wanttaja@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Ronald J Wanttaja) (04/03/89)
From: ssc-vax!wanttaja@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Ronald J Wanttaja) > From: rutgers!ee.ecn.purdue.edu!rowland (Andy Rowland) > >detected the Yamato task force, Spruance saw this as the final chance for a > >"pure" naval battle, and deployed his battleships to intercept. The air > >commander got wind of this, and assembled a full air strike. Without > >orders, he launched a strike towards Yamato. He then signaled Spruance: > > >"Full airstrike now on route to Yamato. Will you take them, or should I?" > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^(shall)^^^ > I believe that Mitscher asked Spruance before he launched the strike--I don't > think he acted without Spruance's permission, if I remember right. > Now ya done it... you made me dig up my source. From "A Glorious Way to Die," by Russell Spurr: No one could accuse Raymond Spruance of being a romantic. But when the submarine report finally arrived comfirming Yamato's sortie, he made an oddly illogical decison. He ordered Task Force 54, a collection of superannuated battleships, to deal with the Japanese attack force. [...] The order went out well after midnight. At about the same time, Spruance told Mitscher and his aviators to forget Yamato. [Mitscher's carrier task force] should concentrate its "offensive effort... in combat air patrols to meet enemy air attacks." Spruance did not know it, but carriers of the task force were already speeding north to attack positions. (Page 206) ... When the last of his eagles were airborne [approx 1045] Mitscher gave the obligatory order to Arleigh Burke: "Inform Admiral Spruance that I propose to attack the Yamato strike force at 1200 unless otherwise directed. Ask him, 'Will you take them or shall I?'" (Page 220) Sorry to quote so much of that, but the text is quite clear... Mitscher disobeyed the intent, if not the direct orders, of Spruance, in leaving position to move into strike range. The next day, he launched the strike, then placed Spruance in the untenable position of having to call back an enroute air strike if he wanted to let the BBs have their last fling. The air strike was thrown together hurriedly, and it showed. They didn't have an updated position report at the time the strike was launched. Some groups got lost in the bad weather and never did find the sstrike force. The attacks were rather haphazard, and occurred over a period of about ninety minutes. Academically, one wonders how the US Battlewagons would have done against Yamato's task force. Task Force 54 consisted of Idaho, New Mexico, Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland, and Colorado, with six cruisers and 21 destroyers. I don't have a Jane's handy, but the US BBs are refered to as "elderly." Now, the Yamato strike force consisted of only Yamato, one light cruiser, and eight tin cans. No question that TF 54 would have won... but at what cost? Yamato was probably twice as large as the elderly US battleships. Yamato's 17 inch guns far outranged the US artillery. A naval maxim states that a fleet of ships is only a little stronger than its largest ship... but surely odds of 6:1 in battleships and cruisers, and 3:1 in tin cans must speak for something. Any wargamers out there ever set this one up? One would think the Yamato would have accounted for a couple American destroyers, at least. Instead, the Yamato was hit by Hellcats, Wildcats, Avengers, and Helldivers from Task Force 58... 15 carriers of various sizes. About 200 to 300 aircraft, all told. They sank the Yamato, the cruiser Yahagi, and half of the destroyers. Over 4200 Japanese sailors died; more than 3000 of them on the Yamato alone. Task Force 58 lost 10 planes and 12 men. Ron Wanttaja (ex USAF!) (ssc-vax!wanttaja)
military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) (04/05/89)
From: military@att.att.com (Bill Thacker) In article <5333@cbnews.ATT.COM> ssc-vax!wanttaja@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Ronald J Wanttaja) writes: > > >Academically, one wonders how the US Battlewagons would have done against >Yamato's task force. Task Force 54 consisted of Idaho, New Mexico, >Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland, and Colorado, with six cruisers and 21 >destroyers. I don't have a Jane's handy, but the US BBs are refered to as >"elderly." Rather. All of them were laid down before the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921. Some pertinent date (from Breyer, _Battleships and Battlecruiser_, op.cit.) Idaho New Mexico 32000 tons, 12x14"/50 in 4 triple turrets, 21 kts, 14" belt, 6" + 1.5" deck Tennessee 32300 tons, 12x14"/50 in 4 triple turrets, 21 kts, 14" belt, 5" + 1.5" deck Colorado West Virginia Maryland 32600 tons, 8x16"/45 in 4 double turrets, 21 kts, 16" belt, 4" + 2" deck Yamato 65000 tons, 9x18.1"/45 in 3 triple turrets, 27 kts, 16" belt (sloped 20 degrees from vertical) belt, 8" deck. >Yamato was probably twice as large as the elderly >US battleships. Yamato's 17 inch guns far outranged the US artillery. A >naval maxim states that a fleet of ships is only a little stronger than its >largest ship... but surely odds of 6:1 in battleships and cruisers, and 3:1 >in tin cans must speak for something. Any wargamers out there ever set >this one up? One would think the Yamato would have accounted for a couple >American destroyers, at least. It's very hard to say. Certainly, Yamato's escorts (CL Yahagi and 8 destroyers) would not have lasted long. Yamato herself was a tough nut to crack, however; her main belt was some 410mm thick, sloped at 20 degrees from vertical; her armored deck was 200mm thick. I would estimate that her deck was vulnerable to US 16" fire (16"/45's) beyond 30000 meters, and her sides were vulnerable within 10000m. Turned around, the Maryland's 16" belt (with no slope) would be vulnerable under 20,000m, and her deck at under 30000m. The 14" belts of the older ships would be vulnerable out to some 30000m. Another important consideration was brought up some years ago in "Warship International", in an article considering a hypothetical gun duel between Yamato and Iowa. (Unfortunately, I'm unable to find the correct issue for reference). The author pointed out that US intelligence of the time estimated that Yamato carried 16"/45's, and was armored similarly to our North Carolina class (inferior to the Marylands, BTW). With this information in hand, the captain of the Iowa could choose the "perfect" distance from which to fight; the zone in which he would be mostly immune to Yamato's fire, while she would be vulnerable to Iowa's. This range could be reached and maintained thanks to Iowa's superior speed (32 knots, 27 for Yamato). Unfortunately, given the facts about Yamato's actual gunnery and protection, that range would, in fact, leave Iowa vulnerable to belt penetrations by Yamato, while Yamato was "immune" to Iowa's gunfire. This could well have told in our hypothetical case. Estimating the Yamato's guns as 16"/45's, one would want to move closer; this gun has better deck penetration and inferior belt penetration to the 18.1". The result would be to make oneself increasingly vulnerable to Yamato's fire. Too, the Yamato had superior speed, and full knowledge of her opponents capabilities. It is not unreasonable to suspect that Yamato's captain would attempt to maintain a range of about 20000 meters, squarely in his immune zone, while delivering crippling penetrations to the US ships. However, I feel that the total weight of fire from the US BB's would tell, and probably do so quite quickly. 24 14" guns and 24 16" guns, all radar-directed, would quickly score hits. Judging by the combat between Bismarck and Rodney/King George V, even rather superficial hits could have crippling effect. For example, in that action Bismarck, the first few hits included a 16" shell which burst on the upper deck between the two fore turrets, putting both out of action; an 8" hit which wrecked the forward director, and a 14 or 16" shell which destroyed the forward fire-control station. Survivors reported that no penetrations of the Bismarck's main belt occurred; yet the ship was wrecked beyond any capacity to fight. I believe that this same fate would have been Yamato's; further, barring some measure of luck, none of the US battleships would have been sunk, or even seriously damaged. The death toll of American sailors would, quite probably, have exceeded that of the pilots of the aircraft which actually did sink Yamato. Torpedoes would no doubt have been needed to sink Yamato, but I would guess that she would be rendered incapable of combat before said torpedoes would be launched. Just my opinion; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Bill Thacker moderator, sci.military military@att.att.com (614) 860-5294 "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." - Sun Tzu