wbralick%dragonlady@afit-ab.arpa (William A. Bralick) (01/21/89)
> From: nak@cbnews.ATT.COM (Neil A. Kirby) > > Let's look at the role of sea power first. The reasons to have sea forces > are 1) protect merchant ships. 2) attack enemy shipping. 3) attack enemy > shore. 4) Protect our shore from other sea powers. 5) Other reasons that > don't occur to me but will to the rest of the net :-). Which brings up a point. What is the status of our merchant marine? I seem to recall (hazily) comments to the effect that our sealift capability is a far cry from what it would have to be to support a protracted conflict. Comments? Regards, Will Bralick : wbralick@afit-ab.arpa | If we desire to defeat the enemy, Air Force Institute of Technology, | we must proportion our efforts to | his powers of resistance. with disclaimer; use disclaimer; | - Carl von Clauswitz
military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) (01/21/89)
wbralick%dragonlady@afit-ab.arpa (William A. Bralick) writes: >Which brings up a point. What is the status of our merchant marine? >I seem to recall (hazily) comments to the effect that our sealift >capability is a far cry from what it would have to be to support a >protracted conflict. Comments? From U.S. Naval Institute _Procedings_, December, 1988 (V114/12/1030): "Soviet Subs vs. the Resupply of NATO" by Lieutenant Commander Michael J. Gouge, U.S. Naval Reserve Table 1. Capabilities of Submarines, Surface Ships, and Merchant Ships Submarines WWII Now Speed Differential (relative to convoys) -5 to +1 kts +5 to +15 kts (surfaced) (SSN submerged) Submerged Endurance 12-24 hrs unlimited Passive Sonar poor good Operating Depth 200-500 ft much better Detection Probability poor poor Torpedo Performance fair-poor good-fair Number Available 50-150 (German) 225 (Soviet) Surface Ships Tactical Speed 25-32 kts 25-32 kts Sensor Performance poor fair Weapons Performance fair fair Number Available hundreds 40-75 (+heli's) Merchant Ships Speed (avg) 10-15 kts 12-17 kts Maneuverability fair-poor fair-poor Survivability poor poor Tonnage per Ship 4200-5200 GRT 19000 deadweight tons The author estimates about 600 merchant ships available to NATO during the first few weeks. He further presents a model which estimates approximately 50% losses to these ships in the first 10 days, along with 12 escorts sunk, against the loss of 52 of 70 Soviet subs (estimating that 20% of the Soviet sub fleet would be detailed for convoy attacks). USNI _Proceedings_ discusses mercantile strategy quite frequently; this article is but the most recent. I have only skimmed it, myself, and so can't really comment on the suitability of the model; nonetheless, it does paint a grim picture. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bill Thacker moderator, sci.military military@att.att.com "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." - Sun Tzu
dmocsny@uceng.uc.edu (daniel mocsny) (01/23/89)
In article <3336@cbnews.ATT.COM>, military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) writes:
[ an alarming assessment of our merchant marine's prospects for finding
a comfortable resting place on the Atlantic ocean floor in the event
of Soviet interdiction ]
Can any readers comment on the feasibility of building submersible
merchant ships? Obviously these would be uneconomic in peacetime, but
even a few tens of meters' submergence should protect greatly against
detection. And compared to the costs of losing our merchant fleet
in a conflict, the idea may have some merit.
This group has also discussed the submarine threat to aircraft carriers.
Is a submersible aircraft carrier an idea simply too absurd to consider?
I would imagine the necessary pressure-vessel/ballast tanks would reduce
the payload by at least a factor of two compared to a surface ship of
similar displacement, while increasing the cost by a factor of anywhere
from two to ten. Assuming negligible snorkel drag, cruising speed might
increase due to wake elimination, if the vessel were optimized for
submerged (rather than surfaced) running. A submersible carrier might
be more practical if it carried either fixed- or rotary-wing VTOL
craft, since that would reduce the size requirement.
A light submersible carrier could probably not replace the really big
flattops, but it be good for sneaking in a bunch of choppers and
Harriers, especially against smaller belligerents that lack ASW
capability. One minute, you're looking at peaceful, blue ocean.
The next minute you've got this breaching craft disgorging a cloud
of aircraft and then dropping out of sight.
Dan Mocsny
dmocsny@uceng.uc.eduugthomps@cs.buffalo.edu (01/24/89)
In article <3335@cbnews.ATT.COM> wbralick%dragonlady@afit-ab.arpa (William A. Bralick) writes: >Which brings up a point. What is the status of our merchant marine? >I seem to recall (hazily) comments to the effect that our sealift >capability is a far cry from what it would have to be to support a >protracted conflict. Comments? The US Merchant fleet number ~5000 ships at the end of WWII. That number has since dwindled to ~500 due to foreign competition and a lack of the US realization of the necessity for a merchant fleet that is US registered. The entire fleet now in existence would have to suffer very few losses in order to continue to support a war in europe. However, history was shown that in WWII the greatest tonnage of ships sunk were merchant marine. The outlook of US support of a war in europe is dismal. - G
schanck@tut.cis.ohio-state.edu (Christopher Schanck) (01/25/89)
In article <3418@cbnews.ATT.COM> ugthomps@cs.buffalo.edu writes: >The US Merchant fleet number ~5000 ships at the end of WWII. That >number has since dwindled to ~500 due to foreign competition and a lack >of the US realization of the necessity for a merchant fleet that is >US registered. > >The entire fleet now in existence would have to suffer very few losses >in order to continue to support a war in europe. However, history was >shown that in WWII the greatest tonnage of ships sunk were merchant marine. > >The outlook of US support of a war in europe is dismal. Wouldn't you also have to take take into account the larger number/ capabilities of aircraft in this day and age? I'm nothing of an expert, but it seems to me there are morer and better aircraft for this purpose, even if they were bastardized commercial machines. Sure, it isn't as effective as sea transport, but wouldn't it be a factor? -=- "My brain is NOT a deadlock-free environment!!!!" --- Christopher Schanck, mammal at large. schanck@flounder.cis.ohio-state.edu
ricko@rosevax.Rosemount.COM (Rick O'Brien) (01/25/89)
In article <3418@cbnews.ATT.COM>, ugthomps@cs.buffalo.edu writes: > In article <3335@cbnews.ATT.COM> wbralick%dragonlady@afit-ab.arpa (William A. Bralick) writes: > >Which brings up a point. What is the status of our merchant marine? > >I seem to recall (hazily) comments to the effect that our sealift > >capability is a far cry from what it would have to be to support a > >protracted conflict. Comments? > The US Merchant fleet number ~5000 ships at the end of WWII. That > number has since dwindled to ~500 due to foreign competition and a lack > of the US realization of the necessity for a merchant fleet that is > US registered. 'Insight' magazine had an article on the state of the merchant marine today. I don't remember which issue but it was in the last six months or so. One point mentioned in the article which no one has brought up is that most cargo ships today are of the 'ro-ro' (sp?) type. The cargo is in containers which attach to semi-trailers and are handled on the ship :y automated systems. This makes such a ship pretty close to useless, according to the article, for such things as military equipment and troops. I don't recall if any figures were given for how many available ships were of this type but if this article is accurate 500 ships might be too optimistic. [mod. note: As I'm sure many of you are aware, "ro-ro" is short for "roll-on, roll-off", the manner in which these ships are loaded and unloaded. - Bill ]