ok@goanna.cs.rmit.oz.au (Richard A. O'Keefe) (12/11/90)
I suppose most of us have heard of Hume's argument against miracles.
(By the way, if you can find a copy of Whately's *brilliant* parody,
"Historical Doubts concerning Napoleon Buonaparte", read it! It is
one of the funniest things I have read. Whately was the author of
several books on logic and reasoning, and was largely responsible
for (re-)introducing the study of logic in 19th century Britain.)
Hume's argument goes more or less like this:
1. Introduction of straw man:
"A miracle is something which violates natural law".
2. Assume the result of the argument:
"We have absolutely uniform experience that natural laws
have never been violated"
3. Complete the circle:
"Therefore miracles _can't_ happen".
So far so good. As it happens, I had never looked at anything else of
Hume's, and wasn't aware of his work on induction. Here's what Popper
says in "Objective Knowledge":
Hume's logical problem is [Ref: Hume, treatise on Human Nature,
ed Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1888, 1960, Book I, Part III, section vi,
p. 91; Book I, Part III, section xii, p. 139]:
Are we justified in reasoning from [repeated] instances of
which we have experience to other instances [conclusions]
of which we have no experience?
Hume's answer to (this) is: NO, however great the number
of repetitions. Hume also showed that the logical situation
remained _exactly the same_ if in (this problem) the word
"probable" is inserted before "conclusions", or if the words
"to other instances" are replaced by "to the _probability_
of other instances". (emphases Popper's)
Never mind what the "real" answer to induction is, the point is that
this was _Hume's_ answer: you cannot _rationally_ conclude from any
number of repetitions that the future will resemble the past.
That doesn't so much saw off the branch Hume was sitting on in his
argument about miracles as dynamite the entire tree: experience not
only cannot _rationally_ establish that miracles can't happen, it
cannot in _Hume's_ account _rationally_ establish _anything_.
I've seen it mentioned before that Hume's argument is circular, but
I've never seen it mentioned that Hume himself showed the major
inferential step to be invalid.
--
The Marxists have merely _interpreted_ Marxism in various ways;
the point, however, is to _change_ it. -- R. Hochhuth.sc1u+@andrew.cmu.edu (Stephen Chan) (12/14/90)
>Excerpts from netnews.soc.religion.christian: 11-Dec-90 Hume, miracles, induction Richard A. O'Keefe@goann (2346) > > >Never mind what the "real" answer to induction is, the point is that > >this was _Hume's_ answer: you cannot _rationally_ conclude from any > >number of repetitions that the future will resemble the past. I think that you should be a little more precise in looking at the language: Hume claims that reason _alone_ is insufficient to establish a *causal* relationship. It is *belief* (which is something outside the realm of reason) which provides the key step that allows us to make causal claims. Thus, it is possible to make causal inferences, but they are not based on reason alone. Thus, a form of empiricism which relies solely on rationality MUST degenerate into pure skepticism. Hume is making an argument against pure reason, not an argument *for* radical skepticism. >Excerpts from netnews.soc.religion.christian: 11-Dec-90 Hume, miracles, induction Richard A. O'Keefe@goann (2346) > > > 1. Introduction of straw man: > > "A miracle is something which violates natural law". > > > 2. Assume the result of the argument: > > "We have absolutely uniform experience that natural laws > > have never been violated" > > > 3. Complete the circle: > > "Therefore miracles _can't_ happen". This argument doesn't contradict the first part (once you know what Hume is really getting at). The argument isn't circular either. Hume makes 2 assumptions in the argument, and ends up with a contradiction. So, he chooses to throw out the first assumption "A miracle is something which violates natural law." However, there is no logical reason why we can't throw out the SECOND assumption "we have absolutely uniform experience that natural laws have never been violated". In fact, invalidating the second assumption seems more reasonable to me. Obviously the existence of miracle claims invalidates the assertion that *all* our experience is uniform. There are several Catholic Saints who have the "miraculous" property of being "incorruptible"; i.e. after death, they have not decomposed. Even now, they are lying in state in various places around the world. St. Phillip Neiri (sp?), who is the saint associated with the Newman Centers at many colleges, is one such incorruptible. Every once in a while, these saints "miraculously" produce pleasant odors and sometimes tears fall from their eyes. These tears are supposed to have amazing curative properties. Countless people have witnessed these things. Hume always claimed that reason was the lackey of the passions; he himself fell in this trap when he uses reason to prove his personal conviction that miracles can't exist. Stephen Chan