking part in the February elections.
On Oct. 2, UNO sent a letter to the Supreme Electoral
Council denouncing irregularities in voter registration. At
a press conference, UNO campaign chief Antonio Lacayo, said
that a "large number" of UNO representatives were denied
participation at the registration booths because the
regional electoral councils had not delivered their
credentials in a timely fashion. He added that some
Nicaraguans did not register because they knew UNO
representatives were not present.
The letter was signed by UNO legal representative,
Hernaldo Zuniga, who claimed that some registration booths
were moved from originally designated areas, resulting in a
type of forced abstention.
[The UN and OAS missions will conduct separate but
coordinated observer activities. Later in the campaign, the
Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, will join the
monitoring effort with a 30-member monitoring team.
On Oct. 1, UN technicians inaugurated a radio and
satellite communications network that will link hundreds of
international observers across Nicaragua until Feb. 25,
1990.
Elliot Richardson is UN Secretary General Javier Perez
de Cuellar's personal representative in overseeing the
monitoring mission. Day-to-day operations of the observer
force are handled by a UN official from Pakistan, Iqbal
Riza.
The UN contingent as of Oct. 1 included 29 full-time
observers, technicians and specialists in electoral
procedure. They are assisted by personnel from other UN
agencies already operating in the country, together with 26
Nicaraguan drivers and secretaries.
By November, the number of UN observers is expected to
double, and then to increase again in February, when the
overall number of observers is to reach at least 160. Those
observers, assisted by personnel from other UN agencies,
will form 80 mobile monitoring teams, a number that UN
officials say will permit close surveillance of at least 10%
of all polling stations in the country, yielding a clear
statistical picture of any irregularities. A similar number
of teams will also be fielded by the OAS.] (Basic data from
AP, AFP, 10/01/89; Notimex, 10/01/89, 10/02/89; New York
Times, 10/02/89)
NICARAGUA: NOTE ON CONTRA ATTACK
In a news release on Oct. 1, the Defense Ministry said
a group of contras attacked a military patrol about 110
miles north of Managua on Sept. 30. The ministry said one
soldier and two contras died in the fighting. (Basic data
from AP, 10/01/89)
SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS NICARAGUA
On Oct. 4 in Managua, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze said that Moscow's announced halt of weapons
shipments to Nicaragua would continue as long as the US-
backed Nicaraguan contras refrain from attack. Shevardnadze
was the highest ranking Soviet official to visit Nicaragua.
Next, the minister said President Daniel Ortega's
government had agreed to hold off seeking more Soviet
weapons until after the Feb. 25 elections. In the interim,
however, said Shevardnadze, any attack by the contras could
force the Soviet government to resume weapons shipments.
On the same day, the Nicaraguan government proposed an
agreement among Central American countries for establishing
a reasonable balance of military forces in the region.
Information Minister Manuel Espinoza said, "The stability of
the region requires maintaining an equilibrium of forces in
such a manner that the Central American countries' armed
forces are aimed at defense and nothing more."
The accord would have as a prerequisite an "immediate
solution to the security problems among Central American
states," said Espinoza.
Shevardnadze said that the US and the Soviet Union
could offer assistance in defining military sufficiency, as
well as providing guarantees to the observance of possible
ensuing accords.
The minister also said that the Soviet Union requests
that the results of free and democratic elections in
Nicaragua be respected by all countries, above all by the
United States, in order that Nicaragua's relations with the
world are normalized.
[On Oct. 2, Shevardnadze repeated Moscow's assertion
that it had unilaterally halted arms shipments early this
year. Since then, Washington has claimed that Soviet-made
weapons continue to arrive in Nicaragua through Moscow's
allies, including Cuba. As the minister arrived in Managua
on Oct. 3, unidentified diplomatic sources in Cuba cited by
AFP and other news services reported that President Fidel
Castro admitted ordering a shipment of Soviet-made weapons
delivered to Nicaragua. The sources said Castro did not say
whether the arms were delivered with Soviet approval. The
shipment consisted of light infantry weapons which Cuba had
held for a long time. (Basic data from Notimex, AFP,
10/04/89)
*********************
PANAMA
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PANAMA: DETAILS ON ATTEMPTED COUP, AFTERMATH
[See CAU 10/04/89 for a summary of coverage on the
events of the attempted coup occurring on Oct. 3.]
Oct. 4: In New York, Panama's provisional president
Francisco Rodriguez said that the government has proof of US
involvement in the attempted coup. The evidence, he said,
includes photographs of troops and tanks close to the area
where the fighting occurred.
Rodriguez said the US Southern Command mobilized
military personnel and blocked access routes to the
Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) headquarters and barracks.
According to the president, there is no dissent within
the PDF. He said the uprising was perpetrated by a minority
group "incited by the US."
Rodriguez denied that Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega had
been captured by the rebel soldiers for any length of time.
Finally, the president called on the US to cease
"military and economic aggression against Panama.
--Pro-government daily newspaper Critica reported that
among the wounded in the Tuesday's fighting was Lt.Col.
Nivaldo Madrinan Aponte, director general of the National
Investigations Department (DNI). Critica said one of the
rebel leaders was killed, but did not mention his name.
--Classes at the University of Panama were suspended.
--According to PDF Lt.Col. Arnulfo Castrejon, Gen.
Noriega was held hostage for four hours on Oct. 3, before
rebel troops released him under threat from loyalist troops.
Castrejon said the US instigated the rebellion.
--Panamanian officials said 10 rebel soldiers died,
including the leader Maj. Moises Giroldi Vera, who headed
the elite Urraca barracks battalion. Military sources said
five rebel soldiers fled to a nearby US military base. US
military officers told reporters that an unspecified number
of Panamanians had asked for asylum.
According to Notimex, a large number of high-ranking
and mid-level officers, privates and policemen were arrested
in connection with the failed coup. Included was state
security chief Col. Guillermo Wong.
Lt.Col. Carlos Arozamena told reporters that among the
rebel soldiers who died were Maj. Giroldi, and Capts.
Edgardo Sandoval, Juan Arza and Leon Tejeda. In addition,
three rebels were wounded, 37 arrested, and five deserted.
According to Arozamena, 18 loyalist soldiers were wounded.
Soldiers arrested included 1st Lt. Jorge Bonilla, 2nd
Lts. Francisco Concepcion and Ismael Rodriguez, Col. Julio
Ow Young, Maj. Jose A. Pajaro, and Lt.Col. Armando Palacio.
Arozamena said one of the five seeking US protection at
Fort Clayton was coup leader Capt. Javier Licona. Later, a
PDF spokesperson, Maj. Edgardo Lopez, said Licona and
another coup leader had taken refuge at Fort Clayton.
--Deputy Foreign Minister Norberto Tejada told 3,000
cheering Noriega supporters in Panama City that he would
formally accuse the US in international forums of sponsoring
the uprising.
--The whereabouts of civilian opposition leaders,
including former opposition presidential candidate Guillermo
Endara, remained unknown on Oct. 4. Reporters were unable
to confirm a rumor that Endara had fled the country.
--Local press sources cited by Prensa Latina reported
that US soldiers backed by tanks blocked access routes to
several PDF units in an attempt to obstruct deployment of
loyalist Panamanian troops. About 100 US troops were seen
blocking passage on the Pan-American highway, the only
overland route linking the capital with the interior. Daily
newspaper Critica reported that US soldiers supported by
tanks and other hardware were observed at the highest point
of Loma Cova.
Unidentified witnesses told Prensa Latina that US
troops supported by tanks blocked access to Fort Amador.
Local newspapers published reports of overflights of the PDF
headquarters and government buildings by US military
aircraft, including helicopters and A-37 planes, for several
hours on Tuesday.
Oct. 5: Armed men in civilian dress surrounded the
office where Guillermo Endara was engaged in a hunger
strike. They dispersed supporters and reporters gathered
outside by firing into the air and by hitting them with
rubber hoses. The men did not enter the building, nor did
they arrest Endara. The doors of the building remained
closed with Endara inside.
--In a televised speech, Noriega said he had evidence
the US planned to install Endara as president after the
coup. Regarding Endara, he said, "This hunger-striking
buffoon sneaks out to eat (Tuesday) so he can be well fed
when he takes over the presidency. But he's screwed."
The civilian opposition has denied any role in the coup
attempt. [According to AP, Endara said he was drinking only
water, taking prescribed medicine and eating only the wafer
of Mass, but that he appeared healthy when reporters
interviewed him at his office.]
Noting that US troops stood by and watched as the
rebellion failed, Noriega said the United States "left its
agents in the lurch." According to the general, the failed
coup was another Bay of Pigs for Washington: "They
mistakenly believed that everyone has a price and that
everyone is a traitor."
Noriega spoke from Santiago (Veraguas province). He
also announced a new series of measures to ensure "stability
and patriotism." He said he was preparing a list of
"treacherous officials" who will be replaced by members of
the Dignity Battalions. Ministers who disapprove will be
asked to leave the government.
The general added that the broadcast licenses of the
radio and television stations who aired the rebels'
proclamation on Tuesday would be canceled.
--According to statements by Authentic Liberal Party
(PALA) spokespersons late on Thursday, Endara was taken from
the party's offices by about 20 armed state security agents.
But he was immediately released through the efforts of the
papal nuncio in Panama, Msgr. Sebastian Laboa, Spain's
ambassador to Panama, Tomas Lozano.
PALA and a Christian Democrat party spokesperson said
Endara was now in a "safe place."
According to PALA, the attackers threw tear gas
canisters into the building, and destroyed windows and doors
with metal bars. A few hours earlier, a group of armed men
forced their way in and abducted three of Endara's
assistants.
AP reported that the office had been surrounded earlier
in the day and Endara held a sign up to the window to inform
reporters he considered himself to be under arrest. But the
uniformed troopers and security agents in civilian clothes
left for a time before returning.
--Opposition leader and former vice presidential
candidate Ricardo Arias Calderon told reporters that the the
Civic Opposition Democratic Alliance (ADOC) had no contact
with the rebel soldiers "before, during or after" the
attempted coup. He said members of the opposition were in
contact with "several Latin American presidents" and foreign
ministers during the fighting to inform them of ADOC's
"demand that they act with clarity and firmness to call for
or require the immediate commencement of democracy in
Panama."
Speaking to a group of nearly 100 reporters, Arias said
that the insurgents did not have a political objective,
although they expressed support for the provisional
government of President Francisco Rodriguez.
Arias did not comment on whether the US Southern
Command had participated in Tuesday's events.
--In an early evening report, Notimex cited an
unidentified European intelligence chief and other European
sources on details regarding what happened Tuesday morning
inside the PDF headquarters and barracks after the rebels
launched their attack. During the first two hours of the
insurrection, said the intelligence chief, Noriega sat in an
office and was not constrained in any fashion by the
insurgents. Meanwhile, the general called out insults and
epithets.
Noriega was apparently waiting for reinforcements to
arrive at the compound. At about 9 a.m., the general walked
out of the building, pushing soldiers out his way. He then
climbed aboard an armored vehicle to take charge of the
counterattack. No one tried to stop him, said the source.
US Southern Command troops limited themselves to
blocking access to the headquarters and to the Pan-American
highway to impede the arrival of troops from Colon and the
interior of the country. Notimex's unidentified
intelligence sources said the rebels had requested that
Southern Command chief Gen. Mark Cisneros give orders to his
troops not to intervene since the uprising was internal to
the Panamanian military. The Command was requested only to
set up roadblocks.
Next, the sources said that because communications were
interrupted and the Southern Command was unable to determine
what was happening inside the compound. To remedy this
situation, the Command dispatched two helicopters to conduct
reconnaissance over the headquarters.
US troops did not block the highway connecting the
headquarters with the international airport, enabling the
arrival of Battalion 2000 units, based in Tocumen.
The European sources said mid-level officers were
unhappy because pro-Noriega officers occupied high command
posts and obstructed promotions.
--From San Jose, Costa Rica, Notimex interviewed Lt.
Jose de Jesus Martinez, described as a staunch Noriega ally.
The lieutenant said that at no time was Noriega ever a
prisoner, but merely confined to the PDF general command
offices. He added that the general was waiting for the
arrival of reinforcements, but they had been delayed by US
troops who had blocked access routes to the headquarters
compound.
--In Washington, Sen. Jesse Helms told members of the
Senate that Washington was caught up in a "tragic
paralysis," and had lost the opportunity to detain Noriega
during the attempted coup. Secretary of Defense Richard
Cheney said earlier that the Panamanian rebel officers had
refused to hand Noriega over to the US. Helms dismissed
Cheney's statement.
Helms said his sources had informed him that Maj.
Moises Giroldi was executed by Noriega himself.
Next, the senator claimed his sources told him that
Noriega was detained for five hours by the rebels in at the
PDF headquarters, and that they had requested US assistance
to take the general to the United States. When the Southern
Command contacted Washington about this development, said
Helms, no decision was made.
Cheney replied that Helms' version of events was
basically false. The Secretary explained that the situation
was confused, and US officers in Panama received
contradictory reports. In addition, the main actors in the
rebellion were suspect because some of them had been major
participants in quashing an earlier uprising. [Basic data
from numerous reports by Notimex, AP, AFP, Xinhua,
10/04-05/89; Prensa Latina (Cuba), 10/04/89]
********************************
SUMMARIES & ANALYSIS
********************************
INTERVIEW: IGNACIO ELLACURIA, RECTOR OF CENTRAL
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (SAN SALVADOR)
Jesuit priest Ignacio Ellacuria is rector of the Simeon
Canas Central American University in San Salvador. The
institution is run by the Roman Catholic Church; a large
proportion of the faculty are members of the Jesuit order.
Accused by rightists of "subversive activities," UCA has
often been the target of bombings and other forms of
harassment. In July, the university's print shop was
destroyed by a bomb. The interview below was conducted by
Pensamiento Propio, a service of the Regional Coordination
for Economic and Social Research of Central America and the
Caribbean (CRIES, Managua), and distributed on Sept. 27.
Pensamiento Propio (PP): How has the Esquipulas II
peace process affected the situation in El Salvador?
Ellacuria: The peace process has affected our situation
a great deal. For instance, two years ago the National
Republican Alliance (ARENA) openly opposed the regional
peace plan. At the August summit in Tela, Honduras, ARENA
party President Alfredo Cristiani agreed to signing a
opposition to the regional peace plan to one of signing a
death sentence for the Nicaraguan contras. He has also
proposed opening negotiations with the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN).
The Esquipulas process has also had repercussions on
the FMLN. The rebels' armed struggle, although not
discredited at present, will be in the future if they do not
negotiate. The four summit meetings of the Esquipulas
process have been very positive, and hopefully, the road to
peace will be consolidated when the circle of summits closes
next year with the fifth one in Managua.
PP: Did anyone win at Tela?
Ellacuria: Cristiani himself said there were no winners
or losers. Cristiani came out legitimized as a follower of
the democratization process initiated by [former president
Jose Napoleon] Duarte, and violence as a means to obtain
power was delegitimized. At the same time, Tela made a very
clear distinction between the contras and the FMLN, and the
five presidents ratified what the FMLN had been putting
forward for some time: negotiations. From Tela, an image
was projected of an FMLN that is not the enemy of democracy
and of a Cristiani who is not the head of a dictatorial
regime.
PP: Cristiani shows a willingness to negotiate, but the
ultra-right and the army speak of dialogue without
negotiation...
Ellacuria: It is necessary to see where we are coming
from and where we are going. The extreme right--present in
the national government, the army, and the party--has
maintained until very recently that dialogue would be
anti-patriotic. In this sense, for the right to speak of
dialogue is a major advance. There is an emotional and a
semantic problem here. The right cannot accept the idea of
the guerrillas having a share of power, so they reject
modifications to the Constitution and participation of the
FMLN in power and in the army.
My thesis is that we have entered into a new phase in
the Salvadoran process. The most recalcitrant rightists
felt betrayed by the Tela agreements. That's why you hear
appeasing declarations from Defense Minister General Larios
about how it is possible to dialogue but not to negotiate.
Cristiani, after all is said and done, had achieved
consensus on June 1 when he made the proposal to hold an
uninterrupted, unconditional dialogue through a commission.
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the Democratic
Convergence, opting not to give any sort of winning card to
Cristiani, hurt themselves by refusing to participate in
this commission. The commission could not be considered
partisan to the extreme right. The PDC and the Convergence
would have been able to withdraw from the commission if it
failed to accomplish anything. Cristiani was planning a
serious process of dialogue that would have caused divisions
in his party. Now he has returned from Tela offering
dialogue without the pre-condition of a cease-fire.
PP: Does Cristiani have enough influence to do this?
Ellacuria: Alone, no. For the first part of his
projected, Cristiani counted on support from the armed
forces high command and the US embassy. Dialogue is
difficult to sell in El Salvador; you are quickly accused of
being a communist if you propose it. But the tendency is
irreversible now. No one here can withstand another five
years of war, not even the United States. And the
confrontational attitudes mistakenly assumed by the two
sides after the March 19 elections seem to have run their
course and are giving way to conciliatory positions.
In addition, there are no significant symptoms of
Cristiani being weakened. His economic measures have been
applied very carefully and that is a concession to the FMLN.
There is evident fear of a social explosion. But Cristiani
has shown himself to be a good calculator and is
simultaneously presenting the argument to the right that
national conditions do not permit going further with his
government's economic plan.
PP: What about the differences inside ARENA?
Ellacuria: In my view, ARENA has three factions with
about equal influence. The "squadronists," dominant in
1980-82 and today a minority, want a "dirty war." The
"militarists," led by [former major Roberto] D'Aubuisson,
favor total war and oppose negotiation. The third faction
consists of the "civilists," who are led by Cristiani. The
three factions agree on the economic level to make things as
easy as possible for capital.
For Cristiani, transforming all factions into civilists
is desirable, or transofrming ARENA into a conservative
right-wing party with a more or less reasonable political
practice.
PP: What do you think of ARENA's version of the recent
murders [of government officials, including Cristiani's main
adviser]?
Ellacuria: Based on my experience, the FMLN is
credible. When it does not take responsibility for an
action, you can believe the rebels were not involved. So
these murders have to be attributed to ARENA's "squadronist"
faction. Cristiani did not fall for the provocation and
impose immediate ultra-repressive measures. He did not
withdraw his offer to negotiate. Those actions, aimed at
creating domestic instability, failed. This is something
which the FMLN has also had illusions about.
PP: Has repression increased since ARENA took power?
Ellacuria: Quite frankly, I do not think that
repression has increased since Cristiani took office. More
than repression, there is persecution by the police in order
to find out who the FMLN guerrillas and their contacts are
in the cities because of their growing presence in urban
areas. That, from the point of view of political
pragmatism, is inevitable under any regime.
It would be quite another thing if the past policy of
terror--killing 200 people a night as was done in 1980-82--
had been resumed. There are definitely more human rights
violations, but I do not think there has been a major
increase over last year. Next, actions by the police and
military have little to do with Cristiani, as was the
situation under Duarte. Their actions are determined by the
High Command establishing a certain general line of action
and strategy with the US embassy which does not
fundamentally contradict Cristiani's policies.
PP: Some accuse of the FMLN of terrorism...
Ellacuria: That is part of the army's ideological and
psychological warfare techniques. In reality, the FMLN is
not a terrorist movement even though in the course of its
history, it has carried out terrorist acts. Some of these,
such as the assassinations of mayors, the FMLN does not
recognize as terrorist. In any event, these kinds of
actions have been a small part of the FMLN's overall
activity.
In its latest proposal for dialogue, the FMLN has even
offered to end insurrectional violence, or economic
sabotage. This could become an opening point in
negotiations. The FMLN has to abandon terrorist violence
for ethical reasons, and insurrectional violence--which
usually does not result in deaths--, for political reasons.
PP: Do you feel there is no future for an
insurrectional explosion?
Ellacuria: For some time now, we have been arguing that
the probability of insurrection is not very high. Perhaps
that has been the point of most dispute with the FMLN, but
time is proving us right. In 1982, sabotaging the energy
network and calling a transport strike animated the masses
to rise up. Today, in contrast, these actions create
resentment and animosity among the people as shown
irrefutably by our polls.
Next, if the FMLN continues dreaming indefinitely of an
insurrection, it cannot make progress in a strategy of
political struggle, a struggle which would be profoundly
revolutionary (and openly marxist as Comandante [Joaquin]
Villalobos says). Conditions for political struggle have
not yet manifested throughout the country. This strategy
was already elaborated by the FMLN General Command last year
when they met for months in what I called their "Vatican
II." Out of their debates came the FMLN's January proposal
for participation in the elections.
This process of "getting up to date" has not yet been
concluded, and there are tactical vacillations. But if
conditions improve, armed struggle can be supplanted by
political struggle. The people in the FMLN are very
capable, reasonable, patriotic, and by taking a close look
at the 40 years of their heroic experience, they have
realized what is possible and what is not.
PP: What is your view of meeting in Mexico between the
opposition parties and the FMLN?
Ellacuria: It is an obvious political ploy for whoever
is in the opposition...to weaken the government...There is
also interest on the FMLN's part in forming an anti-ARENA
alliance. But the PDC's political program, like that of the
National Conciliation Party, is much closer to ARENA's
program than to the FMLN's. The meeting in Mexico is a
purely situational convergence. If the PDC were in power,
it would once again become the FMLN's major enemy.
PP: What role is being played by the United States?
Ellacuria: There are signs of a positive change between
Bush and Reagan administrations. The United States
continues to be the determinant factor for Central America
and for the Salvadoran process. If Washington can arrive at
an understanding with Managua and the Sandinistas show that
they can respect it, that experience could be transferred to
El Salvador. In this respect, the coming elections in
Nicaragua will be decisive for the entire region.
---
Patt Haring | United Nations | FAX: 212-787-1726
patth@sci.ccny.cuny.edu | Information | BBS: 201-795-0733
patth@ccnysci.BITNET | Transfer Exchange | (3/12/24/9600 Baud)
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