willner%cfa183@harvard.harvard.edu (Steve Willner P-316 x57123) (04/17/89)
From: willner%cfa183@harvard.harvard.edu (Steve Willner P-316 x57123) In response to various historical discussions in this group, I finally looked up some of the facts. My source was _The Two Ocean War_ by S. E. Morison (1963, Little, Brown, and Co.). (Serious students will want to read Morison's 15-volume official history, but TTOW should be read first for its better strategic overview.) Here are some of the relevant items. ---------- Pearl Harbor Command: On 1 Feb. 1941, Adm. Husband E. Kimmel took command of the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. At the same time, US ships were reorganized into just three fleets: Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic. The latter was based in Manila and under the command of Adm. Thomas C. Hart. It was a very small fleet, however, and had no ship larger than a cruiser. On 31 Dec. 1941, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz took command of the Pacific Fleet. ---------- Location of US Carriers during Pearl Harbor attack: Enterprise (Halsey commanding) was delivering aircraft to Wake Island, having departed Pearl Harbor on November 28. Lexington (R.Adm. Newton commanding) was delivering aircraft to Midway, having departed Pearl on Dec. 5. Saratoga was undergoing upkeep on the West Coast. Morison does not mention scouting for the Japanese fleet (so I was wrong about that), though routine scouting missions must have been flown. Halsey, at least, was prepared to attack Japanese ships or aircraft under at least some (unclear) circumstances. ---------- Scouting from Pearl Harbor: Scout missions by Catalinas were flown on Dec. 2, 3, 4, and 5, but they were training missions rather than serious attempts to find the Japanese fleet. (Note that these days are Tuesday through Friday.) Nobody in Pearl had any indication that the Japanese fleet was in the vicinity. ---------- Command at Battle of Midway: The senior commander, Carrier Striking Force, was R.Adm. Frank J. Fletcher in Yorktown. Junior to him and commanding TF 16 (Enterprise and Hornet) was Raymond A. Spruance. Captains Murray and Mitscher commanded Enterprise and Yorktown, respectively. Halsey would have had Spruance's post had he (Halsey) not been medically incapacitated. Although Fletcher was senior, "chance" (Morison's word) put Spruance in command of two of the three carriers at the crucial time. (As I understand it, "chance" mainly refers to the timing of scout plane launches.) In particular, it was Spruance, not Fletcher, who set the time of the US air attacks and who later ordered the carriers to retire to the east from dusk to midnight on the night of June 4 instead of pursuing the devastated Japanese fleet to the west. This perceptive order avoided a night gunfire battle in which the undamaged Japanese battleships would have had a huge advantage. Morison's assessment is "Fletcher did well, but Spruance's performance was superb. [Spruance] emerged from this battle one of the greatest admirals in American naval history." ---------- Sinking of Yamato: [Someone asserted that Spruance attempted to set up a surface fleet action rather than attack Yamato with aircraft. Further, the attempt failed only because Mitscher ordered an air attack in defiance of Spruance's orders.] There may be a question of how events are to be interpreted. Morison says "As soon as he heard [Yamato sighted], Spruance signaled to Mitscher 'You take them.'" There is no mention of prior orders against attacking or that Spruance tried to prevent an air attack. The track chart certainly makes it clear that any surface action would have taken place long after air attacks. Furthermore, the battleship squadron commander is quoted as expressing reluctance to engage Yamato because of her superior gun range. In any case, it is clear that the actions actually taken were eminently correct. Aircraft attacked Yamato immediately (and succeeded in sinking her), while the battleship squadron was deployed to protect the invasion fleet in case the aircraft attack had failed. Spruance's priorities cannot be faulted; even losing all six battleships would not have affected the outcome of the war, whereas giving Yamato even a couple of hours unmolested amongst the invasion transports would have lengthened the war by many months. The crucial question seems to be whether Spruance ever intended or attempted to prevent an air attack on Yamato. I personally would require considerable evidence before believing that. Deploying the battleships to protect the invasion fleet is certainly not evidence, since that maneuver was necessary to protect against a possible failure of the air attack. ---------- This got a little long, but I hope it will interest some. Corrections and amplifications are welcome (moderator willing).