loki@relay.eu.net (Never Kid A Kidder) (03/16/90)
In article <Mar.12.21.30.02.1990.6427@athos.rutgers.edu> SXJ101@psuvm.psu.edu writes:
Also, I was reading Drexler's "Engines of Creation". In it, he
states that immortality is impossible because of the nature of the universe
and decay. But I came across another book which advanced the idea that in
the future we would be able to store our brains onto computers (tapes).
By doing so, we would be able to make an exact duplicate of our brains and
we could make several copies of the tapes as to never lose them. Because
the information in our brains makes us what we are, it didnt matter if our
bodies decayed and died. We could have artificial bodies (limbs, e.g.) and
"download" our brain. This way we would never die, excluding natural disasters
,etc.
I'm a wee bit shaky on thermodynamics, but I think that because
entropy always increases, you would at some stage find it impossible
to `store' the brain in a physical medium, simply because there would
only be a uniform photon buzz (or something) at some stage. That's if
we go on expanding. If we get a Big Crunch, then all information will
be lost when the universe becomes one singularity. But then I suppose
either way could be considered a natural disaster... Also, eternity
is a long time (longer than the longest thing ever, and then some).
[I opine that worrying about the heat death, or cosmological collapse,
of the universe, now, is like a bunch of cavemen sitting around
worrying what will happen when erosion has washed all the land into
the sea and there's no land left. Eons before it happens, their
knowledge and technological powers relative to the problem will
have changed enough to make their speculations look silly.
--JoSH]mike@maths.tcd.ie (Mike Rogers) (03/16/90)
In article <Mar.14.13.39.10.1990.12561@athos.rutgers.edu> alan@oz.nm.paradyne.com (Alan Lovejoy) writes: >although that takes trillions of years. But SEVERE energy problems would >confront you in only a few hundred billion... Perhaps there is some extremely >A more mundane problem (by comparison) is the fact that the local star >is going to eventually burn out. Of course, it will fry us first before >it sputters out. We have maybe 50 million years before the temperature >starts to get uncomfortable (according to the most recent research of which >I am aware). However, even we primitives can imagine possible ways to But the latest evolutionary models of the solar system seem to indicate that in fact the Solar Constant has been increasing for the last billion years or so, altering drastically the ecosphere. The strange thing is that the bio- sphere seems to have some kind of feedback mechanism to combat this. Gaia? -- Mike Rogers, 6.3.3 TCD, D2, Eire. | Greater love has no more than this; mike@maths.tcd.ie (UNIX => preferred)| Than to be laying down one's life mike@tcdmath.uucp (UUCP=>oldie/goodie)| For friends. msrogers@vax1.tcd.ie(VMS => blergh) | Yeshua ben Josef [Hardly Gaia. Assuming that some long-term change is actually happening, simple evolution is plenty to explain the adaptation of the ecosystem. After all, that's what evolution is about in the first place. --JoSH]
leech@homer.cs.unc.edu (Jonathan Leech) (03/16/90)
In article <Mar.14.13.39.10.1990.12561@athos.rutgers.edu> alan@oz.nm.paradyne.com (Alan Lovejoy) writes: >There are many horrendous obstacles to truly living FOREVER... >But SEVERE energy problems would >confront you in only a few hundred billion... Perhaps there is some extremely >elegant way to escape this fate, but no one has any realistic notion of how. Actually, noted physicist Freeman Dyson did a nice paper on this (whose title and place of publication I of course forget :-); he concluded we can last *much* longer than a few measly trillion years in an open universe. I vaguely recall the figure 10^70 being mentioned. Part of the process involved dismantling large stars and storing their hydrogen for gradual use in efficient, cool red dwarfs, but that was in the very early stages. (Help! Can anyone come up with the reference/more details?) -- Jon Leech (leech@cs.unc.edu) __@/ ``You're everything I ever wanted in a human AND an extraterrestrial.'' - Dr. Steve Mills in _My Stepmother is an Alien_
peb@tma1.eng.sun.com (Paul Baclaski) (03/21/90)
In article <Mar.14.13.03.16.1990.10047@athos.rutgers.edu>, hcobb@walt.cc.utexas.edu (Henry J. Cobb) writes: > > Immortality implys infinite experence. Restoring yourself from old > tapes wipes out your life along with your senility. JoSH says: > As for infinite experience, that becomes an interesting question. > If your mind "fills up", then you either get old fashioned or > forget things, so you only gain limited benefit from living forever. > It may prove necessary to keep changing into new technology, continuously, > to get bigger and bigger memories. I figure that an intricate "rejuvenation" (Fountain of Youth (TM)) will be a big market. The idea is that the newness, naivete, and energy of Youth is instilled into your jaded, filled memory/brain. The best approaches will cause selective memory loss--keeping the good memories, erasing the bad ones. The tricky part is making local changes to many parts of the brain to eliminate the jadedness or mental momentum of perhaps a century of experience. This would be an expensive process and would require significant knowledge of the organization of the human brain and mind. I predict this would be a big market about 50 years after downloading and backup of the human mind is possible. Paul E. Baclaski Sun Microsystems peb@sun.com [I'll bet that just plain physical rejuvenation will be a pretty hot seller well before then-- but I agree, some way of sweeping out that dusty attic would be nice. --JoSH]
AMSA@cucisa.bitnet (03/21/90)
I haven't read Drexler's books, but there's a more immediate issue to consider when discussing how to make humans "immortal": NO living system thus far has the blueprints for "immortality." Replacing parts with nanotech using the original "blueprints" of the living system is not the real obstacle, although the engineering issues may be a challenge. The real obstacle is that all living systems have a blueprint that programs for DEATH eventually. Living human cells can reliably replicate for less than 100 generations. It would seem that if one were to provide all the growth media necessary for the cells, it could live forever -- but this has been shown not to be the case. Therefore, the real obstacle is to change one innate feature of every single living system's blueprint WITHOUT radically changing the living system (undoubtedly, many proteins are probably responsible for aging, which is not just a matter of "wearing out", but they all function to bring the organism to death). It would not do much good to download the software if the hardware had to be corrected and can't accept the code... Edison Wong amsa@cucisa.bitnet [This is true of human (and other higher vertebrates) but not of lower forms, at least not necessarily. It certainly isn't true of "all living systems". There are theories to the effect that human cells have a replication limit as a cancer defense, etc. If E. Coli had a replication limit, the whole species wouldn't last more than a few days... --JoSH]
bfu@ifi.uio.no (Thomas Gramstad) (03/21/90)
I'm just in the process of reading Eric Drexler's _Engines of Creation_ and then I remembered that I had seen the word "nanotechnology" somewhere on USENET.... Yet another group to be followed... That sure is a book with powerful visions. I find it difficult to assess how much of it is feasible (I'm not an engineer or technologist, but a biologist (genetics)). (Sorry, I lost the attribution:) >The real problem is the fact that we don't know that a backup of your >mind is still you (even if you are nothing but information and a >system of state transition functions). For instance, if we create >multiple instances of you from a backup, which one is you? Are they >all you? What does the concept of identity mean in this case? Is >identity unique, or not? And if not, then why would each one of the >instances of you all object to being killed? >The confusions and contradictions that seem to sprout like weeds when >one considers this subject suggest to me that at least one of the >fundamental concepts we use to define/express this problem is flawed, >inconsistent, meaningless and/or otherwise ill-defined. We don't know >what we're talking about, at least not fully. I think an understanding of our method(s) for concept-formation is crucial if one is to assess what is possible and not. This is both an epistemological and a scientific issue. For example, even with an accurate understanding of how the mind works, a simulation of it may still have restrictions or limitations that the real mind doesn't have (i e don't equate a model with reality). Is it possible to incorporate volition/free will (internal causation) in an Artificial Intelligence? If yes, there is the contradiction that this programming was externally generated. If the AI is supposed to be immortal, other problems arise: Fundamentally, being alive means that self-generating and self-maintaining action is necessary; otherwise the organism will die. This is the basis for goal-setting. Without the alternative of death, what does being alive mean? How can goals be set, and value prioritizations be made by an entity which is automatically existing? Well, enough rambling for now... There is a book by Gary McGath, _Model and reality_ about epistemological issues wrt the nature of consciousness and concept-formation in relation to AI research, another of the books I'm in the process of reading... I don't have the time to review it (I hardly have the time to read these books!), however you may contact McGath at 72145.1014@compuserve.com for further information about it. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Thomas Gramstad bfu@ifi.uio.no -------------------------------------------------------------------
KPURCELL@liverpool.ac.uk (Kevin 'fractal' Purcell) (03/23/90)
On Tue, 20 Mar 90 22:45:00 EST Paul Baclaski (peb@com.sun.eng.tma1) said: >I figure that an intricate "rejuvenation" (Fountain of Youth (TM)) >will be a big market. The idea is that the newness, naivete, and >energy of Youth is instilled into your jaded, filled memory/brain. >The best approaches will cause selective memory loss--keeping the >good memories, erasing the bad ones. There would, of course, be a problem with this -- as most wisdom that we obtain comes from the bad experiences we have (remember the first time you fell in love -- now you wouldn't want to do that again? Or rather you probably would, but avoiding all the bad bits) we stand to lose a lot of our wisdom. Perhaps the best way would be to seperate the wisdom from the bad experiences but I'm not sure this is possible -- a little like the difference between knowing that you shouldn't do something because you've been told not to do it and knowing not to do it because you've done it before and the outcome wasn't much fun. He who never makes a mistake never learns anything. > >Paul E. Baclaski >Sun Microsystems >peb@sun.com _________________________________________________________________________ Kevin 'fractal' Purcell ...................... kpurcell @ liverpool.ac.uk Surface Science Centre, Liverpool University, Liverpool L69 3BX "My karma just reversed over your dogma"
alan@oz.nm.paradyne.com (Alan Lovejoy) (03/23/90)
In article <Mar.20.23.29.43.1990.13217@athos.rutgers.edu> bfu@ifi.uio.no (Thomas Gramstad) writes: > > >I'm just in the process of reading Eric Drexler's _Engines of Creation_ >and then I remembered that I had seen the word "nanotechnology" >somewhere on USENET.... Yet another group to be followed... Welcome aboard! >That sure is a book with powerful visions. I find it >difficult to assess how much of it is feasible (I'm not an engineer or >technologist, but a biologist (genetics)). Don't miss the forest for the trees. The more specific the technospeculation, the more likely it is to be wrong in some way, and the harder it is to assess (unless it's already known to be (im)possible). But the other side of that coin is that it can be relatively easy to forecast the broad scope of future technology in general terms--with the obvious exception of those things that will use or rely on as-yet undiscovered physical principles. We will acquire ever greater skill at molecular engineering. We will be able to do things which are analogous to those things which existing molecular machines can do. There will be both unforeseen limitations and unforeseen novel capabilities exhibited by future technologies--these are the things that will make us look silly and/or naive to our future selves and to our children. This is the most important theme of "Engines Of Creation." The rest is just window dressing by comparison. >(Sorry, I lost the attribution:) That's ok--now you've found it again: you are quoting me! >>The real problem is the fact that we don't know that a backup of your >>mind is still you (even if you are nothing but information and a >>system of state transition functions). For instance, if we create >>multiple instances of you from a backup, which one is you? Are they >>all you? What does the concept of identity mean in this case? Is >>identity unique, or not? And if not, then why would each one of the >>instances of you all object to being killed? > >>The confusions and contradictions that seem to sprout like weeds when >>one considers this subject suggest to me that at least one of the >>fundamental concepts we use to define/express this problem is flawed, >>inconsistent, meaningless and/or otherwise ill-defined. We don't know >>what we're talking about, at least not fully. > >I think an understanding of our method(s) for concept-formation is >crucial if one is to assess what is possible and not. This is >both an epistemological and a scientific issue. Absolutely. The universe doesn't care what set of conceptual boxes we use to categorize our subjective experience into our internal model of objective reality. A population doesn't change its opinions based on how the statistician/pollster phrases his questions, or on how he decides what group each individual is a member of, or on what groups he decides exist, or on how each group is defined. All those things may certainly affect the results he gets and the conclusions he draws. But they change the reality not at all. We need polling and statistical methods which can measure the underlying reality of a population's opinions. And we need analogous techniques for scientific research which do not depend on how scientific questions are asked, on what conceptual boxes are used to classify the answers, or on what language and semantic system the concepts are defined in. Perhaps all self-consistent conceptual systems are equally valid, but reality can only be approximated to the extent that the number of conceptual systems which are used to think about a problem approaches infinity as a limit. >For example, >even with an accurate understanding of how the mind works, a >simulation of it may still have restrictions or limitations that >the real mind doesn't have (i e don't equate a model with reality). The point has been made elsewhere that a computer simulation of a hydrogen atom, no matter how detailed and/or accurate, can always be easily distinguished from the real thing: just try replacing all the hydrogen atoms in your body with computer simulations to see why this is so. We might call this an imperfect simulation. Imperfectly simulated objects exist in a simulated environment, react to simulated events and interact with other simulated objects. Reality and imperfect simulation do not mix--the real object and its imperfectly simulated twin are not freely interchangeable. However, not ALL simulations have this problem. For instance, computer simulations of other computers can work so well that the only way to tell the difference is to cheat by opening up the box and checking the internal circuits. We might call this a perfect simulation. After some thought about the differences between perfect and imperfect simulations, I have reached the following conclusion: only information and symbolic functions/processes can be perfectly simulated. Perfect simulation is symbolic simulation. Imperfect simulation is non-symbolic simulation. The implications with regard to immortality, identity, artificial intelligence and nanotechnology are obvious. ____"Congress shall have the power to prohibit speech offensive to Congress"____ Alan Lovejoy; alan@pdn; 813-530-2211; AT&T Paradyne: 8550 Ulmerton, Largo, FL. Disclaimer: I do not speak for AT&T Paradyne. They do not speak for me. Mottos: << Many are cold, but few are frozen. >> << Frigido, ergo sum. >>
peb@tma1.eng.sun.com (Paul Baclaski) (03/23/90)
In article <Mar.20.23.11.25.1990.12533@athos.rutgers.edu>, AMSA@cucisa.bitnet writes: > ...Therefore, the real obstacle is to change one innate > feature of every single living system's blueprint WITHOUT radically > changing the living system > [This is true of human (and other higher vertebrates) but not of lower > forms, at least not necessarily. It certainly isn't true of "all > living systems". There are theories to the effect that human cells > have a replication limit as a cancer defense, etc. > If E. Coli had a replication limit, the whole species wouldn't last > more than a few days... > --JoSH] Over-population would be a serious problem in a world where it was possible to repair cells and avoid the built-in lifetime. As intelligent organisms, a cultural mechanism could be used to prevent overpopulation. However, this is a political and economic problem, not a technical one. Paul E. Baclaski Sun Microsystems peb@sun.com [I beg to differ. Overpopulation is a function of the exponential nature of reproduction, and the mortality or immortality of the ancestors makes little difference. In a binary tree for example, all the ancestor nodes of a given level are fewer than the difference between that level and the next. Thus one would assume that immortality would correspond to pushing the calendar forward some fixed, constant period (given exponential population growth). Overpopulation WILL be a serious problem if the technology does not keep pulling rabbits out of a hat for us. But practical immortality will make little impact: it's the exponential nature of reproduction that does the damage. --JoSH]
tcourtoi@jarthur.claremont.edu (Todd Courtois) (03/23/90)
SXJ101@psuvm.psu.edu writes: >and decay. But I came across another book which advanced the idea that in >the future we would be able to store our brains onto computers (tapes). >By doing so, we would be able to make an exact duplicate of our brains and >we could make several copies of the tapes as to never lose them. Because >the information in our brains makes us what we are, it didnt matter if our >bodies decayed and died. We could have artificial bodies (limbs, e.g.) and >"download" our brain. This way we would never die > What do you think about this idea? The information downloaded onto the >tapes from our brains would only be the data. How would we actually run the >data and simulate our brains artificially? Currently, program and data are >separate parts of the software. The data would be the information in the >brain, but what about the program? Unless we write a program that simulates th >e brain's processor (i.e. mind), there doesnt appear to be other ways of >simulating the brain... I think the idea is naive. I have no doubt that, given lots of time and money scietists would (and probably will) discover exactly how the brain functions, and how to create a computer which does basically the same thing. However, aren't you missing a basic point here? SO WHAT if you create a computer that thinks just like you-- that doesn't make *you* immortal. It makes the goddamn computer immortal, but you'll die like any disillusioned genius. Do you believe that our "soul," which I suppose is deposited in our brains, would be transferred to the computer? I guess the point I'm trying to make is that the brain-like machine you create doesn't make your soul immortal. Sure, hundreds of years from now people might be able to chat with your computer embodiment, but will *you* as a person, a soul, experience it? No, I don't think so...that's a lot like saying that your photograph makes you immortal. Then again, some indian cultures DO believe that a photograph captures your soul, and they refuse to be photographed. In a sense, since your brain is captured on computer, your spirit and knowledge and whatever would "live on" into the future; but alas, you wouldn't be involved. Think of it this way: if you cloned yourself, or if you have an identical twin, then that is a whole other person whose life is completely seperate from yours. You don't experience everything your twin experiences, and even if your twin were immortal, what good does that do you? No, if we could figure out a way to slowly integrate our brains into circuitry until eventually our entire brain was constructed of indestructible parts, then that might work. But again, do you think your *soul* would transfer? What do other netters think? --Todd Courtois .sig ':^] [In fact, Hans Moravec describes exactly such a procedure ( to move your consciousness over into a robot, without breaking the stream of consciousness, and thus making sure there is a single, unbroken identity through the transformation). The larger answer to the question is that in our current technology, we are each the "keeper of the flame" of our own identities, ie, we're like people before they knew how to start a fire, and if they let it go out they were sunk. Nowadays nobody cares if you let a fire go out, it's easy to start a new one. I imagine that we'll be a lot more blase' about dying when we realize that our "selves" in some very substantial sense will keep going. --JoSH]
tcourtoi@jarthur.claremont.edu (Todd Courtois) (03/23/90)
hmmmmmmmmmm Perhaps we should do a bit of cross-posting on this topic with sci.virtual.worlds..... It seems to me that what a few people have suggested is that we *become part of* a virtual reality. That is, once you have made the real world representable inside a computer, why not stick the person inside the computer to experience the world. I think the thread about "tapes" and "experiences" having to do with the limitations of memory are pretty much irrelevant. In making the leap from a biological mind and soul to an electronic/nanotech brain, I assume that we will develop whole new concepts for memory; just look at stuff like multitasking and windowing for examples. It isn't so much what you remember, but what you want to access *right now*. It seems obvious that physical representations for ourselves using robotics, etc. will be feasible. However, I am still wondering about the fundemental concept of *moving* your mind into a computer, and by this I mean to exclude the idea of *copying* your mind into a machine. Even if you could simulate the brain on a neuron-by-neuron basis, can you move your consciousness and your soul also? I'd like some feedback on this....... This is a very intriguing thread. Thanks for introducing it!!!! --Todd Courtois .sig not included [Remember the Utility Fog? In a Utility Fog world, there would be a fairly seamless spectrum between existing in the real world, and being a simulation. This makes for an interesting environment... --JoSH]