djo@pacbell.com (Dan'l DanehyOakes) (06/29/89)
This is getting *way* out of hand. Part of the problem is that we're simply talking about two different things. Alan is concerned with military gragu; I'm more worried (for now) about the randomly created voracious molecule. Since a lot of this dialog is based on that noncommunication, I'm dropping a *lot* of points from this message (and there was much rejoicing). >What about first proving that "gray goo" is possible? But first, what IS >gray goo, precisely? Simply: an uncontrollably self-replicating nanodevice or group of nanodevices. >There are indications that gray goo may not pose much of a threat simply >because it is impossible--or at least only possible if "gray goo" is given >a very "watered down" definition. I don't regard my definition as watered down; and I'd say it allows for the possibility of real goo: using Drexler's everpresent analogy to biostuff, the existence of uncontrollably self-replicating things like bacteria and viruses is proof of the possibility of goo. >What is an AIA? An "artificially intelligent assembler" I assume? Have you >read Engines Of Creation yet? Yes, I have. And, for all the validity of its ideas, it remains a patchwork of guesses and speculation. By "AIA" I mean a nanodevice or system of nanodevices capable of replicating other objects, whether by program (directed assembly) or by analysis (disassembly) and synthesis (self-directed assembly). Pretty much by definition, such a device would be capable of self-replication. >An assembler will be roughly the same size as a ribosome. An example of what I call guesses and speculation. Until you've built the damn thing -- or at least made a plausible design for it -- you really don't know how big it will be. And, no, I don't regard KED's "design-ahead" speculations on the assembler anything like plausible; he makes assumption after assumption to come up with a size he's happy/comfortable with. We just plain *DO*NOT*KNOW* what's involved in building a doohickey of such flexibility. We've never done it on the macro scale. Nor do such general assemblers exist in nature; ribosomes are *very* limited in what they can build -- they build essentially- linear objects (chains of amino acids) from an extremely small "alphabet" of components. Even if you allow that the assembler is working solely with atoms and not groups of atoms (such as amino acids), there are more kinds of atoms than there are types of amino acids used by ribosomes...and atoms with the same valence will be difficult for an assembler to tell apart by the "purely chemical" means so dear to KED. >It simply cannot be possible to store enough information in >such a small space (around 10**6 atoms) to have an artificially intelligent >device Right; even if each atom carried a full information bit, there would be on the order of one Mbyte total. Small. But I don't buy that assemblers are *necessarily* that small. And the AIA is the integrated system, not a single nanodevice. >I suspect that what you really mean by "AIA" is "a system of assemblers and >nanocomputers running expert-system software for molecular mechanics." Possibly. >But given nanotechnology, what environment will humans >be able to survive in? And active shields? And what about gray-goo counter- >measures which temporarily "kill" biologic life--but not beyond the ability >of nanomachines to perform "resurrections?" To the first, who should I know? I imagine it'll be environments with food and oxygen and a reasonable temperature range. If nanodevices change that, I'll be surprised; more likely they'll bring an environment with them. >Then rest your mind. This is precisely the period when the greatest care will >be taken, if the recent history of biotechnology is any guide. And the early >years will also coincide with the time when nanomachines will be the most >dependent of special enviroments for their survival. This situation will >be quite deliberate, and probably forced on us by the laws of nature. The first point fails to convince me; I think you're underestimating human stupidity. The second is somewhat more comforting. >Software is another matter...but that may be a moot point also in light of the >fact that neural nets are not programmed--just taught. ...maybe... >Have you ever experimented with the game of "Life?" Yes. >If the gray goo devices >are programmed to blindly eat everything that they encouter, then they are >very likely to quickly eat themselves and/or their energy supply--long bofore >they have "finished" their job. Possible. What's finish? Will they wipe themselves before they cripple what they've begun destroying? If it eats my legs and the bottom two feet of my house and car (and wife and kids!) I don't really care about it wiping itself out at that point. >It's also a completely normal human tendency to demand safeguards up the >ying-yang when a new and dangerous technology is being tried out. Just ask >Jeremy Rifkin. Please don't mention that name. I just ate. Yeh, it *does* seem possible. Here, where protestors can shut down a lab or force it to take all reasonable precautions and some not. But what about a place (the USSR, for example) where lab work is not only not to be interrupted by the people's unreasonble demands for "safety," but in fact not even known to the public? >Nothing is 100% safe. There are dangers in avoiding nanotechnology, which may >in the end be even more formidable than gray goo. The question is, "What course >provides the least risk over all?" Agreed; and I think avoiding nanotech is more dangerous than pursuing it. (Always assuming it can "really" be done at all.) >>>And we need to find out how to reliably >>>cure and prevent the sort of "insanity" (or "antisocial behavior") which >>>drives (or permits) people to purposely seek to harm others. <---------- | >>Again -- whose definition? | | >Do you want to argue over definitions or do you want to prevent gray goo? | | I want to protect human beings. And I think your scenario above ----------- violates people's right to mental privacy, among other things. >Remember, nanotechnology promises indefinite life spans. Yeah? I've hear promises before. Again I say "prove it." >>That's culturocentric. Samurai, for example, often performed anti-survival >>acts. Ditto car bombers. Are they insane? > >Those aren't even good examples. Of course they are/were insane. The degree >to which you give people the benefit of the doubt is a function of what risks >you are willing to take. Which do you fear most? The car bombers, ovbviously. But neither can I call them "insane," and I repeat that calling them insane is culturocentric. They're sane, in both cases, by the standard of their own societies. >>Because goo only has to attack one thing. Sheilds have to attack any >>hypothetical goo. > >Pish and tosh. You have it backwards, my friend. Absolutely right. I confused myself. (I'm frequently groggy when doing this news stuff.) That should have read: "Because goo doesn't have to be selective about what it attacks. Sheilds have to attack any hypothetical goo and *only* goo." (Though goo *can* be selective about what it attacks. Imagine stuff that attacks only the vitreous fluids of human eyes... Yuccch...) >But the burden of proof is on you: gray goo has never existed before, as >far as we know. ...but neither has human-made nanotech. If you allow biolife as proof that nanotech is workable, than you have to accept highly successful bacteria as proof that grey goo is workable... Roach
alan@oz.nm.paradyne.com (Alan Lovejoy) (06/30/89)
In article <Jun.28.16.17.30.1989.11650@athos.rutgers.edu> djo@pacbell.com (Dan'l DanehyOakes) writes: >This is getting *way* out of hand. This is a healthy debate. I wish more people would participate. >>What about first proving that "gray goo" is possible? But first, what IS >>gray goo, precisely? > >Simply: an uncontrollably self-replicating nanodevice or group of nanodevices. What does "uncontrollably" mean? Does it mean that the nanomachines can use almost anything as fuel? Does it mean that they can disassemble almost anything and/or use almost any molecule as building material? Does it mean that they can withstand most common forms of radiation (e.g., sunlight, background radiation)? Does it mean that they tolerate most common chemical environments? Temperatures? Does it mean they are immune to interference from bacteria and immune system cells? Nanodevices which depend on a special environment, special fuels and special building materials not randomly available simply cannot get truly "out of control." Nanomachines which can operate anywhere, eat anything, and use any common building material are probably a relatively HARD design problem compared to more limited devices. Until we have a VERY capable active shield technology that we have great confidence in, it would be foolhardy--and unnecessary--for us to create nanomachines that could survive and operate in the biosphere. As I have pointed out before, there already ARE nanomachines that have been "released" into the biosphere. They're replicating out of control even as you read this. They were designed to evolve quickly, and they do it rather well. They're called bacteria and virii. >>There are indications that gray goo may not pose much of a threat simply >>because it is impossible--or at least only possible if "gray goo" is given >>a very "watered down" definition. > >I don't regard my definition as watered down; and I'd say it allows for the >possibility of real goo: using Drexler's everpresent analogy to biostuff, the >existence of uncontrollably self-replicating things like bacteria and viruses >is proof of the possibility of goo. And the existence of immune systems in flora and fauna is proof of the viability of active shields. Could nanomachines "break" or have "bugs" in their programming? Of course. Do they have to be designed so that the probability that such breaks and programming bugs will lead to still-functional machines is anywhere near as high as it is for biolife? NO!!!!!!!! Biolife is designed to MAXIMIZE the probaility that breaks and "software bugs" result in still-functional units. And noticeable evolution STILL takes millenia. No one can GUARANTEE that an accident leading to goo is impossible. But we can radically reduce the risk compared to what biolife presents by using known engineering technology. For instance, multiply-redundant systems with multiply-redundant error-detection and correction systems could be used--AND REQUIRED. >>Have you read Engines Of Creation yet? >Yes, I have. And, for all the validity of its ideas, it remains a patchwork >of guesses and speculation. And your gray-goo scenario, in contrast, is a well-documented scientific paper that proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that we're all doomed to become a snack for Gray Goo? Ahem. This is all just speculation. We have to start somewhere. It's by speculation and discussion and research and deep thought and cooperation that we will advance from speculation to scientific fact. We aren't there yet. Not you, not me and not Drexler. So do you think, perhaps, that we should just forget about gray goo until we can cross all the t's and dot all the i's on the definitive scientific description of nanotechnology? I don't. I think that, in view of our relative ignorance, we should neither be overly alarmist nor overly reassuring at this point. >>What is an AIA? An "artificially intelligent assembler" I assume? >By "AIA" I mean a nanodevice or system of >nanodevices capable of replicating other objects, whether by program (directed >assembly) or by analysis (disassembly) and synthesis (self-directed assembly). >Pretty much by definition, such a device would be capable of self-replication. Why do you call this an "AIA"? What you describe sounds like a system of assemblers and nanocomputers. I don't see what "AI" has to do with it. >>An assembler will be roughly the same size as a ribosome. >An example of what I call guesses and speculation. Until you've built the damn >thing--or at least made a plausible design for it -- you really don't know how >big it will be. And, no, I don't regard KED's "design-ahead" speculations on >the assembler anything like plausible; he makes assumption after assumption to >come up with a size he's happy/comfortable with. We just plain *DO*NOT*KNOW* >what's involved in building a doohickey of such flexibility. We've never done >it on the macro scale. Nor do such general assemblers exist in nature; >ribosomes are *very* limited in what they can build -- they build essentially- >linear objects (chains of amino acids) from an extremely small "alphabet" of >components. Even if you allow that the assembler is working solely with atoms >and not groups of atoms (such as amino acids), there are more kinds of atoms >than there are types of amino acids used by ribosomes...and atoms with the same >valence will be difficult for an assembler to tell apart by the "purely >chemical" means so dear to KED. You are correct that we have no examples of true generic assemblers. It may be that the first generation(s) of assemblers will NOT be fully generic--nor even very much more capable than a ribosome. You are correct that we don't really know how big they will be. Therefore, the most JUSTIFIED assumption is that they will ROUGHLY be the same size as a ribosome--since the ribosome is the closest thing to an assembler that we have seen. Whatever their size, they will probably NOT contain very many more atoms than are absolutely necessary to perform their function--programmed molecular assembly. Unless the number of atoms necessary for the molecular assembly function is equal to or greater than the number necessary for a complete computer system. And that obviously depends on how you define "complete computer system." It's not likely to be "complete" enough to deserve to be called "AI." Drexler claims he will be ready to PUBLISH his design for an assembler Real Soon Now. He thinks he can actually build one by the year 2000. [Source: January 1989 issue of OMNI Magazine, interview of KED.] Seems to me that Drexler knows FAR more about this subject than you or I do. Atoms with the same valence tend to have similar chemical properties. The more chemical properties are similar, the less the distinction between atoms matters (for non-nuclear applications). And if the chemical properties are not identical, then it is possible in principle to tell the atoms apart. >>It's also a completely normal human tendency to demand safeguards up the >>ying-yang when a new and dangerous technology is being tried out. Just ask >>Jeremy Rifkin. > >Please don't mention that name. I just ate. > >Yeh, it *does* seem possible. Here, where protestors can shut down a lab or >force it to take all reasonable precautions and some not [so reasonable?]. > >But what about a place (the USSR, for example) where lab work is not only not >to be interrupted by the people's unreasonble demands for "safety," but in fact >not even known to the public? <<Switch to Voice Of Ronald Reagan>> Well, we could threaten to nuke them if they don't behave... :-) :-) <<Switch back to default voice>> Just how are we going to prevent certain countries from doing whatever they please? Perhaps if we SCARE them into being safe (make science fiction movies with some irresistable-to-the-leadership political message that depicts in grisly detail the dangers of gray goo). In a way, this is a corollary to the terrorism problem. The other option is to start an ACCELERATED program to develop AI and nanotechnology so that we can have active shields in place before the time certain other countries even start experimenting with their first human-designed assemblers. But somehow this option doesn't seem to likely to be tried. And it's not certain it would work if it were. >>>>And we need to find out how to reliably >>>>cure and prevent the sort of "insanity" (or "antisocial behavior") which >>>>drives (or permits) people to purposely seek to harm others. <---------- > | >>>Again -- whose definition? | > | >>Do you want to argue over definitions or do you want to prevent gray goo? | > | >I want to protect human beings. And I think your scenario above ----------- >violates people's right to mental privacy, among other things. And putting criminals in jail doesn't? Isn't the prison system supposed to "rehabilitate" people? In other words, make different people out of them? If that's not an attempt to manipulate minds, what is? Sometimes, you have to choose the lesser of two evils. The time for this choice approaches rapidly... >>>That's culturocentric. Samurai, for example, often performed anti-survival >>>acts. Ditto car bombers. Are they insane? >> >>Those aren't even good examples. Of course they are/were insane. The degree >>to which you give people the benefit of the doubt is a function of what risks >>you are willing to take. Which do you fear most? > >The car bombers, ovbviously. But neither can I call them "insane," and I repeat >that calling them insane is culturocentric. They're sane, in both cases, by the >standard of their own societies. All our ideas are culturocentric. So what? If someone is breaking into my house with a gun, I'm going to shoot him. And I'm not going to worry about the fact that the right of self-defense--or my desire to keep on living--is culturocentric. Our concept of property is culturocentric. Should you let aborigenes camp out in your back yard, cut down your trees and light fires in your garage just because they have no concept of property? Take action to insure your survival--or die. We can NOT afford to think of ourselves as unrelated groups of independent societies, cultures and nations for very much longer. What the Soviets do in Chernobyl affects ALL OF US. >>>Because goo only has to attack one thing. Sheilds have to attack any >>>hypothetical goo. >> >>Pish and tosh. You have it backwards, my friend. > >Absolutely right. I confused myself. (I'm frequently groggy when doing this >news stuff.) That should have read: > >"Because goo doesn't have to be selective about what it attacks. Sheilds have >to attack any hypothetical goo and *only* goo." > >(Though goo *can* be selective about what it attacks. Imagine stuff that >attacks only the vitreous fluids of human eyes... Yuccch...) > >>But the burden of proof is on you: gray goo has never existed before, as >>far as we know. > >...but neither has human-made nanotech. If you allow biolife as proof that >nanotech is workable, than you have to accept highly successful bacteria as >proof that grey goo is workable... And you have to accept immune systems as proof that shields are workable. Shields do not have to "attack" anything. They merely have to immoblize nanomachinery. The hard problem for the shield is deciding when to go into action--and where. Bioimmune systems are triggered by "distress signals." This suggests seeding the world with nanodevices whose only job is to detect suspicious behavior--and then to "raise the alarm." When a nanocomputer receives a distress signal, it directs the assembly of active shield units whose job it is to shut down all nanomachinery in the immediate area. The "distress signal" might be either chemical or electromagnetic--probably both. Nanomachinery can be immobilized both by jamming the communications between nanocomputers and assemblers/disassemblers, and by "gumming up" the mechanics using molecules roughly analogous to antibodies. Also, energy supplies can be pirated, blocked or destroyed. A shield which simply tried to eat the energy supplies up as fast as possible would cause the goo considerable difficulty. Alan Lovejoy; alan@pdn; 813-530-2211; AT&T Paradyne: 8550 Ulmerton, Largo, FL. Disclaimer: I do not speak for AT&T Paradyne. They do not speak for me. ______________________________Down with Li Peng!________________________________ Motto: If nanomachines will be able to reconstruct you, YOU AREN'T DEAD YET. [A shield which tried to eat the energy supplies as fast as possible would be awwwwwfully close to being goo itself. In fact, that probably constitutes the strongest case against active shields--Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? --JoSH]
trebor@uunet.uu.net (Robert J Woodhead) (06/30/89)
In article <Jun.28.16.17.30.1989.11650@athos.rutgers.edu> djo@pacbell.com (Dan'l DanehyOakes) writes: >Alan writes: >>But the burden of proof is on you: gray goo has never existed before, as >>far as we know. >...but neither has human-made nanotech. If you allow biolife as proof that >nanotech is workable, than you have to accept highly successful bacteria as >proof that grey goo is workable... If anything, the existance of the HIV viruses proves that simple ``devices'' can replicate themselves and actively attack specific sites in the target, eventually causing death. And, if you think about it, many of the attempts to cope with AIDS that involve serious bioengineering [eg: spoofing the HIV binding sites] can be considered rudimentary shields. It seems clear to me that the first real ``nanomachines'' that we create are going to be protein-based devices; in effect, engineered viruses. This will allow the designer to borrow the elaborate machinery inside each cell and bend it to his/her purposes. I would venture to guess that the first nanomachines will be built for the purposes of gene therapy. Consider, for example, the benefits to be gained if we can fix a defective gene and alleviate Diabetes. Or do it in-vitro or in-utero (or pre- conception by treating the parent(s)) and banish Tay-Sachs. -- (^;-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-;^) Robert J Woodhead, Biar Games, Inc. !uunet!biar!trebor | trebor@biar.UUCP ``I can read your mind - right now, you're thinking I'm full of it...''
alan@oz.nm.paradyne.com (Alan Lovejoy) (07/01/89)
>[A shield which tried to eat the energy supplies as fast as possible would > be awwwwwfully close to being goo itself. In fact, that probably constitutes > the strongest case against active shields--Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? > --JoSH] Depends on what the "energy supplies" are precisely. If they're protein, then "eating them up as fast as possible" is definitely NOT the strategy we want the shield to pursue. However, it may be a perfectly sensible strategy in some cases. Another related tactic would be to "lock up" the energy-supplying molecules by surrounding them with useless molecules that require more energy to remove than is contained in the molecule(s) they are "protecting". The problem with this is tactic is where the supply of "useless molecules" is supposed to come from. You do have to be able to trust your shield. You do your best to design it so that it can't betray you. And then you have to decide whether going without a shield is a greater risk than releasing it. We DO have options. It's just that none of them are surefire bets. But that's life, ain't it? Alan Lovejoy; alan@pdn; 813-530-2211; AT&T Paradyne: 8550 Ulmerton, Largo, FL. Disclaimer: I do not speak for AT&T Paradyne. They do not speak for me. ______________________________Down with Li Peng!________________________________ Motto: If nanomachines will be able to reconstruct you, YOU AREN'T DEAD YET.