[soc.feminism] Defining Sexual Harassment

U15289%uicvm.uic.edu@ohstvma.acs.ohio-state.EDU (06/21/91)

In article <91168.164210U23700@uicvm.uic.edu>,
U23700%uicvm.uic.edu@ohstvma.acs.ohio-state.EDU says:
>
>    Officially, our workplace policy is that display of sexual material
>in the work place constitutes sexual harassment.

     This, to me, connotes the kind of vague and/or overbroad
definition of sexual harassment that can only undermine the fight
against genuine harass- ment.

     To define the "display of 'sexual material'" as harassment **per
se**, without reference either to the specific content of the
material, or the intent of the displayer, is treading on thin ice with
respect to individual liberties--particularly when there is a
significant risk of punitive sanctions being imposed on the displayer.

     Granted, almost anything with sexual content will be considered
erotica by some, and pornography by others.  But can a classic Edward
Weston nude photograph, on display in an office, seriously be
considered to be on the same level as a cutout from Hustler, from the
standpoint of determining the presence or absence of a harassment
situation?  What is more, it is essential to determine both the actual
effect of the erotic image in question on the complainant, and whether
there is demonstrable **mens rea** on the part of the person on whose
walls the image appears.

     The various postings to this newsgroup on this topic have posited
a number of reasons why people display, or merely view, "erotic
images" in their places of employment.  It is implausible that any and
all of these images will serve to make the working environment
"hostile, lewd and intimidating," or otherwise truly untenable
emotionally, to a person of ordinary sensibilities.  (The latter two
words, I think, are crucial to a viable definition of sexual
harassment, but are all too often overlooked).  It should be
emphasized that this is a much higher threshold of actionability, as
it were, than mere "offensiveness," deviation from individual
definitions of political correct- ness, etc.; Jim Mason's insightful
essay on this aspect of the problem (article
<1991Jun14.190752.209@gnv.ifas.ufl.edu>) is hereby recommended to the
reader.  Nor is there necessarily either an intent to harass (by
either the broader or narrower definition), or an indifference to
possible effects, on the part of every displayer; this too must be
considered in formulating and administering a just policy on
harassment.  (I would venture to say that there is some correlation
between content and intent; pictures on the Hustler end of the
continuum alluded to above are far more likely to reflect a truly
harassing intent than those on the Weston end, or even the Playboy
point).

    All this represents a separate issue, of course, from the norms on
"businesslike" or "unbusinesslike" decor (as well as dress, etc.) that
may be prevalent in particular occupational groups.  Particular
displays (erotic and otherwise) may be impolitic in the context of
particular work settings, without falling within any defensible
definition of environmental sexual harassment.  And it should never be
forgotten that an overinclusive definition of harassment, by the
display of visual images or otherwise, risks functioning at cross
purposes with itself.  If every picture of an erotic or sexual nature
is actionable in principle, the standard will eventually become so
watered down that communications and actions that really do make the
workplace emotionally untenable for some people may be less likely to
be acted against in practice.

                                               Mitch Pravatiner
                                               BITNET U15289 at UICVM