cooley@protocol.fps.com (01/22/91)
I think that something has been ignored in all of this talk about uploading. You can copy the organization of the hardware (the brain), and you can copy the contents of the memory (I think), but I have heard no discussion of how to copy the momentary internal state (which neurons are firing). When you "turn on" this machine, the initial state will not even approximate that of the brain from which it was copied. Is there any reason to believe that it will ever settle into a stable self-consistent state, much less achieve conciousness, or integrity of thought process? The only idea that I have heard so far that seems to hold promise is the incremental upgrade approach. This is not a coying strategy however. On the other hand, I suppose it would be possible to "boot up" the copy incrementally, matching the dynamic states at ever-expanding structural boundaries based upon information supplied by nano-spys circulating in the original brain. It may be possible to define an algorithm to converge upon the momentary dynamic state of the original. I suspect that this would require hardware more complicated than a simple copy. This in itself may have advantages. But can we truly make an "exact" copy? Another "self"? [It may be that we need to know more than we had originally assumed about the way the brain actually works to build a good working copy. However, I would guess that booting a new brain without copying the ephemeral state would be no worse than awakening from a concussion (without the physical damage). --JoSH]
dll@teda.teradyne.com (Dan Liddell) (02/03/91)
In article <Jan.21.13.43.14.1991.9874@athos.rutgers.edu> cooley@protocol.fps.com writes: > >I think that something has been ignored in all of this talk >about uploading. You can copy the organization of the hardware >(the brain), and you can copy the contents of the memory (I >think), but I have heard no discussion of how to copy the >momentary internal state (which neurons are firing). > >When you "turn on" this machine, the initial state will not >even approximate that of the brain from which it was copied. >Is there any reason to believe that it will ever settle into >a stable self-consistent state, much less achieve conciousness, >or integrity of thought process? > There is evidence to support the claim that the brain will organize itself after disruption (or after uploading). Electroshock therapy, which disrupts, on a massive scale, the electrical activity in the brain, is followed by convulsions, and then unconsciousness. When you wake up, you are pretty close to the same person. If the target hardware did not "reorganize" on master initialization (or after disruption), then I think there would be other problems with it, relating to interaction of parallel process, that would make it unsuitable for uploading. I think the convulsions mark a very early stage in the process of reintegrating the parallel processes that are the total person. I guess that the autonomic systems would reorganize very quickly indeed. I wonder what the morbidity rate is for electroconvulsive therapy. Pretty low, I would expect. I think the end of convulsions marks the reintegration of the motor systems. End of unconsciousness marks the end of reintegration of the "higher" functions. -- Dan Liddell UUCP decwrl!teda!dll TELEPHONE 4089805200 USA curb your dogma. The opinions and views expressed are Dan's.
dennis@cpac.washington.edu (Dennis Gentry) (02/10/91)
In article <Jan.21.13.43.14.1991.9874@athos.rutgers.edu> cooley@protocol.fps.com writes: >When you "turn on" this machine, the initial state will not >even approximate that of the brain from which it was copied. >Is there any reason to believe that it will ever settle into >a stable self-consistent state, much less achieve conciousness, >or integrity of thought process? Yes. Besides the electroshock example (which I suspect messes with neuron connections, besides disrupting the instantaneous state), there is another one. When you "turn off" a brain with high doses of barbiturates, you can in some cases achive a flat EEG ("brain death"), but when the drugs wear off, the patient comes back. (Or is it a new, uploaded patient? How can we be sure? :-) Dennis P.S. Sorry if someone mentioned this already--I missed a few articles.