unitex@rubbs.fidonet.org (unitex) (10/11/89)
roads. Were any similar forces dispatched to block them in the
event the coup had gone down on Monday?
A: Not that I recall, but I'd really have to check with General
Powell to see exactly what dispositions of the force were made on
Monday. We focused on Tuesday because that's when things
happened.
General Thurman, I would assume, probably took precautions in
Panama on Monday morning. It was his first day on the job, but
probably took precaution to make certain that our forces were
secure. We may well have had forces out exercising on Monday as
we do frequently, coincidentally. But to be precise, I'd really
have to get back to you.
Q: But you would have to notified the PDF in advance --
A: It would have been done Sunday night ordinarily. Like
Monday, for example, the Tuesday deployments, we notified the
PDF liaison office on Monday evening, as we always do. That's
standard practice.
Q: Was there any contact between U.S. forces and the rebels in
any way before the 11:30 meeting between the U.S. Army general
at Fort Clayton and the two rebels that drove up?
A: Not to my knowledge. Contact was Sunday night with the
major. Subsequent to that we received messages on Monday. The
coup didn't come off. The first message was it's going to come
later in the day. Then another message that eventually came in
said no, it was going to be on Tuesday. But to my knowledge,
once the coup started there was no direct contact between U.S.
military personnel and the rebels until the meeting where one of
our officers met with two of their representatives. That's to
the best of my knowledge. If there was such a meeting, it was
never made...
Q: What did you learn on Monday that caused you to deploy troops
that you were reluctant to deploy on Monday when you had the same
speculation that ther would be a coup?
A: Remember, by then you had more time. We first got a call at
2:30 Monday morning. Again, I have not said that we did not
deploy troops on Monday I don't know specifically what the
deployments were on Monday, and we'll get you that. I'll check
on that. I need to check with SOUTHCOM and see exactly what
deployments they had out. We focused on Tuesday because that's
when things happened.
But on Monday night, it seemed the prudent thing to do to be
positioned so that if we decided we wanted to intervene, we
could have done so. We decided not to intervene.
Q: Mr. Secretary, when you get right down to the basics of this,
the rebels asked you to keep two Noriega units away from the
Comandancia. Through number one, a series of exercises; and
number two, a later declaration of Condition Delta, we closed or
were in a position to close two roads, then they found other
means of getting there and...
A: One of the units didn't move and the other units went by
air.
Q: Isn't the basic complaint against the Administration's
decision is that it wasn't clean? It wasn't one way or the
other. You did just enough so you can't avoid the taint of
involvement in an unsuccessful coup, but you didn do enough on
the other hand, to make sure it was successful which we easily
could have done.
A: What would you have done differently, Bob?
Q: What I would have done?
A: Yes.
Q: I won't duck the issue. I'd have gone in and gotten rid of
the son of a bitch. (Laughter)
A: Let me talk about that for a minute.
Q: At least blocking other routes of access besides the two that
were requested.
A: We were not asked to consider blocking other routes of
access. Again remember where we are and what's going on down
there. You have a coup that goes down on Tuesday that was
supposed to go down on Monday, that didn't go down on Monday but
it went down on Tuesday. It's run by a guy who's a Noriega
crony. It's run by a guy who put down the last coup. Up until
the moment the shooting starts, it's a very good supposition
that this could well be a setup. It's an effort by Noriega to
draw U.S. officials into coup plotting, if you will, that he can
then try to use to create an embarrassing incident for the
United States within the OAS, etcetera, etcetera. So you don't
know up until Tuesday morning that it's for sure, and even for a
real thing.
In terms of the question of using military force, initially when
the coup first starts, you're sitting there and you've got
forces deployed where they could block the 5th Company or the
7th Company. You don't know if the coup plotters, the rebels,
have Noriega. So your option at that point is to intervene with
military force. We're going to send our troops in to deal with
the problem.
Are you going to attack the coup plotters? We found out later on
they wouldn't have turned Noriega over to us. At the time we
made the decision, we didn't know if they had him.
Are you going to go in and confront the pro-Noriega forces?
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