[soc.religion.christian] Election/Free Will Part 2

cash@uxc.cso.uiuc.edu (Peter Cash) (11/17/89)

In a previous article about free will/election, I had trouble understanding
how the problem or dichotomy between these two arises.  I thought that I
could underestand election in terms of a rather simple example:

>>It's a bit like a coach selecting a particularly promising young athlete to
>>be on the team.  The coach has been watching the young man for some time.
>>When the time is right, he approaches the athlete and asks him to be on the
>>team.  The athlete is overjoyed, and immediately accepts.

To this, the moderator replied:

>[Again, I'm not going to try to convince you that these ideas are
>true, but merely make it clear where they came from.

>...But I do think that
>predestination came from a serious attempt to follow out Paul's views,
>particularly in Romans, and also that it is based on real religious
>needs.

>You seem to be saying that God elects those who he forsees are worthy
>of election.  This idea is certainly not an uncommon one.  However it
>would not have satisfied the Reformers.  It implies that God chose the
>elect because he found some specific quality in them that he liked.
>The Reformers' reading of Rom 9 is that election does not depend upon
>any quality of the elect, but is strictly God's free choice.  Luther
>had a clear existential motivation for these views: His own religious
>experience had led him to believe that nothing about himself could be
>relied on.  Only if salvation depends entirely upon God could he have
>any confidence in it.

You have helped me see one way that the problem of free will vs. election
can arise, and I thank you.  As you present it here, the problem arises on
account of two premises:

1) The Reformers say that a man cannot be saved on account of anything he
does nor because of any virtues that are in him.  A man cannot deserve
salvation; it is a free gift from God.

2) Some men are saved, and others are not.

These premises imply the conclusion that God chooses men arbitrarily: it
appears that men are saved or damned on divine whim.  ("Jacob I loved, but
Esau I hated...")

And here there is indeed a disturbing problem, for while the conclusion
seems unacceptable (because it contradicts our belief in a loving God),
denying either of the premises also seems impossible.

I don't find this an easy problem to dispose of.  But I have to make a stab
at it...

I think that God *does* choose men on the basis of something that he knows
about their nature.  However, these characteristics that God looks for (and
I won't pretend to understand more than dimly what they are) are not
something that we have produced in ourselves.  These virtues are not earned
by us, they are not the product of our will.  In a like manner, one pot
might be better than the other, but the better pot is not to be praised for
its good qualities.

I suppose that the potteer--God--must be credited with our virtues, such as
they are.  As to why some men have been created in such a fashion that they
are drawn to God, while others are not, this I don't understand...though it
surely must have something to do with the fallen state of all creation.

I suppose that I am rejecting at least part of the first premise: I'm
saying that God doesn't choose us because of any accomplishments of our
own, but that this doesn't mean that God has no criteria for making his
choice.  (Hmmmm.  Would the Reformers be content with this?)

Thanks again for helping me see this problem somewhat more clearly.

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             |  The fleshe is bruckle, the Feynd is slee --  |
Peter Cash   |        timor mortis conturbat me!             |    cash@convex
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[It's too late at night for me to make ex cathedra judgements on
behalf of Calvin, but I don't see any immediate contradictions.  --clh]