[misc.headlines.unitex] Nica: Elections On Atlantic Coast

criesdif@mtxinu.COM (10/10/89)

/* Written  3:04 pm  Oct  9, 1989 by criesdif in ni:ni.centam-elect */
/* ---------- "Nica: Elections On Atlantic Coast" ---------- */

                 NICARAGUAN ATLANTIC COAST:
                   USHERING IN AUTONOMY
           (ni.centam-elect          362 lines)

            From the monthly magazine "Envio"

As the rest of Nicaragua blinks in the glare of the
international spotlights so shamelessly searching for flaws
in its electoral process, the Atlantic Coast is preparing,
almost unnoticed, for an event of unprecedented proportions.
On February 25, 1990, the two regions of the Atlantic Coast
will elect their first autonomous government in history.

Here At Last

     The moment has been a long time in coming, and many on
the coast--inclined always toward skepticism about anything
promised from Managua--experienced the delays as proof that
autonomy was just one more trick by the "Spanish."  That
defense mechanism dropped perceptibly when the Autonomy
Statute, which provides the legal framework for the
functioning of the new regional government, was actually
passed into law by Nicaragua's National Assembly in
September 1987. But as the months slid by, and little more
was said publicly about elections, the defenses moved back
in place.
     What few could appreciate was that a lot of hard work
was going on behind the scenes. The new, post-Constitution
Electoral Law, passed in August 1988, sets out the electoral
districts for the coast and the concrete mechanisms to
guarantee the election of at least one representative of
every ethnic community to the Regional Council--as the
governing structure is called--in their respective region.
It also defines the requirements for public petition
candidates, particularly important on the coast, where
parties other than the FSLN seldom venture.
     With those last details in place, Comandante TomAs
Borge, president of the Autonomy Commission, announced in
Puerto Cabezas in September that elections were planned for
April 1989. But it was not to be. Just one month later
Hurricane Joan flattened the port city of Bluefields and
destroyed the crops and homes of peasants in a wide swath
from there to Rama, in the interior. The last thing on
anyone's mind, at least in the south, was elections.
     Now, with Bluefields on the mend, and national
elections brought up to February 25 of next year as a result
of the Esquipulas accords, the autonomy elections are
becoming a reality at last.

What Will Government Look Like?

     The Atlantic Coast has been divided into two autonomous
regions, each of which will be governed by a directly-
elected Regional Council. A Regional Coordinator will be
elected by the council from among its 45 members. Although
roughly divided between regulatory and executive functions,
this structure does not parallel the distinctions between
legislative and executive bodies at the national level.
Rather, as Johnny Hodgson, regional coordinator of the
Autonomy Commission in the Southern Atlantic Autonomous
Region (RAAS) explains, it more resembles a traditional
indigenous system, in which a council of popularly chosen
leaders decides and oversees policy, and delegates
responsibility to carry it out.
     To help with the day-to-day implementation of
responsibilities and to liaison between council and
coordinator, the Regional Council will also elect an
Executive Board from among its members. It is here that the
principle of equality of the different ethnic communities
takes on its full weight. The Autonomy Statute specifies
that the seven-member Executive Board must include at least
one member of every ethnic community (Creoles, mestizos,
Miskitos and Sumus in the north, and those four plus Ramas
and GarIfunas in the south.)
     Defining the 15 electoral districts (each of which will
elect 3 representatives to the Regional Council) in each
region so that they are relatively balanced by population
yet do not divide the smaller ethnic communities was not
easy. In the RAAS the final product assigns five electoral
districts to Bluefields and the remaining ten to the widely
dispersed communities. Of these, there are six in which any
slate must be headed by a candidate from a designated ethnic
community (voters choose slates, not individual candidates).
District 12, for example, comprises all the territory in
which the Ramas have traditionally lived, so there all
slates must be headed by a Rama candidate, even though, with
their population of just over 800 people, the Ramas are not
the majority even in their own district. Asked if there were
negative reactions to this constraint by the remaining
population of that zone, Johnny Hodgson said he had heard of
none. Since the requirement is only for the top candidate,
the two others are unassigned. He said that no flaws had
shown up in the new electoral map so far.
     Not so in the north. RenE HenrIquez, a member of the
Regional Electoral Council (CRE) in the RAAN, noted a
serious problem that had just been discovered. The electoral
district in the mining area of Rosita designated to be
headed by a Sumu candidate is not, in fact, the one in which
the majority of the Sumus live. Asked what could be done, he
said that the CRE's responsibility is to register such
problems with the Supreme Electoral Council in Managua,
which has the final authority for finding a solution.

Official Observers Set Up Camp

     While the coast has not yet been besieged by
journalists, observer delegations of both the United Nations
and the Organization of American States have already made
brief visits to the two regions, and will set up offices in
Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas in time for the first day of
voter registration. From their base in the regional capitals
the two teams will visit outlying communities and pass
complaints of any irregularities they receive to the
Electoral Council. As official observers, the UN and OAS
teams will have political immunity, meaning that they can
ask to see or do anything they feel necessary.
     RenE HenrIquez does not foresee major political
complaints, given that the coast is not traditionally
contested seriously by the Pacific parties. By the beginning
of September no opposition parties had yet registered with
the CRE in Puerto Cabezas, and HenrIquez was unaware of any
having set up offices, although he said UNO representatives
had been in to make inquiries. Of the three CRE members in
the north, HenrIquez is an independent and the other two are
from the FSLN and the Central American Unionist Party
(PUCA). PUCA's vice presidential candidate, Daniel Urcuyo,
is originally from Bluefields and says his party intends to
open an office and name candidates, at least for the
National Assembly.
     HenrIquez, however, does envision several logistical
problems, particularly during voter registration. An issue
of dissension in the coast in recent years was a government
requirement that civilians carry ID cards, to distinguish
them from the contras who often entered their communities.
Although the measure was aimed at preventing harassment of
innocent civilians by the army, it was viewed, particularly
by Miskitos, as an infringement of their freedom, and was
finally rescinded as the war on the coast wound down. But
now, to register, an individual must show an ID card or be
accompanied by two reliable witnesses who will verify that
the person does live in the area where registering. "Since
the four registration days are the four Sundays of October,"
HenrIquez quipped, "I don't imagine the pastors in the
communities will get much preaching done, they'll be so busy
verifying registrants."  On the more serious side, there are
indications that several thousand Miskito refugees still in
Honduras may return in time to register, complicating the
process of verifying identity and residency.
     In the south, with a small proportion of the population
out of the country as refugees, the problems are more of
infrastructure than of logistics. Once one leaves Bluefields
proper, the only means of transportation in this jungle
region is by panga, a small river skiff powered by an
outboard motor. Yet the Regional Electoral Commission in
Bluefields suffers the same lack of transport that the
Regional Autonomy Commission there has had for three years.
"Every time we wanted to visit the communities," recalls
Johnny Hodgson, "we had to go around to the ministries and
ask who was going out so we could catch a ride."
     The chronic transportation difficulties in both regions
have hampered efforts to carry out the initial training
workshops for volunteer workers at the polling places. The
first workshop in the RAAN planned to train 65 people from
the different districts, but only netted 38 due to transport
problems. The CRE has decided to hold a make-up session for
the other 27 in the mining region, which has the most
serious transportation limitations. The first workshop
lasted two days, and was attended mainly by teachers,
selected by the CRE from a list supplied by the parties of
those with sufficient academic level. These "multipliers"
will then each train up to 24 volunteers at a district
level, for a total of 1,644 who will actually make up the
Voter Board in the 137 polling places in the region. Each
Voter Board in the country must have a president, 2 members
and 3 secretaries (one for each copy of the registration
list).
     Flipping through the training manual supplied by the
Supreme Electoral Council for these workshops, RenE
HenrIquez said this was the easiest job he has ever had.
"It's all in here--the function of a party poll watcher; how
to register a voter, the function of the electoral police;
what to do if the person is drunk, doesn't have an ID, or
has no hands [registering voters are supposed to put a
fingerprint alongside their name]."
     The electoral police, according to HenrIquez, will be
under the supervision of the CRE, although they will be
trained by the Sandinista Police. There will be two per
polling station, and their duties include keeping order and
guarding materials. Although they will be armed, they may
not enter the polling booth except by permission of the
Voter Board, and have no decision-making authority.
HenrIquez said that an average of 400 voters will be
registered at each polling place, so volunteers must be able
to register a person in 3 minutes, about the same time it
will later take to actually vote.
     In addition to topics such as these, covered in
workshops nationally, participants in the Atlantic Coast
workshops also study the autonomy law, article by article.

Electoral Strategies Coast-Style
     With the final registration date for candidates to the
National Assembly and the Regional Council still a few weeks
off, the political movement in the two autonomous regions is
inclusive. In the north only two groups are visibly in
motion, the FSLN and a number of public petition candidates
who have just formed a coalition called Candidates for
CosteNo Unity (CUC).
     Armando Rojas, a Puerto Cabezas lawyer, regional
coordinator of the Autonomy Commission in the RAAN, and now
one of the CUC candidates, explained with a hint of surprise
still in his voice how the group came about. "Last October
we tried to form an organization called Movimiento IndIgena,
but it never came together--not because of political
differences but because of power struggles. Then we tried to
broaden out from only Miskitos to other indigenous, and it
still didn't work. So aspiring candidates independently
started getting the necessary signatures as public petition
candidates. Then one day last week we all met and suddenly
came together!"
     There are 27 candidates in the CUC so far (3 each in 9
electoral districts), but the coalition's political
complexion is not yet clear. "We don't have a common
program," says Rojas. "Some are pro-Brooklyn Rivera and some
are not. It's a multiethnic movement, even including some
mestizos, but we are least strong in the mines [a zone
inhabited mainly by mestizos and Sumus]." Although Rojas
says the group is "united only by its independence from the
Frente," he added that it was going to meet with the FSLN
and at least some of its members were open to hearing what
they might say.
     Brooklyn Rivera's own immediate future has been cloaked
in a rumor-inspiring combination of mystery and confusion on
the coast. Twice in recent months it was rumored that he was
about to return but he has yet to do so. Increasingly one
hears people on the coast admit that Rivera has closed every
door that opened for his return, and has lost his best
opportunity. He twice abandoned serious negotiations with
the Nicaraguan government, and more recently refused the
government's offer that he return by accepting amnesty.
[Note by conference editor: Rivera returned to Nicaragua in
the last week of September along with Steadman Fagoth. The
two made an alliance with the Social Christian Party (PSC)
which ahas Erick RamIrez as its presidential candidate.]
     Dorotea Wilson, FSLN representative to the National
Assembly from the RAAN, told EnvIo in early September that
at a recent meeting between Rivera and the CEPAD-Moravian
Church Conciliation Commission in Guatemala, he finally
agreed to the amnesty offer. If he wants to participate in
the elections, his only option now would be as a candidate
for the National Assembly, since there is a one-year
residency requirement for candidates to the Regional
Council. If he were to win a seat on the National Assembly
he would automatically be a full voting member of the
Regional Council, and thus theoretically be eligible for the
Regional Coordinator position. But to do that he would have
to return by the deadline for filing candidates, currently
set for September 29.
     Following a visit to Puerto Cabezas with Comandante
TomAs Borge, president of the Autonomy Commission just as
EnvIo went to press in mid-September, ex-President Jimmy
Carter spoke with Brooklyn Rivera by phone and got his
agreement to the government's conditions for his return.
"They will have to disarm their troops, renounce armed
struggle, participate in the political process and fulfill
the conditions that I believe are compatible with those of
the contras," Carter reportedly told journalists in Managua
after his trip to the coast. Carter said he saw no reason
why Rivera and the other Miskito leaders could not return
before September 29. TomAs Borge added that "they have the
complete right to create organizations of a political and
ethnic character for the defense of the costeNo population's
specific interests," but not at the same time as they
reserve the right to have their troops, as Rivera had
previously insisted. "On this point," Borge said, "ex-
President Carter is in agreement with us."
     Dr. Myrna Cunningham, presidential delegate to the RAAN
for the past five years and herself a Miskito, calls
Rivera's project "very weak, because it's a racist project;
it's against costeNo unity. People now understand, because
of the war, that we're only going to survive if we're all
united."  She sees Rivera as a solution only for the more
radical Miskitos, who believe that autonomy should recognize
Miskito hegemony. "We're trying to work with an autonomy not
just for Miskitos, but rather a model that gives equal
rights to all ethnic grops. This means that sentiments of
Miskito hegemony are going to be lacerated, hurt."
     Several Miskitos in Puerto Cabezas said that Rivera has
sent a letter urging his supporters to vote for UNO
candidates, and that Violeta Barrios de Chamorro should be
the Miskitos' choice for president. Most people EnvIo spoke
with felt that this was self-defeating for Rivera since the
dominant wing of the UNO coalition is closely allied with
the contras, and most Miskito ex-fighters had very negative
experiences in their unequal alliance with the contras over
the years. As published in "La Prensa" on August 26, the
only reference to the Atlantic Coast in UNO's platform is as
follows:  "The Government of National Salvation will
dedicate special attention to the Atlantic Coast. With
earnestness it will respond to the unpostponable historic
necessity of freeing it from the underdevelopment and misery
in which it has lived. [The Government's] effort will be
directed to putting an end to the region's traditional
abandonment and disbbimination, to propel its integral
development, to complete its integration into the life of
the Nicaraguan nation and to its struggle for economic and
social progress. The Government of National Salvation will
rebuild and improve the urban and rural structures and the
natural resources of the Atlantic Coast destroyed by the
recent hurricane. It will also improve its communication
infrastructure."  Quite apart from the unfortunate use of
the buzz-word "integration," any reference to autonomy is
glaring by its omission.
     Asked in late August if the FSLN was concentrating its
efforts in the coast on the national or the regional
elections, Myrna Cunningham--who had not yet seen the UNO
program--responded that "the most important elections for
the people are the ones for their government. But some
people have heard what's going on in the rest of the
country, and they say, 'If the FSLN doesn't win, what's
going to happen to our autonomy?  Who else would give it
continuity and follow-up?  We have to vote for the FSLN so
it won't go backward.'"
     In the RIo Coco the FSLN asked the Peace and Autonomy
Commission members in their July assembly to choose people
they felt would be the best Frente candidates to the
Regional Council. "We don't intend to impose candidates on
them," explains Cunningham, adding that the FSLN is also
going to the communities themselves, to be sure that
interests not fully represented by the commissions are
heard, such as women, the recently repatriated and some of
the ex-fighters. "The new autonomous government is going to
be accepted by the population only to the degree that all
sectors are represented," she says. The FSLN's strategy is
similar in the south, although, with fewer Miskitos and less
disruption of traditional community structures due to the
war, the nuances are different. There, the FSLN is
approaching long-accepted community leaders in most cases.
     The FSLN has already established a successful precedent
on the coast for this strategy. In 1984 two of the three
winning National Assembly candidates--Hazel Law in the north
and Ray Hooker in the south--agreed to run on the FSLN
slate, even though neither were FSLN members. The population
knows they were chosen because they were strong,
constructive and articulate leaders, and not because they
toed the Frente line; in fact both had been critical of the
FSLN's early policies on the coast.
     Asked if the moment has passed in which being a
Sandinista is a deadly stain on the coast, Myrna Cunningham
replied,  "The situation has changed, and it's still
changing. Five years ago people said that the key to unity
and peace was that the FSLN get out; now it's that it stay
and that we join in with it."
                    *****************
"Envio" is a monthly magazine of analysis on Nicaragua,
published by the Central American Historical Institute in
Managua.  Subscriptions available for $27 from CAHI,
Intercultural Center, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.
20057, USA.


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