unitex@rubbs.fidonet.org (unitex) (10/25/89)
South Africa: The Negotiations Battle Johannesburg, October 19, 1989 (AIA) -- The current initiatives by the government here are the latest in a long running game of move and counter move with both sides seeking to control the ground on which the negotiations battle will occur. Although some observers date the onset of a rush to negotiate from the election of National Party President F.W. de Klerk, strategies have been unfolding for at least two years. The October 15 release of eight long-term political prisoners must be seen in this context. As one analyst put it, "the chess game remains the same as ever, we have just progressed momentarily from the slow pace of normal play to a period of moves governed by a five-minute clock". On one side there are arrayed the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) led by the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), alongside the banned African National Congress (ANC). On the other side is the De Klerk government, pulling along a nervous coalition of middle class Afrikaners and recent immigrants while being pushed by a small but very powerful multinational corporate elite. Despite the rhetoric neither side believes the other when it says it will negotiate now for a democratic and free South Africa. The regime believes ANC talk is a tactic to engage officials in an exhausting set of procedures, drawing attention away from the so-called "four pillars of the struggle": mass mobilisation, the armed struggle, development of an internal underground and international isolation of South Africa through sanctions and diplomatic activity. Elements within the ANC/MDM alliance distrust De Klerk. They see the seeming shift from former President Botha's hard line regime as a ploy to convince Pretoria's conservative international allies (Britain's Thatcher, America's Bush and Germany's Kohl) that change is on the way. The aim is to stave off increasingly effective sanctions, particularly financial restrictions, while taking the "global high ground" that will force opposition forces to accept the terms on which negotiations or even some settlement might occur. The logic is to get the democratic alliance in the position of having to say "no" to negotiations, therefore losing face before a concerned world public. Both sides are aware of this battle and have been mobilising the support of local and international groupings. The ANC, with the approval of the UDF and COSATU, has been engaged in a two-stage programme to have talks with as many players as possible and, more recently, to get international diplomatic approval for its negotiations position. The "talks tactic" has been deployed since 1985. (see S891012.SA) The aim has been to achieve unity of purpose with as many representative organisations as possible from across the spectrum of South African life while winning over or neutralising potential adversaries. Outside analysts say that this four-year old tactic has been one of the most successful mounted by the movement during the decade of the '80s. It has confirmed that the ANC is a central feature of South Africa's future. More recently there has been a concerted effort to form a united front on setting the pre-conditions for negotiation. The basis has been a 1987 ANC document listing the steps that would create a "climate conducive to negotiations". Meetings with COSATU and UDF representatives has expanded the list into what has become known as the pre-conditions for negotiation. (see S891011.SA) Feverish diplomatic activity during 1989 has had this united front on pre-conditions endorsed by the nations making up the Organisation of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement. On its side, Pretoria government moves towards a negotiation strategy have gathered pace with each sign of a disintegrating apartheid economy. At the same time the repressive state of emergency and attempts to win over conservative black petty capitalists were not bringing the vast majority into line. Through 1988 and 1989 the state hatched a plan to stem the downward flow of economic conditions by an austerity programme that called for sale of public corporations, across the board cuts to certain government departments, and a down- scaling of destabilisation in Southern Africa keyed to a settlement of its lost war in Angola. Key sectors of the National Party, the Afrikaner intellectual elite and their liberal private sector allies started softening up their followers for an inevitable unfolding of a negotiating strategy. January 1989 saw an editorial in the Afrikaans Beeld newapaper, which supports the National Party, discussing negotiations with the ANC. Four months later the same paper ran a column by its political correspondent outlining the strategy for controlling the battleground on which a state- managed negotiations process could be organised. The July 1989 meeting between P.W. Botha and Nelson Mandela was a sign that the state's strategy was in play. When De Klerk became National Party leader he sought alliances around his negotiation strategy. He met with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkhata, which counts many ethnic Zulus as its members, the conservative National Forum, and with a string of bantustan leaders. Without responding to the progressive forces' set of pre- negotiation stipulations, De Klerk started implementing his own version of pre-conditions. Democratic observers say these steps are designed to mimic the ANC/MDM pre-conditions by keying on the release of political prisoners. Internationally, the strategy hopes to create the appearance of rapid change so that Pretoria's conservative allies will be able to stem the tide of sanctions. A major achievement has been to get conservative and "middle-of-the-road" opinion believing the release of Nelson Mandela will confirm the beginning of the end of apartheid. Already Britain and the European Community have made Mandela's release the single factor required for their participation in a state-managed "compromise solution". The United States, stalemated by a right-wing presidency and a liberal congress, has given De Klerk until June 1990 to show he is dismantling parts of the apartheid apparatus. Commonwealth states have agreed with South African church leaders and given Pretoria six months to show intent to implement serious change. For De Klerk the timing is crucial. He needs the next six months to finish negotiating the roll-over of his government's CDN $14-billion debt to foreign commercial banks. He is hoping this "breathing space" will reduce the effectiveness of anti-apartheid campaigns aimed at influencing bankers to get tough. The scenario for the near future portrayed by many here is a series of seemingly fast moves to release prisioners, unban some organisations, and dismantle portions of the state of emergency between now and the middle of 1990. This will allow De Klerk to challenge the ANC/MDM leadership to negotiate. One hope in his ranks is that Margaret Thatcher will sponsor an attempt at a "fast and dirty" settlement along the lines of the Lancaster House accord in 1979 that brought Zimbabwe to independence with a ZANU-PF government bound hand and foot by guarantees protecting the private sector and "minority rights". In the face of this strategy, unity is uppermost in the minds of progressive forces. Through the tactic of talks and the coalition of forces around its own set of negotiation pre- conditions the hope is that there will be a residue of communication networks and understanding available to hear why the answer will be "no" to any negotiation ploy which would put De Klerk in the driver's seat. During the short term the battle for control of the negotiation platform will be used to further split the ruling elite while winning concessions. But, at this time, stalemate is the probable outcome. The government has contempt for the sincerity of the progressive forces, seeking to use them as a foil while playing to the international gallery. The ANC/MDM alliance believes the government, illegitimate because power has been seized from a voteless majority, must relinquish control if it is to create a proper negotiations climate. * Origin: AlterNet Better World Communications (1:163/113) --- Patt Haring | United Nations | Screen Gems in patth@sci.ccny.cuny.edu | Information | misc.headlines.unitex patth@ccnysci.BITNET | Transfer Exchange | -=- Every child smiles in the same language. -=-