[comp.protocols.kerberos] Questions about vulnerability of ticket cache file

hinman@schizo.samsung.com (David Hinman) (06/04/90)

Hello,

It seems to me that if my workstation allows more than one login, someone
with the root password can read my ticket cache file and hence impersonate
me.

1) Is this a problem in practice, or have I misunderstood something?

2) If it is a problem, will the next release of Kerberos be providing some
   facility to deal with it?

3) It seems like one solution would be a new device driver, providing 
   ticket cache files that are readable only by the owner and not by root. 
   Is this a reasonable approach?

Thanks,

Dave Hinman                         
Samsung Software America           (508) 685-7200 ext. 124
One Corporate Drive                hinman@samsung.com
Andover, MA 01810                  uunet!schizo.samsung.com!hinman

smb@ulysses.att.com (06/05/90)

	 Hello,

	 It seems to me that if my workstation allows more than one
	 login, someone with the root password can read my ticket cache
	 file and hence impersonate me.

	 1) Is this a problem in practice, or have I misunderstood
	 something?

Yes, it's a problem *if* someone is able to log in remotely.  That
is usually not the case at Project Athena.

	 2) If it is a problem, will the next release of Kerberos be
	 providing some facility to deal with it?

There is no defense against root on standard UNIX systems.

	 3) It seems like one solution would be a new device driver,
	 providing ticket cache files that are readable only by the
	 owner and not by root.  Is this a reasonable approach?

No, because root could just read /dev/kmem.  It's a bit harder, but
by no means difficult.  Using a device bound to a login session -- to
/dev/tty, for example -- eliminates the problem of tickets not being
destroyed at logout time, but does nothing to protect against root.