[comp.virus] Corporate culture shift resulting from virus mis

DCD@CUNYVMS1.BITNET (07/16/89)

I am actively involved with a large microcomputer BBS for Mechanical
Engineers (CIME-ISE, 608-233-5378).  I will be giving a talk on the BBS
at the International Computers in Engineering Conference this August in
Anaheim, and am preparing a piece that will appear in the magazine
Mechanical Engineering, the main organ (as they say) of the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (circ. approx. 130,000).

I understand that the messages here are in general somewhat academic and
technical, but perhaps the following line of discussion may spark some
interest.   I am intrigued by what can only be called the return of MIS:
we all know the corporate Kulturkampf that took place not so many years
ago when microcomputers became readily available--the MIS people (in large
corporations) kicked and screamed, but eventually their power was diluted.
Now, I am seeing reports that their day has returned.  Relatively techno-
illiterate upper management sees reports on viruses in Time, etc., and puts
a call in that all decisions on software must be blessed from a newly power-
ful management structure.

Consider the following case, which I consider emblematic:  a project engineer
at a large chemical installation plant can
1) sign off on $50,000 daily, but igf

    but if he wants a $200 copy of wordstar, e.g., he must ask his piping
supplier to buy it and bury it in an invoice;
2) he must use some cock-a-mamie line editor on his central computer; he, and
many other engineers, circumvent this by burying their favorite programs on
some hidden directory (of course against compnay policy)
3) he is being hassled about using the engineering BBS, and all BBS's in
general.  A valuable resource is being maligned and his productivity will
suffer.

I have no doubt that such corporate shenanigans are taking place all
the time, and would be interested in any comments.

Thanks for your time in reading this,

        Robert Braham
E-mail: DCD@CUNYVMS1.BITNET
Home:   1315 Third Ave., 4D
        New York, NY  10021
        (212) 879-1026

ignatz@att.att.com (07/21/89)

In article <0004.y8907171856.AA19378@ge.sei.cmu.edu> DCD@CUNYVMS1.BITNET writes
:
>....   I am intrigued by what can only be called the return of MIS:
>we all know the corporate Kulturkampf that took place not so many years
>ago when microcomputers became readily available--the MIS people (in large
>corporations) kicked and screamed, but eventually their power was diluted.
>Now, I am seeing reports that their day has returned.  Relatively techno-
>illiterate upper management sees reports on viruses in Time, etc., and puts
>a call in that all decisions on software must be blessed from a newly power-
>ful management structure.
>
	[A few examples elided]
>
>I have no doubt that such corporate shenanigans are taking place all
>the time, and would be interested in any comments.
>
>Thanks for your time in reading this,
>
>        Robert Braham
>E-mail: DCD@CUNYVMS1.BITNET
>Home:   1315 Third Ave., 4D
>        New York, NY  10021
>        (212) 879-1026

I trust Robert reads this group; otherwise, well, he won't see this.
I'm a consultant in the Chicago area, and have been for almost 11
years now.  This means I get to encounter the MIS and computer
policies of a number of different firms, both Fortune 500 and small
ones.  Most definitely, the MIS departments are attempting to
re-assert their control over computing resources, and use of the
current panic concerning possible viruses, worms, and other
infestations by crackers is one of the prime tools.  Unfortunately,
these organizations often have little or no knowledge of the needs of
the long-alienated users who now must clear requests through them;
many are traditional IBM mainframe managers, who now must deal with
the bewildering plethora of packages and utilities available to the
micro- and mini-computer user.  The (unfortunate) result is that
often, only a very few programs and packages are considered
'authorized', and restrictive (and usually unnecessary) controls are
placed on procurement and use.

Even worse are some organizations who have installed usually
unqualified personnel in the newly-created office of "Computer
Security."  In one unnamed company, this person was a lawyer whose
qualifications were that he knew how to use Lotus 1-2-3.  Period.  In
these cases, it's particularly difficult to express the difference
between accepting a source copy of a public domain program, and a
binary copy--this person passed down a directive that *all* PD
software was to be scrubbed ASAP on all corporate machines.  It took a
**long** training session to explain the difference in verification
capabilities, and why we really could safely review and use PD
sources.

I'm in the position to argue with, and (often) successfully educate
such organizations; but this is difficult for "real" employees, since
such directives often come from individuals who are high enough in the
hierarchy to make disagreement a somewhat risky proposition.  Also,
the decision makers at this level may well not be computer literate
themselves, and have neither the time nor the desire to do so--they
want clear, concise advice from their experts, who are often those
disenfranchised MIS people.  (Who are often not qualified
themselves...see above.)

This is not a happy-making situation, and I don't have a blanket
answer.  I think what, perhaps, will give us all the best ammunition
to counter the rising hysteria is a clear, well-written text that is
targeted at the intelligent layman, describing exactly what the attack
vectors are, and what approaches can reasonably protect a distributed
computing environment without unnecessary stifling of creative use or
access to valuable programs.