padgett%tccslr.dnet@UVS1.orl.mmc.com (A. Padgett Peterson) (05/23/90)
The nice thing about a small group of people is that we can decide our own conventions. Personally, I prefer virii for several reasons: 1) Viri is already taken (vir) 2) Virae is possible but equally incorrect. 3) American English will adopt anything. 4) Virii is distinctive, understood by most researchers, and much easier than viruses for a two-finger typist. 5) Virii, when spoken, readily lends itself to an intonation a la Yogi Bear. Padgett - 10 minutes north of DisneyWorld
padgett%tccslr.dnet@mmc.com (A. Padgett Peterson) (05/14/91)
>From: p1@arkham.wimsey.bc.ca (Rob Slade) >Padgett: We must sue the vendors! Well, this isn't quite what I said, however what we have here is a simple lesson in perception and economics. Quality assurance, which includes sampling and integrity validation (what we are shipping is what we said we would ship), has a cost. Traditionally, the most difficult cost centers to justify are security and quality assurance since anything they find can keep the product from going out the door. In the case of security, the risk is apparent, but quality assurance is usually the result of contractual clauses that specify it. Most electrical appliances carry the Underwriters Laboratories seal of approval because vendors have discovered that the seal works both ways, protecting both the consumer and the vendor. The problem is that with software, there is no such seal, nor is there any demand for one. To the vendors, QA is not a justifiable expense at the disk level since there is no requirement for it. Similarly, if a problem is discovered, most vendors will try to sweep it under the rug since to admit that a problem exists would open them to liability and lost sales. Since at present there is no risk in doing so, it is the exceptional company that will "go public" with a problem. The only way this is going to change is if the risks of not "going public" becomes greater than the risks from "going public". Hopefully, the cost of either will also make effective QA cost effective. Hence my comment "bring in the lawyers", not necessarily to sue, but to explain such concepts as "culpable negligence" in such a way that no-one can plead ignorance & the corporate managers can go to their bosses for QA funding with some hope of success. Unfortunately, as with the SPA, it is probably going to take a few publicised civil actions before the vendors are going to do the "right thing", I was surprised a year ago that it had not already happened. Of course a full recall of all such software is a bitter and expensive pill for a company to swallow (and why most automotive recalls, while always publicised as "for our customer's safety" by the manufacturers, are often the result of a tooth & nail fight with NHTSA (did I get the letters right ?) before they become official. At the moment there is no computer industry "NHTSA" (and few qualified people who would be willing to serve on it). Having been in the corporate world since leaving the unfriendly skies of SouthEast Asia. I KNOW that there must be good people at companies like Packard-Bell who are being forced to follow a "party line" against their better judgement (incidently, from what I have seen, the equipment is pretty good and reasonably priced). However, this does not help the customer with their third largest investment (?) who finds their PC useless shortly after arriving home, something that is going ultimately to hurt the entire industry for some time to come (see below). >From: Peter Jones <MAINT@UQAM.BITNET> >Subject: Re: Packard-Bell (PC) >Perhaps the recent sightings are due to diskettes remaining in >storage for 6 months or so. Quite likely, though the reports of the Azusa are new. However, considering how these units are sold (department stores, mail order), that inventory is liable to be around for quite some time to come. You would think that the manufacturer could at least identify which lots and models are liable to have infected disks, certainly the two viruses involved (MusicBug & Azusa) are easy to identify & the distribution disks reported to be infected (COMBASE, TVGA, & SVGA) are limited. In short, while I am sure that Ken will be glad to see an end to this issue, to me it is a vital one that we can either learn from and insist on safeguards from those best able to provide them, or have the interesting experience of repeating it again in another six months or so. Warmly, Padgett