rshapiro@bbn.com (Richard Shapiro) (07/02/89)
In article <6740@sdcsvax.UCSD.Edu> bloch%mandrill.UUCP@ucsd.edu (Steve Bloch) writes: >rshapiro@BBN.COM (Richard Shapiro) writes: >>The crucial >>step of feminism, one of them at least, was to point out that gender >>is a purely social construct [...] >Well, not PURELY social. Aside, of course, from reproductive >differences, there are certainly skills at which the average woman is >significantly (in a chi-squared sense) better or worse than the >average man, and for some of these there is no evidence to indicate a >social explanation. However, there is quite a bit of overlap in the >curves. [...] >It's plausible, for example, that for biological reasons women could >have more "nurturing" (whatever that means) personalities on average >than men. Here you're confusing "sex" and "gender". The physiological differences (organs etc) are what define sex (as in male or female). Gender, on the other hand, has been abstracted from its linguistic context to refer to the social and psychological manifestations of sex, i.e. masculine and feminine. This is a major difference, and in my opinion one of the most significant and far reaching theoretical advances which came from feminism. In other words, it's much more than semantics. As soon as you begin to derive social differences from physical ones, you start on the slippery slope of natural gender. If feminine and masculine are in some degree natural, eternal, "God given", who's to say how large that degree is? If women are "naturally" better at nurturing, aren't they "naturally" more family-oriented than public-oriented? And if this family/private orientation is natural and eternal (as it must be if it derives directly from physiology), why isn't it legitimate to claim that a woman's (natural) place is in the home? And so on. If there really were natural genders, than feminism would seem to be in big trouble, it would seem to be flying in the face of the undeniable facts of nature, which is precisely the most common argument made against it. But, along with showing the theoretical difference between sex and gender, feminism has taken another major step. It has shown that most supposed examples of natural gender differences have no basis in biology (or Nature) at all, or at least no demonstrable ones -- that the "naturalness" is nothing more than an assumption based on the state of things now and in the recent past; that explanations from biology really are not, in fact, very "plausible", no matter how common sensical they may seem on the surface. There's a whole politics and ideology hiding behind the confusion between sexual differences and gender differences: that's one of the lessons I've learned from feminism. I think we want to keep the politics and ideology in mind as we pursue this discussion.
bloch%mandrill@ucsd.EDU (Steve Bloch) (07/05/89)
rshapiro@BBN.COM (Richard Shapiro) writes: >[in response to my comment] >Here you're confusing "sex" and "gender". The physiological differences >(organs etc) are what define sex (as in male or female). Gender, on the >other hand, has been abstracted from its linguistic context to refer to >the social and psychological manifestations of sex, i.e. masculine and >feminine. Just to make sure I've got this... at first glance, this looks as though you're DEFINING "gender" to be whatever isn't natural and eternal, and then making a big deal about the fact that gender isn't natural and eternal. A second look says you're defining "gender" to be whatever isn't physiological, which isn't quite so circular, but it brings in the centuries-old problem of to what extent human behaviour is determined by physiological factors. (See Gould's _The Mismeasure of Man_ and somebody's _The Tangled Wing_ for two views.) Can you give me a clearer picture of where this sex/gender distinction lies? (By "you're defining..." I don't mean to imply that this whole thing is the fabrication of one R. Shapiro, only that you're the one telling it to me at the moment.) "The above opinions are my own. But that's just my opinion." Stephen Bloch
rshapiro@bbn.com (Richard Shapiro) (07/05/89)
In article <6752@sdcsvax.UCSD.Edu> Steve Bloch <bloch%mandrill.UUCP@ucsd.EDU> writes: >Just to make sure I've got this... at first glance, this looks as >though you're DEFINING "gender" to be whatever isn't natural and >eternal, and then making a big deal about the fact that gender isn't >natural and eternal New definitions are *always* a crucial first step in constructing new problems (i.e. demonstrating the existance of previously unrecognized problems) or new ways of imagining solutions. This is how one goes about learning to think differently (one way, at least). And in my experience, the greatest single advance offered by theoretical feminism is its new way of thinking: its new set of questions and problems and its new way of imagining solutions. You talk as if the ideology of gender was old hat, but in fact it was precisely feminism which brought this to the fore. So in fact I am merely reminding you what "gender" has come to mean and suggesting that slipping back into the confusion between sex and gender implicitly undoes a major theoretical advance which we owe to feminism. The idea of "gender" is a new way of looking at the sexuality, one which is at odds with the more straightforward logic of physical sex. The important point is not that the word "gender" implies "non-natural" by definition, which is what you seem to be suggesting. The important point is that "natural" sexual identity has been shown (by feminism) to be problematic, and that the set of concepts centered around "gender" are a useful way to deal with those problems. >Can you give >me a clearer picture of where this sex/gender distinction lies? We can designate a person with ovaries and a uterus "female" and a person with testicles "male" and by this means completely partition the human species into two exclusive groups. There is no analagous way in which a person, or a behavior, can be designated "feminine" or "masculine". These notions are specific to a social group, an economic class, a nation, a time etc and are in a continuous process of change and redefinition. There are no universals whatsoever that can be called "feminine" or "masculine"; further: the two define, not a polarity like "male" and "female", but a continuum. So the two sets of concepts are quite different from one another. As sexed creatures, we each have a determinate sex (forgetting for now the complications of physically unclear or altered sex); as gendered subjects, we each find or make a place for ourselves somewhere in the continuum. The problem comes when the contingent continuum of gender is mapped onto the unchanging polarity of sex. For reasons which I can't explain, this mapping seems to happen by default: "common sense" tells us that "feminine" is as determinate as "female", that the physical attributes of femalenss will lead, "naturally", to feminine behavior (however that happens to be constituted), that a female who finds herself in the masculine side of the continuum is "perverted" etc etc. It's easy to see how a society which marks the feminine as inferior can use a supposedly natural mapping like this to oppress women (i.e., it's easy to see *now*, in the aftermath of the theoretical work already done by feminists). So here we have a conceptual mapping which would seem to be both unjustified and anti-feminist, a mapping which only appears within the analysis suggested by the notion of gender. Getting back down to earth: the starting point of all of this was "feminist spirituality", which seemed to me to imply a continuity between the "feminine" of some ancient society and that of our own ("eternal feminine principles", as someone else put it). The problem I was raising was how such a "feminine" could exist, except by assuming exactly the mapping I mention above between female and feminine; and how (or if) such a mapping can work effectively with feminism.
HUXTABLE@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu (Kathryn Huxtable) (07/06/89)
In article <6752@sdcsvax.UCSD.Edu>, bloch%mandrill@ucsd.EDU (Steve Bloch) writes: > rshapiro@BBN.COM (Richard Shapiro) writes: >>[in response to my comment] >>Here you're confusing "sex" and "gender". The physiological differences >>[stuff deleted for brevity --- KAH] > > Just to make sure I've got this... at first glance, this looks as > though you're DEFINING "gender" to be whatever isn't natural and > eternal, and then making a big deal about the fact that gender isn't > natural and eternal. A second look says you're defining "gender" to > be whatever isn't physiological, which isn't quite so circular, but it > brings in the centuries-old problem of to what extent human behaviour > is determined by physiological factors. (See Gould's _The Mismeasure > of Man_ and somebody's _The Tangled Wing_ for two views.) Can you give > me a clearer picture of where this sex/gender distinction lies? As long as we're dragging in authorities, I thought I'd throw in some references. These are from The University of Kansas' online catalog system. Our library seems to have not entered most of the relevant books by John Money, (I know they're on the shelves) so I can't get his titles from my desk. Another researcher in this subject (one I like rather less) is Robert J. Stoller. I found three relevant titles: Presentations of Gender, New Haven/Yale University Press, 1985 RC 560 .G45 S76 Sex and Gender, New York/Science House, 1968 RC 557 .S77 Sex and Gender, v. 2, The Transsexual Experiment, New York/J. Aronson, 1975 RC 557 .S772 vol. 2 The main thing I don't like about Stoller is his treatment of transsexuallism. His criteria for deciding whether someone should have sexual reassignment surgery would have excluded a friend of mine who was not particularly functional before and is a much happier, more fulfilled person now. Other than that, he's fine. John Money is more compassionate, though. Just trying to add more gasoline to the fire.... -- Kathryn Huxtable huxtable@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu
bloch%mandrill@ucsd.edu (Steve Bloch) (07/10/89)
I wrote: SB>Can you give SB>me a clearer picture of where this sex/gender distinction lies? rshapiro@BBN.COM (Richard Shapiro) responded: RS>We can designate a person with ovaries and a uterus "female" and a RS>person with testicles "male" and by this means completely partition RS>the human species into two exclusive groups. There is no analagous way RS>in which a person, or a behavior, can be designated "feminine" or RS>"masculine".... the two define, not RS>a polarity like "male" and "female", but a continuum. OK, I'll grant that, but if there's no absolute, exclusive distinction, why do we have to categorize things into "feminine" and "masculine" in the first place? Why not call the ends of the continuum "snark" and "boojum" instead? Why not have three, or fifteen, categories rather than two? How solid is the rock on which this "gender theory" is built? Or does gender theory include what I just said ? Aha. You're objecting to the Transcendental Feminine on grounds that the meaning of "feminine" is culturally-defined and fluid. This is not the circular reasoning of defining a word and then drawing con- clusions about the real world based on that definition, but rather observing the existing definition of "feminine" and pointing out that it IS fluid, and therefore can't possibly refer to something transcen- dental. In which case I'm in total agreement, and there's nothing to argue about. :-) "A crystalline set of dominoes / Except not really crystalline; And sort of domino-like, / But not really." -- Jane Siberry bloch%cs@ucsd.edu
jjb@cs.wayne.edu (J. Brewster) (07/11/89)
My recent article elicited some e-mail from Richard Shapiro, which questioned what the Sophia-ists [Richard's term] conceive to be the goals of feminism and how feminist/feminine spirituality might serve those ends -- or at least not be at odds with them. I went back and reviewed all of the articles in the thread and find that others have already said much of what I would say, often in a much better way. In particular, I would find it difficult to improve on Gretchen Chapman's reply in <8907011558.AA19050@cattell.psych.upenn.edu>. Anyway, here's my $.02... I can't give an authoritative statement of the goals of feminism. For the sake of this discussion, let's assume that the goals are to establish that gender is socially and not physiologically determined. I think that's a fair summary of what Richard says... This might be a concern if the goddesses were consistently linked to the same traits, the gods were not, and if these traits were the same as the ones which we traditionally consider feminine. Were this the case, I think few would be interested in feminist spirituality! However, I believe the opposite is true: there are a lot of goddesses who embody a variety of traits and roles. They are active beings who assume the same roles as gods. They are creators, avengers, protectors, you name it. As such, they cut across conventional gender lines and promote exactly the goal mentioned above. Needless to say, they do not fit our traditional concept of femininity, either. I also think there's reason to prefer goddesses to some sort of neutral deity that is genderless, at least for the present. The reason is that we don't just get up and walk away from our personal history. For those of us raised with the traditional patriarchal religions, adding the feminine to a very masculine religious tradition makes more sense (at least, to me) than adding some sort of neutral deity. That is, our present set of beliefs already is gendered, and what we want to do is balance that set of beliefs out. That I think is much more feasible that trying to redo everything from the ground up. I find in my own experience that this process has made a difference in the way that religion "feels" (much better!) and in the way that it leads me to view women. (Who in their right mind would tell Oya that it's her job to wash the kitchen floor because she's feminine?) -- J. Brewster | "In this country, everything loose jjb@cs.wayne.edu | rolls to the West Coast." ...!mailrus!wsu-cs!jjb | --Thomas A. Vanderslice, CEO of Apollo
nelson@berlioz.nsc.com (Ted Nelson) (07/13/89)
In article <12602@bloom-beacon.MIT.EDU> bloch%mandrill.UUCP@ucsd.edu (Steve Bloch) writes: >OK, I'll grant that, but if there's no absolute, exclusive distinction, >why do we have to categorize things into "feminine" and "masculine" in >the first place? Why not call the ends of the continuum "snark" and >"boojum" instead? Why not have three, or fifteen, categories rather >than two? How solid is the rock on which this "gender theory" is >built? Or does gender theory include what I just said ? Are you aware that there are some, albeit only a few (a couple indian and a few african), cultures that DO have three genders/sexes. These mostly come about due to the unknown status of some persons when born due to undifferentiated genatalia. BUT there was even another indian one (Navahoe?) that has four whereby a physical woman/man can "become" a man/woman for all social purposes. If you are interested, I can look it up. >"A crystalline set of dominoes / Except not really crystalline; >And sort of domino-like, / But not really." -- Jane Siberry "You can't chop down a symmetry." -- Jane Siberry. -- Ted.
rshapiro@bbn.COM (Richard Shapiro) (07/13/89)
In article <12602@bloom-beacon.MIT.EDU> bloch%mandrill.UUCP@ucsd.edu (Steve Bloch) writes: >OK, I'll grant that, but if there's no absolute, exclusive distinction, >why do we have to categorize things into "feminine" and "masculine" in >the first place? Why not call the ends of the continuum "snark" and >"boojum" instead? Why not have three, or fifteen, categories rather >than two? How solid is the rock on which this "gender theory" is >built? Or does gender theory include what I just said ? We're getting at the crux of things here. I can't tell you why any of this is as it is, I can only say ("descriptively", as it were) that this is the situation we seem to be in. Our episteme of behaviors has one its axes, the gender axis, aligned with the male/female polarity. There's no intrinsic reason why this should be so, and there's certainly no reason why any particular distribution of behaviors along the gender axis is more correct than any other. But given that there is such an axis, and that there is particular distribution along that axis (with local variations according to class, ethnicity etc), given, that is, that we look at the world through gendered eyes, it's not surprising that there are tendencies for women to be "feminine" and men to be "masculine" (not surprising, but not tautological either). There's no point in looking for materialist explanations for this -- that's the wrong level of analysis. Psycho-analytic explanations might be more helpful, which is presumably why many feminists are appropriating Freud and Lacan for feminism (there's an interesting new topic: feminist psychoanalysis). But the important first step, I think, is simply to recognize where we are, and then perhaps to figure out how we got here (a genealogy of gender, as Foucault might put it). The reproduction of gender is a hard problem, too hard for me to offer any convincing explanations. This would make for another interesting topic. How is it that gender continues to exist as a social (nb: NOT individual) phenomenon, even as its particular contents change? How can we push those changes that do occur in a feminist direction? What *is* a feminist direction? Can we consider the possibility of undoing gender altogether? How might we do this? Do we want to do this? These are the questions that seem like the important ones to me (some of them, anyway).