GARY@maximillion.cp.mcc.com (Gary Knight) (06/29/89)
I was fascinated by a closing on a recent nanotech posting which said: "If you can be reconstructed, you aren't dead!" I'd like to comment on that and ask some questions for others to consider. Assumptions: (1) A well preserved body/brain system can, at some future time, be resuscitated (even returned to prime operating condition) with memory/personality essentially intact. (2) Using only an individual's DNA (meaning you don't have to find much), the individual can be reconstructed (a) as a tabula rasa, or (b) with memory/personality essentially intact. I'm not commenting on the possibility or likelihood of any of the assumptions, just using them for purposes of discussion. If assumption (1) applies, then anyone in a reasonably sophisticated embalmed or cryonically preserved state could be resuscitated and returned to normal function. If that is the case, is this individual legally dead? Under current law and medical practice, almost certainly yes. But as the practice of resuscitation becomes feasible, those in the preserved state might simply be regarded as "on hold," with "death" a temporary but reversible stage. Do their estates pass to heirs? What if they come back? Won't they want their toys back? But I digress, because I'm really more interested in the philosophical/theological implications than the legal problems. So are they dead or aren't they? If they can be resuscitated, what are they doing in the meantime? By all known information about human physiology and brain function, they aren't doing much of anything. Whereas during sleep (a state which, save for the non-conscious element, is not otherwise analogous to death) our brains are very active (moreso in some situations than during the awake state) and our bodily functions are churning away. But the "dead" person is sort of like Schrodinger's cat -- if someone resuscitates the body, then it wasn't dead after all, but if (after passage of an infinite amount time I guess) it isn't then it was. Aarrgggh. And in the interim, what does this do to ideas of afterlife, reincarnation, and so forth? If the dead person can be reconstructed under assumption (1), then it isn't likely to be off somewhere reincarnated as another living thing is it? Or would the reincarnated life form just topple over when the resuscitation took place? Gets a little macabre, doesn't it? I suppose the memory/personality could be off in some Elysian field, or heaven, waiting for recall (but would it want to come back from paradise? And could it prevent being brought back?). So what does this say about theological theories of what happens when the brain is flatlined? More interesting questions arise if we make assumption (2). Under option (a), the legal questions now become more complex -- namely, is this the same "person" as before, since it has no memory/personality which is the hallmark identification of individual humans. The problem probably wouldn't arise unless someone was interested in obtaining lots of zombie- like labor, because who'd want to be resuscitated if they weren't "they" anymore? But if we make option (b) operative, we now can literally restore full function and personality to anything that ever lived if we can find so much as a shred of DNA (i.e., you can be reconstructed from anything short of a ground zero nuclear explosion). So if even the memory construct of the brain (synaptic modifications held in place through cryonics or embalming) isn't required, what happened to the memory/personality while the individual was demolished? Just restin'? Hmmm. So what say all of you? ------- [I think it's about time we start getting used to the fact that a lot of our old labels will become increasingly inadequate. Rather than waste time trying to nail down whether these new tradesmen are *really* lords or serfs, it would be more productive to propose/develop new schemes of classification that help us model the new reality in a useful way. --JoSH]
alan@oz.nm.paradyne.com (Alan Lovejoy) (07/01/89)
In article <Jun.28.16.30.46.1989.12001@athos.rutgers.edu< GARY@maximillion.cp.mcc.com (Gary Knight) writes:
<
< I was fascinated by a closing on a recent nanotech posting which
<said: "If you can be reconstructed, you aren't dead!" I'd like to comment on
<that and ask some questions for others to consider.
Aha! Someone finally nibbled on my bait! The above is a paraphrase of the
motto in my closing signature.
< Assumptions: (1) A well preserved body/brain system can, at some
<future time, be resuscitated (even returned to prime operating condition)
<with memory/personality essentially intact. (2) Using only an individual's
<DNA (meaning you don't have to find much), the individual can be
<reconstructed (a) as a tabula rasa, or (b) with memory/personality
<essentially intact. I'm not commenting on the possibility or likelihood of
<any of the assumptions, just using them for purposes of discussion.
The probability of 2b is much smaller than that of 1 or 2a, although evidence
is mounting that neurons store long-term memories in DNA. How else could
memories survive cell division?
< If assumption (1) applies, then anyone in a reasonably
<sophisticated embalmed or cryonically preserved state could be
<resuscitated and returned to normal function. If that is the case, is this
<individual legally dead? Under current law and medical practice, almost
<certainly yes.
The Riverside County Coroner wanted to perform an autopsy on Mrs. Dora Kent.
But Mrs. Kent is a cryonics patient. Her representatives went to court,
convinced a judge that her revival was not necessarily impossible, and
obtained a permanent injunction against the coroner. Technically, Mrs.
Kent is still legally dead, however. The point is that even a judge
can see that old ideas need modification if revival of the "dead" is accepted
as a possibility. Whether this will be obvious to legislators is not clear,
however.
<But as the practice of resuscitation becomes feasible, those
<in the preserved state might simply be regarded as "on hold," with "death" a
<temporary but reversible stage.
Most people currently conceptualize death as the currently-irreversible loss
of biological FUNCTION at the organic level. In some contexts, death may be
thought of as currently-irreversible loss of function at the cellular level.
Many people would be content to simply define it as lack of biological function.
Hence, the many stories of people who "died on the operating table" but who
are still alive today. Technology seems to keep changing either the definition
or the permanence of death.
Nanotechnology implies that mere lack of biological function may not always be
irreversible. Irreversible loss of function would only occur in a nano-
technological society if irreparable loss of STRUCTURE occurred. Cryonicists
prefer to call those who have lost biological function--but not structure--as
"deanimated." The other option is to remove the connotation of permanence
from the concept of death, so that "irreversibly dead" would no longer be
redundant (e.g., "wet water"). I prefer to use "deanimation" and "irreversible
death" so as to avoid all possibility of ambiguity.
<Do their estates pass to heirs?
<What if they come back? Won't they want their toys back?
Currently, the estates do pass to the heirs. Should they? Apply the Golden
Rule.
<But I digress, because
<I'm really more interested in the philosophical/theological implications
<than the legal problems.
And the survey said: almost everyone is more interested in the philosophical/
theological implications than in the legal/technical issues. And most
people would rather "just die a natural death." Whatever that means. Of
course, they're never ready to "give up the ghost" just yet...
< So are they dead or aren't they? If they can be resuscitated, what
<are they doing in the meantime? By all known information about human
<physiology and brain function, they aren't doing much of anything. Whereas
<during sleep (a state which, save for the non-conscious element, is not
<otherwise analogous to death) our brains are very active (moreso in some
<situations than during the awake state) and our bodily functions are
<churning away. But the "dead" person is sort of like Schrodinger's cat -- if
<someone resuscitates the body, then it wasn't dead after all, but if (after
<passage of an infinite amount time I guess) it isn't then it was. Aarrgggh.
<And in the interim, what does this do to ideas of afterlife, reincarnation,
<and so forth? If the dead person can be reconstructed under assumption
<(1), then it isn't likely to be off somewhere reincarnated as another living
<thing is it? Or would the reincarnated life form just topple over when the
<resuscitation took place? Gets a little macabre, doesn't it? I suppose the
<memory/personality could be off in some Elysian field, or heaven, waiting
<for recall (but would it want to come back from paradise? And could it
<prevent being brought back?). So what does this say about theological
<theories of what happens when the brain is flatlined?
The empirical evidence is OVERWHELMING that consciousness is a function of
the brain. Blows to the head may knock you out. Drugs alter your state
of consciousness. Surgery on the brain can change you. Occams razor
suggests that the brain is the seat of consciousness. If consciousness
were a manifestation of some "spiritual" phenomenon, then how could mundane
physical events, such as alcohol, affect it? If memory were spiritual,
how could a blow to the head cause amnesia?
I know for a fact that I remember no past lives. Without such memory,
it is irrelevant whether or not I ever "lived" before. Absent the memory,
what good does it do me? To wipe my memories is to kill me. If I do not
remember the past, then I did not live in it. If I forget the present,
then I have died.
Suppose you use nanotechnology to make a perfect copy of yourself. Which
"copy" gets your "soul"? This is really very related to the question of
what happens to the soul of a reanimated cryonics patient. The answer
is so obvious that most people can't see it: your "soul" is simply you.
If you make a copy of yourself, you make a copy of your soul--by definition.
Neither copy has precedence. Bacteria and other cells do this all the time.
If there is a spiritual "soul" that has some sort of existence independent
of the body, then IT IS INDEPENDENT OF THE BODY. The "soul" would then be
analogous to a recording or copy of one's memories/personality/identity.
There can be multiple instances of the same soul, just as there can be multiple
tapes with the same recording. The "copy" of you that goes to heaven is not
affected by what happens to the copy of you that remains in your brain cells.
There is no reason why these copies cannot be played by different instruments
at different times at different speeds--in different universes. But why
would God bother making the last backup when the original copy isn't going
to be erased just yet due to cryonic suspension?
Reanimation of a cryonics patient will no more disturb his soul than making a
perfect duplicate of him would. Unless you beleive that killing one of the
twins would kill the other one, too? Killing a bacterium does not affect its
sibling-parent.
Alan Lovejoy; alan@pdn; 813-530-2211; AT&T Paradyne: 8550 Ulmerton, Largo, FL.
Disclaimer: I do not speak for AT&T Paradyne. They do not speak for me.
______________________________Down with Li Peng!________________________________
Motto: If nanomachines will be able to reconstruct you, YOU AREN'T DEAD YET.