rshapiro@arris.COM (Richard Shapiro) (01/16/91)
In article <15414@sdcc6.ucsd.edu> bloch@thor.ucsd.EDU (Steve Bloch) writes: >>I would rather say something like "subject positions", so as to avoid >>the implication that we can wear such positions (or not) like >>costumes. > >I have no idea what you're talking about. Let me try to explain, by using the analogy of language. Modern linguistics derives in part from Saussere, who pointed out that a language is a system of differences -- ie, that the identity of each component (at any level) comes exclusively from the ways in which it differs from other components. Such components (phonemes, morphemes etc) have no identity outside of such systems. They are not pre-existing things which a language incorporates; rather they are defined by the language system itself. More complex linguistic forms are built from simpler ones in systematic, restricted ways -- there are an infinite number of sentences in English, but not every collection of words is a possible sentence. In fact, most combinations are not possible. I would claim that gender and subjectivity are much the same. Subjectivity is a very complex form of social existance, consisting of simpler component parts (gender among them); there are an infinite number of possible subjectivities, and no two are alike. Nonetheless, in a given social setting, most combinations of components parts are not, in fact, possible. The ones that are possible I call "subject positions". Subjectivity is temporal -- constantly shifting and realigning itself. But if we freeze time, we can focus on the positions themselves, and their components. Going back to the language analogy, the components of subject positions exist only as a system of differences. Gender is an obvious example. "Masculine" and "feminine" provide a simple, binary system of differences, but these only have meaning within the system. So, a human subject is a series of shifting subject positions, formed out of the basic components (like gender). Now, we know from language that while sentences are almost always unique (except when we're quoting someone else), most of what we say follows fairly routine formulas. The details are different and we freely choose them; but the forms are prescribed for us in advance, and we use them nearly all the time. So also with subject positions. We can freely choose the details, but the basic forms are defined outside of any individual. This is what I mean when I say that subject positions are not something we wear like clothes. We don't get up in the morning and say "Today I'll adopt subjectivity X." We don't have that kind of freedom, any more than we can speak "English" in any way we choose. We can speak another language, of course, but the same restrictions apply there. >But I question what you call "the limitations inherent in gender >roles" on two counts. First, the mere fact that Behavior A is >"feminine" and Behavior B "masculine" shouldn't prevent me from >practicing BOTH, either choosing between them as circumstances >warrant, or even making both of them primary modes of operation. As explained above, I think your choices are quite restricted under ordinary circumstances. But the "prevention" is not a matter of law. It's a matter of the definitions inherent in the social system that forms you as a subject. You can transgress a law (and pay the price). You can stand outside of the law. But in order to transgress subjectivity, you would need a place outside of subjectivity in which to stand. And there is no such place. >Second, as long as these "subject positions" are called "gender" and >named "feminine" and "masculine", females will be steered toward the >former and males toward the latter. There isn't a strict match between sex and gender, but I agree that there are strong alignments. The documented cases of sexual misidentification bear this out. But I don't see this as a problem in and of itself. >>Freedom from such positions means the end of >>subjectivity itself. > >Subjectivity depends for its very existence on gender-labelled roles? >I KNOW you didn't mean that... did you? I mean that without a system of differences (of which gender is a classic example), there can be no subjectivity at all. There will *always* be defining differences between people. It is utopian, or maybe prelapsarian, to think otherwise. It seems likely to me that gender will always be part of that system. Perhaps it won't, in some far future. >OK, you're defining "oppressed" as "on the losing end of an >inequality", while I was using something more like "unnecessarily >restricted in freedom". By your definition, certainly, it's >mathematically impossible for everybody to be oppressed simultaneously >(at least on the same dimension). By mine, it's quite possible. But what I'm saying is, oppression in your sense is necessary, inevitable, impossible to do without. Whose freedom is restricted by the existance of difference? It would have to be a pre-differentiated subject, or one which stands outside of subjectivity altogether. To go back to the analogy: If I want to speak, I need a language; the language necessarily has restrictions; thus speech is, necessarily, restricted, or as you would say, oppressive. But the only escape from this oppression is to stop speaking, or never to learn in the first place. This is an odd kind of freedom. > I see no reason to classify all (or many) >behaviors, assumptions, and whatever else makes up a "subject >position" into two mutually exclusive categories and label them >"gender", I haven't done this. I've only claimed that gender is an important aspect of subjectivity and is likely to remain so in the near future. As I mentioned before, it's the *first* thing we ask/determine of a newborn: boy or girl. And this primacy persists throughout our lives.