[sci.nanotech] Problems of identity

steveha@microsoft.UUCP (Steve Hastings) (01/08/91)

In article <Dec.31.18.41.39.1990.26052@athos.rutgers.edu> webber@csd.uwo.ca (Robert E. Webber) writes:
>reminds me of a tale of a
>ship being replaced plank by plank; the question being when it was a
>new ship.  If I take someone's brain and replace it cell by cell with
>the brain of squirrel, at what point would you say I have destroyed
>the person's brain?

This reminds me of an outstanding short story called "The Axe", which was
published years ago in a science fiction magazine.  I think it was
_Galaxy_, but I may be wrong.  I know it was written by a woman author,
since the cover said "Special issue with all women authors!" or some such.
(If anyone can tell me the name of the author, or find me a copy of the
issue, I would be grateful; I have wanted this story for my collection for
years.)

The protagonist was a biological researcher who ran a lab with his brother.
They had developed a tailored bacterium that would go all through your
body, forcing each cell to renew itself, fixing many disorders in the
process, and then dying once its work was done.  (I imagine if the story
were written today, "nanomachine" would replace the word "bacterium.")
The new bacterium posed a grave threat to the dominant bio labs, owned by a
corrupt guy (named, I believe, "Genghis Graham").  The dominant labs made
all their money by growing clones for spare parts.  Who needs spare parts
when you can regenerate without surgery?

The corrupt guy had murdered the brother of the protagonist, destroyed all
the cultures of the bacterium, and ruined the notes on how it had been
created.  In court, his lawyer argued that he had not committed murder; all
he had done was vandalism, and he was prepared to pay for it.  And here is
where it relates to the previous posting.

Take an axe, said the lawyer.  Replace the handle.  Is it the same axe?
Most would say "yes."  Replace the head instead.  Same axe?  Yes.  Now,
replace both handle and head at the same time.  Not the same axe anymore!

He contended that what his client had killed was not the brother, since it
had undergone the regeneration treatment.  All of its cells had been
replaced at once, and it was not the same person under the law.  Further,
under the laws in force in the story, it must be a clone and therefore
property (clones can't be people if you cut them up for spare parts).

Some day, nanomachines will make it possible to do something like this.
They will even make it possible to have multiple copies of a person at the
same time.  The law will clearly have to deal with the problem of identity
differently than it does now.  I can picture people having their
fingerprints altered to little pictures of rock stars, and changing their
appearance several times a month.  How will criminals be positively
identified then?  If you duplicate yourself, and your duplicate commits
a crime, which of you do the police prosecute?  If you download yourself
into a computer, and the copy of you gets erased, was that murder?  How
about if you download yourself, and then years later the copy, which has by
now developed a unique personality and changed its name, gets erased?

Nanomachines will surely make possible true thinking machines, if only by
building "neural network" type hardware millions of times more complex than
the machines being built today.  Will these thinking machines get
protection under the law?

I read a short story, by John Varley I believe, about a young woman after
she was murdered.  In her society, they were able to record brain patterns,
clone you from a tissue sample on file, and restore you from backup when
you died.  (If you knew who killed you you could sue for "alienation of
personality" since the restoral process took months, and things wouldn't be
quite as they were when you died.)  If death is curable, what is the
appropriate penalty for murder?
-- 
Steve "I don't speak for Microsoft" Hastings    ===^=== :::::
uunet!microsoft!steveha  steveha@microsoft.uucp    ` \\==|