[comp.virus] Shrink-Wrapped Software

WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.ARPA (01/15/90)

>At a meeting yesterday some people made comments that some viruses
>have ben found in shrink-wrapped diskettes.  This did surprise me as
>we have been using a rule of thumb to stick to shrink wrapped software
>to help avoid viruses.  What comments &/or advice do you have for this
>situation?
>       Thanks, Craig

Shrink wrapping is a form of encapsulation that reduces the risk that
software will be contaminated and increases the probability that
tampering will leave evidence.  The vendor of software has an interest
in an orderly market place and in the reputation of his product.  If you
have evidence that the product has not been tampered with since the
vendor shipped it, then you may rely, in part upon his interests.

Shrink-wrap that is applied by the vendor would help to serve that
purpose.  However, few original vendors use labelled shrink-wrap and
many distributors and retailers can apply shrink wrap.

Since much software is poorly labelled, since it is hard to demonstrate,
and generally difficult to buy, Many retailers have adopted a
"Trial/Return" policy.  Under this policy a purchaser is permitted to
return software  for a full refund within a limited period of time.  The
retailer re-wraps the software and returns it to the shelf.  Most such
retailers are simply naive, a few are irresponsible.

The risk to the retailer is that the "purchaser" will simply make a copy
of the software and return the original media and documentation to the
retailer.  However, the retailer can measure this risk.  The risk to
subsequent purchasers of the used package is that the media was
contaminated before it was returned.  This risk is harder to measure and
is not to the person making the decisions.

Vendors can help by using labelled shrink-wrap.  To the extent that
users come to expect such labelling, the re-wrap strategy becomes less
effective and efficient for the retailer.  Users can protect themselves
and discourage this risky practice by refusing to deal with retailers
that offer them the right to return.

William Hugh Murray, Fellow, Information System Security, Ernst & Young
2000 National City Center Cleveland, Ohio 44114
21 Locust Avenue, Suite 2D, New Canaan, Connecticut 06840

SPBK09@SDNET.BITNET (Brian Piersel) (01/15/90)

On Sun, 14 Jan 90 18:02:00 -0500 <WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.ARPA> said:
>Vendors can help by using labelled shrink-wrap.  To the extent that
>users come to expect such labelling, the re-wrap strategy becomes less
>effective and efficient for the retailer.  Users can protect themselves
>and discourage this risky practice by refusing to deal with retailers
>that offer them the right to return.

Another way vendors can help is to sell software on write-protected
diskettes. I always (or almost always) write-protect the master
diskette before putting it in the disk drive, to insure that nothing
happens to my original, anyways. This would also prevent the disk
from being infected.

+----------------------------------------------+
|  Brian Piersel                               |
+----------------------------------------------+
| BITNET:  SPBK09@SDNET                        |
| INTERNET:  SPBK09%SDNET.BITNET@VM1.NoDak.EDU |
+----------------------------------------------+
| IBM = Itty Bitty Machine                     |
+----------------------------------------------+

exspes@gdr.bath.ac.uk (P E Smee) (01/16/90)

In article <0013.9001151235.AA07390@ge.sei.cmu.edu> WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.ARPA wr
ites:
>Vendors can help by using labelled shrink-wrap.  To the extent that
>users come to expect such labelling, the re-wrap strategy becomes less
>effective and efficient for the retailer.  Users can protect themselves
>and discourage this risky practice by refusing to deal with retailers
>that offer them the right to return.

Two points here:  The first is (far as I know) unique to the UK.  We
virtually never SEE shrink-wraps.  The reason is that (allegedly to
prevent theft) the software shops display only the empty boxes on their
shelves.  The contents are removed to be stored behind the counter, and
are replaced in the box when you buy the software.  (Yes, it
occasionally causes problems.  My copy of Dungeon Master turned out to
include a Falcon registration card.  Sigh.) For big-selling software
(read, popular games) they will probably also have some unopened boxes
behind the counter; but for more serious stuff, the opened copy is
probably the only one they've got.  And, you can't just take your
business elsewhere, because they all do this.  (Records, prerecorded
cassettes, CD's, and videotapes are all also marketed this way.)

Second problem is more general, in that you are also thereby more or
less guaranteeing that the retailer will not be willing to demo a
package to you before you buy it.  For a lot of packages, particularly
the serious (and expensive) ones, you can't really tell from the
manufacturers' puff whether the product will do what you need -- or,
indeed, anything useful at all.  Again, for popular products this might
be eased, but for things with a limited market -- well, the dealer is
hardly going to invest in a separate demo copy of something which only
sells a copy a month or so.

What's really needed is some way that the maker can include, separate
from the disk, some form of 'signature' which can be used with a
publicly available verification program, so that you could scan the
disk with the verifier, and compare the output with the provided
signature.  Akin to a checksum, but sufficiently complex that any
change to the disk would be detected.  (There's a thesis topic for the
next 10 years' worth of Masters candidates. :-)  The problem should be
easier than the corresponding ideas for protecting 'user' disks, as
there should be no reason for a distribution disk to EVER change once
it has left the maker's hands.

- --
Paul Smee, Univ of Bristol Comp Centre, Bristol BS8 1TW, Tel +44 272 303132
Smee@bristol.ac.uk  :-)  (..!uunet!ukc!gdr.bath.ac.uk!exspes if you MUST)

msm@sgi.sgi.com (Michael S. Maiten) (01/17/90)

WHMurray@DOCKMASTER.ARPA writes:

>   Vendors can help by using labeled shrink-wrap.  To the extent that
>   users come to expect such labeling, the re-wrap strategy becomes less
>   effective and efficient for the retailer.

Much of the discussion of the "shrink wrap" issue is focused on the
inability of the purchaser to determine if the disk has ever been
used and rewrapped.

In my opinion, a solution to this problem is for the software
publishers to use disks that are permanently write-protected.  (ie; no
notch on 5.25" disks and a hole without slider on 3.5" disks).  This
will not stop a determined terrorist from infecting disks, but it will
stop the casual accidental infection of purchased software.

>   Users can protect themselves
>   and discourage this risky practice by refusing to deal with retailers
>   that offer them the right to return.

Stores that offer return policies are exactly the ones with whom I do
deal, since it is almost impossible to see if the software will meet
my needs by reading the box or trying out the store demonstration
copy.  What they should do is to be more careful when accepting the
returned items (check for missing materials, and check for infection
of the disks) before returning the person's money.

- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael S. Maiten                 Internet:    msm%ensys@bridge2.esd.3com.com
Energetic Systems                       or:    msm%ensys@silvlis.com
Telephone: +1 415 964-9746        UUCP:        {sun!silvlis,bridge2}!ensys!msm