unitex@rubbs.fidonet.org (unitex) (10/11/89)
Maybe Noriega is not even in the compound, because we've got reports
that he isn't. So you could end up in a situation where you could
have interposed U.S. forces between the rebels and the
pro-Noriega folks to what end? For what purpose? You're just
in the middle of a shooting scrape in downtown Panama and you
haven't achieved any objective at all except to commit U.S.
troops to a messy situation.
Then let's assume, okay, they've got Noriega. You're told they
will not turn him over to you. Then how do you get Noriega? Do
you attack the guys running the coup? That makes a lot of
sense. Here's the anti-Noriega forces who have risen up in
revolt against Noriega and we're going to use our militar force
against them. That's a dumb idea.
So to suggest that somehow there was ever sort of a neat, clean
picture for us to use U.S. force to go get Noriega, there never
was.
Q: Except in the telephone messages, reports of interception of
telephone messages from the compound involving Noriega himself.
We keep saying we weren't sure he was there, and yet there are
reports that...
A: You ought to know that I never get into the business of
discussing intelligence matters, especially that relate to
sources and methods. I made the point, it's a valid point, it's
true, there were conflicting reports about Noriega's location.
That was true right up until close to the end of the coup
Q: In May, the President called very strongly on the PDF to get
rid of Noriega. In retrospect, in view of the fact that we did
not go in on this occasion, was that a mistake? Should we in
fact tone down that kind of rhetoric?
A: I think it's still the policy of the Administration that the
ultimate solution to the political problems in Panama rest with
the Panamanian people. We are not in the business of willy-nilly
running around the hemisphere toppling governments that we don't
like. If democracy is going to succeed in Panama it's going to
be because the Panamanian people want it to succeed and are
prepared to take steps to have that happen. That policy was in
existence previously and it remains our policy today.
Q: We don't rule out coming to the support of a major coup?
A: We do not rule out the use of force in Panama. We never
have. We've got forces there, we've got rights and obligations
there, we've got people to protect there, and under
circumstances where the President deems it appropriat I'm sure
he's prepared to use force, if necessary, to protect those lives
and those interests.
Q: Back on the scenario that you described, the conundrum that
you described, in effect doesn't all of that begin with the
earlier decision to provide tacit approval to whoever is
calling...
A: I didn't say tacit approval.
Q: Well, to encourage...
A: How did we encourage?
Q: We encourage by saying that we would accept sanctuary
conditions.
A: Can you imagine the United States ever saying to anybody we
wouldn't provide that kind of sanctuary?
Q: The question is, can you tell people to keep their powder dry
if the United States actually has a strategy in the area?
A: Again, you're in a situation where the guy you're talking
with may well be, all the evidence is that he's a Noriega
crony. It may well be a setup. So you go as far as you have to,
for example say yes, if your family shows up we'll provide
sanctuary for them. But you don't go beyond that, and we didn't.
Q: But you're encouraging the Panamanians to handle the
situation, and yet you're at the same time giving them the sense
that if you go ahead and try to handle it you might get your
backside shot off and we might or we might not help you. How is
that encouraging?
A: I come back to the proposition again that the strength of
Panamanian democracy rests upon the Panamanian people. The
United States cannot impose democracy on Panama. They're going
to have to work it out for themselves.
Q: (Inaudible) just enough to taint the United States with
interfering..
A: I don't buy that. I think if we had denied that family
sanctuary we would be legitimately subject to criticism, and I
think that would have been a outrageous act. We would not do
that and we did not do that. The other thing we did, of course,
was to have our forces positioned in a way so that we could
intervene if a decision were made to intervene. That's prudent
management, it seems to me, of the force; that does not involve
us in the coup; that does not say that we were involved in
trying to engineer the coup or support the coup. We were in a
position, should developments have warranted, to be actively
involved from a military standpoint with those forces. Those
developments never arose.
I think that if we had not had people deployed, again, we would
have been derelict in our responsibility. Part of my
responsiblity as Secretary is, I think, to undertake those
deployments, and we did it.
Thank you all very much.
* Origin: UNITEX --> Toward a United Species (1:107/501)
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